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Preface   1 
PREFACE 
 
In November 2002, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the EU 
established a (temporary) Working Group on Enlargement, which I had 
the honour to chair. The mandate of the group was to discuss and evalu-
ate, in the light of the Lisbon agenda, the consequences of enlargement 
on structural economic policies in East and West, and in particular on 
the Community's economic policy co-ordination processes. As envis-
aged, the group reported back to the parent EPC at the end of April 
2003. The report is intended to guide ECOFIN Ministers in their discus-
sions on the structural policy issues resulting from accession. 
 
To back up the report, the members of the Working Group prepared 
"kick-off papers" on several topics covered by the final report. As much 
effort has been put into these papers, they are made available in this 
volume to a broader public readership. 
 
Moreover, the Austrian Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour, in 
co-operation with the EPC Secretariat organised a round-table discus-
sion in Vienna on "Structural Reforms in the CCs and the EU". One of 
the aims was to present the preliminary findings of the Working Group 
and to receive opinions from the Candidate Countries (CCs). The meet-
ing was designed to have an active participation of some 50 experts and 
officials from East and West and no passive audience. Introductory 
speeches were given by renowned professors with affiliations to policy-
related institutions. Their papers are also included in this volume.  
 
Finally, the EPC report on "Key structural challenges in the acceding 
countries: the integration of the acceding countries into the community's 
economic policy co-ordination processes" is reprinted in the current 
publication. 
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The Candidate Countries (CCs), inspired by the Copenhagen economic 
criteria and the Lisbon goals, have already achieved solid progress in 
structural and institutional reforms. However, progress has not been 
consistently strong across all countries and areas. Given the aspirations 
of the Lisbon agenda, most countries in either region face adjustment 
needs in the labour market and unresolved problems in terms of the 
sustainability of public finances, in particular the pension and health-
care systems. In most countries, there is scope to further improve the 
functioning of product markets and to accelerate the transition to the 
knowledge-based economy. The range of problems is enormous and the 
spectrum of instruments is broad - but this is true for both, the CCs and 
the current EU Member States. The continuation and acceleration of the 
structural reform process - interacting with growth and stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policies and exchange rate strategies - is essential for 
the successful integration of all CCs into the EU economy. The benefits 
of economic integration into the enlarged EU market can be fully deliv-
ered only if in the acceding countries implementation of consistent and 
comprehensive policies of structural reform continue in a broad range of 
policy areas. It is crucial to maintain the current reform momentum, also 
in case of temporary lower growth performance, to avoid any risk of 
jeopardizing the overall target of structural reform. 
 
This publication would not have been possible without input by the 
members of the Working Group on Enlargement and the background 
work by Heinz Scherrer from the EPC Secretariat and Christina Burger 
from the Ministry. I cordially thank all persons involved for their con-
tributions. 
 
Heinz Handler 
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KEY MESSAGES ON THE LISBON STRATEGY 
AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE ACCEDING 
STATES INTO THE COMMUNITY’S ECONOMIC 
POLICY CO-ORDINATION PROCESSES  
HEINZ HANDLER AND HEINZ SCHERRER 
 
The Ecofin ministers in November 2002 underlined their commitment 
towards continuing, with the support of the EPC and the Commission, 
the surveillance of progress with economic and structural policies in the 
acceding countries. The aim of the work of the EPC’s Working Group 
on Enlargement is to support the efforts of the acceding states to devise 
structural reform agendas to achieve rapid real convergence, in the light 
of the Lisbon goal for the EU "to become the most competitive and dy-
namic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohe-
sion". It should be a first step towards integrating the acceding states, 
after enlargement, into the multilateral surveillance by the Council un-
der the Treaty, in line with the mandate from the Ecofin ministers of 5 
November 2002. By providing advice and oversight for the Council it 
should help in concentrating the EU’s monitoring on priority areas 
where reform challenges are most evident. 
 
Joining the EU is but one step on the way to full economic integration 
into the EU. Most acceding countries in their Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes (PEPs) have outlined structural reform strategies conducive 
to their future integration into the Union’s economic policy co-
ordination processes and notably the Lisbon strategy. Embracing the 
policies needed to achieve the Lisbon objectives will enhance the catch-
ing-up process and help draw the full economic benefits from an 
enlarged EU. Lisbon means: raising employment rates, increasing pro-
ductivity and growth to enhance international competitiveness. The 
continuation and acceleration of the structural reform process - interact-
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ing with growth- and stability-oriented macroeconomic and exchange 
rate strategies as well as sound public finances - is essential for the suc-
cessful integration of the acceding states into the EU economy and rais-
ing their economy’s potential growth rate.  
 
Measured by per capita income in purchasing power standards, in most 
acceding countries catching-up over the past five years has been limited. 
Catching-up to income levels achieved in the EU will be a long-term 
process, but the challenge is to make the process irreversible through 
sustainable policies in the medium to long-term narrowing the produc-
tivity gap and the gap in employment rates vis-à-vis the EU Member 
States. Also the development of unit labour costs in some countries has 
been rather dynamic. As a matter of emphasis, for the acceding states to 
promote sustainable real convergence and to support the EU-25 in 
achieving the Lisbon goals the following issues are of particular impor-
tance in the current juncture: 
 
• Raise employment and increase incentives to work. Even greater 
efforts than in the EU-15 will be needed in the EU-25 in order to 
achieve the Lisbon employment goals. Whilst for the EU, the aver-
age employment rate has been rising, this is not the case for many 
acceding countries. In most acceding countries, unemployment has 
remained unacceptably high. A key challenge for the acceding states 
is therefore to reduce the high unemployment rate, especially long-
term unemployment, for certain groups especially the youth and the 
low skilled, and regional disparities, and increase employment rates 
for older workers. Measures key to "more and better jobs" include: 
? increasing the incentive effects of tax and benefit systems, in par-
ticular for low wage earners, 
? removing unemployment traps ("increase incentives to work"), 
? strengthening wage developments, maintaining the link between 
productivity growth and wages, 
? improving employment flexibility through a thorough review of 
employment protection legislation, 
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? focusing on precisely targeted, effective and efficient active la-
bour market policies. 
Such reforms will determine how fast the acceding countries con-
verge towards the EU’s Lisbon employment targets.  
 
• Strengthen competition and efficiency in goods and services 
markets. There are still several sectors in goods and services mar-
kets where competition in the acceding countries needs to be 
strengthened. Productivity growth in the acceding countries can be 
increased by a further shift in the sectoral composition of the econ-
omy to sectors with a higher value added Open markets and greater 
competition are a catalyst for innovation and help businesses grow. 
Across all sectors, for enterprise and entrepreneurship to thrive, 
measures to improve the business environment are key. The follo-
wing should be priorities for further action: 
? In some countries, more progress is needed to strengthen competi-
tion rules and establish independent competition authorities.  
? Despite good progress, significant deficiencies need to be ad-
dressed in most countries in regard of the regulatory burden on 
business, the effective implementation and in some countries the 
design of judicial reforms, and the quality and administrative ca-
pacity of the central and local authorities.  
? In a number of countries, incomplete market exit provisions 
should be addressed, in particular through the improvement of 
bankruptcy legislation and procedures.  
? After accession, particular attention will have to be devoted to 
comply to internal market obligations, notably with respect to 
quickly achieving the EU Directive transposition rate targets.  
? State aid should be overhauled and re-directed towards horizontal 
measures.  
Handler, Scherrer    7 
The implementation of competition policies should be a core subject 
of monitoring. Restructuring of the agricultural sector remains an 
urgent priority. In many acceding countries subsistence farming, 
where income does not derive from the sale of agricultural products, 
but from welfare payments which provide no incentives for change, 
might slow down the modernisation process.  
 
• Continue financial market reforms. Bank restructuring and privati-
sation have added to financial sector stability in the Candidate Coun-
tries. The following further reforms have been identified as being 
important for further action: 
? Continued reforms to deepen and widen the financial sector are 
required so as to avoid credit constraints and foster faster real 
convergence.  
? The rapid implementation of EU financial services regulation is 
crucial. 
? The availability of low cost loan and early stage risk capital fi-
nancing for SMEs should be a central priority. 
? Good progress has been made in putting into place adequate regu-
latory and supervisory capacities, but certain persisting weak-
nesses have to be addressed. 
 
• Improve the quality of public finance. The Ecofin ministers in 
their meeting with their counterparts from the Candidate Countries 
on 5 November 2003 noted that reaching sound fiscal positions for 
some of the acceding countries will clearly require efforts over and 
above those described in the PEPs. In addition, the acceding coun-
tries should enhance the efficiency of public spending and revenues 
by institutional and structural reforms. In order to foster a growth-
enhancing environment providing sufficient space and incentives for 
private sector development, there remains the need to re-assess the 
structure of budget revenue and expenditure.  
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Specifically: 
? On the revenue side, challenges should be addressed, such as the 
narrow tax base that characterises several acceding countries, and 
weaknesses in tax collection and administration. 
? On the expenditure side, specific attention should be devoted to 
investment in key areas (such as R&D, and human capital) to un-
derpin future competitiveness and growth, as well as addressing 
the need for norms for expenditure control at subnational level of 
government. 
? It is essential that the use of EU structural funds will be focused 
on those types of investments most conducive to long-term pro-
ductivity gains, particularly human and knowledge capital, as 
well as on basic infrastructure. 
 
• Continue pension and health care reforms. Ageing populations 
could induce dramatic changes in potential growth rates. In the light 
of the Lisbon agenda:  
? As a response to the expected increase in old-age dependency 
rates, policies to increase the workforce, notably amongst women 
and older workers, are key. 
? In line with the three-pronged strategy developed by the Ecofin 
Council to prepare for the budgetary effects of ageing (i.e. debt 
reduction, raising employment rates, and reform of pension sys-
tems), in view of the current parameters of their pension systems 
(for example pension expenditure as a share of GDP), many ac-
ceding countries will have to implement comprehensive reform 
strategies. Those will have to include initiatives aimed at offset-
ting the effects of ageing via productivity improvements, and re-
forms of the basic parameters of public pension systems (e.g. the 
retirement age, the replacement age, or the contribution rate), with 
a view to improving incentives to work and to strengthening the 
actuarial link between contributions and benefits.  
? Due to growing GDP as well as technical progress and product 
innovation, health-care expenditures are expected to grow fast. 
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Containing such expenditures, while providing effective cover-
age, will imply steps to raise the efficiency of the health-care sys-
tems.  
 
• Accelerate the transition to the knowledge-based economy. In 
light of the Lisbon strategy, some important challenges remain for 
the educational systems of many acceding countries. Low levels of 
investment in R&D and IT may hamper the catching-up of the acced-
ing countries with the EU mainstream and their increase in produc-
tivity levels. 
? The acceding countries should continue educational reforms, and 
improve their education and training systems in terms of educa-
tional attainment, skilled human resources as well as R&D and 
innovation performance.  
? More focus should be devoted to technology transfer and gradual 
product and process improvement. 
 
It is crucial for the acceding countries to maintain the current reform 
momentum, even in the event of lower growth performance. There 
should be a determined attempt in the acceding countries to mobilise 
public opinion to build or maintain political reform constituencies 
amongst the various stakeholders backing the drive to catch up.  
 
Economic policy co-ordination processes 
 
Within the EU, a number of economic policy co-ordination processes 
have been developed to foster economic reform and provide for appro-
priate peer pressure: 
• The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which are at the centre of 
economic policy co-ordination and which reflect and guide all other 
co-ordination activities at EU level. They are specific about mis-
alignments, structural imbalances and issues of competitiveness. The 
Council in December 2002 decided that in future the BEPGs should 
focus on the medium-term economic policy strategy, and should only 
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be reviewed every three years (set-up of the improved economic pol-
icy co-ordination cycle see Annex 2). In the intermediate years, the 
focus should be on implementation; 
• Other policy co-ordination processes which deal with specific eco-
nomic policy areas, such as employment (the Luxembourg proc-
ess), structural reforms and competitiveness (the Cardiff process), 
the macro-economic dialogue with the social partners (the Cologne 
process) and pension reforms (the open method of co-ordination 
on pensions); 
• The Lisbon strategy with the Commission’s annual synthesis report 
leading to the Spring European Council on economic reform. 
 
The existing policy co-ordination processes, notably the Cardiff process, 
the Luxembourg process, the Lisbon process and the BEPGs cover all 
economic aspects which are relevant for the present and future Member 
States. The acceding countries will have to be integrated into all the 
existing processes in the course of 2004/2005 as appropriate. 
 
Several working groups of the EPC will have to extend their work to 
cover the acceding countries (for example the EPC’s Ageing Working 
Group to include those countries into their next round of common pro-
jections for public spending on pensions, health and long-term care for 
the elderly in 2004/5, and the EPC’s Working Group on Output Gaps). 
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Annex 1: Key Lisbon targets and objectives 
 
The Lisbon strategy entails a variety of targets and objectives, agreed 
not only at the Lisbon Council itself (March 2000), but also at Stock-
holm (March 2001), Göteborg (June 2001) and Barcelona (March 
2002). Not all are quantified or time-specific, but those which are in-
clude: 
 
Employment: 
• an overall employment rate of 67 per cent in 2005 (Stockholm) and 
70 per cent in 2010 (Lisbon); 
• a female employment rate of 57 per cent in 2005 (Stockholm) and 
60 per cent in 2010 (Lisbon); 
• an employment rate for workers aged 55-64 of 50 per cent in 2010 
(Stockholm); 
• an increase of 5 years by 2010 in the average effective retirement 
age (Barcelona); and 
• available childcare by 2010 for 90 per cent of pre-school children 
over three, and 33 per cent of children under three (Barcelona). 
 
Research and innovation: 
• R&D spending of 3 per cent of GDP by 2010, with two thirds of the 
total coming from business (Barcelona); and 
• 100 per cent of schools to be connected to the Internet by 2002. 
 
Economic reform: 
• full implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan by 2003, and of 
the Financial Services Action Plan by 2005 (Lisbon); 
• a transposition rate into national law for Internal Market directives 
of 98.5 per cent (Stockholm); 
• no Internal Market directives to be more than two years overdue in 
their transposition (Barcelona); 
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• open energy markets for business customers in 2004, and subse-
quently for domestic users (Barcelona); 
• cross-border energy transmission capacity equal to at least 10 per 
cent of installed production capacity by 2005 (Barcelona); and 
• a single European sky by 2004 (Barcelona). 
 
Social cohesion: 
• halve by 2010 the number of early school-leavers not continuing 
with further education (Lisbon); and 
• reduce by 2010 the numbers living at risk of poverty (Barcelona). 
 
Environment/sustainable development: 
• visible progress on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2005 
(Göteborg);  
• an indicative target for electricity generated from renewable sources 
of 22 per cent of gross electricity consumption in 2010 (Göteborg); 
and 
• Combating Climate Change: meet the indicative target of 22% for 
the contribution of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources to gross electricity consumption by 2010 (Göteborg). 
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Annex 2: Flowchart of the improved economic policy co-ordination cycle 
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STUCTURAL REFORM NEEDS IN THE CANDI-
DATE COUNTRIES 
WILLEM BUITER 
 
Introduction 
 
The next enlargement of the EU is to include a large number of transi-
tion countries (the three Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, the Slo-
vak Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in May 2004; Bulgaria and 
Romania hope to join in 2007). 
 
For the objective of catching-up with EU average living standards, these 
countries will need rapid growth over a sustained period and face two 
types of challenges: 
1. macroeconomic challenge: managing the fiscal - monetary policy 
mix in light of potential EMU accession 
2. microeconomic/structural reform challenge: boosting competitive-
ness through deeper institutional reforms, in particular in the enter-
prise, agriculture, infrastructure and banking sectors. 
 
On average, the PPP per capita income in accession countries equals 
40 per cent of the EU average, which shows a large potential for catch-
ing-up 
 
With enlargement, the population of the EU will increase significantly, 
its GDP will increase only marginally.  Average income in the enlarged 
EU will therefore arithmetically be significantly lower than in the old 
EU (this will be the case even if no one in either the old or the enlarged 
EU is worse off!).  This is a long way of saying that the newcomers are 
much poorer than the existing members.  
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Graph 1: GDP per capita in PPP terms, population and GDP in EU15 
and Candidate Countries 
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Only three of the transition countries that are to join the EU reach at 
least 50 per cent of the EU average real per capita income (Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Slovenia); the Slovak Republic is close at 48 per 
cent. 
 
Graph 2: Per capita GDP in PPP as % of EU GDP, 2001 
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At the time of their accession, the Southern countries (Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain) were relatively richer with incomes per capita in purchasing 
power parities between 60 and 70 per cent of the EU average at the 
time. 
 
Convergence with the EU level of income per capita will require sus-
tained growth rates over a long period of time 
 
It would take on average between one and one and a half generation (25 
years) for the Central and Eastern European Countries to fully converge 
with the average standard of living in the EU, if they were to record a 
positive annual growth differential of 3 per cent vis-à-vis the existing 
members. 
 
Table 1: How long will it take for CEEC to converge to EU if growth 
differential… 
 50% 75% 100% 
Czech Rep na 9 19 
Estonia 6 20 30 
Hungary na 13 23 
Latvia 14 28 38 
Lithuania 10 24 34 
Poland 8 22 32 
Slovak Rep 2 16 26 
Slovenia na 3 13 
Romania 24 37 43 
Bulgaria 20 34 41 
 
In order to reduce the duration of the catching-up period for full conver-
gence to twenty years, assuming the average annual GDP growth rate of 
the EU is 2 per cent, the accession countries would have to record 
growth rates ranging from 5 to 10 per cent per annum on average! 
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Table 2: By what rate do CEEC need to grow for convergence to occur 
in 20/30 years, assuming EU15 grows at 2% pa? 
 100% target 75% target 50% target 
 20 30 20 30 20 30 
Czech Rep 4.9 3.9 3.4 2.9 na na 
Estonia 6.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.9 2.6 
Hungary 5.5 4.3 3.9 3.3 na na 
Latvia 7.8 5.8 6.2 4.8 4.1 3.4 
Lithuania 7.1 5.4 5.6 4.4 3.5 3.0 
Poland 6.8 5.2 5.3 4.2 3.2 2.8 
Slovak Rep 5.8 4.5 4.3 3.5 2.2 2.1 
Slovenia 3.9 3.3 2.4 2.3 na na 
Romania 9.1 6.8 7.7 5.7 5.5 4.3 
Bulgaria 9.7 6.4 7.1 5.4 5.0 4.0 
 
The accession countries are facing significant macroeconomic chal-
lenges on the road to E(M)U accession; this is even more emphatically 
the case if they wish to adopt the Euro as soon as possible 
 
Despite a good performance in terms of GDP growth in recent years, 
which shows their resilience in the face of the slow-down in the EU (the 
prime destination for their exports), the CEECs record large fiscal and 
current account deficits and in a couple of cases (including Hungary) 
also continued high inflation. 
 
Table 3: Macro-data of the CEECs 
 Growth 
 
Average 
inflation 
Fiscal 
balance 
Current account 
balance 
Bulgaria    4.5 5.9 -0.8 -4.3 
Czech R 2.0 1.8 -7.3 -5.3 
Estonia 5.8 3.6 1.2 -12.6 
Hungary 3.3 4.8 -9.9 -4.2 
Latvia  6.1 1.9 -2.5 -7.8 
Lithuania 6.7 0.3 -1.2 -4.8 
Poland 1.3 1.7 -5.7 -3.6 
Romania 4.9 22.5 -2.7 -3.6 
Slovak 4.4 3.3 -5.5 -8.2 
Slovenia 2.9 7.5 -2.9 1.8 
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Monetary policy will be mainly focused on bringing inflation down to 
sufficiently low levels permit the CEEC countries to meet the inflation 
requirement for EMU membership. 
 
Graph 3: Bringing down inflation 
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Fiscal tightening will be necessary for CEECs to fulfil the fiscal crite-
rion. This will be all the more difficult because their relatively high 
structural deficits are partially driven by EU accession-related public 
investment needs (as well as by excessively large public administrations 
and high public sector wage pressures). 
 
Table 4: General Government balance in per cent of GDP 
 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic -5,1 -7,3 -7,1 
Hungary -4,6 -9,9 -5,7 
Poland  -5,4 -5,7 -6,0 
Slovakia -3,9 -5,5 -4,9 
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Despite the progress achieved in recent years to qualify as functioning 
market economies, the remaining structural reform challenges that must 
be met to achieve rapid growth, are significant in many ways. 
 
They concern mainly four areas: 
1.  in the enterprise sector: completing the restructuring and privatisa-
tion process, improving the investment climate, and introducing la-
bour market flexibility 
2. in the agricultural sector: developing functioning land markets and 
pursuing the restructuring of farms and agro-enterprises 
3. in the infrastructure sphere: deepen commercialisation, liberalisation, 
and tariff reform 
4. in the banking sector: improving the structure, efficiency and depth 
of f inancial intermediation 
 
An illustration of this situation is given by the structure of GDP in the 
ten accession countries compared to that of the EU: the former still have 
larger agricultural and industrial sectors than the current members of the 
EU, so that services represent only 60 per cent of total output to be 
compared to 70 per cent in the EU. 
 
Graph 4: Structure of GDP 
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Based on the indicators maintained by the EBRD, the environment of 
enterprises needs to be further improved in the accession countries in 
order to promote the potential for growth 
 
In the enterprise sector, the remaining challenges concern large-scale 
privatisations, enterprise restructuring and corporate governance. As 
regards corporate governance, the CEEC countries are still relatively far 
away from the standard of market economies. 
 
Table 5: Enterprise reforms 
 Share of GDP 
produced in the 
private sector 
(mid 2001, in %) 
Large-scale 
privati-
sation 
Small-scale 
privati-
sation 
Governance & 
enterprise re-
structuring 
Czech R 80 4 4+ 3+ 
Estonia 80 4 4+ 3+ 
Hungary 80 4 4+ 3+ 
Latvia  70 3+ 4+ 3- 
Lithuania 75 4- 4+ 3 
Poland 75 3+ 4+ 3+ 
Slovak. Rep. 80 4 4+ 3 
Slovenia 65 3 4+ 3 
Bulgaria 70 4- 4- 2+ 
Romania 65 3+ 4- 2 
Note: Figures in the last three columns of Table 5 are to be read according to the classi-
fication system for transition indicators, which is a stylised reflection of the judgement 
of the of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist; the scale ranges from 1 - little 
progress achieved in terms of transition to market economy - to 4+ - standards and 
performance typical of advanced industrial economies) 
 
As far as the business environment is concerned the main remaining 
obstacles have to do with almost all the dimensions surveyed in the 
BEEPS, despite the progress achieved in the recent years: finance, taxes, 
regulations, judiciary and in some cases corruption. 
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Graph 5: Business environment 
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The high level of unemployment across the region points to its partially 
structural nature and calls for the introduction of more flexibility in the 
labour market, beyond the requirements of the acquis communautaire. 
 
Table 6: Unemployment remains high across the region 
 Unemployment as % 
of labour force, 2002 
Czech Rep. 9,8 
Estonia 10,4 
Hungary 5,8 
Latvia 12,2 
Lithuania 16,3 
Poland 18,1 
Slovak Rep 18,8 
Slovenia 6,5 
Bulgaria 16,8 
Romania 8,1 
 
Efficiency gains can also be expected from pursuing reforms in the ag-
ricultural, infrastructure and energy sectors. 
 
 Conference Contributions 22 
While the share of agriculture in GDP and employment remains high 
compared to the situation in the EU, the reform challenges are signifi-
cant as far as the following aspects are concerned: establishing clear 
property rights to land, restructuring semi-subsistence farms, improving 
market institutions and access to finance. 
 
Table 7: Agricultural reforms 
 Share of 
Agri in 
GDP 
 
Share of 
Agri in 
Emplt 
 
Price &
Market
Land 
Re-
form 
Agro 
pro-
ces-
sing 
Rural 
Finance 
Rural 
Institu-
tions 
Czech Rep 3.9 5.2 8 9 10 9 9 
Estonia 6.3 7.4 9 9 9 9 9 
Hungary 4.1 4.8 8 9 10 9 9 
Latvia 4.5 13.5 9 9 9 9 9 
Lithuania 7.5 19.6 8 9 8 7 8 
Poland 3.3 18.8 8 9 9 7 8 
Slovak Rep 4.5 6.7 8 8 9 8 7 
Slovenia 3.2 9.9 9 9 10 8 8 
Bulgaria 14.5 11.3 9 8 8 7 8 
Romania 12.6 42.8 7 8 8 6 6 
EU-15 2.0 4.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Note: Figures in Table 7 range from 1 to 10; 10 equals the standards of advanced market 
economies, including competitive markets, large-scale private farm ownership, priva-
tised agro-processing, an efficient financial system, and well-functioning rural institu-
tions 
 
Further progress in terms of commercialisation, liberalisation and tariff 
reform will be necessary to reform infrastructures, and in particular 
railways and roads which are lagging behind. 
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Table 8: Infrastructure reforms 
 Telecoms Power Railways Roads 
Czech Rep. 4 3  2+   2+ 
Estonia 4 3   4+   2+ 
Hungary 4 4   3+   3+ 
Latvia 3 3   3+   2+ 
Lithuania   3+ 3   2+   2+ 
Poland 4 3 4   3+ 
Slovak Rep.    2+ 4   2+   2+ 
Slovenia 3 3   3+   3+ 
Bulgaria 3    3+ 3   2+ 
Romania 3 3 4 3 
Note: Figures in table 8 are to be read according to the classification system for transi-
tion indicators, which is a stylised reflection of the judgement of the of the EBRD’s 
Office of the Chief Economist; the scale ranges from 1 (little progress achieved in terms 
of transition to market economy) to 4+ (standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies) 
 
Finally there is a substantial potential for improving energy efficiency in 
accession countries as their energy intensity levels are much higher 
compared to those observable in western countries (i.e. France, UK and 
USA). 
 
Graph 6: Energy intensity in accession countries 
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However, reforms in the infrastructure field will put a considerable bur-
den on the public finance of the accession countries as they will have to 
spend an estimated 2-6 per cent of GDP per annum to meet transport 
infrastructure and environmental compliance costs; the EU will help 
meet much, but by no means all of the financial cost. EU aid is often in 
the form of matching funds. 
 
Table 9: Infrastructure needs and fiscal constraints 
 Transport invest-
ment needs, € mil-
lion (% GDP p.a.) 
Environment compli-
ance costs, € million 
(% GDP p.a.) 
Capital Ex-
penditure, % 
2001 GDP 
Czech Rep 10,203 (1.0) 6,600-9,400 (0.7-1.0) 5,6 
Estonia 628 (0.7) 4,406 (4.9) 3,5 
Hungary 10,166 (1.2) 4,118-10,000(0.5-1.1) 3,6 
Latvia 1,990 (1.7) 1,480-2,360 (1.2-1.9) 3,2 
Lithuania 2,322 (1.2) 1,600 (0.8) 1,6 
Poland 36,423 (1.4) 22,100-42,800 (0.7-
1.4) 
3,1 
Slovak Rep 6,543 (2.0) 4,809 (1.4) n/a 
Slovenia 5,774 (1.9) 2,430 (0.8) 2,8 
Bulgaria 5,278 (2.4) 8,610 (3.9) 4,0 
Romania 11,211 (1.8) 22,000 (3.4) n/a 
 
The financial sector also needs to be further reformed in order to de-
velop and be able to fulfil its intermediation function, which is still very 
weak compared to the EU 
 
The banking sector faces important challenges, as the level of credit as a 
share of GDP in accession countries was, in the best case, equivalent to 
half of the level observed in the EU; these challenges include: bank 
restructuring and privatisation, further consolidation and efficiency im-
provements, and increasing the menu of financial services 
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Table 10: Financial sector reforms 
 Domestic 
Credit (% 
GDP, end yr) 
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
(% GDP) 
Interest 
rate spread 
(in %) 
Czech Republic 46.5 24.4 4.0 
Hungary 52.8 31.5 2.7 
Poland 31.2 18.4 8.5 
Slovak Republic 58 27.6 5.3 
Average accession 
countries 
38.7 23.6 5.8 
Euro- Area 136.8 n/a 3.5 
 
Even without any prior as to whether the main channel of intermediation 
should be the banking sector of capital markets, the development of 
capital markets is necessary; stock market capitalisation in accession 
countries represented less than 20 per cent of GDP in 2001, compared to 
at least 60 per cent in the EU. 
 
Graph 7: Stock market capitalisation, % of GDP in 2001 
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The institutional investor is still weak, even if the situation varies 
greatly in the EU, and many accession countries need to implement 
pension reforms and changes to the legislative framework for securities, 
pension and investment funds, as well as life insurance. 
 
Graph 8: Financial assets of institutional investors, 1999 
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Conclusion and hopes 
 
The need for adequate internal reform of the EU poses one of the main 
risks to the EU accession process, as: 
1. there is a widespread belief that the voting mechanism adopted in 
Nice is not adequate; 
2. the Common Agricultural Policy will have to be reformed when ac-
cession countries are granted equal treatment, unless the EU budget 
is increased; 
3. the rules for allocation of structural funds might change as well, so 
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that poorer existing members can keep more of their current trans-
fers. 
 
Other risks include: 
1. weakening political support in the EU 15 and the Candidate Coun-
tries; 
2. incomplete transition and "reform fatigue" in many Candidate Coun-
tries (including governance and public administration); 
3. the financing of the EU budget, though not posing a threat to the 
enlargement process, might become a problem after 2006. 
 
There are some hopes however, so I end with the following rosy sce-
nario: 
1. ease into EU by 2004; 
2. followed by an easy slide into EMU as soon as possible after EU 
accession; 
3 public finances will become more sustainable thanks to fiscal re-
straint and EU transfers; 
4. steady real convergence will take place (real GDP per capita, eco-
nomic structures, relative prices). 
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THE CEECS IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE: 
PATTERNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND 
CATCHING-UP1 
MICHAEL A. LANDESMANN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I shall present an overview of structural developments 
which have been taking place in countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs) and discuss some of the qualitative patterns of catch-
ing-up which we observe across the region. Since the beginning of the 
transition in 1989, the CEECs have gone through a dramatic process of 
systemic change and structural adjustment in which their integration 
into trade and production links with Western Europe has played a major 
role. EU enlargement will of course be a major step in this process to-
wards full integration, but the basic outlines of the division of labour 
which is emerging in this "enlarged Europe" have already become visi-
ble prior to that. 
 
Underlying the analysis is a theoretical model (see Landesmann and 
Stehrer, 2000 and Stehrer, 2001) which attempts to combine a model of 
catching-up with international trade specialization and thus falls into the 
category of the dynamic modelling of trade and growth (for other 
approaches, see Krugman, 1986, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Taylor, 
1993). The basic outlines of the model are simple and have been guided 
by the "stylized facts" observed in growth patterns of successful and less 
 
                                                     
1 The paper draws heavily on joint work with my WIIW colleague Robert Stehrer. A previous 
version of the paper, "Evolving Competitiveness of CEEC's in an Enlarged Europe" (written 
jointly with Robert Stehrer from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 
(WIIW)), was published in Rivista di Politica Economica, No. I-II, January-February 2002, pp. 
23-87. 
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successful catching-up economies. Such economies start off with sub-
stantial productivity (and product quality) gaps and such gaps are not 
the same across all industrial branches. Typically, the gaps are greater in 
the technologically more advanced branches and less in the technologi-
cally less demanding ones. This has the following implications: full 
catching-up has a longer way to go in the technologically more ad-
vanced branches and this can be interpreted in two ways. On the one 
hand, it is "more difficult" to catch up fully in such branches as it re-
quires a much greater effort in learning, skill acquisition and often a big 
jump in organizational and managerial capacities; on the other hand, it 
means that the scope for differential productivity growth (and for prod-
uct quality upgrading) between the "technology leader" and the catch-
ing-up economy ("the laggard") is higher where the initial gap is larger.  
 
This is a simple application of the Gerschenkron hypothesis ("advantage 
of backwardness") which states that the "potential" for growth is highest 
where the "initial gap" is the highest (Gerschenkron, 1962). This princi-
ple has, of course, been widely applied at the aggregate level and is the 
background for the much tested "convergence" hypothesis in the many 
recent aggregate growth studies (for a survey of such studies see Tem-
ple, 1999). What is special in our model is that we apply this principle at 
the industrial level with the implication that those industries have the 
greatest potential for productivity growth and product quality up-
grading that start off with the biggest "initial gaps". Of course, as 
pointed out early on by Abramovitz (1986), actual growth is not neces-
sarily equal to potential growth as countries (and in our case industries) 
might not be able to exploit this potential. Abramovitz emphasized here 
the importance of "social capabilities", i.e. a wide range of institutional 
and behavioural requirements which are necessary such that actual 
catching-up comes as close as possible to potential catching-up. This 
analysis opens a wide range of possible catching-up patterns. In the case 
of our more disaggregated analysis it also means that the dynamics of 
comparative advantages which determines a country’s position in the 
international division of labour can follow quite different patterns for 
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catching-up economies. At a more concise level, the dynamics of spe-
cialization advantages and disadvantages is determined by the timing of 
"switchovers" in the comparative cost structures across industrial 
branches. Here the dynamics of relative productivity growth rates and of 
wage rates across industrial branches plays a decisive role. We have 
examined these patterns of comparative advantages across the historical 
experiences of a wide range of catching-up economies in a number of 
analytical and empirical studies (see Landesmann and Stehrer, 2001, 
and Stehrer and Wörz, 2001) and show that the approach gets also vali-
dated in the analysis of patterns of catching-up and trade specialization 
of CEECs after the transition. 
 
In an extension of this approach, it is possible to show that the alloca-
tion of foreign direct investment (FDI) across industrial branches is 
similarly affected by the dynamics of comparative advantages although 
in this context we also emphasize the role which price-cost margins 
(Schumpeterian profits) play in determining (particularly foreign) in-
vestment activity2. FDI flows in turn provide a conduit for a speeding up 
of technology transfer and hence for a partial endogenisation of produc-
tivity catching-up across branches. Just as the model implies that the 
range of experiences with respect to catching-up patterns and hence of 
the positions that economies occupy in the international division of la-
bour can be quite wide, this is borne out by the diversity of experiences 
we observe in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
                                                     
2  Foreign direct investment - through technology transfers - in turn affects the dynamics of catch-
ing-up and hence the dynamics of trade specialization. See Landesmann and Stehrer, 2003, for an 
attempt to extend our theoretical model by endogenizing foreign direct investment flows and its 
impact. 
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We shall now give an overview of the structure of the paper: Section 2 
discusses shortly catching-up processes at the macro-level and summa-
rizes the broad patterns of structural shifts (across the primary, secon-
dary and tertiary sectors) which we observed since the beginning of the 
transition. Section 3 takes a closer look at structural change within the 
manufacturing sector and reveals at this level some of the interesting 
emerging patterns of industrial specialization of CEECs. Section 4 re-
ports on the main determinants of industrial cost competitiveness, i.e. 
productivity, wage rates and labour unit costs and shows in which in-
dustry groupings (lower-tech, resource-based, higher-tech) the strongest 
inroads were made in relative productivity and unit cost developments. 
Section 5 discusses trade performance und uses various classifications 
guided by industrial organization and skill content criteria to show the 
qualitative pattern of trade specialization emerging in CEECs in relation 
to the European Union (EU). Section 6 gives some evidence on FDI 
allocation across industrial branches and section 7 looks at the educa-
tional attainment in the CEECs and at labour market developments in 
CEECs in particular in relation to the positions of different skill groups. 
The argument here is that the positions of skill groups reflect the pat-
terns of catching-up and industrial specialization discussed in the previ-
ous sections of the paper. The concluding section provides an outlook 
on the impact which EU enlargement will have on the further integra-
tion processes between Central and Eastern and Western Europe. 
 
2. MACROECONOMIC CATCHING-UP AND BROAD PAT-
TERNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
 
In this section we shortly discuss the main features of macroeconomic 
growth of the CEECs relative to the EU-15 and review the patterns of 
structural change which took place in the CEECs at the broad sectoral 
level. As is well known, all transition economies experienced dramatic 
dramatic declines in GDP and employment in the early phases of transi-
tion (Janos Kornai coined these the "transformational recessions") and 
most of the economies also experienced further - at times sharp - inter-
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ruptions in their growth processes due to delayed corporate restructuring 
and banking crises (often called "secondary transformational reces-
sions") and/or macroeconomic imbalances, most often caused by unsus-
tainable current account deficits. However, taking the group of the 8 
accession countries3 together we can see in Graph 1 that the countries 
have moved towards what appears to be - on average - a rather steady 
growth path since about 1994. The average hides of course volatility at 
the individual country level which have already been mentioned and this 
picture also persists over the most recent period (see Graph 2). How-
ever, the combined long-term trend in GDP is, furthermore, significantly 
above that of the EU-15 (the growth differential over the period 1994-
2002 amounts to 1.3% per annum for GDP growth and 2.6% per annum 
for GDP/employment which we shall refer to as macro-productivity). 
The greater growth differential in productivity than in output in the ac-
cession countries compared to the EU-15, is due to the worse employ-
ment performance of the accession countries over the period. The pat-
tern is even more marked if we just look at manufacturing (right-hand 
side of Graph 1): there the differential in output growth between the 
group of accession countries and the EU-15 over the period 1994-2002 
amounts to 4.6% per annum and for productivity (output/employment) 
to 7.0%. Thus, we can say that, if we look at the group of accession 
countries as a whole, they have embarked from about the mid-1990s 
onwards upon a catching-up process with the current member countries 
of the European Union. 
 
                                                     
3 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic states. 
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Graph 1: Growth of GDP, manufacturing production, employment and 
productivity in the ACs and the EU 
 
Source: wiiw database incorporating national statistics, Wifo and wiiw calculations 
using AMECO. 
 
Furthermore, and we now move to the main topic of this section, strong 
shifts took place at the broad sectoral level which can be interpreted as 
structural convergence with more advanced Western economies. These 
broad shifts can be summarized under the headings "deindustrialization" 
and "tertiarization". It is well known that the Communist economies 
emphasized industry at the cost of services and, furthermore, service 
activities were often supplied within big industrial combines, which 
meant that these service activities were classified under industry. With 
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the transition a strong move towards the expansion of the service sector 
took place and a scaling-down of the industrial sector. With respect to 
agriculture a somewhat more complex picture emerged which will be 
discussed below.  
 
Graph 2 and Graph 3 demonstrate the evolution over the period 1989 to 
2000 of the shares of the three classic sectors (agriculture, industry, 
services) in value added and employment respectively. Graph 4 allows a 
comparison of the sectoral employment structures after a decade of ad-
justment between the CEECs and two groups of EU countries, the "EU-
North" (composed of Belgium, France, Germany, UK) and the "EU-
South" (composed of Greece, Portugal, Spain). We can observe the fol-
lowing tendencies: 
 
De- and re-agrarization 
 
In general, there was a tendency in most of the CEECs to reduce the size 
of the agricultural sector; however, there were exceptions to this: in 
some economies the share of the labour force in agriculture (and in Ro-
mania even the absolute number) has actually increased. This is true for 
Bulgaria and Romania, while for all the other CEECs there were losses 
in the shares (and dramatic losses in absolute numbers) of agricultural 
employment. 
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Graph 2: Comparison of CEECs' value added structures in 1989, 1993 
and 2000 
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Graph 3: Comparison of CEECs' employment structures in 1989, 1993 
and 2000 (based on registration data) 
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Graph 4: CEECs' employment structures compared with EU-North and 
EU-South, 2000 based on LFS 
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Interestingly, the economies with the larger agricultural sectors (Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania) had smaller percentage declines (or even increases) 
in the employment shares of this sector compared to the countries which 
started off with a smaller agricultural sector (Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics, Hungary, Slovenia). Hence, regarding the "primary sector", the 
transition brought about processes both of "deagrarization" as well as - 
in some countries - of "reagrarization". The second type of pattern 
should be considered a transitory phenomenon, resulting from the severe 
employment crisis in the industrial sector (especially in countries such 
as Bulgaria and Romania) and - so far - the limited absorption capacity 
in the services sector (for more details on this, see Vidovic, 2002). 
There are also interesting discrepancies in the movements of value 
added shares and employment shares in agriculture: In value added, the 
shares of the agricultural sectors are declining in the most recent period 
also in those economies in which there were previously signs of "rea-
grarization" (Bulgaria and Romania); this trend supports the view that 
the phenomenon reflects mostly the dramatic overall jobs crisis in these 
countries. 
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Deindustrialization 
 
Broadly, one can also speak of a general process of "deindustrialization" 
with falling absolute employment levels in the industrial sectors (com-
prising manufacturing, mining, water and electricity supply, construc-
tion). In share terms, however, there are some interesting exceptions to 
the general decline of employment in the industrial sector. In Hungary 
the employment shares of the industrial sector have recovered after the 
initial drop at the beginning of the transition and value added shares 
have risen again in Hungary and the Czech Republic and stabilized in 
Slovenia. In relation to both the EU-North and the EU-South, some of 
the CEECs maintain, also at the end of the first decade of transition, a 
high share of industry in both value added and employment (for em-
ployment shares compared to EU-North and EU-South see Graph 4). 
There are again differences in value added and employment shares: the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, followed by the Slovak Republic and 
Hungary, are the countries with the highest employment shares in indus-
try, while the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania, followed by Po-
land, are the countries with the highest shares in value added. These 
differences reflect, of course, differences in relative sectoral productiv-
ity levels, e.g. the extremely low productivity level in Romanian agri-
culture would push up industry’s share in value added in spite of its own 
low level of productivity. The levelling-off of relative employment 
losses in manufacturing in some of the CEECs (such as Hungary and 
Poland) and persistence of manufacturing’s relatively high value added 
shares could be an indication of the attractiveness of some of the CEECs 
as locations for some of Europe’s manufacturing industries within the 
context of an overall European division of labour.  
 
Tertiarization 
 
As regards the "tertiary sector", there are clear signs of a catching-up 
process of the CEECs in the relative size of this sector (although, just as 
in the West, the changes are partially due to statistical reclassifications 
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and sourcing out of service activities previously undertaken within the 
other sectors). Again, the relative increase of the importance of the ser-
vices sector in the CEECs over the last decade has not necessarily been 
in line with the size of the initial gap (relative to the Western European 
employment structure). Thus, countries such as Hungary, Slovenia, Slo-
vakia and the Czech Republic experienced very substantial increases in 
the shares of the services sector, while countries such as Romania and 
Poland where the initial shares of the services sector in overall employ-
ment were relatively low, experienced rather modest share increases. In 
absolute terms, the employment gains in the services sector were, how-
ever, far from sufficient to compensate for the employment losses in the 
other two sectors. 
 
3. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN MANUFACTUR-
ING STRUCTURE 
 
Let us now look more closely at the ongoing structural change within 
the manufacturing sector in the CEECs. We use data from The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) industrial database, 
which reports several variables at the NACE rev. 1, 2 digit level (DA-
DN) for seven Central and Eastern European Countries. In this paper, 
we restrict the analysis to the period 1993-2000, i.e. after the transfor-
mational crises. The data, which are mostly collected from national 
sources, are likely at times to be inconsistent over the years (e.g. as data 
sources changed or for methodological reasons, such as coverage of the 
small enterprise sector). To overcome these problems we tested the se-
ries for significant changes in the growth rates to check when a struc-
tural break was indicated by using dummies in the estimates on growth 
rates. If this procedure indicated a significant break the data series was 
adjusted accordingly.  
 
Let us first get an overview of growth processes in aggregate manufac-
turing over the period 1993-2000, i.e. after the immediate impact of the 
"transformational recession". Graph 5 shows the trend (per annum) 
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growth rates of output, employment and labour productivity. We can see 
that trend employment growth over this period in manufacturing was 
negative in all of the transition countries. It ranged from -8.1 and -7.1% 
in Bulgaria and Romania to -1.4% in Poland. Output growth was even 
more diverse, with negative growth over that period in Bulgaria and 
Romania and a wide spectrum of growth rates amongst the "more ad-
vanced" of the Candidate Countries. The relatively high growth rates in 
manufacturing output in Hungary (11.9) and Poland (9.4) are particu-
larly striking with rather modest trend growth in the other three econo-
mies. (Labour) productivity growth results directly from the difference 
in output and employment growth and shows again a quite wide range 
of diversity, with Hungary and Poland again the forerunners driven by 
high output growth, followed by a range of economies with per annum 
average growth rates in labour productivity of 5-7%. It is clear from 
these figures that the relationship between output and employment 
growth is quite differentiated across the transition countries and, most 
likely (as would be seen if the time series were analysed more closely) 
unstable across time, reflecting major periods of restructuring and other 
periods when labour hoarding takes place in the wake of output de-
clines. 
 
Graph 5: Growth rates of employment, output, and productivity (1993-
2000) 
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We now move on to present a qualitative picture of the ongoing struc-
tural changes within manufacturing. For this purpose we do not report 
developments in all the 14 industries contained in the database but ag-
gregated the industries into three broader categories (note that these do 
not cover all manufacturing industries). 
• low-tech, labour-intensive industries: food products, beverages 
and tobacco (DA), textiles and textile products (DB), and leather and 
leather products (DC) 
• resource-intensive industries: wood and wood products (DD), 
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (DF), chemicals, 
chemical products and man-made fibres (DG), and other non-
metallic mineral products (DI) 
• medium- to high-tech industries: machinery and equipment (DK), 
electrical and optical equipment (DL), and transport equipment (DM) 
 
Table 1 reports data on employment and output shares (both at prices 
1996 and at current prices) and the wage structure for the seven Central 
and Eastern European Countries and Austria as the benchmark.4 Further 
Table 2 shows deviations of the variables from Austria in percentage 
points. 
 
One can see that all countries started in 1993 with high shares in low-
tech industries relative to Austria. In employment Hungary and Poland 
with more than about 20 and 16 percentage points above Austrian shares 
were the countries with the highest shares in low-tech industries. The 
lowest deviation from Austria can be observed for the Czech Republic. 
This corresponds to the data on output shares (either at current or con-
stant 1996 prices). With regard to employment shares in medium-/high-
tech industries only the Czech Republic and Slovakia showed initially 
higher employment shares than Austria, reflecting a strong position of 
 
                                                     
4 An average of EU economies would have been preferable for this comparison, but Austria was 
singled out as a benchmark country for reasons of data availability. 
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the engineering sector in these two economies. In terms of output 
shares, the medium-/high-tech sectors had in all countries lower output 
shares than the benchmark Austria (although for some countries these 
deviations were quite small). In the resource-intensive sectors the shares 
relative to Austria are smallest on average both in terms of employment 
and output shares.5 
 
More interesting than these starting values are, however, the trends over 
time. Employment shares in low-tech sectors have been declining 
slightly in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
but have increased dramatically in Bulgaria (from about 30% to about 
43%) and in Romania. On the other hand one can see slight increases of 
employment shares in the medium-/high-tech sectors in the Czech Re-
public and very large increases in Hungary (from 23% to 32%). Relative 
to Austria all countries except the Czech Republic and Hungary now 
show lower employment shares in medium /high-tech sectors than in 
1993. For the resource-intensive sectors there are no clear trends across 
countries and changes are small. 
 
These trends in employment shares can either result from changes in 
output or changes in (labour) productivity (ignoring possible interac-
tions between these two variables). Compared to Austria the output 
shares of low-tech industries at constant 1996 prices have fallen dra-
matically in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and 
remained almost stable for Slovenia. On the other hand the shares of 
these industries compared to Austria have risen in Bulgaria and Roma-
nia from nine to about 16%.6 This shows a clear pattern of specialization 
amongst the CEECs. Regarding the medium-/high-tech sectors one can 
see the opposite tendencies for output measured at constant prices. Hun-
gary increased its share dramatically from about 17% to more than 55%, 
                                                     
5 One reason for this pattern is the relatively large share of resource-intensive industries in Austria. 
6 It is, however, interesting to see that the output shares of the low-tech industries at current prices 
have fallen in all countries (most strongly again in Hungary and the Czech Republic), the differ-
ence to the constant price output shares being driven by changes in relative prices. 
 Conference Contributions 42 
the Czech Republic from 25% to 36%, and Slovakia from 18% to about 
33%. In the other countries output shares of high-tech industries also 
increased, but at lower rates and remained more or less stable in Bul-
garia. The rising share of high-tech output in Romania is due to the de-
creasing share of resource-intensive industries (especially chemicals and 
chemical products (DG)). Output shares of high-tech industries at cur-
rent prices were rising in all countries except for Bulgaria and Romania. 
Again a clear and diverse pattern of industrial specialization gets re-
vealed.  
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Table 1: Changes in the structure of manufacturing - 1993 and 2000 
 Employment shares Output (at prices 1996) Output structure 
(at current prices)
Wage structure 
 1993 2000 Employment 
growth (p.a.)
1993 2000 Output growth 
(p.a)
1993 2000 1993 2000
Austria1) 
Low-tech 19.64 18.21 -2.39 20.51 17.08 2.36 21.59 16.91 84.57 79.35
Resource-intensive 17.00 16.17 -1.79 23.66 20.72 3.00 23.30 21.74 103.01 104.86
Medium-high-tech 29.22 30.66 -0.17 27.08 34.05 9.23 26.74 33.08 108.48 112.32
Czech Republic2) 
Low-tech 24.65 22.69 -4.80 27.07 19.94 -0.81 28.31 22.39 88.54 83.20
Resource-intensive 14.22 17.16 -1.72 20.60 18.00 1.97 18.59 18.60 105.63 113.70
Medium-high-tech 31.53 33.05 -3.28 25.60 36.35 7.76 26.37 30.16 99.46 106.84
Hungary 
Low-tech 39.20 36.95 -3.91 34.73 16.64 1.83 34.66 19.17 85.44 77.15
Resource-intensive 16.55 15.27 -4.11 27.58 11.28 -0.73 25.95 17.18 124.54 133.67
Medium-high-tech 22.67 32.01 1.32 16.70 56.80 24.40 18.61 46.76 101.93 111.51
Poland2) 
Low-tech 35.56 33.08 -2.59 34.86 27.49 5.61 35.91 30.53 88.55 81.92
Resource-intensive 15.63 16.82 -0.54 21.76 19.56 7.31 22.80 20.07 106.47 110.55
Medium-high-tech 26.22 22.70 -3.51 19.22 24.40 12.10 18.64 23.09 105.16 113.94
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Table 1 (continued) 
Slovakia 
Low-tech 27.52 26.85 -0.03 26.38 17.83 -0.78 25.22 18.52 85.59 85.60
Resource-intensive 17.08 16.18 -1.27 24.27 20.87 2.94 25.26 19.61 111.33 103.71
Medium-high-tech 31.70 28.62 -1.68 18.10 32.90 9.99 18.46 27.29 95.74 105.39
Slovenia2) 
Low-tech 29.21 26.08 -3.83 27.10 23.67 0.11 26.78 23.65 95.44 86.41
Resource-intensive 14.29 15.40 -0.89 18.90 19.63 1.76 20.09 18.35 110.85 113.48
Medium-high-tech 26.84 25.88 -2.69 25.29 29.61 4.30 25.51 28.94 97.20 101.06
Bulgaria 
Low-tech 29.22 43.28 -3.73 29.82 31.37 -4.15 32.67 29.60 97.38 81.21
Resource-intensive 13.46 14.22 -8.61 25.58 31.72 -2.26 25.25 36.66 128.30 135.91
Medium-high-tech 29.21 22.31 -13.33 14.59 13.58 -6.82 17.82 12.39 105.94 102.52
Romania 
Low-tech 32.05 37.90 -4.80 29.54 33.71 0.09 33.77 29.95 86.96 76.62
Resource-intensive 15.60 15.49 -7.54 28.76 23.11 -5.06 24.49 26.72 110.97 114.15
Medium-high-tech 28.92 24.66 -9.63 14.42 18.77 1.65 19.79 14.75 103.96 127.10
Notes: 1) 1999 instead of 2000 for output at prices 1996 and current output. - 2) 1999 instead of 2000 for current output 
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Table 2: The structure of manufacturing and growth in relation to Austria (difference in percentage shares and growth 
rates) - 1993 and 2000 
 Employment shares Output (at prices 1996) Output structure (at 
current prices) 
Wage structure 
 1993 2000 Employment 
growth (p.a.)
1993 2000 Output 
growth (p.a)
1993 2000 1993 2000
Czech Republic2)  
Low-tech 5.01 4.48 -2.42 6.56 2.86 -3.17 6.72 5.48 3.97 3.86
Resource-intensive -2.78 0.99 0.07 -3.06 -2.72 -1.04 -4.71 -3.13 2.62 8.83
Medium-high-tech 2.31 2.39 -3.12 -1.47 2.30 -1.47 -0.37 -2.92 -9.03 -5.48
Hungary  
Low-tech 19.56 18.74 -1.52 14.22 -0.43 -0.53 13.07 2.26 0.87 -2.19
Resource-intensive -0.46 -0.90 -2.32 3.93 -9.44 -3.73 2.65 -4.56 21.53 28.81
Medium-high-tech -6.54 1.35 1.49 -10.38 22.75 15.17 -8.13 13.68 -6.55 -0.81
Poland2) 
Low-tech 15.92 14.87 -0.21 14.35 10.41 3.25 14.32 13.62 3.98 2.57
Resource-intensive -1.37 0.65 1.25 -1.89 -1.16 4.30 -0.50 -1.66 3.46 5.68
Medium-high-tech -3.00 -7.96 -3.34 -7.86 -9.65 2.87 -8.10 -9.99 -3.33 1.62
 Conference Contributions 46
Table 2 (continued) 
Slovakia 
Low-tech 7.87 8.63 2.35 5.87 0.75 -3.14 3.63 1.61 1.02 6.25
Resource-intensive 0.08 0.01 0.53 0.62 0.15 -0.06 1.96 -2.13 8.32 -1.15
Medium-high-tech 2.48 -2.04 -1.52 -8.98 -1.16 0.76 -8.28 -5.79 -12.74 -6.93
Slovenia2) 
Low-tech 9.57 7.86 -1.45 6.58 6.59 -2.25 5.19 6.75 10.86 7.06
Resource-intensive -2.71 -0.77 0.90 -4.76 -1.09 -1.25 -3.21 -3.38 7.84 8.62
Medium-high-tech -2.38 -4.78 -2.52 -1.78 -4.45 -4.93 -1.23 -4.14 -11.29 -11.26
Bulgaria 
Low-tech 9.58 25.07 -1.34 9.31 14.29 -6.52 11.08 12.70 12.81 1.86
Resource-intensive -3.54 -1.95 -6.82 1.92 11.00 -5.26 1.95 14.92 25.29 31.05
Medium-high-tech -0.01 -8.36 -13.16 -12.49 -20.47 -16.05 -8.92 -20.69 -2.54 -9.80
Romania 
Low-tech 12.40 19.69 -2.41 9.03 16.64 -2.27 12.18 13.04 2.39 -2.73
Resource-intensive -1.40 -0.68 -5.75 5.10 2.39 -8.06 1.19 4.98 7.96 9.29
Medium-high-tech -0.30 -6.00 -9.46 -12.65 -15.28 -7.58 -6.96 -18.33 -4.53 14.78
Notes: 1) 1999 instead of 2000 for output at prices 1996 and current output. - 2) 1999 instead of 2000 for current output 
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With respect to the wage structure one would expect that on average 
wage rates are relatively higher in the higher-tech sectors (e.g. by the 
assumption that the skill intensity is higher for these sectors or the 
higher productivity of these sectors). However, the general picture in 
1993 was that average wages have been highest in all countries in the 
resource-intensive sectors and lowest in the low-tech sectors. Compar-
ing this with the year 2000 we can indeed see a catching-up of relative 
wage rates in the medium-/high-tech branches and a falling-behind in 
the low-tech branches. The question for comparative costs is whether 
such changes proceed above or below relative productivity level ad-
justments which will be explored in the next section of the paper. One 
can also find a trend towards a convergence of wage structures (e.g. 
compared to the Austrian as a representative of a Western European 
wage structure) although this process seems to be slow. 
 
Note that the analysis of output and employment patterns already points 
towards our initial (Gerschenkron) hypothesis that specialization pat-
terns of catching-up economies may get directed towards the medium-
/higher-tech branches (as was the case especially in Hungary) where 
initially the gap might have been the largest. This requires the fastest 
catching-up in areas in which the initial gaps are the highest and this in 
turn depends on the existence (or mobilization) and utilization of "capa-
bilities" (to use Abramovitz’ terms) to facilitate such differential catch-
ing-up. This was apparently not the case in Bulgaria and Romania and 
the experience in this respect was also quite differentiated amongst the 
other (more advanced) Candidate Countries. We now turn to the produc-
tivity and cost side of production in order to look at the development of 
productivity gaps and the evolution of comparative cost structures more 
directly. After that we study the emerging patterns of trade specializa-
tion.  
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4. PRODUCTIVITY, WAGE RATES AND UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
 
Not only productivity matters for competitiveness but also wage rates 
play their role in shaping relative cost structures and hence the competi-
tive position of different industries from the cost side. In Table 3 we 
have summarized the data again for the three types of industries (low-
tech, resource-intensive, and medium-/high-tech).  
 
Using the same database as before, we focus now on productivity, wage 
rates and unit labour costs. For productivity levels, we use employment 
and data on output which are first expressed in national currency units 
(NCU) at prices 1996. For comparative analysis these can be converted 
either by using nominal exchange rates (EXR) or PPP rates (PPP) for 
the year 1996.1 Output for industry i in country c in year t is denoted as 
c
tiPR , . Data on wages and salaries 
c
tiW ,  are first obtained in NCU at 
nominal values. These data are converted into a common currency 
(euro) using either current EXR or current PPP.2 Data on employees 
c
tiE ,  
refer to average employment levels over the years.  
 
                                                     
1  For this analysis we are constrained to using PPP rates for GDP as a whole. For selective countries 
we have been able to obtain industry-level unit value ratios to adjust for industry level differences in 
price levels, but this database is not large enough to allow the more extensive comparative analysis 
presented here. 
2  One might ask why one should look at wage rates also in PPP terms as one is interested in 
comparative actual wage costs. The reason could be that one might want to conjecture what wage 
costs would be when price levels between the CEECs and the EU have converged. One could see 
such a comparison as an exercise multinationals might be interested in if they want to judge relative 
wage cost differentials also for the longer run when the severe undervaluation of the CEECs' national 
currencies would get eroded. In this case, workers would still ask at least for the same real wage rate 
as they now obtain, an estimate for which would be the wage rate at PPP rates. 
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Labour productivity  is calculated as .  
Further, unit labour costs are defined as 
 
 
 
 
 
In Tables 3 wage rates, productivity levels and unit labour costs are 
compared to Austria (= 100). The variables for Austria have been calcu-
lated analogously. Table 3 presents the data using the nominal exchange 
rates (EXR) conversion and in Table 4 the gaps are derived from PPP 
comparisons (both wage rates and productivity levels). The difference 
between the two tables thus reflects the development of the ratio be-
tween the exchange rate and the PPP rate. In the following, we shall 
discuss first the three variables expressed at exchange rates.  
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Table 3: Nominal productivity and wage at EXR and unit labour costs - 1993 and 2000 
  Wage Nominal productivity Unit labour costs1) 
 1993
Growth 
rate 2000 1993
Growth 
rate 2000 1993
Growth 
rate 2000
Czech Republic Manufacturing total 7.79 8.80 14.42 13.93 0.04 13.97 18.76 8.76 34.65
 Low tech 8.50 8.77 15.93 16.44 -0.74 16.63 18.47 9.52 33.76
 Resource intensive 6.97 8.95 13.34 15.72 -4.81 13.88 20.47 13.76 66.95
 Medium-high tech 7.36 9.63 14.25 11.47 2.52 13.46 21.66 7.11 35.48
Hungary Manufacturing total 11.22 0.69 11.77 18.22 7.79 31.45 22.82 -7.51 13.49
 Low tech 12.02 0.87 12.70 17.28 3.04 21.10 27.92 -2.58 23.65
 Resource intensive 11.52 0.94 12.52 16.79 -2.41 14.29 39.73 2.95 40.41
 Medium-high tech 10.73 1.53 11.87 13.91 13.52 49.93 28.72 -12.39 9.23
Poland Manufacturing total 7.94 9.60 15.54 15.58 2.98 19.19 20.10 6.62 31.96
 Low tech 8.43 9.56 16.64 15.89 3.16 19.89 22.43 6.40 33.56
 Resource intensive 7.86 9.47 15.44 14.40 1.48 16.69 23.96 7.99 39.53
 Medium-high tech 7.88 10.28 16.35 11.54 6.32 17.87 28.33 3.96 36.19
Slovak Republic Manufacturing total 6.71 6.71 10.74 15.42 -2.74 12.72 13.51 9.46 26.18
 Low tech 7.13 8.38 13.12 17.78 -5.37 12.56 14.53 13.75 34.60
 Resource intensive 6.16 6.14 9.38 12.27 0.49 12.10 17.57 5.65 26.75
 Medium-high tech 5.98 7.97 11.41 9.17 2.92 22.63 20.55 5.05 24.37
Slovenia Manufacturing total 21.65 4.98 30.67 27.60 -3.15 22.15 43.87 8.12 77.46
 Low tech 27.51 4.04 37.22 34.58 -1.91 30.89 52.18 5.95 71.76
 Resource intensive 23.86 4.51 34.70 33.90 -5.55 29.43 41.70 10.06 77.00
 Medium-high tech 19.63 5.39 28.49 28.02 -0.21 27.57 41.55 5.60 69.04
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Table 3 (continued) 
Bulgaria Manufacturing total 4.24 0.86 4.51 6.72 -3.31 5.33 13.49 4.18 18.07
 Low tech 5.57 -0.78 5.20 7.61 -3.13 6.15 16.30 2.35 19.91
 Resource intensive 5.05 -0.65 4.70 7.45 -2.47 5.30 19.22 1.82 19.36
 Medium-high tech 4.31 0.07 4.19 3.49 -1.12 3.36 26.51 1.19 27.05
Romania Manufacturing total 2.93 2.98 3.61 5.34 -2.03 4.63 10.08 5.01 14.31
 Low tech 3.27 1.63 3.67 7.05 1.03 7.90 11.13 0.60 11.38
 Resource intensive 2.77 3.80 3.55 6.10 -3.54 4.37 9.92 7.34 15.83
 Medium-high tech 2.88 5.46 4.24 2.61 2.37 3.11 20.68 3.09 25.23
1) Defined as wage at EXR/Productivity in PPP 1996 
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Table 4: Productivity, wage and unit labour cost gaps at PPP - 1993 and 2000 
    Wage Productivity Unit labour costs1) 
    1993 Growth rate 2000 1993 Growth rate 2000 1993 Growth rate 2000
    (AUT=100)          
Czech Republic Manufacturing total 28.91 3.62 37.26 41.51 0.04 41.62 47.59 4.49 65.16
  Low tech 31.58 3.59 41.16 48.96 -0.74 49.55 47.18 5.80 65.52
  Resource intensive 25.89 3.77 34.46 46.82 -4.81 41.35 54.62 7.91 135.73
  Medium-high tech 27.32 4.45 36.81 34.18 2.52 40.11 54.94 3.75 71.73
Hungary Manufacturing total 28.28 0.59 29.47 49.16 7.79 84.84 61.52 -9.29 32.11
  Low tech 30.29 0.77 31.79 46.61 3.04 56.91 77.35 -7.21 50.04
  Resource intensive 29.05 0.85 31.33 45.28 -2.41 38.55 101.45 -3.34 71.86
  Medium-high tech 27.05 1.43 29.72 37.52 13.52 134.69 72.10 -13.34 22.62
Poland Manufacturing total 22.61 5.40 33.00 39.48 2.98 48.63 51.12 3.76 66.52
  Low tech 24.01 5.36 35.34 40.27 3.16 50.39 56.98 2.92 68.02
  Resource intensive 22.41 5.27 32.79 36.48 1.48 42.30 55.17 5.47 79.70
  Medium-high tech 22.44 6.08 34.72 29.24 6.32 45.29 76.72 0.30 74.89
Slovak Republic Manufacturing total 24.22 3.59 31.14 49.70 -2.74 41.02 50.23 3.33 63.41
  Low tech 25.72 5.26 38.04 57.31 -5.37 40.49 56.77 5.74 80.61
  Resource intensive 22.22 3.01 27.20 39.57 0.49 38.99 58.58 4.29 79.69
  Medium-high tech 21.59 4.84 33.07 29.56 2.92 72.95 77.68 -1.13 58.35
Slovenia Manufacturing total 43.39 2.51 51.74 49.35 -3.15 39.60 86.60 2.28 101.61
  Low tech 55.13 1.57 62.79 61.83 -1.91 55.22 105.14 1.19 107.08
  Resource intensive 47.81 2.05 58.53 60.61 -5.55 52.62 77.83 6.41 110.56
  Medium-high tech 39.34 2.93 48.06 50.10 -0.21 49.29 83.22 -1.95 81.52
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Table 4 (continued) 
Bulgaria Manufacturing total 7.19 -6.90 4.44 31.45 -3.31 24.94 79.32 -5.24 54.96
  Low tech 9.45 -8.54 5.12 35.63 -3.13 28.80 90.06 -5.56 66.33
  Resource intensive 8.56 -8.40 4.63 34.88 -2.47 24.80 100.58 -5.98 64.10
  Medium-high tech 7.30 -7.69 4.13 16.34 -1.12 15.75 135.35 -5.38 87.53
Romania Manufacturing total 15.67 -2.91 12.79 29.04 -2.03 25.20 51.51 1.09 55.60
  Low tech 17.50 -4.26 13.02 38.37 1.03 43.01 49.34 0.35 48.14
  Resource intensive 14.82 -2.09 12.57 33.17 -3.54 23.80 56.65 1.79 66.37
  Medium-high tech 15.44 -0.43 15.05 14.19 2.37 16.93 99.40 4.05 123.16
1) Defined as wage at PPP/Productivity at PPP 
 Conference Contributions 54 
4.1. PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Expressed in nominal exchange rates all countries showed a large gap in 
1993. The best performing country was Slovenia, reaching a productiv-
ity level of about 27% (relative to Austria). Bulgaria and Romania only 
reached a productivity level of about 5% to 6% of the Austrian level.  
 
There are however differences when looking at industry groups. In all 
countries the gaps to Austria were the largest in the medium-/high-tech 
industries and smallest in the low-tech industries, the measured differ-
ence in the productivity gaps between these two sets of industries was 
generally between 5 and 10 percentage points.  
 
Over time rapid changes in these patterns occurred. All countries ex-
perienced positive productivity growth from 1993 to 2000 (see Graph 5 
earlier in the paper). But not all countries succeeded in closing the gap 
relative to the benchmark Austria. In aggregate manufacturing only the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had higher productivity growth 
than Austria. All other countries had lower productivity growth and thus 
the gap widened.  
 
But here again there are marked differences across types of industries. 
Hungary closed the gap in the high-tech industries with a (per annum) 
rate of closure of the gap of 15% and reached a level of about 50% that 
of Austria. Similarly, Poland closed the gap most rapidly in the high-
tech sector with a rate of 6% and the Slovak Republic of 2%. Slovenia 
and Bulgaria were falling back relative to Austria in all three sectors, 
but the gap widened more (at a higher rate) in the low-tech and re-
source-intensive industries than in the medium-/high-tech industries. 
Finally, also Romania succeeded in closing the gap in the low- and the 
medium-/high-tech industries but started from an extremely low level. 
 
Thus information on productivity catching-up seems to confirm in most 
instances the Gerschenkron hypothesis at the industrial level, i.e. that 
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faster rates of catching-up can be achieved in industries in which the 
initial gaps were higher.  
 
4.2. WAGE RATES 
 
With respect to wage rates one can observe the following pattern. First, 
the gaps in wage rates are much more even across sectors than was the 
case with productivity. The gaps in wage rates (at current nominal ex-
change rates) extended from Slovenia with a level of about 20% the 
Austrian wage rate level in 1993 to Romania with only 3%. Second, and 
this is a very important point for the comparative cost dynamic, the 
growth (or closure) rates for wage rates were much more similar across 
sectors than was the case for the (differential) productivity growth rates. 
 
4.3. UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
 
The relative movements of wage rates and productivity determine the 
evolution of unit labour costs which is, of course, an important measure 
of the general (cost) competitiveness of countries but more importantly, 
for our purposes, of the relative competitiveness of different industries. 
 
Looking at the dynamics, we can see that in aggregate manufacturing 
the wage versus productivity growth was such that over the period 
1993-1999 unit labour costs were rising (relative to Austria) in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. They were 
falling quite strongly in Hungary and Bulgaria, but for quite different 
reasons as a comparison of productivity and wage rate movements at 
both current and PPP exchange rates shows. In Hungary this was due to 
a very strong performance in relative productivity growth and very 
moderate relative wage growth (at current exchange rates), while in 
Bulgaria there was actually a fall in the productivity position (relative to 
Austria) but combined with a much sharper fall in relative wage levels 
(again measured at the current exchange rate and this was due to a sharp 
devaluation of the Bulgarian currency).  
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Differences in the dynamics across industry groupings are remarkable 
especially for those sectors in which countries experienced large pro-
ductivity growth rates (as wage growth is rather similar across sectors). 
Especially Hungary reduced relative unit labour costs in the medium-
/high-tech sectors from 66% (the Austrian level) in 1993 to about 22% 
in 1999. 
 
The important point which emerges from cross-industry comparisons is 
that for some countries the productivity catching-up (closure of the gap) 
is rather rapid in the medium-/high-tech industries in which the initial 
gaps were the highest. We reiterate the important point that this pattern 
very much confirms the "Gerschenkron hypothesis" as applied to the 
industry level (and as stated in the introduction of the paper). For other 
countries no such differential productivity catch-up can be observed; in 
the language of Abramovitz, such countries either did not have the "ca-
pabilities" or did not mobilize these to make use of the high learning 
(and technology transfer) potential in those industries in which the ini-
tial technological gaps were the highest. On the other hand, we observe 
that the pattern of wage catching-up (or wage growth) is much more 
even - than productivity growth - across sectors, and hence comparative 
cost structures move in favour of those sectors which experience faster 
productivity catching-up; in Hungary and to a lesser degree also in a 
number of other CEECs these are the medium- to high-tech sectors. This 
is exactly the pattern which was also found in research on the dynamics 
of comparative costs across a much wider range of catching-up econo-
mies (see Landesmann and Stehrer, 2001). Let us now move on to ex-
amine whether these underlying patterns of comparative cost dynamics 
get also revealed in the evolving trade structures of CEE economies.  
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5. TRADE PERFORMANCE AND TRADE SPECIALIZATION 
 
In this section we start with an overview of broad sectoral patterns of 
trade performance and then move towards a more detailed qualitative 
examination of trade specialization. As will be seen below, the analysis 
of evolving patterns of trade specialization will turn out to be consistent 
with the previous observations regarding the dynamics of differentiated 
productivity catching-up (across countries and industries) and the impli-
cations drawn from this regarding comparative cost dynamics. To com-
plete the analysis of trade performance, we shall show that indicators of 
product quality up-grading (measured by the closure of export price 
gaps) also support the picture drawn here regarding the evolution of 
comparative advantage dynamics across the different CEE economies.  
 
5.1. CURRENT ACCOUNTS: STRUCTURES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
We shortly review the broad outlines of the current accounts in the 
CEECs. Table 5 shows the four broad components of the current ac-
counts (all expressed in per cent of GDP) over the period 1989-2001. 
We can see that all countries (with the exception of Slovenia) experi-
enced at times dramatic - and unsustainable - deficits in the current ac-
counts. In general, the CEECs are performing better in the trade ac-
counts on services than on goods. However, at closer examination (see 
Römisch, 2001 and Graph 6), it emerges that this good performance in 
services trade is predominantly due to the travel account, i.e. tourism 
income, which is a very strong net contributor to the current accounts in 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and - potentially - Bul-
garia. Also the transport services sector contributes positively in many 
CEECs to the current account due particularly to the wage cost advan-
tages in road haulage. In other services, in which financial, insurance 
and all types of business services (accountancy, marketing, consul-
tancy, etc.) are the main components, the CEECs are predominantly net 
importers. In previous studies, it has been shown that in the business 
services area, advanced economies retain a strong comparative advan-
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tage vis-à-vis catching-up economies after they have lost comparative 
advantages even in relatively advanced areas of manufacturing (such as 
in electronics). We thus expect the net import position in the business 
services area to persist between the CEECs and the advanced countries 
of Western Europe in the longer run. To some extent high deficit posi-
tions in these areas (especially in financial services) get reduced in those 
countries which were most successful in attracting foreign firms to set 
up local subsidiaries. 
 
The income accounts also show mostly a negative balance (again with 
the exception of Slovenia) which is mostly due to high interest pay-
ments on debt as well as - in countries which managed to attract a lot of 
FDI such as Hungary - the repatriation of profits. In most countries there 
is a positive balance on transfers.  
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Table 5: Current account in per cent of GDP 
 
Source: WIIW Database; own calculations. 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic Current account balance 1.56 -0.97 4.47 -1.02 1.30 -1.91 -2.63 -7.14 -6.73 -2.20 -2.66 -5.28 -4.65
Balance on Goods 1.30 -0.72 1.33 -6.38 -1.50 -3.36 -7.07 -9.89 -9.24 -4.57 -3.46 -6.09 -5.43
Balance on Services 0.63 0.44 3.15 4.98 2.89 1.19 3.54 3.33 3.33 3.37 2.18 2.75 2.69
Balance on Incomes -0.31 -0.60 -0.17 0.02 -0.34 -0.05 -0.20 -1.25 -1.49 -1.91 -2.45 -2.67 -2.73
Balance on Transfers -0.07 -0.08 0.17 0.35 0.25 0.31 1.10 0.67 0.67 0.91 1.07 0.72 0.82
Hungary Current account balance -4.93 0.38 0.80 0.87 -8.96 -9.42 -5.55 -3.71 -2.15 -4.89 -4.33 -2.85 -2.13
Balance on Goods 1.84 1.05 0.57 -0.13 -8.42 -8.76 -5.47 -5.85 -4.29 -5.00 -4.53 -3.77 -3.89
Balance on Services -2.45 1.51 1.83 1.76 0.56 0.63 3.54 5.32 4.95 3.78 2.89 3.80 4.16
Balance on Incomes -4.75 -4.30 -4.14 -3.36 -3.09 -3.48 -4.13 -3.22 -3.11 -3.98 -3.40 -3.38 -2.87
Balance on Transfers 0.43 2.11 2.55 2.60 1.99 2.19 0.51 0.04 0.30 0.31 0.70 0.49 0.47
Poland Current account balance -1.73 1.21 -3.40 -1.80 -3.34 0.73 4.18 -0.95 -2.99 -4.32 -7.45 -6.31 -4.07
Balance on Goods 0.29 3.75 0.36 0.55 -2.89 -0.97 -1.50 -5.69 -7.86 -8.66 -9.27 -8.36 -6.62
Balance on Services -0.28 -0.25 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.06 0.11 -0.15 0.21 -0.31 -1.05 -1.07 -0.55
Balance on Incomes -3.77
-5.64 -3.72 -4.74 -3.95 -3.06 -0.48 -0.25 -0.32 -0.36 -0.51 -0.48 -0.51
Balance on Transfers 9.32 3.36 0.93 0.82 0.56 0.68 0.43 0.70 0.80 1.23 1.04 1.07 1.13
Slovakia Current account balance . . . . -4.44 5.00 2.67 -9.56 -8.56 -9.01 -4.86 -3.62 -8.58
Balance on Goods . . . . -7.77 0.39 -1.19 -11.18 -9.76 -10.70 -5.41 -4.66 -10.43
Balance on Services . . . . 2.82 4.95 3.45 0.85 0.95 0.73 1.08 2.23 2.34
Balance on Incomes . . . . -0.32 -0.79 -0.07 -0.22 -0.58 -0.72 -1.49 -1.80 -1.53
Balance on Transfers . . . . 0.83 0.46 0.48 0.99 0.83 1.67 0.97 0.60 1.04
Slovenia Current account balance 8.99 2.98 1.02 7.40 1.51 3.98 -0.53 0.17 0.06 -0.75 -3.90 -3.37 -0.36
Balance on Goods 1.59 -3.50 -2.07 6.32 -1.22 -2.34 -5.08 -4.37 -4.26 -4.03 -6.20 -6.28 -3.31
Balance on Services 7.61 6.56 3.81 1.44 2.96 4.47 3.08 3.36 3.46 2.51 1.81 2.41 2.66
Balance on Incomes -0.82 -0.68 -0.84 -0.73 -0.41 1.18 0.96 0.70 0.22 0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.40
Balance on Transfers 0.61 0.61 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.67 0.51 0.48 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.68
Romania Current account balance 5.34 -8.73 -3.51 -7.99 -4.45 -1.42 -5.00 -7.28 -6.06 -7.10 -4.13 -3.69 -5.91
Balance on Goods 4.77 -8.96 -3.83 -7.25 -4.28 -1.37 -4.45 -6.99 -5.61 -6.28 -3.53 -4.56 7.48
Balance on Services 0.52 -0.46 -0.48 -0.86 -0.44 -0.57 -0.92 -1.09 -1.17 -1.56 -1.20 -0.69 -0.55
Balance on Incomes 0.04 0.42 0.05 -0.44 -0.55 -0.43 -0.68 -0.87 -0.91 -1.06 -1.15 -0.77 -0.84
Balance on Transfers . 0.28 0.76 0.57 0.81 0.94 1.04 1.68 1.64 1.80 1.76 2.33 2.96
Bulgaria Current account balance -2.78 -1.99 -0.95 -4.19 -10.15 -0.33 -1.51 1.63 10.06 -0.48 -5.03 -5.57 -6.11
Balance on Goods -2.56 -1.31 -0.39 -2.47 -8.19 -0.17 0.28 1.22 3.09 -2.99 -8.35 -9.33 -11.56
Balance on Services 0.82 0.32 -1.06 -1.11 -0.53 0.11 0.50 3.33 8.13 2.93 2.43 4.01 4.02
Balance on Incomes -1.18 -1.19 -0.35 -1.11 -1.78 -1.99 -3.30 -3.96 -3.43 -2.23 -1.43 -2.55 -2.24
Balance on Transfers 0.13 0.19 0.85 0.50 0.34 1.72 1.01 1.04 2.28 1.81 2.32 2.30 3.68
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Graph 6: Net balances of CEECs in components of services trade, 1993-
2001 
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Source: WIIW. 
 
Although a differentiated analysis of the non-manufacturing parts of the 
current accounts across the CEECs would be very interesting in itself 
we shall now - for reasons of space - move towards a mote detailed ex-
amination of trade specialization within manufacturing. 
 
5.2. TRADE SPECIALIZATION IN MANUFACTURING 
 
In order to analyse structures and tendencies of trade specialization of 
CEECs within manufacturing we use the COMEXT database which 
collects all trade with the EU countries as reporting countries. The data-
base includes data at a very detailed (8-digit) level. The very detailed 
level will be used in section 5.3 when examining relative export prices 
as indicators for relative product quality. In this section we shall exam-
ine trade structures at the level of industry groupings which themselves 
are constructed as aggregates of industries defined at the 3-digit NACE 
level. The industry groupings used are the same ones which were de-
fined for the series of European Competitiveness Reports (see European 
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Commission, 1999 and 2000) and the WIIW Competitiveness study 
(WIIW, 2001). 
 
Earlier studies (see e.g. Landesmann, 2000) have shown that the Central 
and East European countries’ trading structure with the EU-12 started in 
1989 with a profile typical of less developed economies: the representa-
tion of exports of the labour-intensive industrial branches was above-
average (in relation to EU imports as a whole), in the capital-, R&D- 
and skill-intensive branches below-average (particularly in the latter 
two), while the representation of exports of energy-intensive branches 
was above-average - which reflected the heritage of cheap energy sup-
plies within the CMEA. Over time, important changes took place in the 
CEECs' export structure to the EU and in the revealed comparative ad-
vantage indicators (RCAs) in the different categories of industries. The 
most remarkable change took place in Hungary: from sizeable deficits in 
its export structure in the areas of capital-, R&D- and skill-intensive 
industries, these deficits either eroded completely or turned into sur-
pluses. This pattern was followed in a much less spectacular manner by 
the Czech Republic and Poland, where deficits in the representation of 
skill-, R&D- and capital-intensive branches were also reduced. For these 
economies and also for the Slovak Republic the relatively strong pres-
ence of energy-intensive branches declined substantially, while this was 
not the case with Romanian and Bulgarian exports to the EU (particu-
larly in the latter case, dependence upon energy-intensive exports to the 
EU increased markedly until 1998). Also the picture with respect to 
labour-intensive industries was remarkably different in the cases of Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the CEEC-5 on the other: in 
the first two, labour-intensive branches became the predominant seg-
ment of their exports to the EU, while the dependence upon labour-
intensive branches got somewhat reduced in the other countries. 
 
Discontinuity in statistics does not allow us to present a full analysis of 
patterns of trade specialization going back to 1989 and we focus instead 
on the period 1995 to 2000 (from 1995 onwards 15 EU reporting coun-
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tries are represented in the COMEXT database and consistent CN-
NACE classification converters can be used). As mentioned above, we 
shall employ for this analysis a qualitative grouping of industries (de-
rived from an aggregation of 3-digit NACE industries) which was being 
used in the EU Competitiveness Reports and has hence the advantage of 
immediate comparability with the analysis conducted there for the EU 
member countries. Two "taxonomies" are applied: one based on the use 
of cluster-analytic techniques where industries are clustered (and indus-
try groupings identified) by the use of a number of industrial organiza-
tion and input use criteria (taxonomy 1). This led to the distinction of 
five industry groupings: mainstream, labour-intensive, capital-intensive, 
marketing-driven and technology-driven. In the other taxonomy (taxon-
omy 2) industries are grouped by skill intensity (low-skill, medium-
skill/blue-collar, medium-skill/white-collar, high-skill). The correspon-
dence between NACE 3-digit industries and the two taxonomies can be 
seen in Appendix Table 9 and more detail on the underlying methodol-
ogy can be obtained from Peneder (2001).  
 
In Table 6 we have calculated (in Table 6 a) for taxonomy 1 and in Ta-
ble 6 b) for taxonomy 2) the percentage points by which certain industry 
groupings are more or less represented in the export structures of the 
CEECs compared to the export structure of the EU Northern countries 
(all EU countries except for Spain, Portugal and Greece). The figures 
for the EU Southern cohesion countries have been similarly calculated 
as differences in the percentage representation of their exports to the EU 
in the different industry groupings relative to that of the EU-North. Fi-
nally for the EU Northern countries the actual percentage representation 
of the industry groupings in their total (intra-EU) exports are presented. 
In Graph 7, we have picked out the shares in countries’ exports to the 
EU of those industry groupings where the qualitatively most striking 
differences can be observed: the labour-intensive and technology-driven 
groupings of taxonomy 1 and the low-skill and the high-skill groupings 
of taxonomy 2.  
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We can see the following:  
• In general there is still a relatively stronger representation of the 
labour-intensive branches in the CEECs export structures to the EU 
(compared to the EU Northern countries’ export structures). For Po-
land, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states this dependence is very 
strong - in fact much stronger than for the EU-South, and for Bul-
garia, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania this dependence has, further-
more, sharply increased over the period 1995 to 2000. For the other 
countries, this "over representation" of labour-intensive branches - 
relatively to the advanced EU member countries - has declined, for 
some quite sharply. For Hungary a (branch) specialization in this di-
rection no longer exists. 
• With respect to technology-intensive branches, which accounted for 
about 33% of EU Northern EU exports, the CEECs started off in 
1995 (earlier figures would indicate that this was even more the case 
before that) with sizable "deficits" in these areas. Over the period 
1995 to 2000 these deficits have declined substantially in Hungary, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia (in fact, in Hungary and 
Estonia they have turned into surpluses), and in Poland more mildly. 
In Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania these deficits have re-
mained at very high levels and in most cases have further increased. 
• The picture is similar if we look at the two extreme categories of 
taxonomy 2, i.e. the relative representation of low-skill- and high-
skill-intensive industries respectively in the countries’ export struc-
tures to the EU. Again we can see that the CEECs all started off with 
an over-representation of the low-skill-intensive branches in their 
exports to the EU (just as the Southern EU countries did). This over-
representation fell quite dramatically in the case of a number of 
CEECs (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia 
and Estonia), but again remains at a very high level in Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and Lithuania.  
• In the high-skill industries, deficits remain in all CEECs (as they do 
in the Southern EU countries) but the picture shows again quite a bit 
of differentiation across the CEECs, so that the percentage differ-
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ences (to EU-North) are below 10% in the case of the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia. 
 
Thus the picture which emerges is of strong differentiation across the 
CEECs by a number of indicators of revealed comparative advantage 
(see also the WIIW Competitiveness Report, WIIW, 2001, for further 
indicators and analysis) in their structures and, furthermore, tendencies 
of trade specialization. While some of the CEECs have reduced dra-
matically (or even lost completely) their inter-industry specialization 
towards labour-intensive, low skill branches and made some inroads 
into technology-driven and skill-intensive branches, others show clearly 
that their specialization structures got "locked in" (at least so far) in the 
labour-intensive, low-skill sectors. We take this as support of our basic 
hypothesis that catching-up patterns can give rise to "comparative ad-
vantage switchovers" if countries can utilize the high potential for pro-
ductivity growth (and, as we shall see below, of product quality up-
grading) in industries in which the initial technological (and product 
quality) gaps are rather high. Alternatively, countries which cannot util-
ize this potential remain locked in a specialization pattern which re-
mains the typical one between (technologically) advanced and less ad-
vanced economies. 
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Table 6: Export structure of CEECs compared to EU-North and EU-South 
 
a) Export shares (taxonomy I - factor intensities) - differences to EU-North 
 Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia Bulgaria Romania 
 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
1 mainstream 7.65 8.95 -0.83 -3.42 -4.37 -0.56 -1.34 2.02 6.96 7.84 -10.32 -8.95 -7.28 -5.13
2 labour-intensive 14.37 8.13 11.11 2.07 25.88 19.44 13.59 8.90 16.64 12.58 10.46 21.50 32.33 35.84
3 capital intensive 0.36 -4.10 -3.09 -10.15 1.70 -3.35 13.79 1.96 -5.52 -3.09 25.41 16.53 3.68 -7.99
4 marketing-driven -6.22 -4.47 -1.07 -4.85 -5.44 -2.73 -7.80 -4.94 -7.99 -5.01 -0.58 -0.03 -2.59 3.08
5 technology 
   driven 
-16.16 -8.51 -6.12 16.35 -17.77 -12.80 -18.24 -7.95 -10.10 -12.32 -24.97 -29.05 -26.14 -25.79
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania  EU-South EU-North 
(Shares)
 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000  1995 2000 1995 2000
1 mainstream -10.66 -12.24 -14.21 -15.27 -14.88 -12.46  -6.60 -7.37 21.67 20.82
2 labour-intensive 27.39 18.06 20.75 46.93 22.49 34.18  12.37 1.84 11.39 11.60
3 capital intensive 8.01 -5.51 31.36 7.99 22.38 9.33  -3.23 2.56 23.81 23.37
4 marketing-driven -8.00 -6.33 -10.90 -8.12 -6.26 -3.63  4.56 7.00 15.53 11.62
5 technology  
   driven 
-16.73 6.01 -27.00 -31.53 -23.74 -27.42  -7.11 -4.02 27.60 32.59
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b) Export shares (taxonomy II - skill intensities) - differences to EU-North 
 Czech Re-
public 
Hungary Poland Slovak Repub-
lic 
Slovenia Bulgaria Romania 
 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
1 low skill 6.54 -3.32 9.41 -7.79 17.08 4.77 12.68 1.42 3.94 -0.08 38.28 45.81 38.06 36.64
2 medium skill/ 
   blue collar 
7.33 16.52 3.92 9.36 11.27 20.15 5.80 13.82 12.85 16.61 -13.42 -14.23 -3.90 -5.40
3 medium skill/ 
   white collar 
-7.11 -8.09 -2.34 0.92 -14.05 -11.91 -5.43 -7.53 -6.39 -7.20 -11.90 -20.14 -19.28 -17.64
4 high skill -6.77 -5.11 -10.99 -2.49 -14.30 -13.01 -13.05 -7.71 -10.40 -9.34 -12.96 -11.44 -14.87 -13.60
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania   EU-South EU-North 
(Shares) 
  
 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000  1995 2000 1995 2000
1 low skill 13.29 4.01 3.68 2.10 19.75 22.05  23.36 14.88 29.41 26.97
2 medium skill/ 
   blue collar 
2.76 7.95 3.08 24.77 -5.28 -1.34  1.67 -2.75 19.59 20.56
3 medium skill/ 
   white collar 
-7.50 3.26 11.25 -9.75 4.07 -3.56  -11.49 -7.28 32.00 33.62
4 high skill -8.55 -15.21 -18.00 -17.12 -18.53 -17.15  -13.54 -4.85 19.00 18.86
Note: Differences of export shares between CEECs and EU-South to EU-North; export shares for EU-North. 
Source: Comext data base and own calculations 
 
 
Landesmann   67 
Graph 7: Shares of different industry groupings in exports to EU 
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However, we have still to be cautious at this stage: What we have ana-
lysed in this section was a distinct pattern of inter-industry specializa-
tion which emerges in trade between the CEECs and the EU. However, 
the analysis of inter-industry specialization is only one aspect of trade 
specialization; the other would be intra-industry specialization, i.e. the 
specialization on particular production stages or on product quality 
segments within an industry. For reasons of space, we are not going to 
present the results from detailed analysis of patterns of "vertical product 
specialisation" which we have undertaken, i.e. the specialization on 
particular production stages or on product quality segments within an 
industry. For this we refer the reader to the results reported in Landes-
mann and Stehrer (2002). The results support the Gerschenkron hy-
pothesis with respect to strong upward movements in the vertical (i.e. 
product quality) structure of intra-industry trade, particular in those 
industries where the initial "product quality gaps" were large, in the case 
of the advanced CEE economies. 
 
In this context, let us also point out that there is well-established strong 
evidence (see Landesmann, 2000 and WIIW, 2001) for growing intra-
industry trade between the more advanced CEECs and the EU. This is 
in line with the "new" trade theory which suggests that trade among 
industrialized countries is motivated by product differentiation and 
economies of scale. Measured by Grubel-Lloyd indices, intra-industry 
trade has been most pronounced in EU trade of the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Hungary whereas it has been lowest in Latvia, Lithuania 
and Romania. Compared with the early period of transition (and even 
more so with the pre-transition period), intra-industry trade between the 
more advanced CEECs (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and 
Poland) and the EU has increased further whereas it has more or less 
stagnated in Bulgaria and Romania. Judging also by the high shares in 
exports and imports, intra-industry trade (including outward processing 
trade) has been of particular importance in textiles as well as in electri-
cal, optical and transport equipment. Again, the evidence on the levels 
and rates of change of intra-industry trade points towards a strong dif-
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ferentiation amongst the CEECs. 
 
6. THE ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ACROSS BRANCHES 
 
We finally look at two important factors which are generally regarded as 
important in determining the course of catching-up and the pattern of 
specialization of the Central and Eastern European countries. We refer 
here, firstly, to the role of foreign direct investments (FDI) as important 
carriers of technological and managerial know-how transfer and, sec-
ondly (in section 7), to the role of human capital whose existence is seen 
as crucial in facilitating the adoption of new technologies and as influ-
encing a country’s pattern of trade and industrial specialization.  
 
There is broad agreement in the literature that FDI plays an important 
role in restructuring and in improving competitiveness (see the general 
evidence world-wide e.g. in UNCTAD, 2001, Barrel and Holland, 2000, 
and for the CEECs, see e.g. Hunya, 2000). Table 7 reports data on FDI 
stocks in 2000 for seven Central and Eastern European countries. These 
data were collected from national sources and/or foreign investment 
agencies. As there are methodological problems in comparing the data 
across countries (especially for Hungary and Poland) we shall only dis-
cuss the structure of FDI within the countries. 
 
Manufacturing industry has been an important target of FDI in most 
Candidate Countries attracting nearly half of the inward FDI stock as of 
end-2000 (exceptions are the Baltic states and no data are presented for 
Bulgaria and Romania in Table 7). The sectoral distribution of FDI is 
highly uneven, reflecting the varying attractiveness of individual 
branches for foreign investors as well as differences in the privatisation 
policies pursued by the individual Candidate Countries (see Hunya, 
2000). Generally FDI inflows have been high in both the domestically 
oriented food, beverages and tobacco industry (DA) especially in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, in 
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some natural resource-based industries such as non-metallic mineral 
products (DI), as well as in export-oriented branches such as electrical, 
optical (DL) and transport equipment (DM) industries.  
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Table 7: Foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in manufacturing industry, 2000 (USD million) 
NA-
CE Activities 
Czech 
Republic1) Hungary Poland
Slovak 
Republic Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 1125.6 918.4 4961.9 229.0 38.5 128.2 100.2 269.3
DB Textiles and textile products 203.6 142.6 254.4 20.6 12.7 78.6 32.5 108.6
DC Leather and leather products 4.1 22.8 17.2 15.3 12.4 . 1.8 0.3
DD Wood and wood products 89.7 40.4 240 17.1 5.6 93.63) 57.9 33.0
DE Pulp, paper & paper products, publishing & printing 587.7 159.4 1470.3 105.9 191.6 . 17.9 25.2
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 210.9 515.92) . 151.6 . 6.0 0.0 42.8
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 398.0 1285.1 117.1 173.2 49.6 38.1 .
DH Rubber and plastic products 104.2 176.7 591.4 21.3 141.4 6.3 10.5 26.7
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 1467.8 233.6 2785.7 97.9 73.3 . 23.7 37.6
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 624.2 194.6 403.4 819.2 88.5 22.3 25.7 11.6
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 218.7 199.1 317.1 80.4 144.7 18.5 21.5 7.4
DL Electrical and optical equipment 662.2 680.6 1575.1 80.0 122.4 16.6 5.9 53.0
DM Transport equipment 989.5 366.0 5167.7 122.3 133.9 39.1 1.3 48.1
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 100.5 38.3 393.5 7.8 4.5 . 8.1 7.9
D Manufacturing 6786.7 3688.4 19462.8 1885.4 1142.7 567.7 345.0 671.5
 FDI total 17552.1 10104.0 45772.0 3692.2 2808.5 2645.4 2081.3 2334.3
Notes: 1) 1999. - 2) Includes DF+DG. - 3) Includes DD+DE. 
Remarks: Czech Republic: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. Hungary: nominal capital based on corporation-tax declarations.  
Poland: equity capital, reinvested earnings gross; projects over USD 1 million capital based on PAIZ data. Slovak Republic: equity capital, rein-
vested earnings - in the corporate sector. Slovenia: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. Estonia: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. 
Latvia: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. Lithuania: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. Croatia: equity capital.  
Source: National banks, Statistical Offices and Foreign Investment Agencies. 
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Using again our previous classification into low-tech, medium-/high-
tech, and resource-intensive industries and looking at the shares of sales 
from FIEs (enterprises with some degree of foreign ownership; for de-
tails on this database see Hunya, 2002) in total industry sales, we can 
see that in all four countries depicted in Graph 8 the FIEs account for a 
higher share of sales in the medium-/high-tech than in the low-tech or 
the resource-intensive branches. This is quite consistent with the picture 
of structural change and trade specialization depicted for the more ad-
vanced of the CEECs  in the previous sections of this paper. 
 
Graph 8: The share of FIEs in different industry groupings (1999 in %) 
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* Slovenia without tobacco. 
 
Overall, there are two points we want to make with regard to FDI: 
• The presence of FDI across CEECs remains very uneven and hence 
the role it can perform in facilitating the up-grading of the CEECs' 
industrial structures will actually be performed to different degrees. 
This is compatible with a picture of differentiated catching-up pat-
terns across the CEECs as pointed out in the previous sections of the 
report. 
Landesmann   73 
• The distribution of FDI across branches (although this point needs 
further elaboration which will not be undertaken in this paper) indi-
cates that FDI is attracted also to branches which can be classified as 
medium-/high-tech and thus plays a role in the productivity and qual-
ity up grading process in these branches (for further evidence on the 
impact of foreign ownership involvement in further productivity im-
provements and export performance in CEECs, see Hunya, 2002). 
 
7. THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND LA-
BOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO DIF-
FERENT SKILL GROUPS 
 
It is well known that the large cumulative employment drops in the CEE 
region since 1989 has been reflected in falling labour force participation 
rates in all CEECs. A comparison between the transition countries cov-
ered here and the EU-15 shows that, despite these considerable falls, 
participation rates are still higher than the EU average (68%) in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, similar to the EU-15 level in 
Poland, and lower than in the EU in Hungary and Bulgaria. Employ-
ment rates (total number of employed relative to the population aged 15-
64) also show a wide range, from close to 70% in Romania and the 
Czech Republic (in 1998) to 54% in Hungary. A comparison of em-
ployment rates in CEECs and the EU in 1998 shows that the average 
CEE-7 rate stood at 62.7%, slightly higher than the EU average of 61%. 
Furthermore, the gender gap in employment rates remained smaller in 
the CEECs compared to most countries in the EU. Unemployment rates 
amounted to between 9% and 19% in the CEECs by the year 1999 
which reflects the development of the labour force (particularly the par-
ticipation rate) on the one hand and that of employment levels on the 
other. Unemployment rates across the region have reached a range not 
dissimilar to the EU in the early 1990s.  
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The labour market structure of the accession countries with respect to 
skill levels and educational attainment must be seen against the back-
ground of these changes in participation rates. A first glance at compa-
rable data across CEECs and a comparison with EU Northern and EU 
Southern economies reveals high shares of upper secondary education 
(see Table 8). 
 
The data presented in Table 8 were collected from national labour force 
surveys and compared to data for European countries reported in Euro-
pean Commission (2001). Although there are methodological difficul-
ties these data provide a rough overview of the structure of educational 
attainment. 
 
Table 8 shows that most countries have a share of lower upper secon-
dary educational levels in the working-age population of about 30% 
(lowest in the Czech Republic with 24%) which is at more or less the 
same level as for the EU Northern countries. Higher shares are only 
reported for Bulgaria and Romania with more than 40%. This can be 
compared to the EU Southern countries which show a share of almost 
60%. With respect to the other aggregates the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries have on average higher shares of upper secondary and 
much lower shares in tertiary education than the EU Northern and even 
slightly lower shares in tertiary education than the EU Southern coun-
tries.  
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Table 8: Educational shares 
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovak Rep. Estonia Latria Lithuania Bulgaria Romania EU-South EU-North
Population              
Age group 15-64 by education 
< upper secondary % 23.8 38.5 33.1 33.9 28.8 26.2 30.6 31.3 43.9 43.2 58.0 28.6
upper secondary % 67.0 50.3 58.3 53.9 63.5 51.3 55.3 36.8 42.7 49.9 29.2 49.5
Tertiary % 9.1 11.2 8.6 12.1 7.6 22.5 14.1 31.9 13.4 6.9 12.8 21.9
Labour force  
Age group 15+ by education 
< upper secondary % 10.4 18.4 15.8 20.7 9.4 12.4 13.8 12.4 22.9 35.7 54.9 23.5
upper secondary % 77.8 65.4 71.9 62.8 80.0 58.5 66.7 44.9 56.8 55.9 28.3 51.6
Tertiary % 11.8 16.2 12.3 16.5 10.6 29.1 19.4 42.6 20.3 8.4 16.8 24.9
Employment  
Age group 15+ by education 
< upper secondary % 8.8 17.4 14.8 19.9 6.9 10.7 12.7 11.4 19.2 36.8 54.7 22.3
upper secondary % 78.7 65.5 71.3 62.8 80.7 57.4 66.3 42.6 57.7 54.4 28.2 51.8
Tertiary % 12.6 17.1 13.9 17.3 12.4 31.8 21.0 45.9 23.1 8.7 17.1 25.9
Unemployment  
Age group 15+ by education 
< upper secondary % 26.7 32.4 20.8 31.9 19.8 23.9 20.8 18.0 39.0 20.0 56.1 38.0
upper secondary % 69.2 64.1 75.0 62.9 77.2 65.1 69.5 57.4 53.0 75.6 29.5 48.7
Tertiary % 4.1 3.5 4.2 5.3 2.9 11.0 9.8 24.6 7.9 4.4 14.4 13.3
Source: Employment and labour market in Central European countries, European Commission, 2001 and own calculations. 
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However, the shares of different educational groupings in the labour 
force and in employment can differ from those in (working-age) popula-
tion as participation rates differ across countries and educational levels. 
Whereas the relative shares between population, labour force and em-
ployment across the different educational groups corresponds roughly 
for the EU Southern and EU Northern countries, there are bigger differ-
ences in relation to the Central and Eastern European countries. The 
share of lower upper secondary educational levels in the labour force 
and in employment is in most cases much below the share in total popu-
lation which reveals a very low participation rate. Correspondingly the 
relative shares of people with upper secondary education and tertiary 
education in the labour force and in employment are relatively higher.  
 
The skill structure of unemployment similarly reflects this picture and 
also differs from the EU Northern and EU Southern countries. People 
with upper secondary educational levels amount to about 60% to 70% of 
unemployed compared to 30% in EU-South and 50% in EU-North. On 
the other hand the share of people with lower upper secondary level is 
lower (the reason might be the lower participation rate) whereas the 
share for people with tertiary education is much lower. Unemployment 
rates are particularly low amongst the persons with tertiary education, 
even in comparison with the EU Southern and EU Northern countries. 
This points towards a structural problem, i.e. the lack of highly-skilled 
workers/employees. However, these data mask further severe deficien-
cies with respect to particular occupations. E.g. the EBRD (2000) re-
ports a lack of skills especially in managerial and other high-skilled 
employment which corresponds to the relatively low shares in tertiary 
education.  
 
Graph 9 shows the evolution of employment levels by skill groupings 
(ISCED classification) for three of the CEE Candidate Countries. The 
compilation of this dataset from national labour force surveys (LFS) was 
laborious and the data series have different starting points as the 
compilation of LFS data started at different dates in the different 
economies. The uniform picture which emerges is that there were strong 
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The uniform picture which emerges is that there were strong negative 
employment developments in the lowest skill categories while there 
were positive labour market pressures for the higher skill groupings 
(mostly those with tertiary education, in some countries those with up-
per secondary educational levels). 
 
Although the above definitely requires much more detailed analysis, the 
evidence obtained with regard to strong labour demand pressures for the 
highly skilled in the transition countries is consistent with the picture of 
a catching-up process with qualitative up-grading which has been de-
veloped in the earlier sections of this paper. 
 
Graph 9:  
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Hungary: Changes of employment in skill categories 
(Index: 1992 = 100) 
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Poland: Changes of employment in skill categories 
(Index: 1993 = 100) 
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8. SUMMARY 
 
This paper has attempted to analyse the evolving patterns of industrial 
specialization in Central and Eastern Europe. We have shown that a 
differentiated picture emerges, with some countries catching up rela-
tively fast in technologically more sophisticated branches and also im-
proving their positions in intra-branch product quality. This picture is 
compatible with an analytical approach in which the potential exists to 
turn comparative advantages in favour of those areas in which initially 
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bigger gaps (in productivity and product quality) exist. This is an appli-
cation of the Gerschenkron hypothesis ("advantage of backwardness") at 
the industrial level. However, the existence of such a potential does not 
automatically imply its utilization (a point which Abramovitz empha-
sized). The approach makes room for a wide diversity of qualitative 
catching-up patterns and evolving positions of catching-up economies in 
the international division of labour. This is what we observe with re-
spect to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe where one set of 
countries got (so far) "locked in" in a rather traditional pattern of trade 
and industrial specialization (in low-skill, labour-intensive branches), 
while other CEECs (to varying degrees) show a much more dynamic 
pattern of integration into the European division of labour. 
 
We have substantiated this picture of diversity by analysing first the 
broad patterns of structural change in Central and Eastern Europe (sec-
tion 2) and then the changes in employment and production structures 
within manufacturing (section 3). We then moved towards examining 
the evidence for a dynamically evolving structure of comparative advan-
tage with a detailed assessment of differential patterns of productivity 
and unit (labour) cost growth across branches (section 4) as  well as 
with an analysis of the evolving structure of trade specialization (section 
5). Finally, we sketched the roles of foreign direct investment (section 
6) and of the existence and utilization of educational attainment (section 
7) as important factors in determining the positions of individual coun-
tries (the analysis could similarly be extended to regions) in the evolv-
ing division of labour in the European economy as a whole. We could 
show that the picture concerning labour demand for different skill 
groups supports our analysis with respect to the up grading of industrial 
structures in the more advanced of the CEE Candidate Countries. 
 
As regards EU enlargement, our analysis shows clearly that different 
CEECs are in different positions with regard to their achieved levels of 
catching-up, and this refers not only to overall levels but - probably 
more importantly - to the qualitative nature of their structural transfor-
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mations and their positions in cross-European trade structures. We ex-
pect such differentiation to have a bearing on how they will cope with 
the additional adjustments required by the accession process itself and 
on what footing they will be able to participate in the integrated struc-
tures of the enlarged European economy. This, of course, also has im-
plications for the instruments which will be required to deal with the 
problems of cohesion which will get further accentuated not only as a 
result of the accession process itself but as a result of the existence of a 
set of other economies which are highly integrated with the EU but will 
not join in the first round.  
 
Differentiation across regions shows a similar picture of differentiation 
across countries (see Fazekas, 2002). Again, some regions are catching 
up in terms of industrial up grading, they are very successful in attract-
ing FDI which accounts for a large share of overall exports, while other 
regions remain "locked in" in low-skill areas of production, with low 
shares of well-educated personnel and little evidence for up grading. 
Regional differentiation constitutes thus a great challenge for cohesion 
policies in the Candidate Countries.  
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10. APPENDIX 
 
Table 9 
WIFO Taxonomies  Taxonomy I Taxonomy II 
 NACE rev. 1 factor inputs labour skills 
Meat products 151 4 1
Fish and fish products 152 4 1
Fruits and vegetables 153 4 1
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 154 4 1
Dairy products; ice cream 155 4 1
Grain mill products and starches 156 4 1
Prepared animal feeds 157 4 1
Other food products 158 4 1
Beverages 159 4 1
Tobacco products 160 4 1
Textile fibres 171 3 1
Textile weaving 172 2 1
Made-up textile articles 174 2 1
Other textiles 175 1 1
Knitted and crocheted fabrics 176 1 1
Knitted and crocheted articles 177 1 1
Leather clothes 181 2 1
Other wearing apparel and accessories 182 2 1
Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of 
fur 183 2 1
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 4 1
Luggage, handbags, saddlery and har-
ness 192 4 1
Footwear 193 4 1
Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of 
wood 201 2 2
Panels and boards of wood 202 2 2
Builders' carpentry and joinery 203 2 2
Wooden containers 204 2 2
Other products of wood; articles of cork, 
etc. 205 2 2
Pulp, paper and paperboard 211 3 3
Articles of paper and paperboard 212 1 3
Publishing 221 4 3
Printing 222 4 3
Coke oven products 231
Refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 232 3 3
Nuclear fuel 233
Basic chemicals 241 3 3
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Table 9 (continued) 
Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 242 5 3
Paints, coatings, printing ink 243 1 3
Pharmaceuticals 244 5 4
Detergents, cleaning and polishing, 
perfumes 245 4 3
Other chemical products 246 5 3
Man-made fibres 247 3 3
Rubber products 251 1 1
Plastic products 252 1 1
Glass and glass products 261 1 1
Ceramic goods 262 2 1
Ceramic tiles and flags 263 3 1
Bricks, tiles and construction products 264 2 1
Cement, lime and plaster 265 3 1
Articles of concrete, plaster and cement 266 1 1
Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 267 2 1
Other non-metallic mineral products 268 1 1
Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 271 3 1
Tubes 272 1 1
Other first processing of iron and steel 273 3 1
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals  274 3 1
Structural metal products 281 2 2
Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radia-
tors and boilers 282 4 2
Steam generators 283 2 2
Cutlery, tools and general hardware 286 4 2
Other fabricated metal products 287 1 2
Machinery for  production, use of mech. 
power 291 1 4
Other general purpose machinery 292 1 4
Agricultural and forestry machinery 293 1 4
Machine-tools 294 2 4
Other special purpose machinery 295 1 4
Weapons and ammunition 296 1 4
Domestic appliances n. e. c. 297 1 3
Office machinery and computers 300 5 4
Electric motors, generators and trans-
formers 311 1 3
Electricity distribution and control appa-
ratus 312 5 3
Isolated wire and cable 313 1 3
Accumulators, primary cells and primary 
batteries 314 1 3
Lighting equipment and electric lamps 315 1 3
Electrical equipment n. e. c. 316 2 3
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Table 9 (continued) 
Electronic valves and tubes, other elec-
tronic comp. 321 5 3
TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for 
line telephony 322 5 3
TV, radio and recording apparatus 323 5 3
Medical equipment 331 5 3
Instruments for measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating 332 5 3
Optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 334 5 3
Watches and clocks 335 4 3
Motor vehicles 341 5 2
Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 342 2 2
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 343 3 2
Ships and boats 351 2 2
Railway locomotives and rolling stock 352 2 2
Aircraft and spacecraft 353 5 4
Motorcycles and bicycles 354 1 2
Other transport equipment n. e. c. 355 1 2
Furniture 361 2 2
Jewellery and related articles 362 2 2
Musical instruments 363 4 2
Sports goods 364 4 2
Games and toys 365 4 2
Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 366 4 2
 Taxonomy I : Taxonomy II :  
Industry clusters: 1. Mainstream 1. Low-skill industries 
 2. Labour-intensive industries 2. Medium-skill/blue- 
      collar workers 
 3. Capital-intensive industries 3. Medium-skill/white- 
      collar workers 
 4. Marketing-driven industries 4. High-skill industries 
 5. Technology-driven industries   
 
Source: M. Peneder (2001), "Entrepreneurial Competition and Industrial Location", 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
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DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN 
CCS AND THE EU - A CC PERSPECTIVE 
ANDRÁS INOTAI 
 
First of all I want to thank the organisers and also the Economic Policy 
Committee for the invitation and for the possibility to share with you 
some of my experience and personal remarks concerning the economic 
development, structural changes and problems in the acceding countries 
and in a wider European Union. I would like to make altogether nine 
points. 
 
1. The environment of the enlargement in which most of the struc-
tural changes are expected to take place in the coming years. The 
environment of this enlargement differs to a significant extent from the 
previous enlargements, for many reasons. First of all, it is a "big bang" 
enlargement. There will be up to ten countries, eight of them from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe that will enter. Of course, as in many other 
cases, it is a fundamentally politically motivated "big bang" enlarge-
ment. That is no problem, the European Union is not just an economic 
actor, but also a political actor. And all the previous enlargements had 
had political motivations, some to a larger, and some to a smaller extent. 
But the problem today is the low level of awareness of the economic 
consequences of the political decision. While during the Mediterranean 
enlargement, these economic consequences were fully taken into ac-
count, in the sense that the European Community was prepared finan-
cially and provided large sums in regional and structural aid for the new 
and less developed countries, this kind of balance is largely missing in 
the framework of the coming enlargement. This imbalance may create a 
number of problems both for the acceding countries at least until the end 
of 2006 and for the present member countries.  
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Secondly, the enlargement is taking place most probably and unfortu-
nately in a Western Europe which has very low economic growth rates. 
There are no encouraging signs at the moment that the situation would 
be dramatically improving in 2004 and 2005.  
 
Third, there is an accumulated reform pressure in some of the EU mem-
ber countries, particularly in those countries which used to be the engine 
of the European integration process - mainly Germany but also in some 
other, mainly large countries. 
 
Also, in addition, the reform needs are not less important on the integra-
tion level. A number of EU policies, from institutional reforms to com-
mon agricultural policy up to the future of the budget, should be revis-
ited and reconsidered not after 2007, but most probably at the moment 
of enlargement, and not only because the enlargement takes place. 
 
And finally, of course, Europe is not isolated from world developments 
and global challenges that certainly make some further and fundamental 
impacts on the shaping of a new and enlarged European Union.  
 
2. For obvious political reasons, the acceding countries have been 
put into one basket. However, it would be extremely not only simpli-
fied but dangerous to think that these countries are homogeneous. There 
are quite important differences both on the macroeconomic level, and 
even more if you look at the microeconomic structures and the institu-
tional level. Let me just mention the latest figures published by 
Deutsche Bank Research a couple of days ago. National growth rates for 
2002 and 2003 are between 1.3 percent for Poland and 6.7 percent for 
Lithuania. The Consumer Price Index is 1.1 percent for the Czech Re-
public and over 5 percent in the case of Hungary. The fiscal balance is 
between almost a balanced situation in Estonia to up to 9 percent of the 
GDP deficit in the case of Hungary, and this year it will be almost 6 
percent in the Czech Republic. Current account balance and unemploy-
ment is from 6 percent in Hungary up to almost 20 percent in some 
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other acceding countries. And in addition, most of these figures can 
change, sometimes very quickly, to the better or to the worse. So the 
sustainability of this process is also a very important issue. 
 
3. When talking about the accession of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries to the European Union, I think we miss the real point. 
The point is not to join. That will happen on 1 May 2004 according to 
the present situation. What I am much more interested in is not the mo-
ment of accession, but the continuity of the integration process, that 
is membership. How will these countries have a sustainable member-
ship in the EU. And not only sustainable but also successful. All the 
efforts, and all the structural changes should focus on how to achieve 
these major goals. 
 
4. What are the pillars of sustainable growth? For the time being I 
think that it’s quite clear that in all countries sustainability of growth has 
to be based on export-orientation and it has to be investment-driven and 
not consumption-driven. That was the case in most of the countries for a 
long time. However, most recently there was a deviation, I would say 
even aberration, from this healthy path of sustainable development in 
some countries. For various reasons, ranging from facing the conse-
quences of global economic downturn, domestic economic problems of 
transition to short-term and short-sighted party-politics, private con-
sumption became the basic engine of growth. This growth pattern is 
already showing a number of negative consequences. It does not mean, 
of course, that private consumption cannot increase. It has to, and under 
normal economic conditions, it can also increase. However, it should 
not outpace the general rate of economic growth. If a country has a 5 
percent growth rate, there is relatively large manoeuvering room to in-
crease private consumption by 3 percent, and still investment-driven and 
export-driven economic growth can easily be sustained. 
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5. If we talk about export-oriented and investment-driven sustain-
able growth, then we have to look at these two factors in more detail. 
 
Looking at the trade and export development of most of the Candidate 
Countries, the traditional classical trade theory can be challenged in a 
number of areas. 
 
First, there is of course a correlation between developments or growth 
rates on the main export markets of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
growth rate in Central and Eastern Europe itself. However, one can see 
that even in 2002 in most CEE countries exports were resistant to the 
downturn or recessionary trends in Western European markets. While in 
the EU total imports fell by 3 percent, exports from the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia increased between 5 and 10 percent to 
the European Union. Despite the uniquely high level of dependence on 
Western Europe, these countries could increase their market share and 
could maintain their dynamic export development. The explanation 
mainly lies in the rapidly growing competitiveness. It was not the case a 
decade ago, when a much lower level of "dependence" from Western 
European import markets was not able to prevent the immediate nega-
tive impacts on growth in Central and Eastern Europe in case of declin-
ing or sluggish growth in Western Europe. 
 
Also the theory on the so-called training ground has been challenged. 
The sequencing was not what many experts had been proposing at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Their advise was to give priority to the CEE 
market, where the transition economies were expected to be more com-
petitive. And once a higher level of competitiveness will have been 
reached, to say, in 10 to 15 years, then these countries could be able to 
enter the Western European market. Just the opposite happened. In this 
context, Central (and partly Eastern) Europe followed the East-Asian 
model. All the East-Asian economies first became competitive on the 
US market, and then, in the second stage, they could prove their com-
petitiveness also on other markets, including the regional ones. To focus 
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more on the regional market is likely to happen in the coming years, 
once most of these countries will become members of the EU. 
 
The different structural specialisation of the CEE countries must also be 
mentioned. Some countries are certainly defying the traditional Heck-
scher-Ohlin model that, being at a lower level of development, they 
should specialise on labour-intensive or raw-material-intensive prod-
ucts, and that they should import more technology-intensive, skill-
intensive goods. This is certainly not the case for Hungary, not the case 
for the Czech Republic, to a lesser extent for Slovakia. It is, however, 
very much the case for the Baltics, excluding services, and particularly 
for Southeastern Europe. Thus, there are very clear structural differ-
ences among the individual CEE countries. Based on international clas-
sification, almost two-thirds of total Hungarian exports to the EU con-
sist of so-called technology-intensive goods, although we can discuss 
what is meant by "technology-intensive goods". This share is about 50 
percent for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is about 40 percent for 
Slovenia, 35 percent for Poland and less than 10 percent for the Baltics.  
 
The unit price of exports is an additional important indicator of struc-
tural differences and different levels of competitiveness. On the German 
market, which is the most important export market for all of these coun-
tries, these differences are more than obvious. Final manufactured goods 
account for 75 to 90 percent of the total exports of the CEE countries to 
Germany. In 2001, one ton of Hungarian exports of final manufactured 
goods to Germany was 2.5 times more "valuable" than one ton of Czech 
exports and 4 times more "valuable" than one ton of Polish exports. The 
deeper one is digging into the micro-level, the more differences can be 
identified. And some of these differences are sustained differences, 
which need a relatively long time to be changed. 
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The last point concerning the critical remarks on classic trade theory is 
the trade balance. If there is free trade between two countries on differ-
ent levels of development, traditional trade theory says that the more 
developed country has to have a surplus, provided that the less devel-
oped country is not an exporter of raw materials, oil or gold, which is 
certainly not the case in Central and Eastern Europe. In the trade of 
some CEE countries with the EU just the opposite can be seen. The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and particularly Hungary have a noticeable to 
remarkable trade surplus with the EU. In turn, they register a substantial 
trade deficit with some developing countries, as a result of increasing 
trade among and within large multinational companies. To a large ex-
tent, international trade has become a flow of commodities and services 
between and within companies, and stopped to follow the classic pattern 
of trade between states. This change has important consequences for the 
competitiveness, for the competitive location of industries and services, 
which brings me to another point still on the trade issue, which is the 
future of trade relations in an enlarged EU. 
 
There is a frequently heard argument that, provided that we already have 
free trade in industrial goods and also a large part of agricultural trade is 
liberalised, we cannot count with tremendous trade creation effects after 
enlargement. I do not fully subscribe to this view. First, there are still 
some areas of trade in agriculture which are not yet part of the free 
trade. Second, membership and, more importantly, participation in the 
internal market, create highly reliable conditions for longer-term busi-
ness contacts, with obvious positive implications for the development of 
bilateral trade relations. In addition, there will be a large increase of 
trade in the service sector, which has been very much neglected also in 
economic research until now. Also I think that higher growth rates in 
Central and Eastern Europe and, in the medium term, hopefully larger 
EU resources which will flow from the structural and cohesion funds 
towards Central and Eastern Europe will have a trade-creating effect. 
However, in the short term, the most important trade-creating effect will 
be generated by the liberalisation of trade among the new member coun-
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tries. CEFTA is a free trade area on paper only. In fact, there have been 
a large number of protectionist measures which time by time have been 
applied in bilateral flow of specific commodities (agriculture, steel, pet-
rochemicals, other semi-manufactured goods, etc.). However, at the very 
moment of membership trade policy will stop to be made in Warsaw, it 
will not be made in Prague, and it will not be made in Budapest either. It 
will be made in Brussels. In consequence, on the first day of member-
ship in the EU, there will be no trade barriers among the new member 
countries, resulting in rapidly increasing regional trade volumes and, not 
less importantly, in further structural changes in the still protected in-
dustrial sectors and agriculture as well. 
 
6. Concerning foreign direct investments, I would like to make two 
sets of remarks. 
 
First, and particularly in the more developed countries of the region, 
there is a clear change on the horizon. FDI had practically in the last 
decade three different patterns. It started in Central Europe by making 
use of low-skilled labour. Then it went to a second stage which is 
higher-skilled labour, mainly in the car industry and also in part of the 
computer industry and electronics. Now it has reached a third level 
which affects R&D-intensive activities. No question that, for various 
reasons, the largest profit can be obtained in the latter case. 
 
There is another change, too. Some countries which started with bold 
and open privatisation have practically come almost to an end of this 
process. Therefore the question is: how can they get new, fresh invest-
ments which they undoubtedly need in order to sustain the rapid mod-
ernization and catching-up process. There are two possibilities to main-
tain the dynamic inflow of FDI. One is greenfield investments, for 
which the conditions have to be created and to which I will come back 
to immediately. The second is, what is missing in many statistics, which, 
however, became a major source of investment: the reinvestment of 
profits which were made by foreign companies in a given country. The 
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older the co-operation with FDI, the earlier foreign investors came to a 
given country, the higher is the likelihood that they have already gener-
ated profit, and they started to invest (a large) part of the profit into ex-
panding and fostering activities in the host country. According to mod-
est estimates, if a country has a stock of 30 billion dollars of FDI and if 
FDI is working at an average profitability of just 8 percent, which is 
most probably an underestimation, then annual profits amount to about 
2.4 billion dollars. If 30 or 40 percent of this profit is transferred, repa-
triated, still at least 1.5 billion dollars remain in the country for rein-
vestment. 
 
Another question here, of course, is and that is a real challenge, how to 
upgrade the activities of FDI in a given country. It implies practically 
three things. It means technological upgrading, how to increase the 
technology-intensity of FDI. It raises the issue of how to increase the 
value added FDI is producing in a given country. And, finally, and in 
the longer term, the most important issue is how to create a production 
and distribution network between large foreign companies and small- 
and medium-sized companies as subcontractors. When I talk about 
small- and medium-sized companies I have in mind both foreign and 
domestic small- and medium-sized companies. I do not make any dis-
tinction between domestic and foreign companies. Where I do make a 
distinction is whether a given small- or medium-sized company is work-
ing in the given accession country or is working still in Western Europe 
so that most of the inputs that a large company is using is imported. 
With higher and sustainable level of development, these imported inputs 
are expected to be gradually relocated to the given host country of the 
large international company.  
 
The second set of remarks concerns the development of FDI after 
enlargement. I think it will be very interesting to look at the regional 
pattern and specialisation of FDI. At the moment we have three different 
patterns. One is when the same foreign company is working in several 
of the acceding countries and is doing practically the same job, produc-
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ing the same things, either for exports or for the domestic market. The 
second is when a large foreign company has its regional headquarters 
just in one country and tries to provide or supply the regional market 
from this centre. And the third and most advanced pattern is when a 
foreign company is active in several countries, with a clear pattern of 
specialization based on the competitive advantage of different locations. 
In this way, it is contributing not only to the establishment of regional 
production networks but also to higher intraregional trade flows as well. 
This pattern will certainly experience a dynamic growth in the next pe-
riod.  
 
However, competition for FDI will remain strong among the CEE coun-
tries, just as there is competition for FDI among the present EU member 
countries as well.  
 
7. Sustaining and strengthening of competitiveness is, in my view, 
the most important policy objective of the CEE countries in a situation 
in which they have already entered the second stage of economic trans-
formation, which I would call sustainable growth in a sustainable mod-
ernisation process. It is unavoidable that in such a situation some previ-
ous conditions which, in an earlier stage, made these countries a favour-
able location for production and also for some service activities, are 
changing. Wages are increasing, not only because the countries are at 
the threshold of membership in the EU, but also for other, partly short-
term political and election considerations. 
 
The question is of course to what extent the productivity keeps on grow-
ing. If productivity growth is outpacing wage growth, as it was the case 
in the previous years, there is no problem. Unfortunately, some coun-
tries seem to have forgotten about this basic relationship. All Central 
European countries made a number of mistakes, some made them ear-
lier, some made them later, and unfortunately those who made them 
later did not learn from the mistakes of those who made them earlier. It 
started in Poland, was followed by the Czech Republic. And from none 
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of these errors did the Hungarian economic policy learn in the last years. 
And not because the economists did not make warnings, but because, 
unfortunately, economic policy became to some extent the prisoner and 
to some extent the victim of short-sighted party-political factors and 
populism. 
 
The second issue is appreciation of the currency. It is an absolutely 
normal development, in all countries which were successful in the catch-
ing-up process. High productivity growth generates appreciation while 
speeding up the catching-up process. However, if there is a sudden ap-
preciation, to say of 8 to 10 percent in a year, the competitive position 
may be shaken. This is even more the case, if the appreciation is accom-
panied by wage pressure. And, in addition, all this happens in a world 
and European economy which is not growing dynamically. In this situa-
tion, the achieved and apparently cemented comparative advantages of a 
country may be easily undermined.  
 
There is one more and basic issue to be shortly addressed. It is the ques-
tion of widespread and fundamental structural reforms which are re-
quired to create the longer-term conditions for sustainable competitive-
ness. Unfortunately, and similar to most Western European countries, 
they have not been started in the years in which the growth was high. It 
is an economic and political commonplace (and common sense) that 
large-scale economic and structural reforms are easier to be introduced 
when a country has a sustainable high growth than when the growth rate 
is declining or when one has to struggle with a number of macroeco-
nomic imbalances. 
 
These reforms become the more relevant the more initial productivity 
reserves are being eaten up. Beyond the well-known statistical impact, 
that growth rates decline with higher levels of development, increasing 
wages and appreciating currencies limit the influence of productivity 
increases on strengthening competitiveness. Therefore, a solid competi-
tive position needs other factors to be given more attention to. First of 
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all, total production costs have to be restructured by decreasing the job-
related expenditures on the one hand, and by cutting taxes, on the other. 
Unfortunately, the years of high economic growth have not been used to 
develop the necessary reforms. 
 
Two other deficits I would like to mention which should be the precon-
dition or the framework conditions for sustainable competitiveness. One 
is investment in physical infrastructure, and the other is investment in 
human capital. Some of the more developed Candidate Countries al-
ready face a shortage of skilled labour. And there is foreign, and in-
creasingly also domestic capital which would like to expand the produc-
tion, but the main barrier to expanding, and even more, to upgrading 
production is the lack of skilled labour, and to some extent also the 
missing infrastructural network.  
 
Let me mention just one example. If you compare a map of Hungary, 
but you can also do it with some other country, showing the geographic 
expansion of FDI in the country, and another map which indicates the 
development of physical infrastructure exemplified by the highway con-
struction, the two maps to a large extent overlap each other. So FDI is 
geograpahically expanding up to the point to which the physical infra-
structure is adequate. Both human capital and physical infrastructure 
should be high-priority goals of the government economic policies in 
CEE countries. 
 
What we sometimes, however, forget about: competitiveness, is that it 
has some non-economic factors as well, which have got enhanced rele-
vance in the last years. I would like to mention just two of them. One is 
the quality of public administration. You may be extremely productive 
in your factory. However, if you go out with your products or services 
to a market and on the way from the factory to the market you face a 
number of barriers - bureaucratic barriers, administrative barriers and 
other barriers - then it turns out that although you might be the best, the 
highest competitive producer in the world, but you will not become 
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competitive once you reach the given market due to the fact that your 
competitors have been facing less bureacratic hindrances or had been 
supported by a better (if you want, more competitive) public administra-
tion. 
 
The second new element which is a non-economic factor of sustainable 
competitiveness. It is social cohesion, which is much more than peace in 
the workplace and lack or low number of strikes. Particularly in small 
countries, social cohesion has to be considered to be a priority factor of 
competitiveness.  
 
Here I would like to make a small remark on the catching-up process as 
measured in GDP per capita terms. I know that there is no better and 
more comprehensive indicator for the catching-up or the lagging-behind 
process. However, I think that we should give more attention to two 
other factors. One is the so-called convergence indicator, which is based 
on a set of 50 or 60 indicators developed by Deutsche Bank Research. 
At regular intervals, Deutsche Bank Research prepares and publishes a 
regional comparison based on convergence indicators. According to this 
survey, and taking the EU level as 100, the gap between the EU average 
(let alone between some less developed member countries) and some 
CEE countries is much less pronounced than indicated by GDP-per cap-
ita-based analyses. This indicator is above 70 percent in the case of Slo-
venia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is 65 percent in the case of 
Poland, about 60 percent in the case of Bulgaria, and between 65 and 70 
percent in the case of the Baltic countries. 
 
But what should be even more reliable, and, unfortunately, there has not 
been made any such comparison until now, although it would be, I 
would say, imperative looking at this in the Lisbon agenda of the EU, is 
the assessment of those factors of the catching-up process which tell 
something about the future. While GDP per capita data reflect the past 
and the present, new, future-oriented indicators are needed to describe 
the potential dynamism of growth in the transition countries. In this 
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context, the objectives fixed in the Lisbon agenda may be useful indica-
tors. According to the objectives formulated in this document, Europe 
should concentrate on R&D, on human resources development, on a 
higher level of competitiveness, a higher level of employment, etc. If we 
include into our surveys such factors as the level of general education, 
human resources endowment, research- and technology-intensity of 
production, expenditure on research and development, but also some 
non-economic factors strongly influencing competitiveness, as social 
cohesion, flexibility of the society, flexibility of the labour market, or 
flexibility of the administration, then, in fact, we could come to a com-
parative picture, in which at least some of the acceding countries would 
be in a better position than some of the present member countries. Such 
a general assessment would be extremely important and urgent to look 
at and to (jointly) shape the future of Europe. 
 
8. Evidently, the continuity of the catching-up process is not auto-
matically granted. There are some fears that this process may be bro-
ken or interrupted in the next few years. I am convinced that we have to 
deal with them. Not with all of them because some of the fears, once a 
country enters the EU, seem to be to a large extent either unjustified, or 
if they are justified, it is not because of entering the EU, it is because 
some of the basic reforms have not been made before entry. We have 
free trade. We have a liberalised commodity market. We have a large 
liberalised capital market. I do not think there will be tremendous price 
rises after joining the EU. I do not think there will be a higher level of 
unemployment either as a direct consequence of membership. If, how-
ever, some of the structural problems in some accession countries have 
not yet been solved, and have been postponed for the first years of 
membership, higher unemployment may be the result. It would, how-
ever, be fundamentally mistaken to blame for such an adverse develop-
ment the EU. Also I do not share the view or the fear that small- and 
medium-sized companies will massively go bankrupt. As a general ex-
perience, these companies cannot be thrown into the same basket. There 
are very different kinds of small- and medium-sized companies. Some 
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of them are export-oriented, some are part of the subcontracting network 
of large multinational companies, some of them are specialised just on 
the local services. They will not be affected adversely. Some of them 
may be affected but mainly those which did not develop a competitive 
performance and did not enter the international market, because they 
remained in or became captured by the large and over the 1990s rapidly 
growing domestic market. The most important problem small- and me-
dium-sized companies are already facing, is the increasing need for 
capital concentration, as a major precondition of sustainable competi-
tiveness. In fact, it is impossible that one million small ventures will 
remain in the country of ten million inhabitants if you want to sustain 
economic growth and remain competitive.  
 
Here I would like to make one more remark, and that is about the sup-
port of SMEs. Should small- and medium-sized companies be artifi-
cially supported? The underlying positive argument is making reference 
to the success of small- and medium-sized companies in northern Italy, 
in Austria, in southern Germany, in Bavaria or in Baden-Württemberg, 
and maybe in some other parts of the world. The situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century is fundamentally 
different in two aspects, and that is why the old patterns do not seem to 
work. One is generated by the development history of such companies. 
At some (remote) time in the past, they started with a one-man firm, 
then after ten years, if they were successful, a family firm was estab-
lished, in 20 years it developed into a small-scale firm, in 40 years it 
may have reached the status of a medium-scale firm. New firms in CEE 
countries generally do not have 40 years for such a development. Either 
a firm is successful at the beginning or in a very short time, or it is likely 
to disappear. The other is linked to national protection. German, Aus-
trian or Italian SMEs, had been developing for a long time in the na-
tional economic framework. Markets were strictly national ones or only 
partially open. In addition, at critical stages of the firms’ development 
process tariffs and non-tariff barriers could be introduced (or main-
tained) CEE firms do not have this kind of instrument, since they have 
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to work and survive in conditions of free trade - and there is no way 
back from free trade. As a result, I would not say that government eco-
nomic policies should not devote attention to the development of small 
and medium-sized companies, but certainly not with the methods which 
are not in compliance with the requirements of the 21st century. 
 
Concerning accession to the EU, there are certainly two real fears. One 
is that, mainly in the first years after accession, regional differences 
within the individual acceding countries may be increasing. The expla-
nation is quite simple. The adjustment and absorption capacity of the 
more developed parts of the country is higher. They will most probably 
be able to attract more of the resources, both domestic and foreign, and 
use them with higher level of efficiency and within a shorter period. 
Also, they are likely to be more successful in applying for EU funds. 
The temporarily growing development gap does not, however, mean 
that the less developed parts of the given country will not develop as 
compared with their previous level of development. It is a key task of 
the government to keep this development process under control, but not 
by constraining the more efficient regions but to provide support to in-
crease the absorption capacity of the less developed ones and speed up 
the spillover process from more to less developed areas. Namely, it is 
obvious that the modernization process must not be undermined by un-
controllable social strains or conflicts. After a short transition period, 
particularly a small country, cannot manage a largely polarised econ-
omy, divided between highly developed and highly underdeveloped 
regions. 
 
The most real threat, however, is the budgetary crunch in all of the CEE 
countries. All of them have already a budget deficit in terms of GDP 
which in most cases is much higher than the one fixed by the Maastricht 
criteria. After membership, the budget will have a number of additional 
burdens. Some of them will be burdens which are connected with the 
preparation of successful membership. There will be some areas where 
the preparation will not be finished by 1 May 2004, and therefore the 
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financial or budgetary implications will burden the budget also later. 
Then there will be some anticipated payments which have to be made by 
the central budget, that is e.g. the direct payments to farmers, which will 
be paid by Brussels ex post, but you will have to provide this money in 
2004 already. In addition, up to 30 per cent of agricultural support may 
added from the central budget to the farmers. Moreover, there will be 
also some anticipated payments including co-financing for the structural 
funds. At the same time, everybody who enters the Union will be com-
mitted to observe or to adjust to the Maastricht criteria. In consequence, 
it is hardly probable that the rapid (and today unforeseen) increase in 
budgetary income can create the financial capacity needed to cover all 
the additional costs mentioned. Therefore, some or even a fundamental 
restructuring of the budget is unavoidable. And just in this point will the 
governments face the most serious challenge. In which areas should the 
necessary cuts be made? If, as it used to happen in the past, the "sav-
ings" will hit those areas which are considered to be the guarantee of the 
medium- and long-term competitiveness of these countries, namely hu-
man resource development and health, then the CEE countries’ future 
and sustainable growth may be undermined. 
 
9. Both the enlarging EU as well as the current and future member 
countries are expected to face critical years. Three basic challenges 
can be shortly mentioned. One is that the enlargement must not under-
mine the critical minimum level of internal cohesion in the enlarged EU. 
All present and future member countries take the responsibility for it. 
Second: there is a heterogeneous group which will join the EU in 2004. 
Cross-country differences are not limited to structural features or to 
macroeconomic performance indicators. The basic difference seems to 
be much more in the adjustment capacity of the individual countries. 
Some countries will be more successful because they will be able to 
adjust in a better way; some others may feel really as second-class mem-
bers, not because they are treated as second-class members but because 
they feel unable to cope with the new challenges. This may create a very 
difficult situation concerning the third condition, that the enlargement 
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enlargement process has to remain open to further members. If the in-
ternal cohesion is threatened, and if some countries feel unsuccessful in 
the enlarged EU, it will be very difficult to create the necessary political 
will and public support for the continuation of the enlargement process. 
If, however, the enlargement is not continued, Europe will get a number 
of additional problems. To avoid them and have the right answers at the 
right time has to become a common task and responsibility for all of us, 
governments, policy-makers, societies alike. 
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THE CONTEXT FOR REFORM: THE PRECONDI-
TIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND THE 
CONVERGENCE CHALLENGES 
MATTHEW SALTER 
 
1. OVERVIEW 
 
The forthcoming enlargement of the EU will contribute to the urgency 
of the economic reform programme. As well as generating opportuni-
ties, enlargement also poses challenges to established patterns of pro-
duction, employment, finance, consumption and trade. To meet these 
challenges and to realise the opportunities of enlargement, ongoing re-
form is vital. Not only will engagement with the Lisbon reform agenda 
increase the rate of real convergence and growth in the candidates, but it 
will also bring benefits to the whole of the EU. 
 
The Copenhagen European Council, held at the end of last year (De-
cember 2002), paved the way for 10 new Member States to join the EU 
on 1 May 2004, increasing the EU market from 370m consumers to 
450m. The expansion of the Single European Market provides consider-
able opportunities for the European economy, associated with the in-
creased supply potential as the Candidate Countries become fully inte-
grated with the EU, and increased demand as their income levels rise 
towards EU-15 levels. But it also poses challenges in terms of the reor-
ganisation of patterns of production, consumption and trade that will be 
needed if the full potential of enlargement is to be realised. 
 
To meet these challenges, it is vital that the economies of both the ac-
cession countries and the EU-15 have the ability to respond to the in-
creased competitive pressures and changing patterns of comparative 
advantage. Ongoing economic reforms in both existing EU Member 
States and accession states are therefore desirable to ease adjustment to 
new patterns of economic activity.  
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This can be achieved through engagement with the EU’s economic re-
form agenda, as set out at the Lisbon Council. The Lisbon programme 
puts the focus of reform on raising productivity and employment by 
improving the efficiency of labour, product and capital markets. Work 
on the Lisbon agenda is of course already underway in many Candidate 
Countries, and follows naturally from the economic reforms they have 
already undertaken since 1989. The shift from a centralised regulatory 
approach towards a more flexible but co-operative policy-making will 
be even more appropriate to the increased diversity of an enlarged EU. 
The Lisbon methods of benchmarking and peer review will enable the 
rapid dissemination of best practice across the enlarged European Un-
ion, thereby enhancing the dynamism of the enlarged Single Market. 
 
Economic Reform in the accession countries is important for the EU 
 
The economic development of Central and Eastern Europe provides 
potential for productivity gains and growth among existing EU Member 
States. The reforms indicated by Lisbon will help the EU Member States 
in their own right, but also help the EU to better respond to the shifting 
patterns of trade and production prompted by EU enlargement. Both the 
EU and the accession countries need to put policies in place that pro-
mote flexible and rapid reallocation of resources that will ease the ad-
justment process. In the EU, labour markets will need to be flexible 
enough to respond to increases in supply from the candidates and also to 
respond to the fact that the demand for labour may well decline in some 
industries, but increase in other industries, perhaps requiring a different 
skill set. Capital markets will also need to respond to the changed and 
changing productive potential of a larger Single Market. 
 
It is important however to recognise that areas of comparative advantage 
will evolve over time. Relative wages in the Candidate Countries will 
converge towards EU levels as their economies develop, which will 
shift their advantages away from labour-intensive industries. Economic 
reform in the EU and candidate states will facilitate adjustment to such 
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changes in comparative advantage, and improve the ability of econo-
mies to grow and create employment. 
 
This paper aims to give a general background to the challenges that lie 
ahead for accession states as they prepare for membership of the Euro-
pean Union, and their integration with EU procedures and processes. 
The next section of the paper, describes the wide gap in prosperity be-
tween the EU-15 and the accession states, and the size of the challenge 
of real convergence; a process which is likely to last for more than a 
generation. The subsequent section sets out some of the key structural 
challenges for the accession states, focussing on the large gap between 
the EU-15 and accession states in employment structure, overall em-
ployment rates, and the gap in productivity and wage costs. 
 
2. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT, AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF REAL CONVERGENCE 
 
Current prosperity levels 
 
Although the economies of central Europe have changed significantly 
over the past decade, the process of convergence with their western 
neighbours has barely begun. Taking account of differences in purchas-
ing power, GDP per capita in the Candidate Countries in negotiations, is 
around 45% of the average EU level. Within this figure there are large 
divergences between the candidates, as the following graph shows. 
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Graph 1: GDP per capita in PPS, 2001 (EU-15=100) 
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Cyprus and Slovenia are in fact as prosperous as some of the poorer 
current EU Member States, yet the Baltics and Poland have a GDP per 
head which is less than 45% of the EU average. It is significant that 
Poland accounts for around 50% of the population and GDP of the ten 
leading candidates. 
 
Against this background, it should be noted that this is not the first time 
that the EU has admitted countries with lower levels of economic devel-
opment than current Member States. The lessons from previous 
enlargements which admitted less prosperous members is useful for 
underlining the challenges ahead, and is a subject covered later on in 
this section. 
 
Convergence over the last ten years 
 
Most of the candidates generally succeeded in the 1990s in creating a 
stable macroeconomic environment and in implementing some of the 
structural reforms required to become market economies. This success 
has been rewarded with steady economic growth in most of the acces-
sion states (see following graph), but it is evident that convergence with 
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EU income levels has been slow and uneven.  
 
Graph 2: Convergence with the EU-15, GDP per capita (EU-15=100) 
 
Real convergence in the future 
 
Using a rather stylised set of assumptions1, it is possible to derive a 
mechanistic long-term outlook for convergence trends of the accession 
states towards the EU-15 average. These assumptions can be used to 
calculate the number of years it will take to reach a certain threshold of 
the EU-15 income level, such as 75%. The following table shows the 
effect of using these specific assumptions: 
                                                     
1 Assumption for EU growth (2.6%) based on the forecast for 2004 in the Commission’s Autumn 
2002 Economic Forecasts. Assumptions for Candidate Country growth based on 2004 forecasts 
in Commission’s Autumn 2002 Forecasts for Candidate Countries. Prices assumed to be constant. 
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Table 1: Years to reaching 75% of the average of EU-15 in GDP per 
capita in PPS 
Bulgaria 36 
Cyprus 1 
Czech Republic 24 
Estonia 25 
Hungary 18 
Latvia 26 
Lithuania 38 
Malta 32 
Poland 50 
Romania 55 
Slovakia 22 
Slovenia 7 
Turkey 71 
 
For most candidates, convergence to 75% of the EU average is unlikely 
in the short to medium term. Indeed, convergence is likely to take one 
or two generations for some of the candidates, and any perceptions of 
instant prosperity on the point of acceding to the EU are naively mis-
placed. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the lessons from the process 
of convergence of past accession states (see following section). 
 
Though very stylistic, these results are similar to the conclusions in the 
Commission’s report (DG Ecfin, November 2001) on "Real Conver-
gence in the Candidate Countries", which stated that "what is clear 
from that exercise is that for many countries catching-up even to levels 
of just 75% of the EU average will probably be a process spanning over 
more than one generation". 
 
But perhaps the most noteworthy point is the sensitivity of the results to 
the assumptions made. Assumptions regarding the growth rates are cru-
cial for the rate of convergence, and as the following simple example 
shows, small changes in growth rates can affect the speed of conver-
gence by more than a generation. 
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Table 2 shows the effect of lowering the growth rate assumptions in the 
candidates by 0.5%. 
 
Table 2: Years to reaching 75% of the average of EU-15 in GDP per 
capita in PPS 
Bulgaria 43 (+7) 
Cyprus 1 (-) 
Czech Republic 41 (+17) 
Estonia 31 (+6) 
Hungary 23 (+5) 
Latvia 30 (+4) 
Lithuania 51 (+13) 
Malta 64 (+32) 
Poland 81 (+31) 
Romania 71 (+16) 
Slovakia 28 (+6) 
Slovenia 10 (+3) 
Turkey 98 (+27) 
 
As in the table above the results show the forecast number of years the 
candidates will take to reach 75% of the EU-15 average, along with the 
increased number of years compared to the "base" case above. The dif-
ferent speeds of convergence resulting from "small" differences in 
growth rates are quite startling. In the case of Malta or Poland, for ex-
ample, a 0.5% difference in growth rates after accession could affect the 
time of "75% convergence" with the EU by over 30 years.  
 
Though simplistic, this contains significant policy implications. There 
have been significant differences in the degree of vigour with which the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe have implemented economic 
reform. The pace and extent of reform has been a key factor in the re-
covery of output over the 1990s. Advanced reform countries have 
achieved greater flexibility in re-allocating resources to their most pro-
ductive use and in general, those economies which have progressed 
most rapidly in implementing reforms have tended to achieve stronger 
recoveries in output, and have the most optimistic forecasts for conver-
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gence with EU levels. 
Current growth rates 
 
To put these calculations into context, the latest growth figures in the 
Commission’s Autumn Forecasts present a very mixed picture for 2002. 
Whereas the Baltic states weathered the global economic downturn, 
with robust growth figures of over 4.5%, Poland recorded growth of 
only 0.8% of GDP. Growth for all ten candidates in 2002 was as fol-
lows: 
 
Table 3: Percentage change in GDP at constant prices, 2002 
CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK Sl AC-10 
2.2 2.2 4.5 3.4 5.0 5.0 2.5 0.8 3.9 2.6 2.1 
 
Previous enlargements 
 
A clear lesson from previous enlargements is that accession to the EU 
does not in itself guarantee convergence with EU income levels, as can 
be seen from the varying records of four previous less prosperous can-
didates - Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
 
Ireland is definitely the star performer of the group. On joining the EU 
in 1973 its GDP was only 60% of the EU average, by 1990 it had 
reached around 75% and ten years later Ireland’s GDP stood at 120% of 
the EU average. 
 
Spain and Portugal have also seen some solid improvements since join-
ing the EU. Spain’s GDP increased from 71% of the EU average on 
joining in 1986, to 83% in 2001. Portugal, whose GDP stood at only 
56% of the EU average when they joined in the same year as Spain, now 
has a GDP approaching 75% of the EU average. 
 
But Greece however, who joined 5 years earlier than Portugal and Spain 
with a GDP of about 60% of the EU average, has seen only a gradual 
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convergence to a current GDP level which is only 72% of the EU aver-
age. 
3. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES 
 
If the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe are to con-
tinue a steady convergence with the GDP levels of the current EU, then 
just becoming members is, in itself, not a sufficient goal. Without ad-
dressing the need for far reaching structural reform policies, not only 
will the new Member States be disappointed when instant prosperity 
fails to materialise, but the current Member States will find themselves 
in an EU with a depressed economic periphery. 
 
The scope of the challenge, which lies before the accession states, is 
apparent from an analysis of the differences between the accession 
states and the current EU-15, with respect to overall sectoral composi-
tion. In terms of employment, the share of those employed in the agri-
culture sector is, on average, three times as high in the accession states 
than in the EU-15 (which is not reflected in a proportionately high share 
of gross value-added); in some individual cases this rises to four or five 
times as much. 
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Graph 3: Sectoral share of employment in 2001 (%) 
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Up to now the candidates have been guided in part by the Copenhagen 
criteria of "establishing a functioning market economy and having the 
capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union". Reforms in the Candidate Countries have included privatisation 
of state-owned companies, trade and price liberalisation and substantial 
changes to institutional and legal systems that have raised the standards 
of financial discipline and corporate governance and also allow market 
mechanisms to operate efficiently. 
 
But substantial challenges lie ahead, as this overview shows. The EPC’s 
Annual Report (2002) on Structural Reforms noted that the "continua-
tion and acceleration of the structural reform process - interacting with 
growth and stability orientated macroeconomic policies - is necessary 
to facilitate economic recovery as well as further improvements in the 
economic performance of Member States". This is no less true, and per-
haps more important, for the accession states, who will soon be incorpo-
rated into the Lisbon agenda, aiming to make Europe the most competi-
tive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 
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Employment 
 
The impact of the ten accession countries joining the EU in 2004 will, 
on current trends, be very likely to increase unemployment in an 
enlarged EU, as well as regional disparities in employment. It will also 
bring about significant changes to the employment profile and labour 
market structure of the EU. A flexible labour market and continued 
structural reform will therefore be vital to achieving the strategic Lisbon 
goal, described above. 
 
But as the following table illustrates, the impact on the overall employ-
ment rates (and other Lisbon targets) post-enlargement are not dramatic, 
due to the fact that the combined working age population of the acces-
sion countries is about 20% of the EU’s. Nevertheless, across the acces-
sion countries, employment rates have decreased and unemployment 
rates increased, since 1997, and if this trend continues it will place a 
significant downward drag on the overall strategic goals of an enlarged 
EU. 
 
Table 4: Employment rates (%) before and after enlargement in the EU 
in 2001 
 Total 15-64 Women 15-64 Older workers 55-64 
EU-15 63.8 54.7 38.2 
CC-10 56.8 51.1 31.0 
EU-25 62.6 54.1 37.2 
2010 Targets 70.0 60.0 50.0 
Source: Commission Employment Report (2002) 
 
Unemployment rates across the region are disparate, as shown in the 
following graph. 
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Graph 4: Unemployment rates in accession countries, 2001 
 
Poland with the second highest unemployment rate of the accession 
countries is the significant since it represents over half of the working-
age population of the accession states. 
 
Productivity, wage costs and unit labour costs 
 
Though low wages have played a major role in attracting FDI into the 
candidates in recent years, real wages have been growing rapidly and 
there is concern that this risks undermining the competitiveness of the 
accession countries. Obviously the crucial element for investors is unit 
labour costs, and the candidates will have to ensure that wage growth 
does not exceed productivity gains. The candidates will therefore need 
to create a business environment conducive to investment from firms in 
new technologies, as well as investing in increasing and changing skill 
levels. 
 
Productivity 
 
Productivity levels currently fall significantly below EU levels, but 
again there is a wide range across the candidates, with some at the 
higher range showing a level of productivity, which is twice that of ac-
cession states at the lower end of the range. 
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Graph 5: Labour Productivity, GDP in PPS per person employed, 2002 
(EU-15=100) 
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But as mentioned above, unit labour costs depend on productivity and 
wage costs; as the following section shows, wages in the accession 
states also fall substantially below EU levels. 
 
Wage costs2  
 
There are marked differences in the level of labour costs in the acces-
sion countries. The level of total hourly labour costs in industry and 
services, ranges from 2.4 euros in Latvia, to 10.74 euros in Cyprus. This 
compares to an EU average of 21.5 euros3, meaning that in most of the 
accession countries labour costs represent less than ¼ of the EU aver-
age. 
 
                                                     
2 All data in this section from Labour Costs Survey 2000, Eurostat Statistics in Focus 23/2002 
3 1999 figure 
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Graph 6: Hourly labour costs in industry and services, 2002 
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The survey also reveals some interesting information about the structure 
of costs, breaking down total costs into the three component parts of 
"wages and salaries", "employers’ social contributions" and "other la-
bour costs". Whereas the largest share of costs is the same across all the 
accession countries, the share of costs accounted for by employers’ so-
cial contributions is more than double in Hungary (30.3%) compared to 
those countries with a lower share, such as Slovenia (14.1%) or Cyprus 
(14.4%). 
 
Graph 7: Structure of labour costs in industry and services, 2001 
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REAL EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES1 
PETER PART 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Copenhagen economic criteria defined "the ability of the Candidate 
Country's economy to withstand competitive pressures and market 
forces within the Union" as a pre-condition for joining the EU. The 
accession process has so far considerably assisted transition countries in 
achieving substantial progress in structural reforms, and in inducing 
higher macroeconomic stability. In the medium and long-term, the ac-
cession countries will benefit significantly from the adoption of the EU 
"acquis communautaire" in terms of higher output growth and employ-
ment. However, as a consequence of an advancing real convergence 
process, some major challenges in these economies may appear with 
regard to competitiveness. Presumed developments of inflation and total 
factor productivity will exert strong and possibly unpredictable forces.  
 
Hence, in addition to the implementation of stability-oriented macro-
economic policies, a well-designed road map of structural reforms is key 
for these economies to manage the successful integration into the 
enlarged EU market. This paper gives an overview on real exchange rate 
developments and their underlying driving forces during the transition 
process in the past decade. Secondly, it will also highlight some future 
perspectives and policy challenges, with a special focus on competitive-
ness in these economies and implications for structural reforms. The 
accession countries will have to find appropriate answers to the major 
policy issue of how to maintain the momentum on both real and nominal 
convergence without creating severe economic imbalances.  
                                                     
1 Many thanks for very helpful comments by Wolfgang Nitsche (MoF), Andreas Pregesbauer 
(MoF), Alfred Katterl (MoF), Helene Schuberth (Austrian National Bank) and Ulrike Magloth 
(Federal Chancellery). 
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2. RECENT REAL EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
2.1. (REAL) EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS AND EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIMES 
 
At the outset of the transition from command to market economies, 
nominal exchange rates were clearly undervalued. Throughout the past 
decade, we have observed sustained real exchange rate appreciation2 in 
the accession countries vis-à-vis the Euro. In the period from 1995 to 
2001, real exchange rate appreciation ranged from approximately 10% 
to a maximum of 100%, with Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus at the lower 
end, Lithuania and Latvia at the upper margin and the majority of coun-
tries within the band of 35% to 60% (see graph 1). This real apprecia-
tion has gone hand-in-hand with strong, significantly above EU-15 real 
GDP growth since the mid-90ies, except for Bulgaria, Romania and the 
Czech Republic. The latter experienced only moderate or even negative 
output growth over this period. Nevertheless, despite the rapidly ad-
vancing real convergence process in general, output and income levels 
are still far from approaching EU averages. However, beside these 
variations in the overall pace of real exchange rate appreciation, the 
time-profile and the magnitude of fluctuations differed markedly be-
tween accession countries. Despite these differences, real exchange rate 
developments are also driven by a number of common factors. Unit 
labour costs, and more specifically productivity and real wage deve-
lopments, play a crucial role when analysing real exchange rates in these 
economies. Substantial capital flows exert significant impacts on nomi-
nal exchange rates, also in the short-run, and thus on external competi-
tiveness.  
 
                                                     
2 vis-à-vis the ECU/Euro and in effective terms 
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Graph 1: Cumulative change in real exchange rates and real GDP (in %) 
Source: Eurostat, WIIW 
 
The first years of transition were characterised in many countries by 
abrupt and large (short and longer-term) swings in nominal exchange 
rates. These were caused by large and possibly disruptive capital flows, 
external imbalances, output fluctuations, an underdeveloped financial 
sector, high fiscal deficits, high interest rate differentials and at least 
double-digit inflation rates. These exchange rate fluctuations conse-
quently distorted investment decisions and trade patterns and to a certain 
degree dampened consumer confidence. This, together with measures 
taken to correct these economic imbalances, negatively affected output 
and employment growth. Many accession countries responded to theses 
severe economic challenges by visibly altering their exchange rate re-
gimes.  
 
S L O V E N IA
C Y P R U S
M A L T A
C Z E C H  R E P U B L IC
R O M A N IA
B U L G A R IA
S L O V A K IA
H U N G A R Y
P O L A N D
L IT H U A N IA
L A T V IA
E S T O N IA
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0
R ea l ex ch an ge  ra te  ap p rec ia tio n  (b ila te ra l) 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 1
R
ea
l G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 d
iff
er
en
tia
ls
 v
is
-à
-v
is
 E
U
-1
5 
 (c
um
ul
at
iv
e)
 1
99
5-
20
01
Part    123 
Real appreciation depends crucially on the exchange rate regime. Under 
a fixed exchange rate regime, with the nominal rate tied to an external 
anchor, real appreciation is driven by inflation developments only. In a 
regime of fully flexible rates, such as in Poland to a high degree, real 
exchange rate developments follow closely the catch-up process in equi-
librium. Obviously, however, real developments may deviate substan-
tially from equilibrium trends. Especially in the countries operating 
flexible regimes, the management of exchange rate strategies may be 
challenged by large capital flows. In case of large inflows these may 
bring about excessive currency appreciation, jeopardising a country’s 
competitiveness. In the intermediate regimes, such as a managed float, 
real exchange rate appreciation could be fully or at least partially caused 
by nominal trends; here, economic analysis is even much more complex.  
 
Currently, accession countries follow quite divergent exchange rate 
policy regimes, encompassing currency boards in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania and quasi in Latvia, several pegged exchange rates (in general 
to the Euro, only in Latvia to the SDR-basket), a managed float in the 
Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and a quasi fully float 
regime in Poland (see table 1).  
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Table 1: Current Exchange Rate Regimes in the Accession Balance 
 Regime Peg/Basket Band Monetary  
Policy 
Bulgaria fixed peg Euro currency board 
Cyprus fixed peg Euro +/- 15% ( + 
softer inner 
bands)
 
Czech Re-
public 
managed 
float
main refer-
ence: Euro
inflation  
targeting 
Estonia fixed peg Euro currency board 
Hungary central 
parity
Euro +/- 15% implicit infla-
tion targeting 
Latvia fixed peg SDR intervention at 
+/-1%
quasi currency 
board + mone-
tary aggregates 
Lithuania fixed peg (formerly to 
USD) as of 
2.2.2002: Euro
currency board 
Malta fixed peg Trade 
weighted bas-
ket 
intervention at 
+/- 0.25%
 
Poland full float inflation  
targeting 
Romania managed 
float
main refer-
ence: USD 
monetary ag-
gregates target-
ing 
Slovakia managed 
float
main refer-
ence: Euro 
monetary ag-
gregates target-
ing 
Slovenia managed 
float
main refer-
ence: Euro 
monetary ag-
gregates target-
ing 
Source: European Commission (2002) 
 
With the ultimate goal of joining EMU, ERM-II participation represents 
an important intermediate step of monetary integration. Whilst, in prin-
ciple, several exchange rate regimes and different stages of nominal and 
real convergence are considered to be compatible with the ERM-II sys-
tem, it is absolutely crucial that a credible and viable exchange rate 
strategy will be pursued in order to create a favourable environment for 
coping with economic vulnerabilities associated with the ongoing proc-
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ess of catching-up, enhanced competition and increased market flexibil-
ity. However, most of the accession PEPs remained rather vague on 
concrete paths of monetary integration.  
 
In recent years, with the exception of those countries with currency 
boards, accession countries have tended to adopt a more flexible policy 
stance. This move towards more exchange rate flexibility was, in gen-
eral, motivated by the necessity to better accommodate the surge of 
(short-term) capital inflows rather than to maintain international com-
petitiveness. Subsequently, nominal exchange rate developments have 
overall become steadier and less disruptive.  
 
Graph 2: Selected nominal exchange rate developments 1999-2002 (vis-
à-vis Euro, Index 1999=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: OeNB 
 
Graph 2 shows the more gradual appreciation/depreciation trends in 
selected accession countries over the period 1999-2002. Whilst, in par-
ticular, Romania and Slovenia have been facing nominal depreciation 
over the last four years, the opposite has mostly been true for many 
other accession countries, above all for Latvia and Lithuania: the cur-
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rencies of most accession countries have strengthened against the Euro 
(see graph 2). Only Poland, and to a minor extent, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Czech Republic, were exposed to larger shorter-term 
volatility. In contrast to the more structural driving forces of long-term 
trends, short-term fluctuations are still driven mainly by the exchange 
rate regime, capital flows, and inflation and interest rate differentials 
vis-à-vis their most important trading partners and the degree of finan-
cial integration.  
 
2.2. INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS: THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT 
AND IMPACTS RELATED TO THE TRANSITION TO MARKET 
ECONOMIES 
 
Inflation developments are, in particular, driven by wages, productivity 
and monetary policy. Inflation has been the main factor of real apprecia-
tion, as the strengthening of the currencies has been playing a greater 
role only in recent years. Regarding the monetary policy framework, the 
accession countries have apparently started to converge to the Euro area 
monetary policy set-up of independent central banks, pursuing the goal 
of price stability and the non-bailing-out of the public sector. Together 
with the initial disinflation programmes based largely on pegs to exter-
nal anchors, this transformation of monetary policy has successfully 
assisted in first stabilising and then reducing high and volatile inflation 
and interest rates. Hence, accession countries have made considerable 
progress in bringing inflation down from double to single-digit numbers 
and, thus, closer to EU-15 levels in 2001.  
 
Yet, significant inflation differentials vis-à-vis the Euro inflation rate 
still exists in several countries. In 2001, CPI inflation rates were within 
a range from fairly low levels in Lithuania (1.3%) and Cyprus (2.0%), to 
9.2% in Hungary, and to the outlier of 30.3% in Romania, compared to 
2.3% in EU-15. All accession countries, except for Cyprus, Latvia and 
Lithuania, envisage a further decline of inflation over the PEPs’ time-
horizont. In Romania, in light of the very high present CPI inflation, a 
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particularly ambitious fall to single-digit levels is foreseen in 2005. 
Many accession countries count on structural reforms and liberalisation 
to reduce inflation, but also on strict low inflation-targeting. The pro-
jected declines in inflation rates will require substantial efforts, includ-
ing sound fiscal policies, far-reaching structural reforms, an appropriate 
framework of monetary and exchange rate policies and (price) stability 
oriented wage policies.  
 
Table 2: CPI inflation rates and price levels 
 CPI inflation 
1996 (in %)
CPI inflation 
2001 (in %)
CPI price level 
2001 (index,  
EU-15=100) 
Bulgaria 121.6 7.4 31 
Cyprus 3.0 2.0 83 
Czech Republic 8.8 4.7 46 
Estonia 23.1 5.8 47 
Hungary 23.6 9.2 46 
Latvia 17.6 2.5 54 
Lithuania 24.6 1.3 48 
Malta 2.0 2.9 88 
Poland 19.9 5.5 54 
Romania 38.8 30.3 39 
Slovakia 5.8 7.1 41 
Slovenia 9.9 8.4 67 
EU-15 2.4 2.3 100 
Source: European Commission, OeNB 
 
In the coming years, inflation differentials may be continuously driven 
by a catch-up process in product markets. The so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect suggests that transition countries with higher potential 
growth will also face notably higher inflation rates (or, by putting it in a 
more forward-looking way, in a catching-up process higher income 
levels will induce higher relative prices in sheltered sectors). Productiv-
ity growth in the exposed sectors will determine wage increases and will 
also be higher because of higher innovation and technological progress. 
As wage increases in the sectors with lower productivity growth (shel-
tered services industries) will roughly follow the same pattern as in the 
exposed sector, this will lead to higher price increases in the whole 
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economy. While there is more or less consensus on the existence of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, empirical evidence gives no uniform picture 
of its actual size.  
 
This depends, in particular, on the assumptions of how far product mar-
kets are already integrated into the EU internal market, how "perfect" 
competition is in these countries, and/or in how far it is possible to dif-
ferentiate between tradeable and non-tradeable products. Moreover, 
while in many accession countries wages were fairly equalised across 
sectors in the pre-transition period, a stronger wage differentiation re-
flects overall market conditions nowadays. Real exchange rate apprecia-
tion has, in part, been also the result of raising administered prices, lift-
ing subsidies and other administrative barriers to price competition and 
changes in indirect taxation. And, finally, in the accession countries 
productivity growth in the service sector will benefit from new informa-
tion and communication technologies which have lately helped the more 
industrially advanced countries to keep inflation down.  
 
Again, graph 1 very clearly demonstrates, in comparing Bulgaria and 
Romania with other accession countries, that the relationship between 
real GDP growth and real exchange rate appreciation is not straightfor-
ward because of negative growth effects of high inflation and deferred 
structural adjustments. Inflation differentials vis-à-vis the EU/Euro av-
erage could be attributed to initially distorted structures of these econo-
mies which, with the introduction of market-based reforms and prices, 
brought about massive changes in output, employment and (relative) 
price levels. This real exchange rate appreciation mainly mirrored la-
bour market and relative wage adjustments between the exposed sector, 
which was heavily subsidised in centrally planned economies, and the 
sheltered one. Labour shedding, in particular to gain productivity in the 
traded-sector, was accompanied by price liberalisation. Generally speak-
ing, these effects of the labour reallocation process, with a few excep-
tions, worked through five year after the actual transition process had 
been initiated.  
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Recent empirical studies have attempted to disentangle the Balassa-
Samuleson catching-up effect from these structural reforms at the be-
ginning of the transition process. This has consequently led to lower 
estimates of the former. The European Commission stated in its Euro-
pean Economic Review 2002 that this effect might be smaller than the 
estimates of 4-5% published some years ago and might have prevailed 
especially in the more advanced transition economies.  
 
In 2001, price levels in accession countries remained well below EU-15 
levels, ranging from 31% of EU average in Bulgaria, over 67% in Slo-
venia to 83% in Cyprus (see table 2). According to the PEPs, with mod-
erate inflation, low price levels and no sizeable nominal appreciation, 
the convergence of price levels between accession countries and EU 
averages is assumed to progress quite moderately until 2005. In this 
sense, most PEPs have kept fairly silent on the extent the countries ex-
pect the still occurring inflation differentials with EU-15 to be related to 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect one the one hand, or to specific transition 
factors, such as deregulation, indirect tax harmonisation or relative price 
changes on the other.  
 
2.3. (UNIT) LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS AND REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION 
 
Initially, the comparative advantage of accession countries, especially in 
the labour-intensive industries, was a result of low and falling (nominal) 
wages combined with a highly-qualified labour force and undervalued 
currencies. After the first period of rapid structural adjustment ending 
around 1992, cost competitiveness deteriorated markedly in many ac-
cession countries, as (real) unit labour costs (converted into Euro/ECU 
at current exchange rates) rose significantly. However, (real) unit labour 
cost developments varied quite substantially across countries and sectors 
throughout the 90ies. In many manufacturing industries cost competi-
tiveness even notably improved. Here, many accession countries have 
experienced a striking increase in the productivity differential between 
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the tradeable and the non-tradeable sectors, contributing via strong 
changes of relative prices to real exchange rate appreciation. Neverthe-
less, until 2000, unit labour costs remained at relatively low levels com-
pared to the advanced countries (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: Nominal and unit labour costs 2000 
 Productivity 
levels1 (index, 
Austria=100)
Nominal labour 
costs2 (index, 
Austria=100)
Unit labour costs 
(index,  
Austria=100)  
Bulgaria 28 4 17 
Czech 
Republic 
46 14 49 
Estonia 37 10 38 
Hungary 72 13 19 
Latvia 33 8 37 
Lithuania 37 7 30 
Poland 52 17 34 
Romania 28 5 18 
Slovakia 45 11 25 
Slovenia 43 31 72 
Source: WIIW, 1) compared at purchasing power parity, 2) converted into Euro at cur-
rent exchange rates 
 
Besides real exchange rate appreciation, this increase in unit labour 
costs was largely due to considerable wage increases in many countries. 
Since 1992, nominal and (even more pronounced) real wages went up 
substantially over the last decade, more than compensating already high 
labour productivity growth in several accession countries (c.f. up to 
15% in manufacturing in Hungary over the period 1993-2000). How-
ever, despite these increases, wages in most accession countries are still 
fairly low compared to EU-15 levels, though wage dispersion among 
accession countries is definitely also high. The low level, however, ap-
plies to average productivity as well, which, together with some existing 
product quality gaps, will constrain wage cost advantages. While wages 
were rather equalised in the pre-transformation phase, wage differentia-
tion among industries already turns out to be higher in some accession 
countries compared to EU-15 nowadays.  
 
Part    131 
2.4. CAPITAL FLOWS AND CURRENT ACCOUNT SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The role of capital flows in triggering exchange rate dynamics is espe-
cially associated with current account sustainability. Their effects hinge 
fundamentally on their nature and structure, whether they finance public 
or private consumption or investment expenditure, whether financing 
occurs via FDI or portfolio flows. In recent years, large FDI inflows, 
with the focus on the private sector and related to large-scale privatisa-
tion programmes, have been able to finance a great deal of occurring 
(high) current account deficits in the accession countries. For instance, 
in 2001, the current account deficit of the accession countries amounted 
to 4% of GDP on average, ranging from an almost balanced level of 
0.4% of GDP in Slovenia to a medium-term unsustainable one of 8.6% 
of GDP in Slovakia.  
 
In the short-run, FDI inflows are presumed to still play a dominant role 
in financing, above all due to further large-scale privatisation plans of 
many governments. In the future, especially in connection with the 
gradual phasing-out of massive privatisation, the accession countries are 
expected to rely much more on (short-term) capital inflows for their 
domestic financing needs. This might give rise to more disruptive ex-
change rate movements. Indeed, a main concern is that these large in-
flows will lead to an overvalued currency, thereby hampering competi-
tiveness and exacerbating already existing current account deficits that 
may, in turn, lead to the eventual reversal of capital flows. 
 
Moreover, the accession countries may especially face very volatile 
capital flows in the run-up to EMU participation, due to expected posi-
tive (real) interest rate differentials with the Euro area and declining 
exchange rate volatility at the same time because of expected ERM-II 
participation. This could be even aggravated by adopting the "acquis 
communautaire" and in particular, by the forthcoming liberalisation of 
the capital account. Moreover, in recent years, the privatisation process 
has often initiated larger cross-border intra-company portfolio flows 
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which are likely to remain in the future, as privatisation plans have not 
been completed so far. Given the remaining fragility of financial sector, 
and even if structural reforms are further advanced, large and volatile 
capital flows could have an unfavourable impact on the economies. For 
this reason, also taking account of the different stages of progress in 
structural reform, as well as the discrepancies in market size and market 
conditions, the optimal strategy and the speed of monetary integration in 
combination with structural reform will have to differ markedly across 
accession countries. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the future, accession countries are likely to face further real exchange 
rate appreciation, as inflation differentials with EU-15 will not, in gen-
eral, diminish completely due to catching-up price movements, internal 
market integration in association with low initial price levels and further 
adjustments in administered prices. When real appreciation cannot be 
absorbed by productivity gains or by moderate, productivity-related 
wage developments, this will obviously constrain external competitive-
ness and could further aggravate the already existing current account 
deficits. There is vast potential for gains in productivity both through 
more efficient use of capital, human resources and technologies and 
through upgrading technology.  
 
A sound macroeconomic policy framework, in particular credible and 
viable monetary and exchange rate policies in combination with produc-
tivity-related wage settlements, is key for lowering macro and financial 
vulnerabilities and conflicts between low inflation, external stability and 
output/employment growth. For this reason, accession countries will 
take these real convergence and other transition effects on prices into 
account, while committing themselves to credible stability-oriented 
inflation objectives and to an ambitious disinflation process, respec-
tively. Structural reforms to enhance flexibility on product and labour 
markets will clearly help to keep inflationary pressures better down. 
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This should be accompanied by the strengthening of the financial sector, 
to cope with higher capital flows pursuant to the liberalisation of the 
capital account and to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
These ongoing reform efforts will be of particular relevance with the 
prospect of ERM-II and later of EMU participation. Thus, it will be 
crucial for the accession countries to find an appropriate policy mix 
between the speed of monetary integration and enhanced structural re-
forms.  
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ASSESSMENT OF PRODUCT MARKETS IN THE 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES1 
LARS ÖSTLING 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This contribution contains a preliminary analysis of the 13 Candidate 
Countries' product markets and their transition to the knowledge-based 
economy. The purpose of this paper is to give information for an as-
sessment of how the Candidate Countries can be integrated into the ex-
isting surveillance of the structural reform elements of the EU economic 
policy processes.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of the Candidate Countries’ structural re-
forms has been made in the Commission Regular Reports on the Copen-
hagen economic accession criteria. A more in-depth description of each 
Candidate Country’s structural reform measures is presented in the 
Candidate Countries’ Pre-Accession Economic Programmes (PEPs). 
Several other Commission studies have partly dealt with structural re-
forms in the Candidate Countries. The analysis in this paper draws on 
this material and different indicators, especially the structural indicators 
used to measure progress towards the Lisbon Strategy objectives 
achieved in the present Member States. This facilitates comparisons 
between the Candidate Countries and the EU. 
 
The paper starts with section 2 describing the general economic envi-
ronment relevant for the product market performance in the Candidate 
Countries. Section 3 is concerned with labour productivity and the struc-
ture of the economy, stressing the differences between Candidate Coun-
                                                     
1 Working document from the European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Finan-
cial Affairs submitted to the Economic Policy Committee ad-hoc group on enlargement. The 
document has been prepared by Lars Östling with the support of Fabienne Ilzkovitz, Adriaan 
Dierx and Peter Grasmann. The views expressed in this working document can not necessarily be 
attributed to the European Commission. Copyright European Commission, 2003. 
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tries and EU Member States. The next section deals with market integra-
tion. It is assessed to what extent the Candidate Countries’ product mar-
kets are integrated with the EU economy through trade and investment. 
Section 5 focuses on issues relevant to the business environment, such 
as competition policy, state aid, regulatory burden and SMEs. Due to a 
lack of consistent data in this area it is difficult to make a detailed 
evaluation. Section 6 is devoted to the knowledge-based economy. It 
contains a first assessment on how much the Candidate Countries have 
achieved in their transition to the knowledge-based economy. Finally, in 
section 7 the main structural reform priorities relating to the product 
markets in the Candidate Countries are discussed. The paper ends with a 
summary section. 
 
2. GENERAL ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
There has been limited success among Candidate Countries in terms of 
catching-up with the EU Member States standards of living levels dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s. The 13 Candidate Countries’ weighted 
average per capita GDP in 1995 PPS terms was 38.5% of the EU aver-
age in 2001, compared with 37.8% in 1995. There appears to have been 
some additional catching-up in 2002. Eight Candidate Countries were 
relatively better off in 2002 than in 1995, whereas five Candidate Coun-
tries, according to available statistics, had a higher GDP per capita rela-
tive to that of the EU back in 1995.2 However, during the last three 
years the catching-up process seems to have accelerated with a solid 
majority of Candidate Countries increasing their relative GDP per cap-
ita. The dispersion between Candidate Countries is still large ranging 
from 74% of the EU average in Cyprus to 23% of the EU average in 
Turkey.  
                                                     
2 A statistical break in the series between 1999 and 2000 affects the comparison between 1995 and 
2001 for all Candidate Countries. This especially concerns Cyprus and it is uncertain if GDP per 
capita in Cyprus really has dropped between 1995 and 2001. 
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Graph 1: Income level per capita 2002 and 1995 in 1995 PPS with EU 
average = 100. 
 
It is evident that the Candidate Countries have a long way to go to 
achieve the same prosperity as the EU, as illustrated in graph 1. Even 
with high long-term growth figures, it will take many years before the 
majority of the Candidate Countries will reach the level of the least 
prosperous EU Member States. Already now, however, the most pros-
perous Candidate Countries are at the same level as the least prosperous 
EU Member States. This points to the large differences between the 
Candidate Countries, which resemble the differences between EU Mem-
ber States.  
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Graph 2: Annual average GDP growth from 1995 to 2002. 
 
 
The gap in income levels between Candidate Countries and EU Member 
States is substantial, but there is evidence that the Candidate Countries 
are slowly closing the economic gap to the EU. In 2000, all Candidate 
Countries posted positive GDP growth for the first time. Five Candidate 
Countries have had an uninterrupted positive growth record for the 1995 
to 2002 period and no Candidate Country has had less than four years of 
positive growth during the period. Furthermore ten of the Candidate 
Countries had higher average growth than the EU average growth over 
the 1995 to 2002 period, with the Czech Republic, Romania and Bul-
garia being the exceptions. 
 
The return to growth in all Candidate Countries could indicate the start 
of a period of sustainable high economic growth. This could be com-
pared with the developments after accession of Ireland, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece.3 For these countries it took many years before the full eco-
                                                     
3 The Commission paper "Real convergence in Candidate Countries: past performance and scenar-
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nomic benefits of EU membership materialised. Similarly, after several 
years of sluggish growth many Candidate Countries can now fully start 
to reap the fruits of structural reforms and increased economic integra-
tion with the EU, which for some of them started ten years ago with the 
Europe Agreements. 
 
Graph 3: Inflation in 2002 as annual change of HICP. 
 
Inflation has come down in most Candidate Countries, but is generally 
still higher than in the EU as illustrated in graph 3. In 2002, Lithuania, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia had inflation levels below the 
EU average. Four Candidate Countries recorded an inflation rate above 
5%, as measured by change in HICP over the previous year, thereby 
exceeding the highest inflation rate among the EU Member States. 
 
                                                                                                                     
ios in the Pre-Accession Economic Programmes" gives a good overview of the economic per-
formance in PT, IE, ES and GR before and after joining the EU. Another evaluation of the con-
vergence of GR, IE, ES and PT with other EU Member States can be found in Martin, Velazques 
and Funck "European integration and income convergence", World Bank 2001.  
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The relatively high inflation may not be too detrimental for the Candi-
date Countries' competitiveness if it can be attributed to the catching-up 
process. Various estimates indicate that the so-called Balassa-
Samuelsson effect accounts for a part of the inflation in Candidate 
Countries, but there is no consensus on the magnitude of the effect.4 
Thus it is possible that the catching-up can be combined with a rela-
tively low consumer price level, similar to the developments in Portugal, 
Spain and Greece. 
 
Graph 4: Consumer price levels 2001 in purchasing power standard 
(PPS) with EU average consumer price level = 100. 
 
                                                     
4 See European Commission 2002 "Balassa-Samuelson effects outside the Euro area" for a compre-
hensive overview of different estimates.   
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Consumer price levels are distinctly lower in most Candidate Countries 
compared with EU consumer price levels, as shown in graph 4. In seven 
Candidate Countries the relative consumer price level is less than half 
the EU average. None of the Central or Eastern European Candidate 
Countries has a consumer price level equal to the EU Member State 
with the lowest consumer price level. The low consumer price level is 
partly due to the low levels of GDP per capita and remaining adminis-
tered prices. The relationship between price levels in Candidate Coun-
tries and their income levels needs to be further explored.  
 
Consumer prices in Candidate Countries have risen significantly in the 
past years and this may continue. The abolishing of price controls are 
likely to contribute to further increases of consumer price levels in Can-
didate Countries. A moderating effect on the consumer price level is 
expected from increased competition through imports and the develop-
ment of more efficiently functioning domestic product markets. Depend-
ing on exchange rate movements, the consumer price level in the Candi-
date Countries could converge rather rapidly towards the EU level.5  
 
                                                     
5 Real exchange rate movements are reflected in changes in the purchasing power parities, which 
will affect the purchasing power standard. See the Eurostat webpage for more information: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/info/notmeth/en/theme1/strind/ecoref.htm  
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Graph 5: Administered prices in Candidate Countries in 2001 as share 
of Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
 
One factor contributing to the low consumer price level in Candidate 
Countries are price regulations. According to data in the European 
Commission Regular Reports, there are still substantial price controls in 
the Candidate Countries. Administered prices, e.g. in the energy sector, 
are common in most Candidate Countries, covering from 13% to 25% of 
the consumer price index (CPI) in 2001 (see graph 5). In five Candidate 
Countries, regulated prices comprise more than a fifth of the CPI. Sev-
eral Candidate Countries are undertaking reforms, which will reduce 
price controls and open up markets for competition. There is no 
comparable data available for the EU Member States.6 
 
                                                     
6 There are few examples of price regulations in the EU Member States. Some price controls remain 
on energy and a few goods.  
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3. PRODUCTIVITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE  
ECONOMY 
 
In order to increase economic growth and close the gap in GDP per cap-
ita to the EU, one main challenge in the Candidate Countries will be to 
increase labour productivity. 
 
Graph 6: Labour productivity per person employed 2002 with EU aver-
age = 100. 
 
Labour productivity is relatively low in most Candidate Countries, as 
illustrated in graph 6. Six Candidate Countries do not reach half the EU 
average productivity level and only four Candidate Countries have a 
labour productivity level, which is above the lowest productivity level 
among the EU Member States. However, labour productivity has in-
creased steadily for most Candidate Countries between 1996 and 2002. 
The increase in labour productivity has in several Candidate Countries 
outpaced the EU productivity increase, although labour productivity in 
some sectors seems to remain low.  
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Productivity growth in the Candidate Countries could be further boosted 
in the future, as implemented structural reforms begin to pay off, includ-
ing a shift in the sectoral composition of the economy to sectors with a 
higher value added. Improvements of the general business environment 
and a successful transition to the knowledge-based economy will also 
contribute to raise productivity and increase living standards. 
 
The sectoral composition in Candidate Countries with a relatively large 
agricultural sector and the existence of big state-owned manufacturing 
companies with hidden unemployment contribute to explain the low 
labour productivity. The sectoral composition of the economy in the 
Candidate Countries differs from the composition in the current EU 
Member States. In general, service sectors are less developed than 
manufacturing industries in the Candidate Countries.  
 
Graph 7: Gross value added in the industry sector in 1991, 1995 and 
2001 as % of total value added. 
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Since 1991, the industry share in the economy has decreased in all Can-
didate Countries, as illustrated in graph 7. In Hungary and Turkey the 
share of the industry as a percentage of total value added has remained 
relatively stable, whereas it has dropped significantly in Latvia, Roma-
nia, Slovenia and Poland. The share of industry in the Candidate Coun-
tries’ economies in 2001 ranged from 13% to 33%, and in Cyprus and 
Latvia the share of industry was below the EU level (22% of total value 
added).  
 
Whereas the share of manufacturing has declined, the share of the ser-
vice sector has increased in most Candidate Countries. This is illustrated 
in graph 8, which shows the development in the service sector of finan-
cial intermediation, real estate and business renting activities.7 However, 
even though the service sector has increased in Candidate Countries, it 
is still considerably smaller than in the EU.  
 
Graph 8: Gross value added in the sector financial intermediation, real 
estate and business-renting activities in 1991, 1995 and 2001 as % of 
total value added.  
 
                                                     
7 This sector was chosen because of data availability. 
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The contribution to total gross value added from the sector financial 
intermediation, real estate and business renting activities does not ex-
ceed 21% for any Candidate Country, whereas the EU average is 27%. 
However, it is evident that in a number of Candidate Countries there has 
been a rapid growth in this sector since 1991, even surpassing the sec-
tor’s growth in the EU. This indicates a significant resource reallocation 
in terms of production value in these countries.  
 
One other sector standing out in the Candidate Countries is the agricul-
tural sector. Although the share of the sector in % of GDP has decreased 
during the last decade, it is still a relatively significant sector in all Can-
didate Countries. This is illustrated in graph 9, describing the share of 
the sector agricultural, hunting, forestry and fishing in the Candidate 
Countries. Agriculture is dominating this sector and hereafter the sector 
is referred to as the agricultural sector. 
 
Graph 9: Gross value added in the agricultural, hunting, forestry and 
fishing sector in 1991, 1995 and 2001 as % of total value added.  
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The agricultural sector was large in many Candidate Countries in 1991. 
In all Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries it accounted 
for more than 5% of total value added in 1991, peaking in Latvia, 23%, 
and Romania, 20%. The sector’s share of total value added in the EU in 
1991 was less than 3%. Although the sector has decreased in all Candi-
date Countries it is still relatively large in many of them. In 2001, the 
agricultural sector accounted for a larger share of the economy in all 
Candidate Countries than the EU average. In six Candidate Countries, in 
2001 the sector still accounted for close to 5% or more of total valued 
added, which is significantly above the EU average of 2.1%. Even if the 
agricultural sector continues its relative decline it will take time before 
the size of the sector comes down to the EU average.  
 
Another difference in the sectoral composition of the economy is that 
the public sector still is relatively large in several Candidate Countries. 
This reflects the remaining state ownership of big companies in some 
Candidate Countries.  
 
Graph 10: Private sector share of GDP in Candidate Countries in 2001.  
 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
EE* SK* HU* CZ CY LT BG PL LV RO SI* 
%
 o
f G
D
P 
No data available for TR and MT. 2000 data for EE, SK, HU and SI.  Source: European Commission Regular  
Reports 
Östling    147 
The private sector has increased significantly in most Candidate Coun-
tries over the last decade, but in a number of Candidate Countries the 
private sector is still relatively small as illustrated in graph 10.8 In Lat-
via, Romania and Slovenia the public sector still accounted for one third 
of GDP or more in 2001 and only in Estonia, the Slovak Republic and 
Hungary did the private sector produce more than 80% of GDP, which 
could be higher than in some EU Member States. The relatively small 
private sector in some Candidate Countries may indicate a lack of com-
petition and ample room for efficiency gains. There is no comparable 
data available for the EU Member States, but some other data indicates 
that the private sector on average is larger in the EU Member States. 
The general government sector accounts for between 8% and 20% of 
GDP in EU Member States, according to the national accounts.  
 
Privatisation of public assets has been undertaken in Candidate Coun-
tries in order to reduce the public sector’s influence on the economy and 
to promote efficient markets. Through privatisation, well needed foreign 
capital and knowledge can be attracted, increasing the economic effi-
ciency. In graph 11 the revenues from privatisation from 1994 to 1999 
are shown. 
                                                     
8 As there is no uniform definition across countries the figures should be interpreted with caution. 
Data originates from national sources in the Candidate Countries and EBRD. 
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Graph 11: Privatisation revenues in % of GDP as an annual average 
between 1994 and 1999 according to World Bank Development Indica-
tors 2001. EU figures are from "OECD in figures - 2000 edition". 
 
Privatisation has been one of the main economic reforms in the Central 
and Eastern European economies and remains high on their structural 
reform agendas. Annual average privatisation revenues in these Candi-
date Countries ranged from less than one percentage point of GDP to 
almost 4.5 percentage points of GDP for the 1994 to 1999 period. For 
single years and countries the revenues from privatisation have reached 
double digit figures. In some countries, notably Estonia, the privatisa-
tion process has been practically completed. In other Candidate Coun-
tries, the proceeds from privatisation are still considerable.  
 
Summarising, labour productivity is low in the Candidate Countries. 
This indicates that the structural shift to more productive sectors has not 
yet been completed. For a number of Candidate Countries the private 
sector is still relatively small and substantial price controls remain. 
These Candidate Countries have room for further reform in these areas, 
which could support labour productivity. 
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4. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
Opening up markets and increasing economic integration with the EU 
are key measures to improve the functioning of the economies in the 
Candidate Countries. The two main mechanisms for economic integra-
tion with the EU are trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Trade 
integration increases competition in the Candidate Countries and FDI 
contributes to raising the growth potential. Together with other struc-
tural reforms this will help the Candidate Countries to catch up with the 
more prosperous EU Member States.  
 
Graph 12: Total trade in relation to GDP in 2001.  
 
The Candidate Countries are in general open economies. This fact is 
illustrated in graph 12 where the trade of goods and services as a share 
of GDP is depicted. Seven of the Candidate Countries have a total trade 
openness that is higher than the average for smaller EU Member States.9 
All Candidate Countries have higher trade openness than the average for 
                                                     
9 EU small member states are NL, BE, PT, EL, SE, AT, DK, FI, IE and LU. Large member states 
are DE, IT, UK, FR, and ES. 
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large EU Member States. The high trade openness in the Candidate 
Countries is partly explained by the fact that most of the Candidate 
Countries are small countries. The three Candidate Countries with the 
least trade are also the biggest ones: Turkey, Poland and Romania.  
 
The Candidate Countries do not only have open economies, but they are 
also well integrated with the EU economy. This is manifested both by 
high export shares to the EU and by substantial FDI from the EU. 
 
Graph 13: Export of goods from the Candidate Countries to the EU in 
2001 as share of total goods exports.  
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Most of the Candidate Countries' export of goods go to the EU, as illus-
trated in graph 13. For all but three Candidate Countries, more than half 
their export of goods go to the EU. The exceptions are Cyprus, Lithua-
nia and Malta.10 Five of the Candidate Countries have a higher export 
share to the EU than the EU average, although they are not yet part of 
the internal market.11 Thus, in trade terms the Candidate Countries seem 
to be as integrated in the EU as current Member States. 
 
In a majority of Candidate Countries, the export share of "machinery 
and transport equipment" has increased significantly between 1996 and 
2000. In these countries the export share for this sector typically ex-
ceeds one third of the total value for all exports. On the other hand, ex-
port shares for "food and live animals, beverages and tobacco" has de-
creased in most Candidate Countries and exceeds 10 percent of the total 
export value only for Cyprus, Turkey and Lithuania.  
 
There are also indications on an increasing degree of intra-industry trade 
between the Candidate Countries and the EU. Several Candidate Coun-
tries have a level of intra-industry trade comparable to EU Member 
States. However, this applies primarily to the larger Candidate Coun-
tries, as the smaller countries seem to have a more specialised produc-
tion structure, which is reflected in a narrower range of export products.  
 
                                                     
10In Malta, this is explained by one single big manufacturing company, which in 1999 switched 
from exporting mainly to the EU to exporting to other markets. Cyprus is very well integrated 
with the EU through the service sector, predominantly tourism, which integration effects is not 
reflected in the trade of goods. In Lithuania’s case, the low export to the EU is partly explained 
by high energy exports to Belarus and other non-EU countries.  
11This is even more remarkable as the share of EU exports went down in seven of the Candidate 
Countries between 2000 and 2001.   
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Graph 14: High technology export as share of total export of manufac-
turing goods 2000 according to World Bank development indicators. 
 
As shown in graph 14, most Candidate Countries have considerably less 
high-technology exports than the EU average. However, in Malta, Esto-
nia and Hungary, high tech exports are well developed, exceeding 25% 
of total manufactured exports, thereby surpassing the EU average of 
20%. In Estonia and Hungary there have been dramatic increases in the 
share of high technology exports during the period 1995 to 2000, with 
an average increase of more than 3 percentage points per year. In Malta 
high technology exports increased by close to 2 percentage points on an 
annual average for the same period. No other Candidate Country re-
corded an average annual increase by more than 0.7 percentage points. 
The EU average annual increase for the same period was 0.9 percentage 
points.  
 
However, the share of high technology exports has increased in all Can-
didate Countries for the period 1995 to 2000, with the possible excep-
tion of Cyprus, Malta and the Slovak Republic. This would indicate a 
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structural shift at least in some Candidate Countries from the old indus-
trial structure towards a knowledge-based industrial structure. This con-
clusion is supported by data showing that in recent years the export 
share of capital- or technology-intensive production has increased in 
most Candidate Countries.  
 
Graph 15: Foreign direct investment flows to Candidate Countries from 
EU as % of GDP. Annual average 1996 - 2001.  
 
Integration is also driven by foreign direct investment. FDI from EU 
Member States is high in several Candidate Countries, reflecting high 
growth prospects and profitable investment opportunities. Graph 15 
shows the annual average FDI between 1996 and 2001 from EU Mem-
ber States to the Candidate Countries.12 In Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary annual FDI from EU averaged more than 3% of  
 
                                                     
12The annual average was chosen since the annual values are volatile reflecting large privatisations 
and other temporary effects.  
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GDP. This is considerable more investment than Slovenia, Latvia, Ro-
mania and Turkey managed to attract whose average annual inflow of 
FDI from EU Member States was below 1.6% of GDP. As comparison, 
FDI to EU Member States from other EU Member States during these 
years averaged 3% of GDP. However, FDI in the EU comprises a sub-
stantial amount of mergers and acquisitions, which does not necessarily 
involve investment in new assets. In the Candidate Countries, it is likely 
that more FDI has been invested in greenfield projects or invested in 
replacement of old production assets as part of the privatisation and 
restructuring process.13 FDI could be particularly important for the Can-
didate Countries, as this source of investment may not only contribute 
with capital, but also with technology transfer and management know-
how. FDI in the Central and East European Candidate Countries is con-
centrated in a few sectors. Out of the total FDI stock in these countries 
more than two thirds was invested in four sectors: "manufacturing", 
"financial intermediation", "real estate, renting and business activities" 
and "trade, repair of motor vehicles, etc".14 
 
FDI is one important source for investment in the Candidate Countries, 
but the bulk of the capital for private investment is channelled through 
other sources. Therefore the total level of business investment is an im-
portant additional indicator. 
                                                     
13It has not yet been possible to obtain reliable data for Candidate Countries on the share of 
greenfield investments. 
14Data is taken from the WIIW-WIFO database, which covers the Central and East European 
Candidate Countries. These FDI data should be used with caution. Even though all these coun-
tries follow the established IMF definitions and methodological guidelines, serious differences 
appears in practice, according to the methodological note in the WIIW-WIFO database.   
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Graph 16: Business investment, gross fixed capital formation by the 
private sector as % of GDP in 2001.  
 
Graph 16 shows business investment in ten Candidate Countries. In five 
of these Candidate Countries, business investment in 2000 exceeded the 
EU average of 18% of GDP. However, whereas business investment in 
most EU Member States has been stable or increasing from 1998 to 
2001, the results have been more mixed in the Candidate Countries. In 
several Candidate Countries business investment has even been falling. 
 
The high trade openness and the high share of export to the EU clearly 
show that the Candidate Countries already can face competition on the 
internal market at least in some sectors. Furthermore, the Candidate 
Countries are generally open for import from EU Member States, which 
increases competition in the domestic markets. The openness in the 
Candidate Countries should thus contribute to more efficient markets. 
However, the high trade openness and the FDI inflows do not automati-
cally facilitate functioning markets across the whole economy. There 
may still be sectors with a significant impact on the total economy 
where competition is weak. 
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5. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
The starting point for the enterprise sector in the Candidate Countries in 
the former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
was not encouraging. Most enterprises were in state ownership and the 
predominant industry was in most cases heavy manufacturing. Consid-
ering this starting point the change in the enterprise structure the last 
decade has been profound.  
 
Data is still relatively scarce, but available data point at a thriving busi-
ness sector in most Candidate Countries.15 SMEs typically account for 
more than half of total employment16 and a substantial part of the pro-
duction in terms of GDP. This development indicates that a relatively 
favourable climate for entrepreneurship has emerged, which can con-
tribute to higher productivity.  
 
However, at the same time, studies suggest that improvements in the 
administration and local government are needed to support business in 
general and SMEs in particular.17 Anecdotal evidence suggests that bar-
riers to entry and exit remain in some sectors and that administrative 
burdens are heavy in several Candidate Countries. There may still be a 
substantial amount of red tape preventing start-ups to thrive and grow. 
The development of an appropriate administrative capacity, less admin-
istrative burden for the business sector and transparent regulatory 
frameworks have been identified by most of the Candidate Countries in 
their 2002 PEPs as key measures to promote a dynamic business 
development.  
                                                     
15EU Commission "Enlargement papers: progress towards meeting economic criteria for accession: 
the assessment from the 2001 regular report". 
16In the EU on average 66% of total employment was in SMEs in 1998, defined as companies with 
0 to 249 persons employed. In Italy and Portugal, the member states with the highest share, SMEs 
contributed with 80% of total employment, whereas the lowest share of employment in SMEs in 
the EU was found in Ireland, 49%.   
17EU Commission "European Economy: Evaluation of the 2001 pre-accession economic pro-
grammes of Candidate Countries". 
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The Candidate Countries keep good pace to implement the acquis as 
part of their preparation for EU membership. In this process they will 
also have to adopt the EU competition policy framework. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that competition policy in the Candidate Countries 
could improve and that restructuring and further strengthening of com-
petition authorities is necessary. There are no data before accession on 
implementation of internal market directives or on the share of public 
procurement published in the Official Journal, because public procure-
ment is not yet published in the Official Journal. When these data be-
come available for the new EU Member States, they will provide some 
information for an assessment of the opening up of public procurement 
in these countries.  
 
A major issue in the Candidate Countries is the existence of state subsi-
dies and other obstacles hindering better functioning markets. It is pos-
sible that substantial state subsidies exist in some Candidate Countries. 
This may take the form of soft budget constraints18 for state owned 
companies, tax exemptions or other forms as parts of efforts to sustain 
industrial activities in economically weak regions or within non-
competitive sectors. If this is the case, it will be necessary to overhaul 
state aids in Candidate Countries with the purpose to both reduce total 
state aid and redirect state aid towards horizontal measures.  
                                                     
18The state could have different economic expectations than a private owner seeking to maximise 
the company market value.   
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Graph 17: State aid in 2000 as % of GDP, excluding aid to agriculture 
and fishery.  
 
Total state aid in Candidate Countries, excluding aid to agriculture and 
fishery, ranged from 0.4% of GDP to 1.9% of GDP in 2000 according to 
the Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard (see graph 17). The EU average 
was 0.8% of GDP. Four Candidate Countries recorded lower total state 
aid than the EU average, whereas state aid in Hungary and Romania was 
more than double the EU average. However, in per capita terms, the 
total state aid in all Candidate Countries, except Hungary, was below 
the EU average in 2000. In several Candidate Countries, a large share of 
the aid was sectoral or ad-hoc, e.g. steel and coal, which can have a 
particularly distorting effect on the economy. This is especially pro-
nounced in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia were horizontal aid corre-
spond to 10% of total aid or less. The data on state aid for Candidate 
Countries should be used with caution. Due to several factors, such as 
recent adoption of state aid legislation, classification of state aid and 
measurement problems, the information on state aid in Candidate Coun-
tries could be less complete than for EU Member States. Significant 
changes in state aid policies after the year 2000 and large annual fluc-
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tuations also implies that results for individual Candidate Countries may 
change significantly over time. 
 
6. FOSTER A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
 
Progress towards the knowledge-based economy is another key element 
to increase productivity, growth and employment creation. In general, 
more wealthy countries have a higher degree of maturity in information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and a larger share of high tech-
nology in their economies. Consequently, the Candidate Countries may 
have special challenges to encounter in this area compared with EU 
Member States.  
 
Several indicators show that Candidate Countries lag behind EU Mem-
ber States in the transition to the knowledge-based economy. This could 
be a hampering factor for the economic catch-up in the Candidate Coun-
tries. 
 
Graph 18: Business and other R&D expenditure as % of GDP in 2000. 
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Candidate Countries have a poor record for both total and business 
R&D as share of GDP, which is illustrated in graph 18. In 2000, the 
average total R&D expenditure for the Candidate Countries was well 
below 1% of GDP, compared with almost 2% of GDP for the EU aver-
age. Slovenia, 1.5% of GDP, and the Czech Republic, 1.3% of GDP, 
had the highest R&D expenditures among the Candidate Countries in 
2000. Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Cyprus invested 0.5% of GDP or 
less in R&D. This large difference in R&D investment among Candidate 
Countries is mirrored also among EU Member States, where total R&D 
expenditure in 1999 ranged from 0.7% in Greece to 3.8% in Sweden. 
There is not much sign of increasing R&D investment in the Candidate 
Countries. For half of the Candidate Countries, total R&D investment as 
% of GDP was lower in 2000 than in 1995. The decrease was most pro-
nounced in the countries with the least R&D.  
 
Also business R&D investments were low in the Candidate Countries in 
2000, corresponding to less than 0.4% of GDP, which is not even a third 
of the EU average. In Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, business R&D investment was less than 0.2% of GDP. Only 
in Slovenia and the Czech Republic did business R&D investment reach 
0.6% of GDP. Moreover, business expenditure on R&D, as a percentage 
of GDP, increased in only half of the Candidate Countries between 1995 
and 2000. There is therefore no sign that the large gap in business R&D 
expenditures between Candidate Countries and the EU is about to close.  
 
ICT expenditure is another indicator on the emergence of a knowledge-
based economy. Investment in ICT could increase the productivity in 
the economy and promote a structural shift to more value adding indus-
tries. The indicator on ICT investment gives a rather mixed picture for 
the Candidate Countries, as illustrated in graph 19.  
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Graph 19: ICT expenditure as % of GDP in 2000.  
 
Three Candidate Countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slo-
vak Republic, invested more in ICT in 2000 than the EU average.19 
Three other Candidate Countries, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, in-
vested less than the least investment prone EU Member State. This 
points to a large dispersion between Candidate Countries with regard to 
ICT investment. Several Candidate Countries run the risk of falling 
further behind. Furthermore, no Candidate Country, except the Czech 
Republic could match the growth of ICT investments in the EU during 
the last six years, from 1995 to 2000. This trend points to a further wid-
ening of the gap in ICT maturity between the EU Member States and the 
Candidate Countries.  
 
The internet penetration ratio is one indicator of IT maturity. The con-
sumer internet household penetration for those Candidate Countries 
where data was available in 2001 ranged from 2% in Latvia to 24% in 
                                                     
19Due to limited data availability, it has not been possible to check whether the large ICT-
investments are caused by mobile telephone investments. Investments in IT may be considered 
more productive than some communication investment.    
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Slovenia.20 In the EU, the average internet penetration rate in 2001 was 
36%, ranging from 12% in Greece to 64% in Sweden.21 The Candidate 
Countries are generally lagging the EU Member States also concerning 
mobile telephone penetration. The gap for mobile phones in 2001 was 
38 percentage points (37% for Candidate Countries and 75% for EU 
Member States).22 
 
7. REFORM PRIORITIES IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
 
Most challenges in product markets seem to be shared by both Candi-
date Countries and EU Member States. These challenges include reform 
of network industries, strengthening of competition rules and competi-
tion authorities, efforts to make the public sector more efficient and 
embracing the knowledge-based economy. However, Candidate Coun-
tries are facing more severe problems in their reform efforts, especially 
regarding the transition to the knowledge-based economy.  
 
It is likely that the enlargement in 2004 will further increase the pressure 
for further structural reforms in the product markets in the Candidate 
Countries. The Candidate Countries seem to be ready to meet this chal-
lenge. In their 2002 Pre-Accession Economic Programmes (PEPs), they 
have all set priorities for the reforms to be undertaken to further 
strengthen their product markets and to facilitate the transition to the 
knowledge-based economy.  
 
The Commission evaluation of the 2002 PEPs from November 2002 
concludes that the main emphasis of the planned reforms in Candidate 
Countries in product markets seems sensible. After attaining macroeco-
nomic stability the focus has rightly shifted to structural reforms to sup-
                                                     
20Data on internet penetration in Candidate Countries is scarce. There is very little data from Euro-
stat on internet penetration in enterprises and only for seven Candidate Countries regarding 
household internet penetration (CY, CZ, EE, LT, LV, PL, SI). 
21Eurostat structural indicators. 
22IDC "European Telecommunications Services - Monitoring European Telecoms Operators: Final 
Report", 2002 
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port sustainable and high economic growth. Strengthening competition, 
reducing barriers to market entry and promoting productivity enhancing 
R&D are among the necessary structural reforms on the supply side 
mentioned in the evaluation. 
 
In the Commission evaluation, it is noted that the main measures to 
strengthen product markets in the Candidate Countries are largely the 
same in the 2001 and 2002 PEPs. This is logical reflecting the long-term 
nature of structural reforms. Although the PEPs are reflecting specific 
circumstances in each Candidate Country, there are several broad cate-
gories of measures figuring in most PEPs, which is illustrated in table 1. 
A majority of Candidate Countries emphasised both in their 2001 and 
2002 PEPs that privatisation and restructuring of industries is a high 
priority. Several Candidate Countries also stressed the importance of 
deregulation, support for SMEs and the general business environment, 
improvement of regulations and development of competition policies. If 
the Candidate Countries are able to carry out the reforms envisaged in 
their PEPs, they are likely to make good progress to catch up with the 
EU Member States and close the gap in income levels. 
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Table 1: Product market measures identified by Candidate Countries in 
their 2002 Pre-Accession Economic Programmes. 
Candidate Country Main product market measures in the 2002 PEPs 
Bulgaria - Privatise infrastructure industries 
- Liberalisation of prices 
- Deregulation of monopolies 
Cyprus - Liberalise utilities 
- Rationalise public intervention in the economy 
Czech Republic - Restructuring of industries 
- SME 
- Export promotion 
Estonia - Further develop entrepreneurship  
- Competition and market supervision 
Hungary - Increase competitiveness of SMEs 
- Regulation of public utilities 
- Privatisation 
- Laying foundation for knowledge-based economy 
Latvia  - Complete privatisation 
- Deregulation of utilities 
- Develop entrepreneurship 
- Export promotion 
Lithuania - Restructuring and privatisation 
- SME 
Malta - Restructuring and privatisation 
- Liberalise utilities 
- Abolish price controls 
Poland - Conclude privatisation 
- Restructure several industries 
- Develop entrepreneurship 
- Develop infrastructure 
Romania - Accelerate privatisation and restructuring 
- Strengthen SMEs 
- Improve competition policy 
Slovak Republic 
 
- Restructuring and privatisation 
- Improve entrepreneurial environment 
- Export promotion 
Slovenia - Privatisation and restructuring 
- Reduce administrative barriers 
- Liberalise telecom and utilities 
Turkey - Privatisation 
- Establish regulatory authorities 
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8. SUMMARY 
 
Summarising, it seems that most challenges in product markets are 
shared by both Candidate Countries and EU Member States. However, 
Candidate Countries are facing more severe problems in their reform 
efforts, especially regarding the transition to the knowledge-based econ-
omy. It is also likely that some product market issues which are already 
tackled in existing EU processes, such as privatisation, administered 
prices and the sectoral composition of the economy, need to be dis-
cussed more intensively than is currently the case for the existing Mem-
ber States.  
 
Furthermore, it is likely that accession will increase the pressure for 
further structural reforms in the product markets for the ten Candidate 
Countries in the first accession wave. The Candidate Countries con-
cerned seem to be ready to meet these challenges. In their 2002 Pre-
Accession Economic Programmes (PEPs) they have all set priorities for 
the reforms to be undertaken to further strengthen their product markets 
and to facilitate the transition to the knowledge-based economy. These 
structural reforms should contribute to high economic growth and in-
creasing living standards in Candidate Countries.  
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AGRICULTURE IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
CHRISTOPHE BLANC 
 
In spite of the downward trend, the agriculture share in GDP and em-
ployment in most Central Eastern European Countries remains consid-
erably higher than in the present European Union. In many of those 
countries, agriculture needs restructuring. Very small subsistence farms 
play an important role. Labour productivity is very low in such farms 
which are partly excluded from agri-food market channels. Eastern 
European agriculture also appears ill prepared to face Western European 
competition after enlargement. Agri-food production in many of those 
countries is for instance still far from meeting quality requirements of 
EU markets. 
Despite recent stabilisation, in most countries agricultural production 
remains lower than pre-transition levels. 
 
Graph 1: Gross agricultural production (1989=100) 
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Despite stabilisation since the mid 90s, agricultural output remains in 
most countries considerably lower than pre-accession levels (see Graph 
1). Resumption of macro economic growth since the mid 90s did not 
transmit to the agricultural sector. Only in Slovenia is production now 
higher than its pre-transition levels. In some Baltic states and Bulgaria, 
agricultural production stabilised at less than 40% of its pre-transition 
level. It has been stagnating for several years at less than 60% of the 
1989 level in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia.  
 
Production decrease was lower for crops. Crop production growth is 
resuming in some countries but farmers lack financial resources to buy 
necessary inputs (fertilisers, pesticides). Production development poten-
tial is nevertheless rather good in some CEECs1 such as Hungary. Live-
stock production growth is hindered by lack of capital and difficulties to 
respect European sanitary and quality standards, but low labour costs 
could favour investments and future production growth. This would not 
entail higher exports since growing meat consumption with increasing 
living standards would easily absorb domestic production growth. 
 
Agricultural trade balance of Eastern European deteriorated during tran-
sition. This resulted from low competitiveness of Eastern European 
agriculture. 
 
Resumption of macro-economic growth in CEECs did not result in 
growing demand for national food products. Thus imports grew to sat-
isfy growing demand. As a consequence, agro-food trade balance dete-
riorated in most countries. Only Hungary and Bulgaria still enjoy agro-
food surplus. The Czech Republic and the Baltic states that recorded 
agro-food surpluses before transition, now record deficits.  
 
In fact, CEECs imports of processed products grew rapidly whereas 
their exports consisted mainly in raw products. This reflected a deterio-
ration of CEECs agricultural competitiveness. Development of agro-
                                                     
1 Central Eastern European Countries 
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food exports to the European Union was hindered by the low quality of 
agro-food production and its difficulties to meet European quality stan-
dards. That lack of competitiveness is reflected by the fact that those 
countries encountered difficulties filling their reduced duty export quo-
tas to the EU. 
 
Thus lower prices in Eastern Europe did not result from higher competi-
tiveness but from lower quality standards. With the gradual introduction 
of European regulations, production costs are rising. Prices of most ag-
ricultural commodities are thus gradually rising and approaching Euro-
pean levels, even exceeding them for some commodities. Rising real 
exchange rates (due to the Balassa Samuelson effect) will probably ac-
centuate that phenomenon.  
 
In most Candidate Countries farm support remains lower than in the 
European Union. 
 
Eastern European agriculture enjoys lower support than European agri-
culture. Economic transition at the beginning of the 90s brought about a 
lowering of support for CEECs agriculture. Disruption of storage and 
transportation systems made prices fall to levels lower than world prices 
in some places. Prices gradually rose in the late 90s with production 
costs increases and direct payments were gradually introduced in some 
countries. Thus producer support recovered, but remains in most coun-
tries lower than its pre-transition level.  
 
With the exception of Slovenia PSE2 are a lot lower than in the present 
European Union (see Table 1). Contrary to the European Union, price 
support represents in those countries the main source of transfers to 
farmers. The recent introduction and increase of area and headage assis-
                                                     
2 Producer support estimate (PSE) is derived from the following calculation: The difference be-
tween production valued at domestic prices and production valued at world prices is added to 
direct payments to farmers. Subsidised inputs are also taken into account. PSE is thus an indicator 
of the value of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to producers. The nominal value of PSE 
can, for purpose of international comparison, be compared with the value of agricultural output. 
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tance did not alter that fact with the exception of Slovenia. In spite of 
increased lobbying of farmers, the lack of financial resources, prevented 
those countries from developing policies involving levels of support 
similar to the European Union. The gradual introduction of direct pay-
ments in new Member States will entail an increase of PSE but PSE will 
remain lower than in the European Union, direct payments being only 
gradually phased in . 
 
Subsistence farming developed during transition and will probably slow 
Eastern European agriculture modernisation. 
 
In most CEECs collective farms were broken up and land was either 
returned to former owners or distributed to employees. But those farms 
still play an important role in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria 
(see Table 2). In these countries, many collective farms were not totally 
dismantled. Most became private co-operatives or companies but their 
title deeds were dispersed among numerous owners. Those owners 
therefore do not directly manage these farms. Employees often collec-
tively manage them. But employees are more concerned with employ-
ment protection than with economic performance. They do not consider 
profitability and productivity improvement as a priority. Therefore these 
farms cannot easily be considered as the backbone of future agricultural 
development. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
This ratio (PSE as a percentage of agricultural output value) is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Producer support estimate in Candidate Countries (as a percentage of output value) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -40 -45 -4 -27 -25 -55 -10 2 -2 1 3
Estonia 59 -89 -32 -10 0 7 6 20 6 7 13
Latvia 70 -143 -40 7 5 3 5 20 22 15 16
Lithuania -262 -124 -37 -15 0 1 4 16 16 6 11
Romania 15 8 16 19 10 12 3 30 20 19 24
Slovenia N.C. 32 25 29 35 27 32 42 49 39 40
Czech Rep. 53 32 29 21 20 19 6 23 24 16 17
Hungary 12 18 20 22 13 10 6 19 23 20 12
Poland -1 1 11 17 11 13 12 22 19 7 10
Slovakia 41 30 40 29 14 2 11 31 25 23 11
EU-15 44 38 37 35 35 32 32 36 39 34 35
Source: OECD 
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Table 2: Land distribution among different farm categories (percentage 
of agricultural land and average area) 
 Family farms Co-
operatives 
State Farms Companies 
 % land Av. 
area
(ha)
% 
land
Av. 
area 
(ha)
% 
land
Av. 
area 
(ha)
% 
land
Av. 
area 
(ha) 
Poland 83 6.9 3 222 2 183
2
12 415 
Hungary 60 3 24 833 16 204 
Czech 
Republic 
38 37 29 1493 33 1004 
Slovenia 96 4,8 4 371  
Estonia 64 10 36 564 
Slovakia 5 7,7 60 1509 15 305
6
20 1191 
Romania 69 2,4 16 301 15  
Bulgaria 52 1,5 42 637 6 735  
Lithuania 67 4,2 33 372  
Latvia 95 12 1 340 4 309 
Source: Pouliquen (2001). 
 
Land privatisation also resulted in the development of very small subsis-
tence family farms. Rising unemployment prevented people from leav-
ing the farming sector in spite of low earnings and high modernisation 
potential. As a consequence, agriculture became a social safety net for a 
population which had to deal with a massive rise of unemployment. 
Thus, agricultural employment decreased very slowly and even grew in 
some countries such as Romania.  
 
That latter phenomenon entailed the development of very small subsis-
tence farms. Family farms are thus in Eastern Europe considerably 
smaller than in the European Union. Farms bigger than 50ha account for 
less than 30% of agricultural land in CEECs compared with more than 
60% in the European Union. In those subsistence farms marketable pro-
duction account for only a small share of total production, the bulk of 
which is consumed by farm households, thus household income does 
not derive from the sale of agricultural products but from welfare pay-
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ments (pensions…). Those farms enjoy low labour costs but lack of 
financial resources prevents them from investing and increasing produc-
tion. They are not integrated in product collection network and cannot 
meet European quality and sanitary requirements. Bigger family farms 
would probably more easily overcome Western European competition 
but are developing very slowly. Lack of financial resources and poorly 
functioning land markets prevent them from expanding. 
 
The emergence of a competitive agricultural sector after enlargement 
will be slow. 
 
Subsistence farming thus plays an important role in most of those coun-
tries with the notable exception of Slovakia, the Czech Republic. Resis-
tance of subsistence farmers will slow the necessary restructuration of 
the sector. As was previously outlined, modernisation of farms and en-
tailing decrease of agricultural employment is hindered by lack of em-
ployment opportunities in other sectors. That problem seems less acute 
in Hungary and Slovenia and the Czech Republic that enjoy smaller 
unemployment rates. But even in those countries, adequacy between 
present farmers qualifications and new urban jobs qualifications re-
quirements could be problematic.  
 
Agriculture modernisation is also hindered by inadequate access to 
credit and lack of capital. Direct payments will increase farmers' finan-
cial resources. It could enable them to modernise their farms. More fi-
nancial resources for input purchases would be available. Productions of 
cereals and oilseeds could thus increase, especially in countries with 
high potential such as Hungary. Increase in animal productions such as 
meat and dairy products, for which quality and sanitary requirements are 
harder to meet, would be slower. Direct payments will also entail an 
increase in subsistence farmers’ income. This could reinforce subsis-
tence farming and slow agriculture modernisation.  
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ANNEX 
 
Table 3: Share of agriculture in GDP and employment in Eastern Euro-
pean Countries (2000) 
Share in employed 
civilian working 
population (%)
Share of agri-
culture in GDP 
(%) 
European Union (15) 4.3 1.7 
Central Eastern European  
Countries 
21.5 5.1 
Bulgaria 27.0 15.8 
Czech Republic 5.3 3.4 
Estonia 7.0 5.7 
Hungary 7.2 3.9 
Latvia 14.4 3.9 
Lithuania 18.4 7.9 
Poland 18.7 3.3 
Romania 45.2 11.4 
Slovakia 7.5 2.7 
Slovenia 9.6 4.3 
Source: European Commission 
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FINANCIAL SECTORS IN EU ACCEDING COUN-
TRIES - STYLIZED FACTS AND CHALLENGES 
REINER MARTIN, GIACOMO CAVIGLIA AND CHRISTIAN 
FEHLKER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION2 
 
Acceding countries (ACs) have made major achievements over the past 
decade in establishing overall sound and stable banking sectors and in 
developing many other segments of their financial markets.3 Progress 
has been particularly significant in restructuring and consolidating the 
banking sector of the transition economies. This has been mainly ac-
complished through the privatisation of state-owned banks and the ex-
tensive opening-up to foreign ownership. Despite these considerable 
achievements, some issues remain as to whether, at the current stage, all 
features of their financial sectors already fully meet the challenges en-
tailed in the EU integration process as well as in the countries’ process 
of real and nominal convergence.  
 
                                                     
1 European Central Bank. Views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the authors and do 
not necessarily correspond to those of the ECB. Valuable research assistance by Stefan Wreden-
borg is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 For a more detailed overview see ECB (2002), "Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries", 
Frankfurt.  
3 The acceding countries have departed from highly diverse economic environments, as not all 
countries (in particular Cyprus and Malta) had to go through a process of transforming their 
economies. 
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This contribution reviews briefly the link between financial and eco-
nomic development and outlines some key features of ACs’ financial 
sectors4. The description of the key features of ACs’ financial sectors 
focuses in particular on the efficiency of the system and its level of inte-
gration with the EU. This is followed by a short overview of the regula-
tory systems for the financial sectors in ACs. The final section looks at 
challenges for the adjustment of ACs’ financial sectors and their infra-
structure due to EU integration.  
 
Financial Development and Real Convergence 
 
Financial development has increasingly been found by economic re-
search to be linked to the economic development and growth perform-
ance of an economy.5 In particular, financial sector development in ACs 
may stimulate the real convergence process via several channels. One 
channel refers to the mobilisation of savings, which is vital as these 
countries have high investment needs to modernise the capital stock 
necessary for catching-up growth. By providing safe depository facili-
ties, by offering key trade financing services and by diversifying finan-
cial risks and pooling liquidity, national savings and investments are 
likely to be fostered. As a side effect, more efficient domestic financial 
intermediation may alleviate recourse on foreign savings, which in most 
transition acceding countries led to current account deficits that at times 
have threatened external sustainability.  
 
Strengthening the monitoring function of financial markets in ACs is 
seen as crucial in enforcing corporate performance. Sound corporate 
governance structures require the existence and, equally important, the 
implementation of property and creditor rights, contract law and bank-
ruptcy regulation as well as the use of proper accounting standards. Ex-
                                                     
4 This contribution focuses mostly on the eight transition economies among the EU acceding coun-
tries. Cyprus and Malta present a financial sector whose structures are more closely in line with 
that of the EU. 
5 However, the importance of financial markets for growth is not uncontested and counter-examples 
of solidly growing economies without a highly developed financial system exist.  
 Kick-off Papers 178
ercising effective corporate control on a sound legal basis fosters mar-
ket-driven restructuring processes, leading to enhanced productivity of 
existing input factors and the accumulation of new factors of produc-
tion. Almost all ACs appear to display some potential to foster financial 
market development by strengthening the legal framework and espe-
cially by enforcing the existing rules and standards.6  
 
Turning the attention to some empirical findings, a positive relationship 
between financial and economic development can indeed be observed 
for ACs (Graph 1). Analysing along the dimensions of GDP per capita 
and domestic credit in relation to GDP, all euro area member countries 
clearly lie ahead of the acceding countries in transition with regard to 
both financial and economic development. Therefore, further conver-
gence may be expected to go hand in hand with financial development. 
However, the time series for ACs under consideration might be too short 
to assess whether the relationship is a strong one and whether causality 
flows indeed from financial development to growth or vice versa.  
 
                                                     
6 See for example European Commission (2002), "Regular Report on AC’s Progress towards 
Accession", Brussels. These reports are published separately for each country on an annual basis. 
See also European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2002), "Transition Report", Lon-
don. This publication is also annually published.  
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Graph 1: Financial vs. economic development 
 
The dispersion of financial sector size increases for higher income coun-
tries, reflecting that different models of financial sector size are com-
patible with a given stage of development. Still, even the - relatively 
small - Austrian financial sector is about three times the size of the aver-
age financial sector in acceding countries, indicating the enormous po-
tential for financial sector growth in these countries.  
 
Key Features of the Financial Sector in acceding countries 
 
The financial sector of the Central and Eastern European ACs has un-
dergone major changes since the beginning of transition. The former so-
called monobanks have been broken up into a two-tier structure of cen-
tral banking and commercial banking and after several rounds of bank-
ing crises and an initial period of transition-related recession a broadly 
stable and functioning banking sector has been established in all coun-
tries. At present, the financial sector is characterised by the strong 
dominance of an overall well-capitalised banking sector over capital 
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markets, a still relatively low level of financial intermediation and a 
relatively low degree of liquidity in many market segments. Further-
more, a high degree of foreign involvement can be observed in almost 
all financial market segments of ACs. 
 
2. KEY FEATURES OF AC FINANCIAL SECTORS AFFECT-
ING EFFICIENCY 
 
The financial systems in ACs are largely bank-based, and the domi-
nance of the banking sector over capital markets is even more pro-
nounced than in some euro area countries that are known for their bank-
based systems (Graph 2). The average stock market capitalisation of 
ACs amounts to around 18% of GDP at the end of 2001 (euro area: 
around 72% of GDP), while domestic credit represents to 47% of GDP 
(euro area: close to 135% of GDP). Of all acceding countries, only the 
non-transition countries Cyprus and Malta have a domestic financial 
intermediation mechanism that broadly mirrors the financial intermedia-
tion mechanism of euro area Member States.  
 
Although recent studies have revived the discussion about the respective 
merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems, there is no 
clear evidence as to the general appropriateness of any of the two sys-
tems. The importance seems to lie more on the establishment of a proper 
legal and regulatory framework for financial services - i.e. establishing 
international accounting standards, reinforcing minority shareholder 
rights and property rights etc. - than on considerations whether markets 
or banks are better suited to support economic development.7 
 
                                                     
7 Levine R., "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of 
Economic Literature 35 (1997), pp. 688 - 726. 
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Graph 2: Banking sector vs. stockmarket 
 
Overall, the banking sector in ACs seems to be well-capitalised, with the 
risk-weighted capital ratio exceeding the Basle recommendation of 8% 
in all countries, often by a large margin. The share of non-performing 
loans has been substantially reduced in countries that have faced severe 
banking crises a few years ago, while it actually somewhat increased in 
other ACs as a consequence of high real interest rates and/or decelerat-
ing growth.  
 
The level of financial intermediation still remains relatively low. This is 
mainly reflected in the ratio of bank assets to GDP in transition coun-
tries, which is only about one-quarter of that in the euro area, and in the 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP, which is only about one-third of that in 
the euro area. For stock and bond markets, the level of market capitali-
sation broadly corresponds to one-fifth and one-fourth, respectively, of 
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that in the euro area. However, access to bank financing and capital 
markets abroad is somewhat alleviating domestic financing constraints.  
 
Access of individuals to capital represents one of the fastest growing 
areas of the banking system’s operations in most ACs but starting from 
a low level. The strong current rise in lending to households (Table 1), 
which is expected to continue over the coming years, largely reflects a 
catching-up phenomenon, as the share of household lending in overall 
bank credit as well as the households’ level of indebtedness (i.e. the 
ratio of household financial liabilities to disposable income) is still very 
low. In Hungary, for example, the level of indebtedness of individuals - 
in 2002 at around 7% of disposable income falls far short of the above 
50% rate seen in the EU member countries. The availability of financial 
services varies across the regions within ACs with rural areas clearly 
lagging behind. Innovative distribution channels such as internet bank-
ing have also become available although they are still less developed 
than in euro area countries. 
Table 1: Commercial bank lendig to households* (% of total at year 
end) 
 1998 2000 2001 
Czech Republic 6 9 12 
Estonia  20 22 
Hungary  8 12 
Latvia 10 15 15 
Lithuania 11 10 11 
Poland  24 27 
Slovakia 8 14 21 
Slovenia 22 30 27 
Bulgaria 10 7 8 
Romania  4 4 
Euro area* 42 43 42 
Source: National data, IFS, ECB staff calculations. 
Note: * As % of total loans of euro-area residents excluding MFI. 
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Loans with a maturity of over one-year are predominant in this market 
segment, accounting for nearly 80-90% of total lending to households, 
while consumer credit represents the largest share of household lending 
by credit institution.  
 
The availability of risk capital and low cost debt finance for small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs), especially at the earliest stages of their life 
cycle, is important for funding innovation and development. Although 
some progress has been made here, it remains inadequate and risk capi-
tal is - by and large - too expensive. The Risk Capital Action Plan that 
was adopted in 1998 deserves particular attention in this context as it 
aims to eliminate remaining barriers, which impair the full development 
of risk capital markets in Europe. A recent communication on its im-
plementation explicitly refers to the significant contraction of the ven-
ture capital industry in the ACs being still new and relatively underde-
veloped.8 
 
Liquidity levels in some segments of acceding countries' financial mar-
kets - including foreign exchange, money, bond and stock markets - are 
relatively low. Stock market turnover - as a rough proxy for liquidity - is 
particularly low in absolute terms, given the small size of the markets. 
For example, the annual turnover of the three largest stock exchanges in 
ACs (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) is each equivalent to 2-
5 days of turnover at the stock exchange in Frankfurt. However, it 
should be noted that also in the euro area a large variation in market size 
and liquidity exists.9  
 
                                                     
8 European Commission (2002), "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan", COM(2002) 563 FI-
NAL. 
9 In 2000, the Warsaw stock market has reached a capitalisation and turnover level roughly compa-
rable to that of Vienna, the smallest stock market in the EU with a capitalisation of only 13% of 
GDP (euro area: 84% of GDP). 
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3. INTEGRATION OF AC FINANCIAL SECTORS  
 
Ownership in AC banks has been largely converted from public to pri-
vate and from domestic to foreign. This can be seen as a result of transi-
tion, numerous banking crises and extensive opening of the domestic 
system to foreign direct investment. Except in a few countries, the pri-
vatisation process can be regarded as largely completed, due to major 
efforts and funds by public authorities to restructure and recapitalise the 
banking system. Notable exceptions to private ownership in banks are 
Poland, where the government controls the largest bank and Slovenia, 
where government controls the second largest bank and holds a signifi-
cant share in the largest bank. Moreover, ACs have in individual cases 
retained interests in the privatised banks by guaranteeing for future 
losses. 
 
Virtually all large banks in ACs are majority owned by EU banks. EU 
banks both act as strategic investors and as portfolio investors, thus as-
suming no managerial role. For almost all large AC banks an EU bank 
with controlling interest is identifiable and US firms hold few signifi-
cant stakes mainly in Czech and Polish banks. Rating agencies fre-
quently refer to these ownership structures when assigning a rating 
grade to AC banks and express the expectation that the owner will pro-
vide additional support in case of need.  
 
Geographic proximity apparently plays a role in the investment deci-
sions of EU banks in the ACs. Furthermore, investment is concentrated 
with a few and large EU banks. For Sweden and Finland, the Baltic 
states are the most important investment targets while Greece is linked 
to Cyprus. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have rather diversi-
fied links to banks from Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Italy and Austria.  
 
In addition to direct ownership, EU banks also have significant cross-
border exposure to ACs. While Germany shows by far the largest expo-
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sure in absolute terms, Belgium ranks second and is followed by France 
and the Netherlands. The main recipient countries are Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. Foreign participants coin much of the activity on 
financial markets, including foreign exchange, stock and bond markets. 
Furthermore, a large share of financing of domestic enterprises ulti-
mately takes place via banks abroad and foreign capital markets.  
 
The structure of bank’s assets and income in the ACs approaches EU 
figures but remains diverse. This divergence could give rise to individ-
ual paths of integration in the future. As a common feature, most AC 
banks appear to be adequately capitalised and approach cost/income 
ratios that are also found with EU banks. Interest income remains the 
dominant source of revenue while profitability of banks is quite dis-
persed across banks with no clear picture at country level emerging. 
Some EU banks have benefited in the recent past from their investment 
in ACs, which bolstered their profitability. The structure of banks’ ac-
tivities differs across banks and countries if measured by the relative 
importance of loans versus more liquid assets and the size of off-balance 
sheet items, the latter reaching a multiple of asset values in the most 
extreme cases.  
 
Regulatory systems for the financial sectors in ACs  
 
Economic policy has to establish a supervisory framework, which en-
sures that financial intermediaries operate in a safe and sound manner. 
Both, a sound legal basis and prudent implementation are crucial in 
maintaining public confidence in the stability of financial sectors. 
Moreover, maintaining the level playing field across institutions in an 
enlarged EU will also be crucial for current EU members with a view to 
overall financial stability in the EU and in order to avoid a supervisory 
"race to the bottom" by lowering supervisory standards. 
 
The achieved progress in establishing a sound legal fundament in ACs is 
overall rather advanced but progress remains uneven across countries 
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and across different sectoral frameworks. The most significant progress 
was achieved in those countries that started relatively early and in the 
sector that is most relevant for financial intermediation, namely banking 
supervision. From a historical perspective, laws on banking have gener-
ally been established at an early stage of the transition process but un-
derwent frequent reforms that extended the scope and sophistication of 
requirements. Laws addressing the insurance and securities sectors also 
frequently date back to that stage but developments in the regulatory 
framework for these sectors appear to be more gradual.  
 
All ACs have aligned their regulatory frameworks with EU legislation 
to a sufficient extent that enables them to join the EU. The formal con-
text, in which financial regulation is incorporated into the accession 
process, is the Copenhagen Criteria. More, specifically, the acquis 
communautaire relates to financial sector regulation in its Chapter 3 
"Freedom to provide services", which in turn is closely linked with 
Chapter 4 "Free movement of capital". A number of transitional ar-
rangements and exemptions were concluded, namely as regards deposit 
insurance schemes. These may become relevant from the point of view 
of consumer protection.  
 
Further challenges remain for the ACs particularly after having joined 
the EU. These challenges also stem from the fact that a substantial part 
of the relevant legislation is currently under review and new legislative 
procedures, namely the Lamfalussy Procedure, are being introduced. 
The transposition and implementation of the substantial reform process 
within the EU that has started in 1999 under the Financial Services Ac-
tion Plan (FSAP) presents an additional challenge for ACs. Whereas 
many ACs have already addressed a few issues that are also dealt with 
under the FSAP such as supervising capital based pension funds, sub-
stantial challenges remain.  
 
The institutional structure in financial sector supervision and the alloca-
tion of resources to supervisory authorities differs significantly across 
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ACs. As regards the allocation of responsibilities, most ACs have sepa-
rated supervisory competencies in line with sectoral borders while oth-
ers have recently established a single supervisory authority. Even in 
these latter cases the central bank remains involved in supervision in 
various forms while in case of a sectoral separation, banking supervision 
is mostly allocated with the central bank. As regards the availability of 
resources, competent authorities in ACs have significantly increased the 
number of staff mainly in banking supervision. Also, EU Member States 
and ACs have already established various bilateral memoranda of un-
derstanding mostly on supervisory co-operation and information shar-
ing. 
 
Challenges of EU Integration  
 
Looking ahead, EU accession represents an important structural change 
for both the banking and the non-banking sector. As for market devel-
opments, integration is seen as accelerating concentration, raising pres-
sure for efficiency, promoting the extension of service availability in 
segments such as mortgages, consumer credit and SME finance and 
strengthening the competition both for deposit taking and lending activi-
ties. This trend is already prevalent in most ACs and entails a number of 
challenges for the development and functioning of the banking system 
and the non-banking system as well as financial stability. As for banks, 
EU integration is seen as accelerating a trend towards transforming the 
subsidiaries of foreign banks in ACs into branches, in order to reduce 
costs and avoid the subsidiaries' narrower constraints on exposure limits.  
 
As for structural and policy developments, integration can be expected 
to advance further liberalisation, especially through the chapters on the 
free movement of capital and services, fostering better regulation and 
providing a momentum especially for retail banking. Furthermore, inte-
gration will foster the centralisation of activities in head offices outside 
acceding countries, making a closer co-operation between national and 
foreign supervisors important. The enforcement of the Basle II Capital 
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Accord will provide another challenge for banks.  
 
The adjustment process of ACs market infrastructure seems particular 
challenging against the background of a continuously evolving market 
infrastructure of the euro area. These changes are particularly relevant 
for payment systems and may also affect other market infrastructure 
elements. Hence, ACs need to establish modern and efficient infrastruc-
tures, but they also have to make sure that these investments are com-
patible with a future participation in the EU and the euro area and take 
ongoing changes in the euro area's market infrastructure into account. 
Thus, the need for co-operation among the competent monetary and 
supervisory authorities will likely increase in the future. 
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LABOUR MARKETS, LABOUR MARKET POLI-
CIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES  
CHRISTINA BURGER1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. EVOLUTION OF LABOUR MARKET CHALLENGES IN THE TRANSI-
TION PERIOD 
 
The labour markets of the former centrally planned economies on the 
eve of transition were characterised by full employment (i.e. no open 
unemployment) and excess of labour demand over supply. Labour 
hoarding was present in many sectors contributing to low levels of la-
bour productivity. "Full employment" was achieved at the cost of low 
wages with a "demotivating effect on workers". Job security was en-
sured and a large amount of hidden unemployment was created through 
soft budget constraints. Firms rarely laid off workers and, as open un-
employment was virtually zero, an unemployment security system was 
redundant and hence non-existent. Overstaffing, i.e. hidden unemploy-
ment, is estimated to have been as high as 30 percent. Where the struc-
tural division of labour is concerned, employment was concentrated in 
heavy industries, usually in large conglomerations, and in the public 
sector. In Estonia, for example, 80% of the workforce were employed in 
the state sector and the rest in co-operatives in 1989. Strong SMEs, as 
well as self-employment, were lacking, with private initiative only being 
tolerated in the agricultural sector, which in general recorded employ-
ment shares larger than in countries with comparable levels of GDP. 
                                                     
1 Working document from the European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs submitted to the Economic Policy Committee ad-hoc group on enlargement. 
The document has been prepared by Christina Burger with the support of Björn Döhring, David 
Young, Mary McCarthy, Jan-Host Schmidt and Heinz Handler. The views expressed in this 
working document can not necessarily be attributed to the European Commission. Copyright 
European Commission, 2003. 
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Little wage variation was allowed by centrally determined wages. Non-
cash benefits played an important role and were probably less equally 
distributed than monetary wages. The work force tended to be well edu-
cated and the female labour force participation rate was high.  
 
Most candidate economies experienced substantial falls in GDP and 
wages as well as a pronounced decrease of employment at the initial 
stage of transition, with smaller declines in labour productivity. Stag-
nant unemployment accompanying the restructuring of the economies 
was another key feature of the transition process. There are, however, a 
few exceptions to this pattern: The Czech Republic experienced an ex-
ceptionally long period of low unemployment and Estonia achieved 
significant labour reallocation from the beginning of the transition proc-
ess.  
 
The transition period was/is characterised by job shedding in the pub-
lic sector and with some delay, job creation in the private sector - with 
an increased incidence of temporary (frictional) unemployment and a 
significant level of structural unemployment. The temporary mismatch 
between labour demand and supply was/is due to the length of time 
taken to develop new private enterprises and the process of privatisation 
of enterprises. Privatisation agreements have typically included em-
ployment guarantees, thereby slowing down the transition in the labour 
market. Employment losses were transformed to a large extent into eco-
nomic inactivity which concerned, in particular, less productive work-
ers. Outflows to inactivity even exceeded outflows to unemployment. In 
order to acquire the new skills needed in the labour market, increased 
participation in higher education can now be observed, contributing also 
to a decline in employment participation rates. Nevertheless, older and 
younger workers, in particular, have difficulties in finding a job - the 
former because of a lack of new skills and the later because of a lack of 
experience and because vocational training is insufficiently responsive 
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to market demands.2 
 
1.2. EU-REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THE LABOUR MARKET  
 
The European co-ordination on employment3 is part of the acquis com-
munautaire which has to be transposed into national employment poli-
cies by the accession countries. This strategy (with all its targets, in-
struments and evaluation), which is currently under revision, must there-
fore be implemented in the accession countries as soon as they are 
members. 
 
EU guidelines and directives with respect to labour law focus on four 
areas: 
• Equal opportunities for men and women: Equal access to employ-
ment, training and promotion as well as to social security, occupa-
tional security schemes and self-employment activities must be as-
sured. This could require changes in legislation of the accession 
countries. 
• Co-ordination of social security schemes: Although no harmonisa-
tion is envisaged, technical changes to national legislation will have 
to be made.  
• Health and safety at work: In this respect not only legal changes but 
also the establishment of a certain infrastructure (effective labour in-
spectorates and worker training) will be required. 
• Labour law and working conditions: EU regulation concentrates on 
protecting employees of insolvent enterprises, conditions on collec-
tive redundancies, transfers of undertakings and protection of young 
people. Concerning these aspects, accession countries are exposed to 
a change in legislation. 
                                                     
2 For an overview of the evolution of labour market challenges see Boeri - Terrell, 2002; IMF, 
2001a; Nesporova, 2002. 
3 Since the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on May 1 1999, incorporates an employment 
Title which outlines the Luxembourg process.  
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In addition to the acquis communautaire, conditions for membership in 
the EU were set out by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The 
economic criterion is defined as "the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the European Union".  
 
The Essen European Council, at the end of 1994, defined a pre-
accession strategy to prepare the countries of central Europe for EU 
membership. This strategy was based on the implementation of the 
Europe Agreement, the Phare Program of financial assistance and par-
ticipation in different EU programmes opened to accession countries, 
and, finally, a "structured dialogue" bringing all Member States and 
Candidate Countries together to discuss issues of common interest. The 
latter is founded on the so called "Accession Partnership". 
 
The "Accession Partnership" provides an assessment of the priority 
areas in which the Candidate Country has to make progress in order to 
be ready for accession. In accordance with the Accession Partnership, 
the Commission and the governments of the accession countries have 
carried out bilateral employment policy reviews. The objective of these 
reviews is to examine the extent to which the countries have made pro-
gress in adapting the labour market functioning and policy so as to be 
able to implement the European Employment Strategy upon accession. 
The starting point in the Employment Policy Review is a Joint Assess-
ment Paper (JAP) by the European Commission and the national gov-
ernment. The Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities is one element 
of the attempt to a more systematic employment-policy development. In 
addition, several accession countries have already developed employ-
ment strategy plans organised along the pillars (of the old guidelines) of 
the Luxembourg strategy which should be a good preparation for their 
future incorporation in the employment process. 
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The Accession partnership has also led to the establishment of Pre-
Accession Economic Programmes (PEPs) which take into account the 
requirements for economic and monetary union and concentrate mainly 
on public finance. These programmes are relevant for the analysis of 
employment in the accession countries in so far as they cover topics 
such as tax structures and benefit systems, which in turn are important 
for creating incentives for employment.  
 
The principle underlying the labour market reforms in the pre-accession 
periods is that labour markets in the accession countries have to be 
flexible and solve the problems on their own, because the role of mobil-
ity to ease these problems (especially concerning unemployment) can be 
restricted by long transition periods imposed concerning the free move-
ment of workers. The free movement of workers is completely sus-
pended for the first two years after accession in some EU Member 
States, especially those along the border to the accession countries. 
Thereafter, one of the existing Member States can request an extension 
of this transition period for its territory, if this is deemed necessary, for 
three years initially and subsequently for two further years.  
 
1.3. WHERE DO THEY STAND AND WHERE ARE THEY GOING: THE 
LISBON STRATEGY 
 
The European Council in Lisbon set an overall goal for the European 
Economy "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion."  
Moreover, it has set goals concerning the participation in the labour 
market: 
• to raise the employment rate to 70% by 2010 and  
• to increase the number of women in employment to more than 60% 
by 2010.  
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In Stockholm, intermediate targets have been agreed on: 
• to raise the employment rate to 67% by 2005 and  
• to increase the number of women in employment to 57% by 2005.  
 
Finally, a goal for the participation of older workers was introduced at 
the meeting of the European Council in Stockholm: 
• to increase the employment rate among older women and men (55-
64) to 50% by 2010. 
 
The current employment rates of the Candidate Countries and the EU 
average are listed in the following table: 
 
Table 1: Employment rates 2001 
 total female older
Accession countries 56.7 51.0 30.2
Bulgaria 49.6 46.8 23.9
Cyprus* 65.9 53.2 49.2
Czech Republic 65.1 57.0 37.1
Estonia 61.3 57.3 48.4
Hungary 56.5 49.8 24.1
Lithuania* 60.1 58.5 41.6
Latvia 58.7 55.7 36.9
Malta 54.2 31.6 31.0
Poland* 55.0 48.9 28.4
Romania 62.4 57.1 48.2
Slovenia 63.8 58.8 25.5
Slovak Republic 56.8 51.8 22.4
EU 
   Average 64.1 55.0 38.8
   Maximum 76.2
DK
72.0
DK
66.8
SE
   Minimum 54.9
IT
40.9
EL
25.1
BE
Source: Eurostat, 2003a 
 
No Candidate Country reaches the Lisbon or Stockholm goal for the EU 
overall employment rate. In Cyprus and the Czech Republic, the em-
ployment rate is higher than the EU average; in all other countries it is 
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lower than this. Only Bulgaria and Malta face a lower total employment 
rate than Italy, which has the lowest level within the EU. Concerning the 
target for the female employment rate, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia reach or exceed the Stockholm goal, 
whereas no country reaches the Lisbon goal. All Candidate Countries, 
with the exception of Malta, have higher female employment rates than 
the lowest EU rate. In Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland and the Slo-
vak Republic the employment rate of women is lower than the EU aver-
age. Finally, no accession country reaches the Stockholm goal for older 
workers. In the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, fewer older 
people participate in the labour market than in Belgium, where the em-
ployment rate of the older workers is the lowest in the EU. Cyprus, Es-
tonia, Lithuania and Romania have values above the EU average. Thus, 
a lot would have to be done in the Candidate Countries to reach the 
goals set in Lisbon and Stockholm. But this is true for some EU Mem-
ber States as well. 
 
Table 2 shows the total unemployment rates from 1997 (where avail-
able) to 2002 as well as the development of long-term unemployment. 
The highest (total and long-term) unemployment rates in the Candidate 
Countries exceed the upper bounds for the EU countries. Moreover, in 
contrast to the EU countries, unemployment seems to have risen in 
many Candidate Countries since mid 1990s. This is even more true for 
long-term unemployment. One can probably conclude that the structural 
problems in the labour market are more pervasive in the Candidate 
Countries than in the current EU Member States. 
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Table 2: Evolution of unemployment  
 Total unemployment Long-term unemployment rates 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Acc. Count. - - - 13.6 14.5 14.8 6.6 7.6 
Bulgaria - - - 16.4 19.2 18.1 - - - 9.6 12.6 
Cyprus - - - 5.2 4.4 3.8 - - - 1.2 - 
Czech Rep. - 6.4 8.6 8.7 8.0 7.3 1.4 2.0 3.2 4.2 4.3 
Estonia 9.6 9.2 11.3 12.5 11.8 9.1 4.5 4.8 5.5 6.3 6.2 
Hungary 9.0 8.4 6.9 6.3 5.6 5.6 4.5 4.3 3.4 3.1 2.6 
Lithuania - 11.8 11.2 15.7 16.1 13.1 - 7.4 5.0 8.1 - 
Latvia - 14.3 14.0 13.7 12.8 12.8 - 7.8 7.5 8.2 7.4 
Malta - - - 7.0 6.7 7.4 - - - - 2.9 
Poland 10.9 10.2 13.4 16.4 18.5 19.9 - - - 7.4 - 
Romania 5.3 5.4 6.2 6.8 6.6 7.0 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.7 3.3 
Slovenia 6.9 7.4 7.2 6.6 5.8 6.0 3.5 3.3 3.3 4.1 3.7 
Slovak Rep. - - 16.7 18.7 19.4 18.6 - - 7.7 10.1 11.3 
EU     
   Average 10.0 9.4 8.7 7.8 7.4 7.7 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 
   Maximum 17.0 
ES 
15.2 
ES 
12.8
ES
11.3
ES
10.6
ES
11.3
ES
8.1
ES
7.0
ES
6.9
IT
6.5 
IT 
5.8 
IT 
   Minimum 2.7 
LU 
2.7 
LU 
2.4
LU
2.3
LU
2.1
LU
2.8
LU
0.9
LU
0.8
LU
0.7
LU
0.5 
LU 
0.5 
LU 
Source: Eurostat, 2003a 
 
Unemployment in general and long-term unemployment in particular 
are higher among low educated and low skilled persons in the Candidate 
Countries. The same is true for ethnic minorities and younger persons. 
 
In more than half of the Candidate Countries, unemployment rates of 
women are lower than for men as shown in table 3. In general, the 
trends seem, however, to be the same for male and female unemploy-
ment. Women, however, suffer more from long-term unemployment 
than men. 
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Table 3: Evolution of unemployment by gender 
. Unemployment men Unemployment women 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Acc. 
Countr 
  12.6 13.7 14.2 14.8 15.5 15.6 
Bulgaria - - - 16.7 20.0 18.7 - - - 16.2 18.4 17.4 
Cyprus - - - 3.2 2.9 2.9 - - - 7.8 6.4 5.0 
Czech 
Rep. 
- 5.0 7.2 7.3 6.7 5.9 - 8.1 10.3 10.3 9.7 9.0 
Estonia 10.3 9.9 12.5 13.4 11.5 9.8 8.9 8.3 10.1 11.5 12.0 8.4 
Hungary 9.7 9.0 7.4 6.8 6.1 6.0 8.1 7.8 6.3 5.6 4.9 5.1 
Lithuania - 13.1 12.3 17.9 18.4 13.3 - 10.4 10.0 13.4 13.8 13.0 
Latvia - 15.0 14.3 14.4 14.1 13.7 - 13.6 13.6 12.9 11.6 11.8 
Malta - - - 6.6 6.1 6.4 - - - 7.8 8.0 9.8 
Poland 9.1 8.5 11.8 14.6 17.1 19.1 13.0 12.2 15.3 18.6 20.2 20.9 
Romania 5.0 5.5 6.8 7.2 6.9 7.3 5.7 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.2 6.6 
Slovenia 6.8 7.3 7.0 6.4 5.5 5.7 7.1 7.5 7.4 6.8 6.2 6.4 
Slovak 
Rep. 
- - 16.6 18.9 19.8 18.4 - - 16.9 18.5 18.9 18.8 
EU     
   Average 8.9 8.2 7.5 6.7 6.5 6.9 11.6 11.1 10.2 9.2 8.6 8.7 
   Max. 13.1 
ES 
11.2 
ES 
9.8
FI
9.1
FI
8.6
FI
9.1
FI
23.4
ES
21.8
ES
18.7
ES
16.7
EL.
ES
15.5 
EL 
16.4 
ES 
   Min. 2.0 
LU 
1.9 
LU 
1.8
LU
1.8
LU
1.7
LU
2.1
LU
3.9
LU
4.0
LU
3.3
LU
3.1
LU
2.7 
LU 
3.0 
NL 
Source: Eurostat, 2003a 
 
Finally, unemployment rates of young persons, as shown in table 4, 
by far exceed the corresponding unemployment rates in the EU Member 
States. 
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Table 4: Evolution of youth unemployment  
. Youth unemployment 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria - - - - 10.2 13.6
Cyprus - - - 4.0 3.5
Czech Rep. - 3.2 5.0 7.6 7.5 6.7
Estonia - 8.3 6.1 8.3 8.5 8.8
Hungary 6.6 5.8 6.0 4.9 4.6 3.7
Lithuania - - 10.6 9.1 10.1 10.2
Latvia - - 11.2 10.2 8.2 8.6
Malta  
Poland - 8.2 7.5 10.2 13.4 15.2
Romania - 8.0 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.0
Slovenia 7.1 7.5 7.7 7.5 6.1 5.7
Slovak Rep. - - - 14.7 16.5 17.6
EU  
   Average 10.2 9.2 9.3 8.5 7.8 7.1
   Maximum 17.3 
ES 
13.2
ES
12.8
IT
12.6
EL
11.7
IT
10.3
FI
   Minimum 3.7 
LU 
2.9
LU
2.5
LU
2.3
LU
2.5
LU
2.7
LU
Source: Employment in Europe, 2001 and 2002 
 
Where sectoral developments are concerned, most countries experi-
enced a fall in the still-dominant agricultural sector and in the industrial 
sector. In Romania, for instance, agriculture accounts for about two 
fifths of employment, where much of the farming is subsistence in na-
ture. Although a more or less pronounced rise in employment in the 
services sector has been observed, the services sector is still viewed as 
the most likely source of new jobs. Most self-employment is concen-
trated in agriculture and in the services sector. SMEs are still to be de-
veloped and are seen as an important job motor. 50 to 60% of all em-
ployees in Candidate Countries work for small enterprises with less than 
50 employees. In Slovakia, this is true for more than 97% of workers 
and 80% among them work in an enterprise with less than 10 employ-
ees. 
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2. KEY ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
 
The European Council in Brussels, in March 2003, listed the following 
areas on which Member States should focus in their employment policy, 
which are also likely to become priorities for the accession countries, 
once they are members: 
• "reforms in tax and benefit systems and their interaction, so that they 
promote participation in the labour force and tackle poverty and un-
employment traps, and increase labour demand and participation, in 
particular of those with low earning prospects; 
• improving wage formation systems, so that they take into account the 
relationship between wages, price stability, productivity, training 
levels and labour market conditions, and modernising employment 
legislation taking account of the need for both flexibility and secu-
rity, inter alia, by relaxing overly restrictive elements that affect la-
bour market dynamics, while respecting the roles of social partners 
in accordance with national practice; 
• improving the effectiveness of active labour market programmes, by 
better follow-up and monitoring; improving labour mobility, over 
occupations, sectors, regions and across borders, for example by 
improving transparency and recognition between systems of voca-
tional education;  
• increasing labour supply particularly amongst older people, women, 
immigrants and young people; encouraging active ageing, by dis-
couraging early retirement incentives; and reducing barriers and 
disincentives for female labour force participation, including 
through better child care facilities." 
 
The following overview concentrates mainly on these priorities insofar 
as data are available for the Candidate Countries. It also touches on 
some other issues which have been highlighted in the BEPGs and dis-
cussed in the EPC, e.g. efficiency of the active labour market policies 
and investment in human capital. While the corresponding situation in 
EU Member States is used as a comparison point, this is not intended to 
provide a "benchmark", as many Member States still have ground to 
make up if the Lisbon EU-wide targets are to be achieved. 
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2.1. TAX-BENEFIT-SYSTEMS 
 
The high incidence of job shedding in the transition period has led to the 
introduction of an unemployment insurance system in all of the Candi-
date Countries. The design of the tax-benefit system, comprising also 
social assistance and early retirement schemes, is of crucial importance 
and a review of such systems is urged in the Commission recommenda-
tion for the BEPGs 2002 "to make work pay and encourage the search 
for jobs". 
 
Expenditures on social benefits 
 
Public expenditures on social benefits in the accession countries, where 
data are available, seem to be in line with the shares of GDP spent in the 
EU countries, with Poland showing a relatively high ratio in % of GDP. 
The same seems to be true for total government disbursements and total 
tax revenue. One can conclude that social benefits do not seem to play a 
completely different role in accession compared to the EU countries. 
 
Table 5: Expenditures for social benefits and their role in public fi-
nances 
 Social Benefits paid 
by Government
Government total 
Disbursements
Total tax revenue 
 % of GDP, 2000 
Czech Rep. 13.6 46.1 39.5 
Hungary - 47.5 38.7 
Poland* 18.9 43.7 35.2 
Slovak Rep. 12.1 52.2 35.8 
EU-rates:  
   Median 14.2 43.3 42.0 
   Maximum 18.8
DE
52.2
SE
53.3 
SE 
   Minimum 8.1
IE
29.2
IE
31.5 
IE 
*: Tax revenue 1999    Source: OECD Database 
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Net replacement ratios and incentives 
 
Net replacement ratios compare the various (cash) benefits made avail-
able to those without work (net of taxes) with potential in-work income 
and hence are a good indicator of incentives to take up work that are 
embedded in tax-benefit systems. Net replacement ratios are currently 
only available for those countries which are members of the OECD - 
where accession countries are concerned, only the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.  
 
Table 6: Net replacement ratios (in the 1st month of unempl., after a 
waiting period) 
 APW wage level 66.7% of APW wage level 
 single Married 
couple
Couple
2 kids
Lone 
parent 
2 kids
single Married 
couple
Couple 
2 kids 
Lone 
parent 
2 kids 
Czech Rep. 49 67 70 71 66 69 70 72 
Hungary 48 48 60 61 65 65 75 76 
Poland  36 43 46 47 53 62 58 67 
Slovak 
Rep. 
79 77 78 80 77 75 77 79 
EU-rates: 
   Median 64 63 73 73 78 76 82 80 
   Max. 82 
LU, 
NL 
89
NL
89
NL
87
LU, 
FI
89
DK
89
DK
95 
DK 
96 
DK 
   Min. 31 
IE 
44
IE, IT
44
EL
47
EL
39
IT
40
IT
46 
EL 
47 
IT 
Source: OECD, 2002a. 
 
The variation in net replacement ratios is very high across the EU with a 
spread of between 40 and more than 50%-points. As regards the acces-
sion countries, the lowest net replacement ratios are recorded in Poland 
and the highest in the Slovak Republic, where the ratios exceed the me-
dian value for the EU countries for average wage earners. The presence 
of children and/or spouses tends to increase the net replacement ratios in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This is not the case in the 
Slovak Republic. The additional benefits granted for an unemployed 
person’s family tend to increase the net replacement ratios more than in 
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EU countries. The difference in net replacement ratios between single 
workers earning the average production worker wage and those earning 
only two thirds of the average wage seems to be greater in the accession 
countries than in the EU.  
 
Table 7 shows the net replacement ratios for the same groups of coun-
tries and family types for long-term benefit recipients. 
 
Table 7: Net replacement ratios for long-term benefit recipients 
 APW wage level 66.7% of APW wage level 
 Single Married 
couple
Couple
2 kids
Lone 
parent 
2 kids
Single Married 
couple
Couple 
2 kids 
Lone 
parent 
2 kids 
Czech Rep. 37 60 80 74 54 84 100 96 
Hungary 28 28 38 40 28 28 39 41 
Poland  33 50 74 56 48 72 93 81 
Slovak Rep. 38 62 80 60 54 90 100 100 
EU-rates: 
   Median 49 57 68 68 63 80 84 71 
   Max. 60 
NL, 
DK 
71
FI, SE
89
FI
79
DK
85
DK
102
SE
110 
SE 
97 
DK 
   Min. 0 
IT 
4
IT
10
EL
11
EL
0
IT
5
IT
11 
EL 
12 
EL 
Source: OECD, 2002a. 
 
Net replacement ratios for those unemployed with children are higher 
for long-term benefit recipients than for persons in the first month of 
unemployment in the Czech and the Slovak Republics and in Poland. 
This might be problematic in so far as incentives for long-term unem-
ployed to seek a job should be stronger, whereas at the start of an unem-
ployment spell, benefits could be more generous. In order to increase 
the efficiency of the allocation of labour resources and to improve the 
match of labour demand and supply, some frictional unemployment may 
be deemed beneficial.  
 
Although no comparable data are available, it can be stated that in Malta 
a relatively small gap between minimum wage and the unemployment 
benefit exists, in particular for large families. This raises problems con-
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cerning low wage earners which have few incentives to take up work. 
Net replacement ratios for skilled industrial workers with three depend-
ants amount to 78% in Cyprus. In Lithuania, a value of 70% of the aver-
age wage is recorded for one adult and two children. The Polish unem-
ployment insurance system grants a flat rate amounting to 29% of the 
net average wage and 78% of the minimum wage. Compared to that, the 
Polish social assistance payment is rather generous: A single person 
receives 70% of the net minimum wage and a married couple with two 
children 198%. In comparison with EU Member States, the situation in 
the accession countries is not outstanding. In the Netherlands e.g., un-
employment benefit replacement rates for wages at the minimum wage 
level are between 74 and 94% depending on the family situation. In 
Greece, the level of daily unemployment benefit amounts to about half 
the minimum wage. 
 
Net replacement ratios are particularly high in some countries, e.g. as 
recorded in certain cases in the Czech and the Slovak Republics, where 
they amount to 100% for some family types. But in a few EU Member 
States, in some cases the ratios exceed even the 100% threshold; thus 
the situation in the accession countries is not extraordinary. A compari-
son of the development of net replacement ratios between 1995 and 
1999 for average wage earners gives a divergent picture: the net re-
placement ratios decreased in Hungary and in the Czech Republic for 
single workers; they increased for persons with children in Poland. The 
development of the median value, the highest and the lowest net re-
placement ratios of the EU Member States show no clear trends either 
(see graphs on last page). 
 
Design of tax-benefit systems 
 
At the start of transition when unemployment benefit systems were 
newly introduced, they were designed to be relatively generous both in 
terms of the amount paid and in terms of duration. As unemployment 
increased, the systems had to be revised in order to remain sustainable 
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and to allow them to activate jobseekers. In Poland, initially no end date 
for the payment period was fixed, but it was later shortened to one year. 
Maximum duration was halved in the former Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary and the level of the benefit had to be reduced in Bulgaria, the for-
mer Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
 
Concerning the employment conditions governing eligibility for unem-
ployment benefits, the requirement concerning previous employment 
duration varies a great deal in the EU countries as well as in the acces-
sion countries. The conditionality in the Czech Republic is the same as 
that of Germany. The Slovak Republic seems to be more restrictive with 
a requirement of 24 months of employment in 3 years. A waiting period 
does not exist in half of the EU Member States and, in the others, it 
ranges between 3 and 8 days, with the accession countries being in the 
same range. 
 
The payment rate (% of previous gross/net income) in the EU lies be-
tween 40 and 90% with a median value of 70%. Unemployment systems 
in the accession countries tend to be less generous on average than in 
the EU. Poland is a particular case in point, having a flat rate, like Ire-
land and the UK. Finally, the unemployment benefit in the EU is 
granted for periods between 6 months in the UK and Italy and 60 
months in France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The median value of 
duration amounts to 12 months with three countries granting the benefit 
for 60 months. The accession countries tend to be much less generous 
than the EU countries, where duration of benefits is concerned, with the 
shortest duration of 4 months in Bulgaria and the longest in Poland of 
18 months. 
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Table 8: Main characteristics of the unemployment benefit system 
 Employment 
conditions 
Waiting 
period 
Payment rate %* Duration 
(months) 
Bulgaria 9 months in last 
15 months 
- 60% 4 to 12 depend-
ing on length of 
previous em-
ployment 
Cyprus 26 weeks 3 days 60% 156 working 
days 
Czech 
Republic 
12 months in 3 
years 
7 days 50% 
40 after 3 months 
6 
Estonia 12 in 24 
months 
7 days 50% for first 100 
days 
40% thereafter 
180 days, longer 
in case of long 
insurance  
Hungary 12 months in 4 
years 
- 65 12 
Latvia 9 months in 12 
months 
? 50 for 6 months 
then depending on 
employment and 
duration 
9 months  
Lithuania 24 months in 3 
years 
7 days 19-34% 6 months in 12 
months 
Malta ? ? Flat rate 150 days 
Poland  365 days in 18 
months 
1 day Flat rate 18 max (lower in 
areas with low 
unemployment) 
Romania 12 months 
during last 24 
 
- 75% of gross 
national minimum 
wage  
6/9/12 months 
depending on 
length of previ-
ous employment 
Slovenia 12 in last 18 
months 
? 70% of average 
wage in last 12 
months for 3 
months, 60% 
afterwards 
3-24 months de-
pending on 
length of em-
ployment history 
Slovak 
Republic 
24 months in 3 
years 
- 50% 
45 after 3 months 
6 or 9 months de-
pending on 
length of em-
ployment history 
* previous gross income, in CZ and LT previous net income. 
Source: OECD (2002a) for CZ, PL, IMF (2001) for LV; JAPs of BG, CY, EE, LT, RO; 
GVG (2003) for EE, HU, MT, SK; Homepage of the Ministry for Labour for SI 
 
Generally speaking, the unemployment benefit systems in the accession 
countries do not deviate too much from the EU systems, bearing in mind 
the strong degree of heterogeneity in both groups of countries.  
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As for other benefit systems, social assistance and/or unemployment 
assistance schemes exist in most accession countries. Mostly, unem-
ployed persons are eligible to participate in such schemes after termina-
tion of unemployment benefits or in cases where they are not at all enti-
tled to receive unemployment benefits. A recent change in the Bulgarian 
system reduced the period in which unemployment assistance is paid to 
six months in order to encourage job search. The social allowance sys-
tem in the Czech Republic provides several benefits simultaneously 
thereby creating a poverty trap in particular for large families. A similar 
situation can be observed in Lithuania where social security recipients 
receive benefits from different resources and can accumulate an income 
from benefits which exceeds the minimum wage. In the Slovak Repub-
lic, payments from the social assistance system for a family with two 
children are at the level of the average net wage and thus give rise to 
significant employment disincentives. In Hungary, however, reforms 
were designed explicitly to reduce poverty traps. In most accession as 
well as EU countries, unemployment assistance (paid when unemploy-
ment insurance is exhausted) and social assistance are given without a 
limit on duration. Exceptions to this trend include Hungary, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. A subsistence allowance increases 
the disposable income to the "subsistence level" in Estonia, which under 
certain circumstances has lead to an income level above the unemploy-
ment benefit. The system of public assistance allowances seems to be 
rather restrictive in Cyprus, where only just over 1% of the long-term 
unemployed are entitled to receive this type of benefit. The social assis-
tance benefit for a single person in 1998 amounted to 10% of the aver-
age wage in Romania, about 15% in the Baltic countries, over 20% in 
Hungary, about 33% in the Czech and Slovak Republic. These ratios 
were exceeded by the values of Belgium and the UK (about 40%) and 
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden (about 60%). 
 
The accession countries devote more resources to non-employment 
benefits than the EU countries. Generous non-employment benefits de-
crease the incentives for low productivity workers to search and accept a 
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job by increasing their reservation wage.  
 
Early retirement schemes are sometimes used as response to the de-
cline in employment. This is particularly true for the Czech Republic. In 
Poland 12% of the registered unemployed receive pre-retirement bene-
fits and the share is on an upward trend. The system was introduced in 
order to release jobs for young people and is rather generous, providing 
between 120 and 160% of the unemployment benefit. No early retire-
ment system exists in the Slovak Republic and Malta. In some countries, 
e.g. the Czech Republic, disability benefits provide a more generous 
alternative to social allowance, particularly for older workers, and are 
used as an alternative to early retirement, as in Malta.  
 
Unfortunately, no systematic data on the participation in early retire-
ment programmes are available. Some tentative conclusions can be 
drawn from the table below which shows public expenditure on old age 
pensions and early retirement as a percent of GDP. 
 
Table 9: Expenditure on pensions 
 Old age pension Early retirement 
programmes
 Public expenditure, % GDP, 2000 
Czech Republic 7.8 1.8
Hungary 6.0 1.2
Poland 10.8 1.4
EU-rates: 
   Median 9.0 2.2
   Maximum 14.2
   IT
4.0
  DK
   Minimum 4.3
     UK
1.1
BE
Source: OECD, 2002c 
 
Expenditure on old age pensions seems to be in line with the EU coun-
tries, whereas expenditure on early retirement programmes tends to be 
less generous. Early retirement schemes were reduced during the transi-
tion period as they overburdened public finances when unemployment 
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and economic inactivity rose. Some accession countries have made ef-
forts to increase the retirement ages (the statutory retirement age was 
raised to 62 in Hungary and Latvia; 63 in Estonia; 65 in Cyprus; 
63/men, 60/men in Bulgaria, 62/men, 61/women in the Czech Republic; 
60/men, 62.5/women in Lithuania). 
 
The tax burden on labour and the general tax burden are rather high in 
most accession countries. Thus, they share one of the main problems 
with EU Member States. Tax rates on low wage earners show pro-
nounced differences in this tax burden, ranging from a tax rate of 43.6% 
in Slovenia to 17% in Cyprus in 2001. Only in four countries was the 
tax rate on low wage earners lower than the EU average. Nevertheless, 
between 2000 and 2001, only about half of the acceding countries re-
duced the tax rate on low wage earners, as a measure to encourage job 
creation.  
 
Graph 1: Tax rates of low wage earners 2002 
0
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Source: Eurostat 2003
* 2001
 
The tax wedge does not exceed the highest EU values. Neverthless, the 
accession countries share the problem of a high tax burden with the EU-
MS. Cyprus is an exception, which has a relatively low overall tax bur-
den. The tax wedge for an average production worker wage earner 
amounts to 23.2%, for a person earning two thirds of the average wage 
to just over 17%. This is extremely low compared to Lithuania with tax 
wedges of 42 and 45% and the Slovak Republic with tax wedges 
amounting to 40 and 41%. 
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Table 10: Tax burden - Average personal income tax and social security 
contribution rates on gross labour income 2001 
 % average production worker wage 
 67% 100% 133% 167% 
Czech Republic 41.6 43.0 44.3 45.3 
Hungary 49.7 52.6 56.4 57.7 
Poland 41.8 42.9 43.5 43.9 
Slovak Republic 41.0 42.1 44.0 45.5 
EU-rates  
   Median 38.5 44.2 47.2 49.9 
   Max 49.2
BE
55.6
BE
59.0
BE
61.4 
BE 
   Min 17.4
IE
25.8
IE
31.6
IE
32.9 
UK 
Source: OECD, Tax data base, 2000-02 
 
Employer and employee contributions to all forms of social security 
amount to about 60% of wages in the typical case in Romania; this is 
more than most other countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia (50% 
each), France (47%), Germany (about 40%) and Latvia (37%).  
 
High tax rates not only create disincentives for the take up of work, but 
also contribute to the already high and increasing informal sector in the 
Candidate Countries. Another reason for the increase in the size of the 
shadow economy is poor law enforcement and the large decline in in-
comes following market liberalisation. 
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Table 11: Shadow Economy (Labour Force as a % of Working Age 
Population 1998/99) 
Bulgaria 30.4 Lithuania 20.3 
Czech Republic 12.6 Poland 20.9 
Estonia 33.4 Romania 24.3 
Hungary 20.9 Slovak Republic 16.3 
Latvia 29.6 Slovenia 21.6 
Source: Schneider, 2002 
 
Conclusions 
 
Policy concerning tax-benefit systems in the accession countries seems 
grosso modo to resemble the policy approaches in the EU Member 
States. Unemployment benefit systems do not seem to be more generous 
or to provide less appropriate incentives for seeking and taking up work 
- apart from some problematic cases than in EU Member States. Disin-
centives appear to come more often from the social assistance schemes 
and early retirement systems than from the unemployment benefit sys-
tems. Reforms assessed in terms of the development of net replacement 
ratios, mostly go in the right direction in accordance with the require-
ments of the BEPGs and the Luxembourg Strategy according to which 
"Particular attention should be given to promoting incentives for unem-
ployed or inactive people to seek and take up work,…". As in the case 
of Member States, more precise conclusions await the analysis of mar-
ginal effective tax schedules, which are currently being estimated for the 
existing Member States and the four OECD countries which are Candi-
date Countries. The high tax burden on labour is a common problem 
shared between most EU and accession countries, which needs to be 
further tackled by both groups of countries. 
 
2.2. WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS 
 
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 2002 include a recommendation 
concerning wages "Wage developments … should reflect different eco-
nomic and employment situations. Governments should promote the 
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right framework conditions for wage negotiations by social partners. 
For wage developments to contribute to an employment-friendly policy-
mix, social partners should continue to pursue a responsible course and 
conclude wage agreements … in line with the general principles set out 
in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines." Although this recommenda-
tion is only given to EU Member States, it can of course be applied to 
accession countries, too. 
 
Minimum wages 
 
Minimum wages can be seen from a social point of view of guarantee-
ing a certain minimum standard of living to the working population. 
From an economic point of view, minimum wages may guarantee a 
certain intensity of effort which workers are willing to undertake. On the 
other hand, the minimum wage may act as a barrier to the labour market 
entry of low-productivity workers whose productivity falls short of what 
would correspond to the minimum wage. Of course with the minimum 
wage, what matters is whether the level is prohibitively high in countries 
where the unemployment rate is high. Legally binding minimum wages 
exist in all accession countries. Their influence on the labour market 
varies however, as does the ratio of the minimum wage to the average 
wage. In Estonia, Hungary and Romania, the comparably low minimum 
wage, in combination with rather low unemployment benefits, does not 
appear to be a barrier for hiring additional employees. About 5% of the 
employees are paid around the minimum wage in Hungary, about 4% in 
Romania and about 3% in Poland. In Malta, which has a very high 
minimum wage in comparison to the average wage, the lowest wage 
exceeds the legal minimum by 8%. Involvement of the social partners in 
one way or another (be it consultation, a recommendation by the social 
partners or tripartite negotiations) is common in most accession coun-
tries. Several countries use an indexation system (e.g. the Slovak Re-
public and Slovenia) or base the increase of the minimum wage on fore-
casts of inflation and wage increases (e.g. Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic). 
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At the start of the transition, almost all countries introduced legally 
binding minimum wages at levels similar to this in western countries 
(about 45 to 50% of the average wage). As nominal minimum wages 
remained unchanged for several years despite high inflation, the ratio of 
the minimum wage to the average wage fell. Table 12 provides an over-
view of the latest available data on the minimum wage in relation to the 
average wage. Moreover, data on the monthly minimum wage in Euro 
and in Purchasing Power Parities are provided. In January 2003, Slove-
nia and Malta had national minimum wages which exceeded the lowest 
minimum wage in the EU (i.e. Portugal). The differences in the levels of 
the minimum wages are considerably reduced when Purchasing Power 
Parities are used for the calculation of comparable minimum wages. 
 
Table 12: Minimum wages  
 Minimum wage as 
% of average wage 
Year Monthly minimum 
wage, January 2003 
   in € in PPP 
Bulgaria 35.0 2001 56 139 
Czech 
Republic 
34.0 2001 199 389 
Estonia 28.2 1999 138 264 
Hungary 40.0 2001 212 384 
Lithuania 40.0 2001 125 252 
Latvia 40.0 2000 116 239 
Malta 74.0* 2001 535 752 
Poland 38.0 2000 201 351 
Romania 34.0 2002 73 194 
Slovak 
Republic 
38.5 2000 118 265 
Slovenia 58.0 target value 451 668 
EU Mem-
ber States 
45.0 - 50.0  Min: 416 
PT 
Min: 543 
PT 
* in % of average net wages 
Sources: OECD (2001) for CZ; IMF (2001) for EE, OECD (2002b) for HU, others: 
JAPs; for the last two columns: Eurostat, 2003b. 
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For the most part, no regional variation of the minimum wage is pro-
vided for, which seems to increase regional divergence in the labour 
market. This is especially true for Poland, where the generally high 
minimum wage seems to harm job creation especially in certain regions. 
In Lithuania, however, a new law allows the government to set different 
minimum wages for individual branches, employee groups or regions. 
 
Box 1: Regional unemployment and labour mobility 
 
Regional unemployment is rather high in most accession countries 
with Slovakia and Bulgaria showing the widest gap between regions. 
Table 13 lists the regions with the lowest and highest unemployment 
rates in 2001. They vary between 2.0 and 32.8%, a range quite simi-
lar to that concerning EU NUTS level 2 regions. 
 
Table 13: Regional unemployment in the accession countries 2001 
 Region Unemployment rate  
 Közep-Magyarország (HU) 2.0  
 Praha (CZ) 3.0  
 Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU) 3.2  
 Bucuresti (RO) 4.1  
 Közép-Dunántúl (HU) 4.3  
 Nord-Vest (RO) 4.8  
 Jihozápad (CZ) 5.7  
 Slovenija 5.7  
    
 Yugoiztochen (BG) 22.9  
 Severen Tsentralen (BG) 23.3  
 Lubuskie (PL) 23.6  
 Východné Slovensko (SK) 23.9  
 Dolno´slaskie (PL) 24.1  
 Severoiztochen (BG) 26.5  
 Severozapaden (BG) 32.8  
 Source: Eurostat, 2002  
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So far, labour mobility has not contributed to reducing this problem. 
Mobility in central planned economies was restricted by the resident 
permit system and housing restrictions. Moreover, there was an at-
tempt to stabilise the territorial distribution of the population by mov-
ing jobs to people. In the course of the transition, the closing of large 
enterprises in "one company towns" and the decline in agriculture 
have led to high unemployment rates in some areas. Labour mobility 
seems generally to be low, caused partially by high prices for new 
housing and a low housing stock and turnover in urban areas. The 
low degree of wage dispersion in regional respects is another factor 
to explain low labour mobility. In several countries (esp. in the Czech 
Republic and Romania), commuting is common; however, relocation 
is not. In others (Hungary, Poland), the poor roadway systems are 
found to hinder internal migration. People face problems in selling or 
renting their houses. The attitude during communism, under which 
people had a job for life, has also contributes to low movement across 
regions within a country, despite relatively large regional economic 
differences. Fostering mobility is not only important from the point 
of view of regional development, but also in order to reduce the mis-
match in the labour market. Labour mobility after transition has been 
found to be more pronounced in terms of occupational than in terms 
of regional mobility (Svejnar, 2002). 
 
Policies in the Candidate Countries try to cope with the impediments 
to mobility through mobility grants for unemployed or persons with 
low income (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovak Republic), regional employment (Bulgaria) and education 
(Latvia) programmes, training services for businesses in slowly de-
veloping areas (Hungary), support for SMEs (Slovakia), reimburse-
ment of recruitment costs for firms recruiting labour in a region with 
high unemployment (Hungary), temporary foreign employment (Cy-
prus), the improvement of the transport system (Hungary) and subsi-
dies for the construction of houses (Hungary and Slovakia). These 
measures cover the main European approaches to enhance mobility 
and tackle the special problems (such as those incorporated in the 
transport system) of the accession countries. 
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Wage bargaining mechanisms and institutions 
 
The discussion of how wage bargaining structures affect wage devel-
opments has to a large extent been shaped by the Calmfors and Driffill 
hypothesis. It predicts an "inverted U" relationship between unemploy-
ment and the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining. Fully central-
ised and fully decentralised bargaining both favour the employment 
situation: the first, because it can better take into account the economy 
wide consequences of the wage bargaining; the latter, because it can 
better reflect the productivity in the firm.  
 
In the communist area, tripartite bargaining was well developed in con-
trast to the bilateral discussions between employers and employees. In 
this respect, one has to bear in mind that private employers did not 
really exist in the planned economies. Wage negotiations have gradu-
ally been developed in all accession countries.4 There are, however, still 
important differences. In Lithuania and Bulgaria, for instance, bipartite 
discussion and collective bargaining lags clearly behind the tripartite co-
operation. In some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Slovak Republic), 
work councils have to be established which have to be involved in im-
portant business decisions. Usually, collective agreements cover not 
only wages, but also regulations concerning overtime or rules for dis-
missals. In Latvia and Romania, agreements on the sectoral level or on 
the enterprise level are automatically binding for all workers, regardless 
whether they are members of a trade union or not. In the Czech and the 
Slovak Republics, the government may decide to extend the collective 
agreements to non-organised workers. In some countries, wage negotia-
tions are urged to take into account special characteristics of the work 
performed by the individual workers, such as hazardous working condi-
tions, work at night, or demand and supply conditions for a special pro- 
 
                                                     
4 For further details see Annex 1 on wage development and wage bargaining. 
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fession (in Lithuania) or a guideline annual rate negotiated at the na- 
tional level (in Poland). Table 14 indicates the degree of centralisation 
of wage negotiations. The dominant level for wage bargaining in the 
accession countries seems to be the enterprise level. 
 
Table 14: Degree of (de)centralisation of wage negotiations 
 national sectoral enterprise 
Bulgaria x   
Cyprus  x x 
Czech Rep.   x 
Estonia   x 
Hungary   x 
Latvia   x 
Lithuania   x 
Malta   x 
Poland   x 
Romania   x 
Slovak Rep. x x  
Slovenia  x x 
Sources: JAPs 
 
Membership of trade unions plays a crucial role in most wage bargain-
ing systems. It has obviously decreased from the 100% coverage of the 
work force registered at the beginning of economic transition. By the 
end of the year 2000, the degree of trade unionisation was below 30% of 
the labour force. The fall was particularly strong in Estonia, now 
amounting to 18% as well as in Poland and Hungary (now 20% each). 
In Lithuania, union coverage fell from 85% of the labour force in 1989 
to about 13% in 1996. The role played by trade unions has changed 
from an "ideological" one to active participation in wage bargaining. 
Employer organisations represent on average 30-40% of industrial en-
terprises, or between 2 and 5% of the total number of enterprises (see 
EC 2002b). The strength of the trade unions varies a lot between differ-
ent countries: from Poland at one end of a possible scale where firms are 
characterised by strong insider power of trade unions to Estonia at the 
other end of the scale, where employees have no right to demand nego-
tiations. 
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Even in the public sector, wage bargaining between the government 
and trade unions is becoming more and more common. Wages differen-
tiate between different grades, positions and administrational branches. 
Partly, earnings of civil servants are set as multiples of a base amount 
(in Poland) or the minimum wage (in Lithuania). Wages in the state-
owned enterprises are more and more linked to the financial perform-
ance of the companies. Especially in Romania and Bulgaria, co-
operations that were until recently state owned had a soft budget con-
straint and wage increases did not at all reflect changes of productivity. 
Within the framework of the IMF agreements, this has changed and 
wage increases are now subject to strict conditions (profit, absence of 
state subsidies and debts duly paid). 
 
Wage dispersion 
 
Wages seem to cover a wide range both within and between the acces-
sion countries. The average wage level in the sector with the lowest 
wages amounts to 33% of the average wage in the sector with the high-
est wage in Bulgaria and to 61.9% in Slovenia. This has implications not 
on the acquisition of general and specific education and training by 
workers, but also for the efficient allocation of productive human re-
sources.  
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Table 15: Wage differences in the accession countries 1997 
 Bulgaria Czech 
Re-
public 
Hungary Latvia Poland Roma-
nia
Slovak 
Re-
public
Slovenia 
Wage 
dis-
persi-
on* 
33.5 61.4 51.3 47.5 42.2 46.7 55.7 61.9 
Sector 
with 
lowest 
wage 
other 
services 
agri-
culture 
agriculture trade 
and 
cate-
ring
trade 
and 
catering
trade 
and 
catering
agri-
culture
manu-
facturing 
Sector 
with 
highest 
wage 
power 
and water 
financial 
services 
and real 
estate 
financial 
services
and real 
estate
trans-
port 
and 
com-
muni-
cation
mining mining financial 
services
and real 
estate
public 
ad-
ministra-
tion 
* Wage in sector with lowest wage as a % of wage in sector with highest wage 
Source: OECD Data base 
 
Income distribution has grown more unequal during transition, although 
it is still comparable to EU levels. The position of low wage earners has 
deteriorated, while that of highly paid workers has improved. Returns to 
education were low under central planning but this situation has 
changed dramatically in the course of the transition period. Differences 
in educational attainment account for one third of the explained varia-
tion in earnings. Inter-industry wage differentials are the second most 
important factor explaining earnings inequality. Gender is the third im-
portant factor, contributing very little to the differences, although it 
seems that gender gaps have increased in recent years In contrast to 
returns to education, returns to work experience have not increased dur-
ing the transition period. Quite the reverse, in most accession countries 
work experience is now less rewarded than previously (see Rutkowski, 
2001, and Boeri - Terrell, 2002). 
 
A comparison between the private and the public sectors does not lead 
to a uniform picture: Wages are higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector in Bulgaria and Slovenia. The opposite is true for e.g. in 
Hungary, Malta and Poland, the latter faces difficulties in attracting 
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highly productive staff in the budgetary sector. 
 
The decentralisation of the wage setting process has had a stronger im-
pact on the wage structure than the speed of privatisation or other re-
forms. However, wages should not be used to draw conclusions about 
household poverty: Low-paid workers are often secondary earners 
(young people, women) whose earnings complement other family mem-
ber’s income. In Bulgaria, for example, families with a low-paid house-
hold member are less often poor than families without a low-paid 
worker (see Rashid - Rutkowski, 2001). 
 
Labour costs 
 
Labour costs per working hour including non-wage labour costs are 
much lower than in all EU countries, with the exception of Slovenia. 
Slovenian labour costs exceed those in Portugal where the lowest value 
within the EU can be observed. 
 
Table 16: Labour costs per working hour 2001 in Euro 
Bulgaria 1.41 
Czech Republic 3.53 
Hungary 3.65 
Poland* 4.60 
Romania 1.45 
Slovak Republic 2.91 
Slovenia 6.89 
EU 19.77 
Max 22.12 
BE 
Min 5.49 
PT 
*: 2000, Source: Guger, 2002 
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2.3. LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 
 
Labour market flexibility is a prerequisite for the successful transition of 
the formerly planned economies. This concerns not only wage flexibil-
ity, but also the regulations on hiring and dismissals, working time and 
other non-standard forms of employment. These topics are covered 
within the Employment Guidelines, under the heading "modernisation 
of the organisation of work". Flexible working arrangements and an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and security are especially 
stressed - also in the BEPGs and the Barcelona Council Conclusions. 
 
The Estonian labour market has been judged as the most flexible by 
various authors (see e.g. Rashid - Rutkowsky, 2001, Cazes - Nesporova, 
2001) - job destruction and creation rates are even higher than the EU-
average. Latvia, on the other hand, has very strict regulations. Although 
labour law lays down only the minimum requirements, the social part-
ners have the right to develop more detailed provisions concerning mu-
tual rights and obligations. Strict regulation can be observed in the Slo-
vak Republic compared to other transition countries, but they are far less 
strict than in Italy, Spain or Portugal. Detailed provisions for performing 
over 360 narrowly defined occupations have a negative impact on la-
bour mobility in Slovenia. In Poland, job turnover is similar to that in 
relatively regulated labour markets (such as Germany), but substantially 
lower than in flexible ones such as the UK or USA, due to the strict 
employment protection legislation and the presence of strong trade un-
ions.  
 
2.3.1. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
 
Regulations concerning the hiring and dismissals of employers can 
make it easy or difficult for firms to adjust their workforce. High costs 
of dismissals and strict rules concerning hiring (e.g. quotas for special 
groups) may smooth out employment dynamics over the economic cy-
cle. However, this may be achieved at the cost of misallocation of hu-
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man resources, to the extent that it encourages employees to reduce 
turnover costs by hoarding labour. For employees strict labour regula-
tion provides secure jobs and may be viewed as part of quality in work 
which may increase their motivation. Employees may be willing to pay 
a premium for having secure employment in form of lower wages. On 
the other hand, the job security provided by employment protection 
legislation could also lead employees to reduce their work effort. La-
bour protection improves the situation of insiders compared to outsiders. 
Thus, low productive outsiders in particular may face even more diffi-
culties in finding a job.5 Employment protection legislation in accession 
countries has been found to result in lower job turnover, lower flows 
into unemployment and longer unemployment spells, but not to longer 
job tenure (see Nesporova, 2002). 
 
Accession countries tend to be most restrictive concerning collective 
dismissals and least restrictive concerning temporary employment as 
can be seen from table 17 which depicts indicators of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation in some accession and EU countries. 
In comparison to some EU members, regulation seems to be in line with 
the more restrictive countries (such as Germany, Italy, France and Por-
tugal) concerning regular employment, but less restrictive, close to less 
regulated countries such as the United Kingdom, where temporary em-
ployment is concerned. On collective dismissals, the accession countries 
can only be compared to Italy and Portugal. 
 
                                                     
5 For a general discussion of employment protection legislation, see EC, 2001a. 
 Kick-off Papers 222 
Table 17: Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation, Late 1990s1 
 Regular 
Employment 
Temporary 
Employment 
Collective 
Dismissals 
Overall 
EPL strict-
ness Index'2 
Czech Rep. 2.8 0.5 4.3 2.1 
Estonia 3.1 1.4 4.1 2.6 
Hungary 2.1 0.6 3.4 1.7 
Poland 2.2 1.0 3.9 2.0 
Slovak 
Rep. 
2.6 1.4 4.4 2.4 
Slovenia 3.4 3.1 4.8 3.5 
UK 0.8 0.3 2.9 0.9 
Germany 2.8 2.3 3.1 2.6 
France 2.3 3.6 2.1 2.8 
Italy 2.8 3.8 4.1 3.4 
Portugal 4.3 3.0 3.6 3.7 
Source: Knogler 2002 and Worldbank, 2002.  
Notes: 1) Indicators range from 0 to 4 according to degree of strictness. 2) Weighted 
average of indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismiss-
als. 3) Rankings increase with strictness of employment legislation. 
 
The termination of a contract is usually connected with costs for the 
employer which can be divided in two groups: first, the severance bene-
fits paid directly to the employee, and second, costs imposed from out-
side on the employer, such as information procedures or negotiations 
with trade unions. 
 
The notice period for the termination of a contract (two months on aver-
age) tends to be much longer in accession countries than the EU average 
(12.3 days). The grounds for terminating a contract are limited. Usu-
ally termination is prohibited during justified periods of absence and for 
pregnant women. Disabled individuals tend also to have special regula-
tions concerning dismissal. In Estonia, women raising a child under 3 
years are protected by the prohibition of being dismissed. In Poland, 
periods of excused absence during which termination is prohibited can 
last up to 9 months. Special security is provided to older persons for 
whom termination of a work contract is prohibited within two years be-
fore pension entitlement. Hiring and dismissal procedures have already 
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been simplified in Slovenia, where the dismissal regulation was previ-
ously were strict. 
 
When an employee is dismissed, notification to a third party (labour 
office and/or trade union) is generally required without the necessity of 
receiving permission from this third party. This is broadly in line with 
EU practice. In Bulgaria, notification of the relevant territorial body for 
tripartite co-operation, the municipal administration and the territorial 
unit of the labour office is required. Difficult co-ordination with trade 
unions is costly and usually takes much time. The local trade union and 
the local labour office have to be informed about dismissals by Czech 
firms. Similarly, the national labour organisation and the trade union 
must be informed in the Slovak Republic. Firms in Lithuania have to 
give notice to the labour office and the municipality. The latter has a 
formal possibility of stopping dismissals. Finally, in Poland the enter-
prise trade union to which the employee belongs or the union, which 
would represent the employee’s interest, has to be informed. If this un-
ion raises objections against the dismissal, the employer is obliged to 
apply to a supra-enterprise trade union. In the case of mass layoffs, no-
tice must be given to the enterprise level union and the district labour 
office. 
 
Laws about severance pay tend to play the greatest role in countries 
where unemployment benefits are low. These countries require formal 
sector employers to pay benefits when permanent employees are dis-
missed. The typical amounts often correspond to between six and twelve 
monthly wages for tenured workers. Both the severance pay and the 
notice period tend to increase stepwise with the length of the employ-
ment period in the firm. 
 
In some countries, support for job search must be given by the dis-
missing enterprise. If a person is dismissed in the Czech Republic for 
reasons on the employer’s side, the employer is obliged to actively assist 
in finding other suitable employment in co-operation with the state au-
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thority. In Poland, the employer is obliged to provide employees with 2 
or 3 days off, if the reason for the termination is on the employer’s side. 
Dismissed persons have a right of entitlement to compensatory pay if 
they take up a new job at a lower wage. The new employer is obliged to 
pay a compensation for the difference in earnings for a period of six 
months. The costs of these payments are incurred by the Labour Fund. 
 
Table 18: Regulation concerning dismissals 
 Notice period 
(individual) 
Notice 
period 
(Mass 
layoff) 
Legal provisions  
for severance pay 
Bulgaria 30 days 60 days 1 month wage,  
2 months for persons who 
acquired the right to pension, 
6 months if employee has wor-
ked with the same employer for 
the last 10 years,  
negotiations with trade unions 
often lead to higher compen-
sation 
Czech 
Republic 
2 months 30 days 2 months wage,  
collective agreements can 
negotiate additional months 
Estonia 2 months, 0 if bank-
ruptcy (IMF 2001) 
2 weeks to 4 months 
(Arro, 2001) 
 1-4 months wage 
1 month in case of unsuitability 
of worker 
4 months if employee has 
worked with the same em-
ployer for the last 10 years 
Latvia   No mandatory severance pay 
Lithuania n.a. 60 days  
Poland 2 weeks if employee 
was employed for less 
than 6 months 
1 month if employed 
for at least 6 mo. 
3 months if employed 
for at least 3 years 
45 days 1 months wage for employees 
with employment shorter than 
10 years,  
2 month if duration 10-19 
years,  
3 months if 20 or more years,  
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Table 18 (continued): Regulation concerning dismissals 
 Notice period 
(individual) 
Notice 
period 
(Mass 
layoff) 
Legal provisions  
for severance pay 
Romania 15 days  
agreements at sectoral 
level may stipulate 
longer periods  
 6-15 months wages, depending 
on length of service in case a 
company’s restructuring plan 
cost was born by government 
and world bank 
Slovak 
Rep. 
2 months 
3 months in case of 
closure or relocation 
1 month 2 months wage 
Sources: Arro (2001) for EE, Beleva-Tzanov (2001) for BG; IMF (2001), for EE, LT, 
LV; Kwiatkowski (2001) for PL, OECD (2000) for RO, OECD (2002d) for SK; Vecer-
nik (2001) for CZ 
 
Regulations aimed at the integration of and providing job chances for 
disadvantaged groups often achieve the opposite results: Enterprises 
may choose between a special quota of disabled workers or a levy in 
Poland. Most enterprises vote for the latter. Latvia imposes quotas on 
employers concerning women re-entering the labour market, for labour 
market entrants, ex-convicts and workers less than five years from re-
tirement age. All together this touches around one third of the labour 
force. In Lithuania, a legal employment guarantee is given to persons 
younger than 18 years, single parents with a child under 14, persons 
within five years of reaching the pension age, newly released prisoners 
and disabled persons. Quotas for employment of persons from these 
groups can be legally enforced. Disabled persons must account for at 
least 3% at firms with 20 or more employees and severely disabled per-
sons for 0.2% in the Slovak Republic. 
 
2.3.2. WORKING TIME 
 
Working time flexibility is one way to decrease labour costs, especially 
if overtime is considered. From the employee’s point of view, working 
time flexibility may lead to welfare gains resulting from a better match 
of actual working time and preferences. The availability of part time and 
fixed term contracts may induce more people to enter the labour market 
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(in particular those who have to care for children or elderly persons) and 
may induce employers to increase labour demand. Moreover, these 
forms of work provide a way for new labour force entrants to achieve 
experience. Their advantage lies in the greater flexibility in organising 
production schedules and in the more advanced possibilities for reacting 
to variations in demand. 
 
The degree of working time flexibility is varied across the accession 
countries. Low flexibility can be observed in Bulgaria and in Lithuania. 
In most countries, a shift away from regular full-time wage employ-
ment, which is still the most prevalent form, to irregular time-limited 
and flexible employment arrangements, including self employment, has 
been taking place and is still on-going. Normal working time normally 
corresponds to a 40-hours working week and shorter working periods 
for certain sectors (e.g. 37 hours in mining and around-the clock-
operations in the Czech Republic). Overtime is usually restricted and an 
additional premium has to be paid. Special restrictions are applied to 
certain groups, such as young persons, pregnant women or minors. 
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Table 19: Regulations concerning overtime 
 Overtime 
Time restrictions 
Overtime pay 
Bulgaria 3 hours day/2 hours night work per 
day 
30 hours day/20 hours night work per 
month 
50% on working days 
75% on holidays 
100% on official holidays 
Czech 
Republic 
150 hours p.a. if involuntary 
416 hours p.a. if voluntary 
n.a. 
Estonia 200 hours p.a. 
4 hours per day 
50%  or additional time 
off;  
60%  for evening work (6-
10) 
70% for night work (10-6) 
150% work on public 
holidays  
Poland  50% for first 4 hours, 
100% for hours at night, 
Sunday or other days 
of rest 
Romania 8 hours per week n.a. 
Slovak 
Rep. 
8 hours per week 
150 days per year 
25%  
Sources: Arro (2001) for ES; Beleva-Tzanov (2001) for BG; OECD (2000) for RO; 
OECD (2001) for CZ; OECD (2002c) for PL; OECD (2002d) for SK. 
 
Non-standard employment as a % of total employment is characterised 
by a wider spread in the accession countries than in the EU. Part-time 
employment is more pronounced in Estonia than in the Netherlands, the 
EU country with the highest part-time share, and is less pronounced in 
the Slovak Republic than in Greece, the EU country with the lowest 
part-time share. Several accession countries (e.g. Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania) have only recently changed legislation in order to in-
crease incentives for and provide flexible forms of part-time work.  
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Table 20: Non-standard employment as a % of total employment 2001 
 Part-time Fixed-term
Bulgaria 3.4 5.7
Cyprus 8.1 8.1
Czech Republic 4.3 6.9
Estonia 6.9 2.6
Hungary 3.3 6.4
Latvia 10.0 6.0
Lithuania 8.2 5.3
Poland 9.5 8.6
Romania 16.8 1.6
Slovak Republic 2.3 4.6
Slovenia 6.1                  10.8
EU              17.9                  13.4
   Maximum 42.2
NL
                 31.7
ES
   Minimum 4.0
EL
3.1
IE
Source: European Commission, 2002d 
 
The incidence of fixed-term contracts is clearly below the lowest EU 
value in Poland, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Romania. Several 
European countries limit the use of fixed-term contracts to certain 
maximum periods, and fixed-term agreements are limited in about one-
third of collective agreements in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary 
and the Slovak Republic and in almost half in Poland, thereby strength-
ening the position of insiders at the cost of outsiders. 
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Table 21: Regulations concerning fixed-term contracts 
Bulgaria Only 2 successive jobs 
Czech Rep. No limits for adults, not even disabled 
no temporary contracts for school graduates from secondary 
vocational education, apprentices under 18 - only if they ask 
for it 
Estonia Maximum duration is 5 years 
Hungary Regulated  
Poland Can only be renewed twice before being automatically trans-
formed into contract of indefinite duration 
Romania Max. 24 months, allowed if parties agree to them in writing 
Slovak Rep. Restricted to 3 years (does not apply to firms with less than 
20 employees) 
Slovenia Limited 
Sources: Arro (2001) for EE; Cazes - Nesperova (2001) for CZ; IMF (2001), for BG; 
OECD (2000) for RO; OECD (2002d) for SK; Vecernik (2001) for CZ; Worldbank 
(2001b) for PL; JAPs for HU and SI 
 
In Bulgaria, the proportion of fixed-term contracts amounted to 1/3 of 
all contracts in mid-2000 according to trade unions. Due to the applica-
tion of the seniority principle, fixed-term contracts are characterised by 
lower wages. Such contracts seem to be widespread for unskilled work-
ers in some sectors (e.g. forestry and tourism) in Romania. Increasing 
reliance on alternative forms of labour contracts is observed in Poland, 
particularly in sectors that account for most of the growth in employ-
ment over the last few years (30% of jobs in services in the private sec-
tor are self-employed or part time). These alternative forms are, how-
ever, not new - private, temporary labour contracts were already con-
cluded under central planning in the 1980s. 
 
2.3.3. SELF EMPLOYMENT 
 
In the Candidate Countries, self employment as an other form of "non-
standard" employment is not a strategy for the unskilled, but rather a 
labour market choice that brings high rewards. Enterpreneurs are conse-
quently one group of winners of the transition. In all Candidate Coun-
tries, the self-employed account for the largest share of individuals in 
the top consumption group. The share of self employment in the Candi-
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date Countries is similar to the (range of) ratios in the Member States 
(EBRD, 2000). 
 
Table 22: Self employment in % of total employment, 2001 
Bulgaria 13.7
Cyprus 20.6
Czech Republic 14.6
Estonia 6.7
Hungary 13.9
Latvia 10.3
Lithuania 15.9
Poland 22.5
Romania 25.7
Slovak Republic 8.4
Slovenia 11.8
EU 14.8
   Maximum 43.3
GE
   Minimum 5.0
SE
Source: European Commission, 2002d 
 
2.3.4. FEMALE LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT RATES 
 
The high participation rates of women in the labour market during 
communism has continuously declined during the transition period, 
although employment rates of women in the transition countries are still 
high compared to many EU countries.6 This is mainly due to a lack of 
possibilities to combine work and family life based, inter alia, on restric-
tive labour law. 
 
                                                     
6 Equal treatment of men and women has to be guaranteed by law in order to fulfil the acquis 
communautaire. 
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Currently, women are over-represented in lower paid sectors and under-
represented in the higher paid sectors in accession countries. The choice 
of study programmes is often determined by traditional patterns, al-
though women have a higher level of education on average in many 
accession countries.  
 
Measures to increase the participation of women in the labour market 
have covered several fields: Awareness raising, information and gender 
education is often used in order to address the different problems facing 
women. Many accession countries face problems due to lack of flexible 
working patterns, which are currently being addressed by national 
policies. In general, special provisions for parents including parental 
leave, reduced and flexible working hours, are made in the public ser-
vice. Quotas for women returning to the labour force after maternity 
leave have to be fulfilled in Latvia. Parental leave was introduced as a 
new right for fathers in Estonia. The Polish labour code does not make 
any provision for substitute employees and hence creates problems for 
employers who have to find temporary replacement for workers on 
leave. As a number of laws provide privileges for women with children, 
which do not apply for men with or persons without children, gender 
discrimination in recruitment has been observed in Lithuania (see JAP 
Lithuania, 2002). The government now envisages a refinement of the 
legal provisions. 
 
Access to affordable childcare facilities deteriorated in most accession 
countries during transition. The need to develop such facilities is par-
ticularly acute in Cyprus and Malta, where no public childcare facilities 
exist. Lithuanian parents face special difficulties in access to pre-school 
childcare.  
 
2.4.  EDUCATION AND SKILLS 
 
Appropriate education and skills are a prerequisite for a competitive 
economy and there is a need to ensure that the skills acquired are suited 
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to the needs of the economy. Job opportunities and wages tend to in-
crease with skills. The virtue of lifelong learning is considered to go 
beyond economic competitiveness and job creation, by enabling people 
to cope with new challenges. One difficulty, especially faced in connec-
tion with education in the accession countries, is insufficient preparation 
for the transition from school to work. The hiring of school leavers often 
requires additional on-the-job training. Ethnic minorities seem to face 
special problems in all accession countries in acquiring appropriate 
skills. 
 
2.4.1. SCHOOL EDUCATION 
 
Public expenditures on education in the accession countries seem to be 
within the range of the GDP shares in EU countries. Public expenditure 
on education amounts to between 3.1% of GDP in Romania and 6.9% in 
Estonia. 
 
Table 23: Public expenditure on education as % of GDP 2001 
Accession countries** 5.0
Cyprus 5.9
Czech Republic 4.3
Estonia 6.9
Hungary 4.5
Lithuania 6.0
Latvia 5.9
Malta 5.0
Poland** 5.2
Romania 3.1
Slovak Republic 4.2
EU* 4.9
   Max* 8.4
DK
   Min 3.5
EL
Source: Eurostat, 2003a. *: 2000; **: 1999 
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As to indicators concerning school education, all accession countries 
with the exception of Slovenia achieve a higher score than the EU aver-
age in terms of average years of education. The variation of class size in 
the accession countries is substantial, but nevertheless in line with varia-
tion within the EU. Latvia has e.g. an average class size comparable to 
Austria and Belgium. In Poland, it is larger, but still comparable to that 
in Spain.7 
 
Table 24: Basic school enrolment ratio % 1998 
Bulgaria 94.3 
Czech Rep. 97.6 
Estonia 95.0 
Hungary 99.2 
Latvia 90.9 
Lithuania 96.1 
Poland 98.1 
Romania 97.0 
Slovak Rep. 93.9 
Slovenia 98.2 
Source: EBRD, 2001 
 
Those leaving the educational system without sufficient skills for the 
workplace are also at risk for poverty and social exclusion. In 2002, the 
share of early school leavers was very divergent in the acceding coun-
tries. In general, male students suffered more from early drop-outs than 
female. Compared to the EU, however, the accession countries came off 
rather well.  
 
                                                     
7 See Gundlach, (2002) and Knogler (2002). 
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Graph 2: Early school leavers not in further education and training, 
2002 
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Source: Eurostat, 2003
 
As to the number of tertiary graduates in science and technology, an 
indicator which tries to highlight the ability of a country to cope with 
the technical and scientific challenges in the knowledge society, the 
accession countries are within the range of the European countries. 
Lithuania has recorded an outstandingly high value for this indicator, 
which exceeds that of more than two third of European countries. 
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Table 25: Tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1000 inhabi-
tants aged 20-29, 2001 
Accession countries* 6.3
Bulgaria 7.9
Czech Republic 5.6
Estonia 7.3
Hungary* 3.7
Lithuania 13.1
Latvia 7.6
Malta 3.3
Poland 7.4
Romania 4.9
Slovenia 8.2
Slovak Republic 7.4
EU 
   Median* 9.8
   Max* 23.2
IE
   Min* 1.8
LU
Source: Eurostat, 2003a. 
 
Education seems to have concentrated too much on encyclopedic learn-
ing and less on the application of knowledge. Vocational training sys-
tems are now being developed and improved. They already existed in 
former times but were characterised by weak links between education 
and enterprises and in-depth specialisation. People in the accession 
countries do not yet perceive learning as lifelong process. Coherent 
strategies for lifelong learning are still lacking. Systems of continuing 
training are currently being set up, although a large number of providers 
already exist in Bulgaria, Poland and Latvia. Adult participation in life-
long learning in 2002 ranged from 1.1% in Romania to 9% in the Slo-
vak Republic, which was the only country which exceeded the EU aver-
age. The direction of change was, however, not uniform, with some 
countries showing an increase and others a decrease in 2002.  
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Graph 3: Adult participation in lifelong learning 2002 
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2.4.2. SKILLS 
 
Workers in centrally planned economies tended to have received exten-
sive technical education, but foreign investors have perceived a lack of 
adaptability and flexibility. They have complained especially about 
deficiencies at the level of managerial and skilled employment. The 
literacy scores of the adult working population in a number of central 
European countries were, however, very close to those in other OECD 
countries. Table 26 shows the latest results from the OECD PISA study 
which concentrates on 15 year olds. The countries are ranked on a scale 
with an average score of 500 points and a standard deviation of 100. 
Results are given for reading, mathematical and scientific literacy. 
Reading skills are not only important per se but also as a crucial prereq-
uisite for lifelong learning. In this category, all Candidate Countries 
rank significantly below the OECD average, although some EU coun-
tries have a worse ranking. Mathematical literacy is considered to be 
important for analytical skills, logic skills and reasoning. The results for 
the Czech Republic do not differ significantly from the OECD average, 
but those for the others fall significantly below it. Finally, scientific 
literacy points to the capability to think scientifically, to understand 
scientific concepts, to use scientific knowledge, to identify questions 
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and to draw conclusions. The accession countries come out best in this 
category. The Czech Republic significantly exceeds the OECD average. 
The figure for Hungary lies approximately at the OECD average and the 
others achieve results below the OECD average. 
 
Table 26: PISA literacy scores 2000 
 reading literacy mathematical 
literacy
scientific literacy 
Czech Republic                     492                    498                       511 
Hungary                     480                    488                       496 
Poland                     479                    470                       483 
Latvia                     458                    463                       460 
EU    
   Max                      546
                      FI 
                    536
                    FI 
                       538 
                       FI 
   Min                      441
                     LU 
                    446
                   LU
                       443 
                      LU 
Source: EC, 2002c. 
 
2.4.3. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
Activation plays a crucial role in the Emloyment Strategy and the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines. Member States are requested to intensify 
their efforts to develop preventive and employability-oriented strategies 
in order to be able to offer a new start (training, retraining, work prac-
tice, a job, guidance or counseling) to every unemployed adult within a 
year and to every unemployed young person within six months. In most 
accession countries, as in the EU, a shift from passive to active labour 
market policy can be observed during the last years. The shares of GDP 
spent on active labour market policies still tend to be rather low com-
pared to EU countries, as can be seen in table 21.  
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Table 27: Expenditures on active labour market policy  
 ALMP
% of GDP 
Year 
Bulgaria 0.35 2001 
Czech Republic 0.17 2000 
Estonia 0.08 1999 
Hungary 0.47 2000 
Latvia 0.16 2000 
Lithuania 0.09 2000 
Malta 0.08 1999 
Poland 0.20 2000 
Romania 0.15 2001 
Slovak Republic 0.18 2000 
Slovenia 0.40 
1.00 
1998 
target for 2006 
EU   
   Median 1.15 2000 
   Maximum 1.74 
UK 
2000 
   Minimum 0.46 
EL 
2000 
Source: OECD (2002) for EU countries; OECD (2001a) for CZ, Worldbank (2001b) for 
PL; others: JAP. 
 
As to the special programmes, active labour market policies include 
measures which are also used in EU countries. Each country has, how-
ever, a particular focus. Bulgaria puts great emphasis on temporary job 
schemes, especially in the public sector, as do Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Recruitment subsidies play a very 
modest role in Estonia and an important role in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Support for self employment is granted 
in most countries. Training and re-training play a very important role in 
a wide range of countries (such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia) and a minor role in Bulgaria and the 
Slovak Republic. In the latter, training is usually provided to meet the 
needs of a specific employer. Romanian labour market policy puts great 
stress on support for small businesses in form of counselling and loans.  
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Disabled persons belong to special target groups in Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. Special focus is placed on 
young unemployed persons in the Czech Republic, Romania and Esto-
nia. The integration of non-Estonian-speakers is another important goal 
in Estonia. In Estonia and Poland, long-term unemployed receive spe-
cial attention. Moreover, in Poland several special target groups are 
defined, such as women, lone parents, jobless households, school gradu-
ates, persons released from prisons, persons released from military ser-
vice and miners losing employment in hard coal collieries. In Latvia, 
special job-seekers clubs for social-psychological rehabilitation have 
been introduced. Convicted persons and those released from prison are 
another important target group. 
 
As women tend to suffer from longer unemployment spells than men, 
training programs for unemployed women and for women returning to 
the labour market after a long break are offered in most accession coun-
tries. In Poland, women make up the majority of participants in several 
active labour market programmes and special programmes are devoted 
to them. As women apparently face special problems in becoming self-
employed, they receive special support in Estonia and Slovakia.  
 
Concerning the effectiveness of active labour market policies, there is 
some evidence in the Czech Republic that these policies have lowered 
the length of unemployment for persons who would tend to have longer 
unemployment spells without this measure. Only 25% of the partici-
pants in Latvia found a job in 1997. The proportion increased to just 
over 50% in 2000. In Poland, the employment rate is higher and the 
unemployment spell shorter for those who have undertaken training. 
Temporary job schemes in Bulgaria seem to function more as an income 
support than as activation measures. A certain degree of cream skim-
ming can be observed in the Slovak Republic. Women, low skilled and 
older unemployed face a lower chance of being accepted into such pro-
grammes (see EBRD, 2000).  
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
 
During the transition period, job shedding took place in the public sector 
and in state-owned enterprises. Employment creation in the private sec-
tor has been and is clearly lagging behind. Unemployment and eco-
nomic inactivity are both important problems in the labour market. 
 
While challenges in the labour market of the accession countries do not 
differ fundamentally in nature from those in the EU Member States, the 
problems are often more severe. Low employment rates and high unem-
ployment rates remain serious problems. This poor labour market per-
formance may be attributed for the most part to the break down in eco-
nomic activity and the restructuring of the economy. The types of labour 
market policies used do, however, not deviate much from that in the EU. 
Each of the accession countries has its own special problems (e.g. high 
net replacement ratio in the tax benefit system or strict employment 
protection legislation), but the same can be said from the EU countries 
as well. Some problems, such as a high tax burden and the labour mar-
ket implications of an ageing society, are shared between current and 
future EU members.  
 
Concerning the Lisbon and Stockholm targets, there is still a long way 
to go for the accession countries. In this respect, special emphasis must 
be put on increasing the employment rate of older workers and the over-
all employment rate.  
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5. ANNEX: DETERMINATION OF WAGES 
 
Minimum wage determination in Candidate Countries 
 
The minimum wage is determined by the government after consulting 
the social partners in Bulgaria, Hungary - where it was previously set 
by a tripartite council - and Lithuania. The minimum wage in Bulgaria 
can be re-negotiated at the branch or regional level, but it may not be 
lower than the nationally set minimum wage. In Poland, the Minister for 
Labour and Social Policy sets the minimum wage in a regulation based 
on a recommendation of the tripartite commission, which itself bases 
its recommendation on forecasts of inflation and wage increase and an 
analysis of household budget surveys. For young workers covered by 
special vocational training contracts a special minimum wage exists. In 
Romania, collective framework agreements are negotiated each year at 
the national level for each sector which set the minimum gross wage for 
an unqualified worker. At the local level social partners determine an 
enterprise-specific minimum wage at least as high as the minimum wage 
agreed nationally and qualification coefficients which determine, when 
multiplied by the enterprise minimum wage, the basic wage for each 
job. A law establishes the minimum wage in Estonia. In Latvia the 
minimum wage is subject to revision based on an agreement among the 
social partners. An indexation mechanism with direct involvement of 
the social partners is used in the Slovak Republic, thereby taking into 
account the evolution of the average wage and changes in the official 
subsistence minimum income. In Slovenia, the minimum wage was 
introduced in 1995 and has since then been increased at the same rate as 
the basic wage from the collective agreement, which compensates for 
85% of the inflation in the previous year. Up to the point where it 
reaches 58% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector, an addi-
tional increase based on the growth of GDP in the previous year is taken 
into account.  
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The evolution of minimum wages has differed a lot among the acces-
sion countries. E.g. in the Czech Republic, the minimum wage was not 
adjusted for a long period thereby allowing it to be overtaken by the 
level of social benefits. A stepwise adjustment was subsequently agreed. 
The monthly statutory wage almost doubled in two years in Hungary in 
2001 and 2002. Consequently, the proportion of wage earners receiving 
the statutory minimum wage increased from 10% in the business sector 
two years ago to one third in 2002. The finally-imposed wage level was 
partly paid by the enterprises "under the table" even before the increase 
of the minimum wage. The increase hurt especially the low labour cost 
industries such as agriculture, tourism and textiles. As a reaction, in-
creased use of part time work was observed. Moreover, labour subsidies 
were paid to the sectors most affected by the minimum wage. In Bul-
garia, the minimum wage amounted to 54% of the average wage at the 
beginning of the 90s; it decreased to 27% in 1997 and again increased 
thereafter to 35% in 2001.  
 
Wage bargaining mechanisms and institutions 
 
Tri-partite co-operation-councils exist in Bulgaria at national, industry 
and local levels. Until recently, anticipated inflation was a more impor-
tant factor in wage bargaining than productivity trends. In Cyprus, most 
bargaining takes place at the industrial and enterprise levels. A mixed 
system of wage formation at industry and firm levels is applied in the 
Czech Republic. The Czech government makes a decision on whether or 
not to impose the increases agreed in some firms on employees and 
employers in other firms. In 2000 the Minister for Labour and Social 
Affairs ordered 1900 non-unionised firms in the construction sector to 
implement the agreement reached in unionised firms. More or less the 
same rights are given to the Slovakian minister, who can set collective 
agreements as binding for employers who are not members of the or-
ganisation in the same sector and with similar economic and social con-
ditions. Collective bargaining between employers and trade unions takes 
place at sectoral and national levels in the Slovak Republic. In Slovenia, 
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the responsibility for wage bargaining at the sector and enterprise levels 
remains with the social partners. A law ensures that wage growth lags 
behind productivity growth. In Malta, the government has a mediation 
role in wage disputes in the private sector.  
 
Wage bargaining at the enterprise level is predominant in Estonia. The 
same is true for Hungary, where around 45% of the workforce in enter-
prises with up to five employees are covered by collective agreements 
concluded at the enterprise level. Decentralised wage bargaining has 
contributed in Hungary to a more flexible wage structure where educa-
tion and skills are better reflected. In Latvia, the tripartite social dia-
logue is well developed, but the bipartite discussion and collective bar-
gaining lacks clearly behind. Employers organisations and trade unions 
cover a relatively small share of all employers and employees. Never-
theless, collective agreements on wages and labour conditions are set-
tled in more than half of the enterprises where a trade union is repre-
sented. Bipartite collective bargaining is currently developing at the 
sectoral level. The new labour law states that a sectoral agreement, 
which covers at least 60% of the workforce in a sector, will be binding 
for all employers and employees in this sector. In Lithuania, wages are 
also a matter for free bargaining between employers and employees. The 
law states, however, that wages should reflect supply of and demand for 
the profession, the amount and quality of the work and requests addi-
tional payment for hazardous working conditions, overtime and work at 
night or during holidays. Wages in Poland are negotiated at the enter-
prise level, taking into account the guideline annual rate determined by 
the national tripartite commission for social and economic matters, 
which is mostly seen as a minimum rate. In Romania, the government 
lays down the institutional framework for the wage negotiations, which 
are mostly carried out at the enterprise level. Only relatively large trade 
unions and employer associations are allowed to participate in the col-
lective bargaining. The law permits only one collective agreement in 
each enterprise, which is binding for all workers regardless of whether 
they are members of a trade union or not. A trade union in an enterprise 
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may only negotiate if it represents 50% of the workers or belongs to an 
association, which has been found to be representative at the national 
level. 
 
Degree of corporatism 
 
In Cyprus, the collective agreements cover wages, pay systems, over-
time and sickness pay, holidays, and rules for recruitment and dismiss-
als. Employers from non-unionised firms in the Czech Republic are 
required to organise work councils if so requested by employees. Em-
ployees elected to these councils are paid even if they do not carry out 
their normal work. Employers must engage in lengthy consultations 
with these councils when important business decisions are to be made 
(e.g. lay-offs, technical change, health and safety). If the workers fail to 
elect a work council, the employer must negotiate with each worker 
individually. The new labour code in Slovakia provides for the estab-
lishment of employees’ councils representing all employees in firms 
where no trade unions operate. In Estonia, the employer is not obliged 
to initiate negotiations nor to conclude a collective agreement; the 
employees have no right to demand the initiation of negotiations or the 
conclusion of an agreement. Agreements may be concluded at enter-
prise, branch or state level and may be bilateral or tripartite. The agree-
ment is extended to the members of the workers’ organisation that con-
cluded the agreement. In practice, it is generally extended to all workers 
of the enterprise. If an agreement is concluded at the branch level, it 
might also become effective in enterprises where the trade union has no 
members, but the employer is represented in the employer’s union. 
However, a representative of a branch trade union may not ask for the 
conclusion of an agreement from an enterprise that has no union. Not 
only trade unions, but also workers’ representatives representing non-
members may conclude a collective agreement. In fact, the number of 
collective agreements concluded is small and strikes are rare. This may 
be partly explained by the fact that there are simply no effective trade 
unions.  
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Some special features concerning wage systems can be observed in 
several countries: In Bulgaria bonuses still play an important role in the 
earnings. In the Czech Republic, the government has to pay the out-
standing wages of former employees of bankrupt firms. This creates an 
incentive for firms to leave wages unpaid. Real wage moderation and 
productivity improvements in Romania have been led more by product 
market competition than by the labour market situation. Private firms 
pay lower average wages than state-owned firms and tend to have a 
more unequal wage distribution. 
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THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE 
ACCEDING COUNTRIES 
KARI VARIS AND LAURI TARO 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the moment, most acceding countries (ACs) are running fiscal defi-
cits. Although fiscal adjustment has been part of the stabilisation policy, 
deficits have remained high and are perhaps facing additional upward 
pressure due to e.g. weakened economic growth and rising expenditure 
needs. Public debt levels are in general relatively low but it is notewor-
thy that in several countries debt levels have been increasing somewhat 
in recent years. Table 1 presents the deficit and graph 1 the debt deve-
lopments in the ACs. 
 
Table 1: General government balance (% of GDP) 
 1998* 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003p 
Czech Republic -4.5 -3.7 -4.0 -5.5 3.9 5.8 
Estonia -0.4 -4.0 -0.4 0.2 1.3 -0.3 
Hungary -8.0 -5.6 -3.0 -4.7 -9.2 -4.5 
Latvia -0.7 -5.3 -2.7 -1.6 -3.0 -3.1 
Lithuania -3.1 -5.7 -2.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 
Poland -2.3 -1.5 -1.8 -3.0 -4.1 -4.0 
Slovak Republic -4.7 -6.4 -10.4 -7.3 -7.2 -4.9 
Slovenia -2.3 -2.2 -3.3 -2.8 -2.6 -1.4 
Source: Fiscal notifications 2003, * Fiscal notifications 2002; p planned. 
 
The ACs are going to meet considerable challenges, as they improve 
their basic infrastructure and develop their welfare systems. The main 
avenue in promoting the quality of public finances should be redirecting 
public funds so that these challenges will be met and public finances can 
better support economic growth and other Lisbon goals. 
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Once EU members, the ACs will enter the EU economic policy coordi-
nation framework. In the 2002 Council recommendation for the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), it was noted that to maximise the 
contribution of public finances to growth and employment and the 
achievement of the goals agreed in Lisbon and Stockholm, all Member 
States must achieve and sustain sound budgetary positions. An appro-
priate balance and sequencing have to be drawn between running down 
public debt, cutting taxes and continuing to finance public investment in 
key areas. According to the 2002 BEPGs, the Member States should: 
 
i. pursue efforts to make tax and benefit systems more employment 
friendly;  
ii. promote the quality of public expenditure by redirecting funds to-
wards physical and human capital accumulation and research and 
development; 
iii. enhance the efficiency of public spending by institutional and struc-
tural reforms; 
iv. improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by pursuing 
the comprehensive three-pronged strategy, of raising employment 
rates, reducing public debt and adapting pension systems; 
v. reform pension policies so as to secure the long-term financial sus-
tainability, to safeguard the adequacy of pensions and meet chang-
ing societal needs; and  
vi. pursue tax co-ordination further. 
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Graph 1: General government debt (% of GDP) 
Source: EBRD. 
This paper attempts to raise some preliminary thoughts as to what the 
current and future challenges and risks facing the ACs in the area of 
public finances are. Pension questions are dealt with separately.  
 
2. THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
 
The overall level and composition of revenues and expenditures in the 
acceding countries resembles that of the present Member States, al-
though significant differences for individual countries can be found.  
 
The ratio of public expenditure to GDP remains relatively high in most 
of the ACs, at above 40% in 2001. However, total government expendi-
ture declined by several percentage points of GDP in the late 1990s in 
those countries that were in transition. Activities carried out by the gov-
ernment were reduced, state-owned enterprises privatised to a varying 
degree and complex systems of taxes and subsidies meant to equalise 
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incomes across different enterprises and sectors reformed or dismantled.  
 
In the 2002 PEPs, most ACs envisaged lower deficits and a continued 
decline in GDP ratios for both public expenditures and revenues in the 
medium-term. This kind of a scenario is, nevertheless, challenged by the 
present weakness in the global and in the European economy and the 
mounting expenditure pressures rising from e.g. EU and NATO mem-
bership.  
 
Table 2: General government finances (% of GDP) 
 Revenue Expenditure Balance Primary  
balance 
 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Cyprus 40.5 42.2 43.5 42.5 -3.0 -0.3 2.6 4.8 
Czech Rep. 42.1 41.3 47.1 46.8 -5.0 -5.5 -3.8 -3.6 
Estonia 38.6 38.4 38.4 38.4 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 
Hungary 46.1 42.5 50.2 45.0 -4.1 -2.5 0.2 0.7 
Latvia 41.4 38.6 43.0 40.6 -1.6 -2.0 -1.0 -1.1 
Lithuania 34.2 36.1 36.1 37.6 -1.9 -1.5 -0.2 0.0 
Malta 37.4 35.8 44.4 38.8 -7.0 -3.1 -3.4 0.2 
Poland 41.8 42.2 45.3 44.5 -3.5 -2.2 -0.6 1.5 
Slovak 
Rep. 
41.2 39.8 46.6 41.8 -5.4 -2.6 -2.0 0.4 
Slovenia 43.1 42.5 45.6 43.3 -2.5 -0.8 -0.5 0.9 
EU 46.4 - 47.2 - -0.8 - 2.9 - 
Source: PEPs 2002. 
 
On the revenue side, total tax income in the ACs averaged about 35% of 
GDP in 2000. Privatisation of state assets has played an important role 
as an additional source of income in many of the countries. The cumula-
tive amount of privatisation receipts varies considerably from country to 
country, between 3 and 30% of GDP, which reflects both the ap-
proaches chosen in large-scale privatisation as well as the attractiveness 
of the assets on offer. Privatisation of the corporate sector is for a large 
part completed in the most advanced countries.  
 
 Kick-off Papers 254 
Table 3: Structure of general government revenue in 2000 (% of GDP) 
 Czech 
Rep. 
Es-
tonia 
Hun
gary 
Lat-
via 
Lithua
nia 
Po-
land 
Slovak 
Rep. 
Slove-
nia 
Euro-
zone 
Current 
revenue 
39.2 38.7 41.8 36.8 30.4 41.6 36.6 41.5 45.0 
Tax 
revenue 
36.7 35.8 36.2 31.3 28.5 39.9 34.1 39.2 44.9 
Personal 
income 
tax 
5 7.8 7.2 6 7.8 4.6 4.6 7.6 9.9 
Corpo-
rate 
income 
tax 
3.9 1.0 2.2 1.7 0.7 2 3 - 3 
Social 
security 
contri-
butions 
14.7 12.4 9.8 10.7 7.1 8.7 13 13.6 15.9 
Prop-
erty tax 
0.5 0.4 0.9 1 0.6 - - 2.3 1.5 
Indirect 
tax 
12.6 14.2 16 11.9 11.7 11.4 13.5 15.7 13.6 
Totoal 
public 
revenue 
40.6 - 44.5 - - 41.6 46.1 - - 
Sources: IMF/EU, OECD, Finmin of Poland 
 
Financing the scale of public expenditure - not much different from that 
of the present Member States - lays a heavy burden on the tax base, 
which is narrower in the ACs. Social security contributions take a large 
share of total labour costs.  
 
Nominal tax rates for labour and capital incomes are rather high, while 
many exemptions and tax evasion reduce effective rates. The distortions 
caused by high rates of taxation on labour are a serious impediment to a 
job-intensive growth strategy, according to the IMF and the EU Com-
mission. There is a general intention in the tax policies, as laid out in the 
2002 PEPs, to gradually shift the tax burden from labour and capital 
towards consumption. As the nominal VAT rates are already close to or 
at EU rates, boosting effective consumption tax income should take 
place mainly through a broadening of the tax base and by higher excise 
duties. Furthermore, there is a need to improve tax administration and 
the effectiveness of tax collection. A significant lowering of company 
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taxation is planned according to the PEPs.  
 
Table 4: Value Added Tax and Corporate Income Tax rates in 2002 
 VAT Corporate income tax 
Cyprus 10 23/28 
Czech Republic 22 31 
Estonia 18 0*/26 
Hungary 25 18 
Latvia 18 25 
Lithuania 18 15 
Malta 15 35 
Poland 22 28 
Slovak Republic 23 25 
Slovenia 20 25 
EU min. 15 - 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, EU Commission; * reinvested 
profit; 
 
As for the expenditure side of budgets, spending on public services and 
social transfers as a percentage of GDP is at comparable levels with that 
of the present Member States. Some ACs appear to spend more on ser-
vices and less on transfers, while others do the opposite. Also needs 
differ, for example poverty rates are high in some ACs, but low in oth-
ers. In most cases, it takes time before pension and health insurance 
schemes adopted by the ACs are mature and can fully contribute to so-
cial security. 
 
The World Bank estimates that up to 80% of government expenditures 
in these countries is rigid in the sense that it is determined by rules out-
side the budget bill process. These are mainly expenditures in the areas 
of defence, old age and disability pensions and transfers to local gov-
ernments. Such rigidity is often compounded by indexation clauses for 
pensions and public sector wages.  
 
Public investment levels are higher in the ACs than in the present Mem-
ber States, due to the poor state of infrastructure. Old networks and utili-
ties of the transition countries from the period of heavily subsidised 
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energy, housing and transport prices are ill-suited for the needs and 
standards of a market economy. For example, rail networks are exten-
sive and heavily staffed, while road networks remain inadequate. Tele-
communications services are still vastly undersupplied, especially for 
households. The ACs face considerable challenges in replacing old 
technology and building new infrastructure networks. In the 2002 PEPs, 
investment expenditure is foreseen to be maintained at a level of 3% of 
GDP, on average.  
 
Table 5: Structure of general government expenditure as a share of GDP 
in 2000 
 Czech 
Rep. 
Es-
tonia 
Hun
gary 
Lat-
via 
Lithua
nia 
Po-
land
* 
Slovak 
Rep. 
Slove-
nia 
Euro-
zone 
Current 
expendi-
ture 
38.4 36.3 39.9 36.6 30.4 - 38.2 39.2 43.8 
Govern-
ment 
consump-
tion 
8.7 24.6 14.4 16.1 16.6 15 17.6 17.6 19.8 
Interest 
payments 
1.1 0.3 6.1 1.1 1.7 3 2.7 1.5 3.7 
Subsides 
and cur-
rent trans-
fers 
28.6 11.4 19.4 18.9 12.1 - 17.9 20.1 19.8 
Subsides 8.1 0.8 2.8 5 0.2 - 4 1.5 1.4 
Current 
transfers 
20.5 10.6 16.6 13.9 11.9 - 13.9 17.9 18.4 
Capital 
expendi-
ture 
5.9 3.2 7.1 4 1.9 2.8 3.9 4.1 1 
Total 
public 
expendi-
ture 
46.1 40.1 47.5 40.6 32.3 45.5 52.2 43.3 44.8 
Sources: IMF/EU, OECD, Finmin of Poland; * 2001 
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3. MACRO-ECONOMIC STABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
Accession countries will enter the EU as Member States with a deroga-
tion. They will assume the EMU framework including adherence to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. They are expected to join 
the exchange rate mechanism ERM II, although not necessarily immedi-
ately after accession, and eventually to adopt the euro. Before adopting 
the euro, their macro-economic stability will be assessed with the help 
of the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria. Fulfilment of these cri-
teria requires simultaneous price, fiscal and exchange rate stability. 
 
Many of the ACs have fiscal deficits and rapid growth rates of public 
expenditure, which can be contained only under rapid real and nominal 
economic growth. These policies may, however, turn out to be unsus-
tainable under periods of slower GDP growth and inflation. Presently, 
several ACs are, in fact, facing this kind of a situation, as they are under 
increasing pressure to bring about a consolidation of their public fi-
nances in the coming years.  
 
The gross public debt situations are influenced by privatisation incomes 
and other transitional phenomena, which mask the underlying trends. 
Some countries also had the advantage of starting from a low level of 
indebtedness1, while others have debt levels closer to those of the old 
Member States. Without corrective measures the presently quite man-
ageable debt positions may deteriorate quickly in the countries currently 
running large deficits.  
 
International disinflation and ACs’ strive for the fulfilment of the con-
vergence criteria are rewarded in the form of lower interest rates for 
government bonds. On the other hand, for most ACs fulfilment of the 
criteria would require substantial fiscal (or monetary) tightening, which 
could slow down real convergence or postpone it further in future.  
                                                     
1 E.g. the Baltic countries, as Russia inherited all of Soviet Union debt. 
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Structural change and transitional costs due to the EU membership make 
fiscal stability assessment particularly difficult. Deficiencies in the qual-
ity of data complicate it further. There are good reasons to tread care-
fully in drawing any strong conclusions on the basis of partial informa-
tion.  
 
Sustainable convergence should be the ultimate goal for the new Mem-
ber States. To achieve that, they need to maintain a judicious macro-
economic policy mix which allows their economies to catch up, while 
maintaining public finances in good balance. Sustainability also requires 
that long-term challenges deriving from unfavourable age structure of 
population are addressed duly. It would appear evident that some of the 
new member countries would be ready for joining ERM II at an earlier 
date than others. Differences among the new Member States and the 
nature of the procedure imply that decisions are taken on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
Table 6: EMU Convergence 
 Price stability, avg. 
of period, %yoy 
General gov. balance 
% of GDP 
General gov. debt  
% of GDP 
 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Ref. value 3.6 3 2.8 -3 -3 -3 60 60 60 
Cyprus 2 2.8 4.3 -3 -3.5 -4 54.6 - - 
Czech 
Rep. 
4.7 1.4 1.5 -5.5 -6.5 -6.3 19.4 23.3 26.3 
Estonia 5,8 3.6 3.5 0.5 1.3 -0.5 5.4 5.1 4.8 
Hungary 9.2 5.3 5 -4.2 -9.1 -4.9 51.8 53.3 54.8 
Latvia 2.5 1.9 2.5 -1.9 -2.5 -2.9 13.8 13.9 14 
Lithuania 1.3 0.3 1 -2.3 -1.8 -1.9 29.1 28.4 28.6 
Malta 2.9 2.2 2.7 -7 -6.1 -5.2 65.4 66.6 65.6 
Poland 5.5 1.9 1.1 -3.1 -4.2 -4.2 42.9 48 46.1 
Slovak 
Rep. 
7.3 3.3 8.8 -5.4 -7.7 -5.3 42.7 34.5 34.1 
Slovenia 8.5 7.5 6 -2.5 -1.8 -1.5 28.4 31 32.4 
Sources: European Commission Forecast spring 2003, Deutsche Bank Research 2003, 
Ameco 2003. f = forecast 
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Credit ratings for sovereign bonds measure investor confidence in a 
broader sense. Not only the rate of indebtedness, but also confidence in 
economic policies and institutions more generally together with the 
quality of assets and the extent of contingent liabilities, among other 
things, influence the rating. Credit ratings for the ACs are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Credit ratings in May 2003 (local currency debt / foreign cur-
rency debt) 
 Moody's S&P Fitch 
Slovenia Aa3/Aa3 AA/A+ AA/A+ 
Cyprus A2/A2 AA-/A AA/A+ 
Hungary A1/A1 A/A- A+/A- 
Estonia A1/A1 A-/A- A+/A- 
Malta A3/A3 AA-/A AA-/A 
Czech Rep. A1/A1 A+/A- A/BBB+ 
Poland A2/A2 A/BBB+ A+/BBB+ 
Latvia A2/A2 A-/BBB+ A/BBB 
Slovak Rep. A3/A3 A-/BBB A-/BBB 
Lithuania Baa1/Baa1 A-/BBB+ A-/BBB 
Source: Bloomberg. Scale used by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Group: 
Aaa/AAA, Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, Aa3/AA-, A1/A+, A2/A, A3/A-, Baa1/BBB+, 
Baa2/BBB, Baa3/BBB- etc. 
 
4. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS   
 
The acceding countries face several medium-term risks and challenges, 
which may not have been fully addressed in the 2002 PEP budget pro-
jections. Here are some preliminary observations: 
 
1. It is vital that the availability and quality of public sector data for 
Candidate Countries be improved to allow a more detailed assess-
ment.  
 
2. For most ACs the present economic slowdown has increased deficits 
from those presented in the latest PEPs, thus increasing the need for 
budgetary consolidation. 
 Kick-off Papers 260 
3. Privatisation has significantly supported state budgets, but now its 
role is declining. The possibilities for expenditure savings by trans-
ferring costly activities from public to private sector have largely 
been exhausted. This may influence the public finance developments 
in the future. 
 
4. A large part of the FDI inflows has been attracted by the opportuni-
ties offered by privatisation. Now that these opportunities are de-
creasing, FDI inflows may diminish, unless stronger incentives for 
new private sector investment are introduced. The possibly resulting 
lower nominal and effective corporate tax rates would add to the 
pressures to broaden the tax base and avoid too much tax burden re-
maining on labour income; especially when taking into account the 
simultaneously intensifying tax competition. 
 
5. On the expenditure side, spending pressures abound. Part of the ex-
penditure increase is automatic or obligatory. EU membership will 
raise income, but also augments public spending. There will be costs 
due to new institutions, more administration as well as higher stan-
dards and requirements. In many ACs, military spending require-
ments will rise with NATO membership. 
 
6. The need for public investment expenditure will remain high in the 
foreseeable future. High level of investment is necessary for a rapid 
real convergence by the acceding countries. In their PEPs, all ACs 
seem to design their policies in a way to maximise the use of EU 
structural funds, which could lead to the risks that (a) this kind of 
prioritisation will lead to a sub-optimal investment structure; and (b) 
the attractiveness of EU funding will lead to a too high level of in-
vestment and public investment expenditure due to additionality. 
 
7. Social indicators (male life-expectancy, poverty rates) reveal a need 
for economic reform, but also for better social and health services in 
many countries and regions. This keeps up public expenditure pres-
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sure. Education expenditure should also be a priority in these coun-
tries to enable them to catch up with the present Member States. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that prices and wages converge gradu-
ally towards the EU-level also in the public sector. To cope with the 
twin challenge of the rapidly increasing public expenditure pressures 
and fulfilment of the higher EU standards on the public services, the 
ACs need to put special emphasis on improving the efficiency of 
their public services. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK AND PENSION RE-
FORM CHALLENGES IN THE ACCESSION COUN-
TRIES 
MICHELINE LAMBRECHT, FELIX LOWINSKI, DOMINIQUE SI-
MONIS, PATRICK VAN BRUSSELEN1 
 
1. AIM 
 
The population of the present EU Member States will undergo substan-
tial changes in size and age profile in the coming decades which may 
have profound implications for the long-term sustainability of public 
finances, as shown in the EPC report of October 2001 on budgetary 
challenges posed by ageing populations.2 
 
In the accession countries, against the backdrop of public spending on 
pensions equivalent to between 4% and 13% of national income in 2000 
and a demographic outlook for most countries similar to that for the 
present Member States, the long-term sustainability of public finances is 
an issue that deserves increased attention, even if debt ratios at present 
in many cases are lower than in the present Member States.  
 
In line with the goal of the Lisbon strategy to ensure that public finances 
contribute to growth and employment, the relevance of the sustainability 
of public finances arises from the direct economic and financial implica-
tions of ageing, but also from possible crowding-out effects relative to 
other urgent categories of government spending. The present note pre-
sents a very first and preliminary analysis of the issue only. 
 
                                                     
1 The paper benefited from comments by Henri Bogaert, the chairman of the Ageing Working 
Group of the EU’s Economic Policy Committee, and Heinz Scherrer from the secretariat of the 
Economic Policy Committee. 
2 EPC/ECFIN/655/01 of 24 October 2001. 
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2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK  
 
At present, there are no Eurostat demographic projections available for 
the Candidate Countries. Recent UN population forecasts show that in 
most Candidate Countries the working age population (aged between 20 
and 64), the number of elderly persons aged 65 or over, and the old-age 
dependency ratio would follow broadly similar trends as in the present 
Member States but actually surpassing EU levels by around 2040 (see 
Graph 1 and the Table on the old-age dependency ratio in Annex 1; 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic would surpass EU dependency ratio 
levels even earlier).  
Graph 1: Old-age dependency ratio, 2000-50 
Source: UN population projections 2002 (EU-15: Eurostat population projections 1995 - 
baseline scenario). Note: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as persons aged 65 or 
over as a percentage of the working-age population (aged 15-64). 
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The demographic outlook in the Candidate Countries is as follows (see 
Tables 1-3 and Annex 1): 
 
• Total population: The aggregate population of the twelve accession 
countries (i.e. not including Turkey) decreases under the influence of 
negative natural and migration balances, while the still positive natu-
ral and migration balances of the EU-15 will help to keep those of 
the EU-27 positive. In the long run (2050), according to the UN 
population forecast, the total population of the EU-27 would de-
crease further by 6.8%, as compared with 3% for the EU-15. 
 
• Fertility and life expectancy: With the exception of Cyprus and 
Malta, which have fertility and mortality parameters similar to those 
of the present EU Member States, the accession countries have very 
low fertility and lower life expectancies (LE) at birth than the present 
Member States. This leads to negative natural balances. 
 
• Migration: With the exception of Cyprus and Malta and the notable 
positive migration balance of Hungary, most of the accession coun-
tries have a strong negative migration balance, especially Bulgaria 
(the estimation for Bulgaria must though be treated with care). 
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Table 1: Demographic parameters in 2001 (mostly estimations) 
 Total fertility 
rate 
LE at birth - 
men 
LE at birth - 
women 
Bulgaria 1.2 68.2 75.3 
Czech Rep. 1.14 72.1 78.5 
Cyprus 1.79 75.3 80.4 
Estonia 1.34 65.1 76 
Hungary 1.32 67.7 75.7 
Latvia 1.24 64.5 75.6 
Lithuania 1.25 67.5 77.7 
Malta 1.51 75.1 79.3 
Poland 1.29 70.2 78.4 
Romania 1.2 67.7 74.8 
Slovakia 1.21 69.1 77.2 
Slovenia 1.22 72.3 79.7 
EU-15 1.47 75.3 81.4 
   maximum Ireland = 1.98 Sweden = 77.5 France = 83 
   minimum Italy = 1.24 Ireland = 73 Ireland = 78.5 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2: Population change in 2001 (mostly estimations; in '000) 
 Natural balance1 Migration 
balance 
Change in  
population 
Bulgaria -44.2 -23.9 -68.1 
Czech Rep. -17.0 -8.6 -25.6 
Cyprus 3.3 3.1 6.4 
Estonia -5.9 0.2 -5.7 
Hungary -35.0 14.0 -21.0 
Latvia -13.3 -1.4 -14.7 
Lithuania -8.9 -2.6 -11.5 
Malta 0.9 2.3 3.2 
Poland 5.0 -16.7 -11.7 
Romania -39.2 -4.9 -44.1 
Slovakia -0.8 1 0.2 
Slovenia -0.8 4.7 3.9 
AC-12 -155.9 -32.8 -188.7 
EU-14 403.7 1160.3 1564.0 
EU-27 247.8 1127.5 1375.3 
1 Birth-deaths 
Source: Eurostat (migration balance for Bulgaria adjusted) 
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Table 3: Evolution of the population 2000-2050 (in ‘000 000) 
      Change 
 2000 2050 Absolute %
Bulgaria 7,9 4,5 -3,4 -43,0
Czech Rep. 10,3 8,4 -1,8 -17,9
Cyprus 0,8 0,9 0,1 16,1
Estonia 1,4 0,8 -0,6 -46,1
Hungary 10,0 7,5 -2,5 -24,9
Latvia 2,4 1,7 -0,7 -27,9
Lithuania 3,7 3,0 -0,7 -19,1
Malta 0,4 0,4 0,0 2,5
Poland 38,6 33,4 -5,2 -13,6
Romania 22,4 18,1 -4,3 -19,1
Slovakia 5,4 4,7 -0,7 -13,4
Slovenia 2,0 1,5 -0,5 -23,2
EU-15 376,4 364,2 -12,2 -3,2
EU-27 481,7 449,2 -32,5 -6,8
Source: UN Population forecasts 2002 
 
Overall, demographic changes of this magnitude, as in the EU Mem-
ber States, will have substantial economic implications, e.g. via the la-
bour supply. A decline in the size of the active labour force will lead to 
a lower rate of economic growth unless offset by increases in factor 
productivity. This development may make it more difficult to finance 
the impact on public spending on pensions caused by ageing population 
and will pose a challenge in the light of the Lisbon objectives. 
 
3. MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
3.1. GROWTH PERFORMANCE 
 
The Candidate Countries experienced differing growth paths during the 
transition in the 1990s (Table 4). By 2001, only half of them surpassed 
their pre-1990 levels of real GDP. In general, GDP bottomed out be-
tween 1991 and 1993. Poland’s GDP reached its trough in 1991, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia in 1992, and Hungary in 1993. 
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In the Baltic states, Latvia reached its low point in 1993 and Estonia and 
Lithuania in 1994. A high growth period ensued between 1995 and 
2002. Despite the consequences of the economic crisis in Russia, which 
were mostly felt in Lithuania, bringing about a 3.9 percent decline of 
GDP, and in Estonia to a lesser extent, overall growth over the 1995-
2002 period reached an average rate of 4.9 percent, 5.6 percent and 3.9 
percent, respectively in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Both Romania 
and Bulgaria went through severe economic recession in the early 
1990s. Then economic recovery started in 1993 and 1994, respectively. 
However, episodes of severe economic and financial crises occurred in 
both countries (in 1996 in Bulgaria and in 1997 in Romania) and the 
economic situation improved only recently. Average annual GDP 
growth rates for the two countries are below one percent over the period 
1991-2002. 
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Table 4: Real GDP growth 1991-2002 (% of change) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002//1995 2002//1991
BG na -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -9.4 -5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.0 4.0 0.5 -0.1
CZ -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1.0 0.5 3.3 3.3 2.2 1.7 1.7
HU -11.9 -2.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.7 3.4 3.9 2.6
PL -7.0 2.5 3.7 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.1 0.8 3.9 4.2
RO -13.1 -8.7 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 1.8 5.3 4.2 0.4 0.5
SK na na 6.2 5.2 6.5 5.8 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.3 3.9 3.7 na
Sl -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 3.0 2.6 3.9 3.1
EE na na na -2.0 4.3 3.9 9.8 4.6 -0.6 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.9 na
LV -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -1.6 3.7 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.7 5.0 5.6 -2.0
LT -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -3.9 3.8 5.9 5.0 3.9 -2.0
CY 0.7 9.7 0.7 5.9 6.2 1.9 2.4 5.0 4.6 5.1 4.0 2.2 3.6 4.3
MT na 4.7 4.5 5.7 6.2 4.0 4.9 3.4 4.1 4.8 -0.4 2.8 3.3 4.0
EUR-12 na 1.5 -0.8 2.4 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.5 0.8 2.2 1.9
EU-15 na 1.1 -0.4 2.8 2.4 1.6 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.4 1.5 1.0 2.2 2.0
Source: AMECO, European Commission, November 2002. Note: (//) Average growth rate 
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Employment dropped markedly in response to the severe contractions in 
output in the early stages of the transition period. However, the transi-
tion-induced fall in the Central and Eastern European Countries GDP in 
the early 1990s was not met by an immediate and proportional drop in 
employment, due to initial labour hoarding. Then, over the following 
years, structural change brought massive layoffs, new job opportunities 
limited in number and oriented toward the higher skilled/educated, with 
substantial reductions in the labour force. Though GDP recovered in 
Poland as of 1992, employment rose only moderately between 1994 and 
1998, and dropped once again thereafter. In Hungary, though renewed 
GDP growth appeared in 1994, employment rose only modestly be-
tween 1998 and 2001. Over the 1995-2002 period, important job losses 
were also noted in Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania, with only 
Cyprus and Slovenia exhibiting small positive annual average rates of 
job growth over the period. 
 
This evolution of GDP and employment lead to important and sustained 
gains in labour productivity over the 1995-2002 period, particularly in 
Poland, the three Baltic states, Slovakia and Slovenia (Table 5). With 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta, only the Czech Republic, Bulgaria 
and Romania had average annual labour productivity growth rates be-
low three percent over the period 1995-2002, while EU labour produc-
tivity grew at approximately one percent over the same period.  
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Table 5: Implicit labour productivity 1991-2002 (growth rate) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002//1995 2002//1991
BG na 1.0 0.1 1.2 1.6 -9.5 -1.8 4.2 4.4 10.6 8.8 3.5 2.7 2.1
CZ na na 6.0 5.0 3.5 2.2 4.6 3.4 1.1 4.2 3.4 3.6 2.3 na
HU na na 0.3 1.1 5.2 4.1 -0.1 0.4 2.6 4.0 2.9 2.3 3.2 na
PL na na 6.2 4.2 5.1 4.0 3.9 2.4 6.9 6.4 3.0 2.3 4.1 na
RO -12.6 -5.9 5.5 4.5 13.0 5.2 -2.3 -2.5 3.5 -0.7 5.9 3.9 1.8 2.6
SK na na na na 4.3 2.4 6.8 2.4 4.7 4.9 2.3 3.7 3.9 na
Sl -3.6 -1.0 4.8 5.7 3.0 4.5 5.1 3.8 3.9 3.5 2.3 2.6 3.7 3.5
EE na na na 1.4 11.1 6.5 9.7 6.7 3.9 8.5 4.2 3.1 6.1 na
LV -9.6 -29.7 -8.6 12.0 1.9 6.5 6.4 4.1 3.4 6.8 7.8 5.5 5.8 0.8
LT -7.9 -19.5 -12.6 -4.2 5.3 3.7 6.6 5.9 -3.4 7.8 10.4 5.0 5.1 0.0
CY na na na na 1.6 0.9 2.7 3.9 3.2 2.2 2.1 1.6 2.4 na
MT na na na na na na na 2.9 4.5 2.5 -0.7 2.7 na na
EUR-12 na 2.4 0.8 2.7 1.7 0.9 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.3
EU-15 na 2.5 1.2 2.9 1.7 1.0 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4
Source: AMECO, European Commission, November 2002. Note: (//) Average growth rate 
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Table 6: Gross investment, in constant prices 1991-2002 (growth rate) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002//1995 2002//1991
BG na -7.3 -17.5 1.1 16.1 -21.2 -23.9 32.9 25.3 8.2 19.9 8.0 4.9 2.1
CZ -27.3 16.5 0.2 9.1 19.8 8.2 -2.9 0.7 -1.0 5.3 7.2 3.0 2.9 5.8
HU -10.4 -2.6 2.0 12.5 -4.3 6.7 9.2 13.3 5.9 7.7 3.5 6.5 7.5 5.3
PL -4.5 2.4 2.9 9.2 16.5 19.7 21.7 14.2 6.5 2.7 -9.8 -6.5 6.3 6.8
RO -31.6 11.0 8.3 20.7 6.9 5.7 1.7 -5.7 -4.2 5.5 6.6 7.0 2.2 5.6
SK na na -3.1 -2.5 1.8 30.9 14.3 11.0 -18.5 1.2 9.6 0.9 6.1 na
Sl -11.5 -12.9 10.7 14.1 16.8 8.9 11.6 11.3 19.1 0.2 -1.9 2.5 7.2 6.9
EE na na na 6.3 4.1 11.4 17.6 11.3 -14.8 13.3 9.1 16.0 8.6 na
LV -63.9 -28.7 -15.8 0.8 8.7 22.3 20.7 44.0 -4.0 20.0 17.0 4.5 17.0 6.3
LT na na na na na 17.6 22.0 9.9 -6.3 -3.9 8.7 15.0 8.6 na
CY na na na na -1.7 7.4 -4.5 2.4 -0.1 7.0 1.4 6.0 2.7 na
EUR-12 na 0.1 -6.3 2.3 2.5 1.3 2.5 5.3 6.0 4.9 -0.3 -1.9 2.5 1.4
EU-15 na -0.4 -5.8 2.7 2.8 1.8 3.0 6.5 5.2 4.6 -0.2 -2.1 2.7 1.6
Source: AMECO, European Commission, November 2002. Note: (//) Average growth rate 
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At the same time, there was a marked increase in investment (Table 6), 
particularly over the period 1996-2002, when large inflows of foreign 
capital were registered. While Hungary attracted foreign investment at 
an early stage of transition, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania 
started out with very low ratios of investment to GDP during the first 
half of the 1990s. As of 1996, investment rates increased sharply, more 
than doubling in Latvia, and rising substantially above the EU average 
investment rates in all Central and Eastern European Countries but Bul-
garia. Investment picked up significantly in Bulgaria as from 1998, and 
to a lesser extent in Romania from 2000, but current investment ratios 
remain the lowest of all the countries under review (with the exception 
of Cyprus and Malta). 
 
3.2. BREAKDOWN OF GROWTH INTO ITS VARIOUS COMPONENTS 
 
To analyse the sources of growth in the countries under review, recent 
empirical studies3 have put output developments in a longer-run per-
spective, linking the initial transition years with the last two central 
planning decades, and provide a decomposition of GDP growth in order 
to identify the contributions of factor accumulation and productivity 
changes to overall economic growth. A characteristic of the planned 
economies is that, until the beginning of the 1960s, economic growth 
has been mainly driven by investment in capital and shifts in production 
from agriculture to industry. Then, growth has slowed down inexorably 
under the influence of external constraint and the lack of TFP growth.  
 
The growth decomposition data in Campos and Coricelli (2002) show 
that, over the 1991-1995/7 period, average output growth (a 1.1 percent 
                                                     
3 Campos N., Coricelli F. (2002), "Growth Transition: What We Know, What We Don't and What 
We Should", Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XL, September, pp. 793-836. Doyle P., Kuijs 
L., Jiang G. (2001), "Real Convergence to EU Income Levels: Central Europe from 1990 to the 
Long-Term", IMF Working Paper, N°146. De Broeck M., Koen V. (2000), "The Great Contrac-
tions in Russia, the Baltics and the Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union: A View from the 
Supply Side", IMF Working Paper, N°32. 
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decline) in the Central and Eastern European Countries4 is essentially 
due to the 1.2 percent decline in overall (TFP) productivity, while pro-
duction factor growth (+0.1 percent) contributes positively to change in 
output (Table 7). At the country level, differences are striking. Hungary 
and Slovenia experienced relatively high TFP-driven output growth 
contrary to Poland where factor growth represents the main contribution 
to growth. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania ex-
perienced negative average output growth rates, which were also driven 
by steep declines in TFP. In Bulgaria, the output fall was reinforced by 
the negative contribution of factor growth. On the whole, it appears that 
output has been influenced more by changes in TFP than in changes in 
the quantity of inputs used. In the Baltic States, negative average output 
growth rates in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were both driven by steep 
declines in TFP and by the negative contribution of factor growth.  
 
Table 7: Contributions to growth rates for the accession countries over
the period 1991-97 (average) 
Output growth TFP growth Factor growth
BG -8.8 -6.2 -2.6
CZ -4.2 -5.1 0.9
HU 1.9 1.6 0.3
PL 1.8 0.1 1.7
RO -2.4 -2.4 0
SK -1.6 -2.3 0.7
Sl 8.9 7.9 1
EE -3.4 -2.2 -1.2
LV -8.6 -5.3 -3.4
LT -6.3 -4.5 -1.8
Source: Campos N. and Coricelli F. (2002), op.cit., pp.798-800. 
 
                                                     
4 This average is calculated for Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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In a study by Doyle, et. al. (2001), which allows for a distinction be-
tween capital and employment contributions to overall output growth, in 
five Central European countries5, the growth decomposition data show 
that the cumulative output growth over the 1991-1999 period benefited 
from relatively high TFP growth in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia (Ta-
ble 8). The higher cumulative output growth in Poland was due to the 
higher contribution of capital to growth. The contribution of employ-
ment was negative in the countries under review, except in Slovakia. 
Table 8: Cumulative output growth in Central European countries 1991-
99 (in percent) 
  Contribution of 
Cumulative GDP growth TFP growth Employment Capital
CZ 9.1 4.6 -4.3 9.0
HU 16.6 20.2 -11.1 9.2
PL 47.9 20.9 -1.6 24.3
SK 21.8 2.0 6.2 12.4
Sl 25.6 21.0 -6.4 10.9
Source: Doyle P., Kuijs L., and Jiang G. (2001), op.cit., p.31. 
 
Investment rates for the second half of the 1990s would suggest a strong 
growth of the productive capital stock. However, one must take into 
account that a significant part of the accession countries’ capital stock 
must have been made obsolete at the beginning of the transition process, 
replaced by new imported capital equipment. This would imply that the 
strong post-transition growth in such countries as Latvia, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Lithuania and Slovenia are not so much due to capital deepening 
as to increases in total factor productivity. Only in the case of Poland, 
both total factor productivity growth and capital deepening contribute 
strongly to GDP growth.  
 
                                                     
5 The data cover the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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This is a finding of recent empirical studies6 that use growth accounting 
techniques to evaluate and decompose the growth performance of the 
Central and Eastern European Countries. It should be noted as a health 
warning, though, that the production function approach to growth ac-
counting for transition economies poses the problem of the plausible 
representation of these economies by the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, with assumed weights of capital and labour. First, the estima-
tion of this type of function with the sum of factor elasticities equal to 
unity implies "long run" constant returns to scale, and unity-negative 
own-price elasticities. This raises the question whether such theoretical, 
steady-state properties, are characteristic of the transition economies 
over the last decade. At the steady-state, the capital output ratio remains 
constant. With increasing capital output ratio, the countries could 
achieve faster than steady-state growth and would also converge more 
rapidly on EU income levels. Moreover, there is an implicit assumption 
that the quality of labour and capital is unchanged over the time period 
under review. This is a particularly strong assumption in the context of 
the transition from a planned to a market economy, accompanied by a 
significant opening of the economy through trade and investment. 
 
The production function approach also brings forth practical questions, 
bearing on the production factor data used for estimation. The shortcom-
ings of employment data expressed in thousands of units, in the context 
of transition economies subject to supply, demand and institutional 
shocks has been largely commented upon. The questions posed by such 
an approach are also numerous, and maybe even more complex, when 
one turns to the data on productive capital stock. Building capital stock 
series in each country requires assumptions on the rate of depreciation 
and on the portion of each country's capital stock rendered obsolete at 
the beginning of the transition process.  
 
                                                     
6 See footnote 2. 
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3.3. RECENT GROWTH PERFORMANCE 
 
With the exception of Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic, the 
annual average growth rates of GDP of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries (CEECs) exceeded 3 percent between 1995 and 2002, 
and were in general significantly above EU-15 levels (see Table 4). 
After the years of exceptionally high world growth in 1999-2000 which 
benefited the CEECs as a whole, there was a deceleration in the pace of 
growth in many countries over the last two to three years, although it 
accelerated in a few others. Overall, the CEECs have so far avoided the 
immediate negative effects of the global economic downturn and the 
weak economic performance of Western Europe, owing to the combina-
tion of various factors, of which the continuing recovery in their domes-
tic demand, the contribution of the ongoing expansion of FDI to fixed 
investment, the diversion of sales from traditional to new markets7. The 
sensitivity to the deteriorating external environment also varies across 
industries, which can explain that overall slowdown in industrial pro-
duction is less pronounced in some countries, according to their particu-
lar specialisation8. However, it is unlikely that these economies will be 
able to remain unaffected by external factors, due to their strong de-
pendence on trade, in particular with the European Union.  
 
Poland stands out among the accession countries in transition and the 
recent slowdown is particularly noteworthy. Following several years of 
strong growth, with growth rates above 4 percent between 1994 and 
2000, the economy dropped to a state of near stagnation, with growth 
rates to around one percent in 2001 and 2002. This evolution of growth 
in Poland can be attributed to both external and internal conditions9. 
                                                     
7 UN/ECE (2002), ECE/UN, "Economic Survey of Europe", 2002 No. 2, p.11. 
8 There is a strong differentiation across the CEECs in terms of structures and trade specialisation. 
See Landesmann M. (2003), "Structural features of economic integration in an Enlarged Europe: 
patterns of catching-up and industrial specialisation", Economic Papers, n°181, European Com-
mission. 
9 OECD (2002), "Economic Survey of Poland", June 2002, pp.16-35. UN/ECE (2002), ECE/UN, 
Economic Survey of Europe, 2002 No. 1, pp.63-69. 
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With respect to external conditions, Poland suffers from the recent weak 
performance in the economies of its main trading partners, the EU, and 
particularly Germany. With respect to internal conditions, the economic 
slowdown in Poland can be attributed to a cyclical downturn in invest-
ment, both from domestic and foreign firms10, accompanied by declin-
ing private consumption, employment, and productivity. The economic 
slowdown results in a further deterioration of the persistently high un-
employment rate. While employment had grown over the 1994-1998 
period, substantial new net job losses have arisen starting in 1999, and 
continue through 2002. At the same time, we note a marked decline in 
labour productivity growth, which dropped from 6.9 percent in 1999 to 
an estimated 2.3 percent in 2002. Finally, gross investment growth rates 
dropped from 6.5 percent in 1999 to -9.8 percent in 2001 and an esti-
mated -6.5 percent in 2002, due to excess productive capacity, gloomy 
prospects for growth in sales, declining profitability, and high real inter-
est rates. This drop in gross investment pushes the investment to GDP 
ratio from a high of 26.7 percent in 1999 down to 21.8 percent in 2002.  
 
Although remaining high in comparison with EU GDP growth, Hungar-
ian growth rates, after reaching 5.2 percent in 2000, slowed down to 3.7 
percent in 2001, and an estimated 3.4 percent in 2002. Growth in Slove-
nia also dropped from 5.2 percent in 1999 to an estimated 2.6 percent in 
2002. The three Baltic states continued to experience particularly high 
growth between 2000 and 2002, with rates of up to 7.7 percent for Lat-
via in 2001, 5.9 percent for Lithuania in 2001, and 7.1 percent for Esto-
nia in 2000. Growth also picked up in Slovakia, from 1.3 percent in 
1999 to an estimated 3.9 percent in 2002. In Romania, growth acceler-
ated from 1.8 percent in 2000 to 5.3 percent in 2001 and 4.2 percent in 
2002. Finally, growth rates reached and stayed above 4 percent in Bul-
garia between 2000 and 2002.  
 
                                                     
10Foreign direct investment inflows in 2001 were 25 per cent lower than in 2000 (See OECD 
(2002), "Economic Survey of Poland", June 2002, p.30). 
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According to official forecasts, all the economies of the CEECs expect 
an acceleration of growth in 2003 (Table 9). The most significant upturn 
is awaited in Poland. However, taking into account the uncertainties 
surrounding the global economic outlook, short-term prospects for 
growth are likely to be moderate. 
 
Table 9: Real GDP growth 2002-2004 (% of change) 
2002* 2003* 2004*
BG 4.0 5.0 5.5
CZ 2.2 3.2 3.8
HU 3.4 4.5 4.9
PL 0.8 3.2 3.9
RO 4.2 4.6 4.7
SK 3.9 3.9 4.8
Sl 2.6 3.6 4.0
EE 4.5 4.7 5.1
LV 5.0 5.5 6.0
LT 5.0 3.5 4.5
CY 2.2 3.5 4.1
MT 2.8 3.4 3.6
EU-15 1.0 2.0 2.6
Source: * Official forecast by the European Commission Autumn 2002 forecast for the
Candidate Countries (Nov. 2002) 
 
3.4. LABOUR MARKETS: PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT RATES 
 
In the Lisbon agenda, the goal of higher factor productivity goes hand-
in-hand with one of higher participation and employment. The overall 
labour market participation rates11 (for persons aged 15 to 64) in the 
1990s were lower in the accession countries than in the EU, with the 
exception of Cyprus. They were relatively stable, except in the Baltic 
countries, where they declined (Annex 2). By contrast, the participation 
rate of older persons aged 55 to 64 was high (albeit with a decreasing 
tendency) in the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and Romania. In 
                                                     
11 Ratio of labour force to working-age population (15-64). 
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Hungary it rose significantly from 28.8 in 1996 to 36.3 in 2001. The 
changes in participation rates reveal considerable scope for narrowing 
the current gap. 
 
For the employment rate, the Lisbon Council agreed a specific target for 
the EU as a whole of 70% by 2010, and an interim target of 67% by 
2005. With the exception of Cyprus and the Czech Republic, the overall 
employment rates12 (for persons aged 15 to 64) in the Candidate Coun-
tries, especially Bulgaria and Poland, are lower than in the EU (50.7% 
for Bulgaria and 53.8% for Poland, compared with 63.9% for the EU-15 
in 2001; see Table 10). The Stockholm Council set an additional target 
for the female employment rate of more than 60 per cent by 2010 (with 
an interim target of 57 per cent by 2005, of which several accession 
countries fall short). Employment among older workers also comes un-
der the Lisbon spotlight, the Stockholm Council having agreed a 50 per 
cent employment target for 2010. The employment rates of older per-
sons aged 55 to 64 are generally lower than in the European Union, 
except in Cyprus and in the Baltic states, where they are significantly 
higher. 
 
                                                     
12 Ratio of employment to working-age population (15-64), i.e. the percentage of the working age 
population actually in work. 
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Table 10: Employment rates in the accession countries (as % of age-
specific groups) 
Male 
 15-64  55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 56.1 53.6 -- -- -- -- 34.9 34.2
Czech R. -- 77.1 76.1 74 73.1 73.2 -- 38.5 37.5 37.6 36.1 36.9
Cyprus -- -- -- 78.7 78.9 79.7 -- -- -- 66.3 67.1 67.9
Estonia -- 69.7 70.3 66.3 64.3 65.6 -- 59.6 60.9 59.2 50.2 57.1
Hungary 59.4 59.6 60 62.4 62.7 63.3 27.1 27.1 26.3 29.3 33 35
Latvia -- -- 63.5 65.2 62.3 61.9 -- -- 49.2 50.2 48.3 44.8
Lithuania -- -- 67.6 68.9 61.8 59.8 57 56.7 52.2 48.6
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 66.2 66.3 63.6 61.2 59.2 -- 44.5 42.7 41.8 37.4 38.3
Romania -- 73.4 71.9 70.4 69.5 68.6 -- 62.8 61.9 59.4 57.4 56
Slovakia -- -- -- 64 61.6 61.8 -- -- -- 36.4 35.2 37.7
Slovenia 66 67.1 67.5 66.8 66.7 68.5 28.1 29.8 32.8 32.2 31 33
EU-15 70.1 70.3 71 71.7 72.5 73 47.2 47.1 47.3 47.5 48 48.6
           
Female 
 15-64  55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 47.2 47.9 -- -- -- -- 11.2 11.4
Czech R. -- 60.2 58.9 57.4 56.8 57 -- 24 23.2 23.6 22.1 23
Cyprus -- -- -- 50.2 52.5 56.5 -- -- -- 28.8 31.9 32.6
Estonia -- 60.6 60.7 58 57.1 56.9 -- 40.5 42 39.3 37.5 41.9
Hungary 45.1 44.8 46.8 48.8 49.4 49.6 10.2 10.7 9.3 11.1 13 14.6
Latvia -- -- 54.2 54.1 53.5 56.1 -- -- 28.1 26.4 25.9 30.1
Lithuania -- -- 58.5 61.4 58.5 57.4 -- -- 27.4 31.8 34.5 31.8
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 51.6 52.2 51.6 49.3 48.4 -- 27.7 25.2 24.5 21.8 23.8
Romania -- 61.1 60.1 59.7 59 58.2 -- 48.2 48.4 47.3 47.3 45.8
Slovakia -- -- -- 52.1 51.1 51.8 -- -- -- 10.6 10.2 10
Slovenia 57.5 58.4 59.5 58.1 58.5 58.6 12.9 16.4 19.4 14.9 14.3 14.4
EU-15 50.1 50.6 51.5 52.8 54 54.9 25.8 26.1 26.3 27.1 27.9 28.8
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Male and female women 
 15-64  55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 51.5 50.7 -- -- -- -- 22.1 23.9
Czech R. -- 68.6 67.5 65.6 64.9 65 -- 54.8 53.4 53.2 51.6 52.4
Cyprus -- -- -- 64.2 65.5 67.9 -- -- -- 47 49 49.8
Estonia -- 64.9 65.3 62 60.6 61.1 -- 48.9 50.2 47.9 43 48.6
Hungary 52 52 53.2 55.4 55.9 56.3 17.6 17.9 16.7 19.1 21.9 23.7
Latvia -- -- 58.6 59.4 57.7 58.9 -- -- 37 36.6 35.4 36.4
Lithuania -- -- 62.9 65 60.1 58.6 -- -- 40.2 42.6 42.2 39.1
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 58.8 59.2 57.5 55.1 53.8 -- 35.5 33.3 32.5 29 30.5
Romania 67.2 65.9 65 64.2 63.3 -- 55 54.7 52.9 52 50.5
Slovakia -- -- -- 58 56.3 56.7 -- -- -- 22.2 21.4 22.5
Slovenia 61.7 62.8 63.5 62.5 62.7 63.6 19.9 22.7 25.9 23.4 22.3 23.4
EU-15 60.1 60.5 61.2 62.3 63.2 63.9 36.2 36.3 36.6 37.1 37.8 38.5
Source: Employment in Europe 2002 - European Commission and EPC Ageing Work-
ing Group 2001. 
 
3.5. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIOS 
 
Table 11 below presents three dependency ratios: 
• the old-age dependency ratio, which expresses the number of people 
aged 65 or over as a percentage of the population aged 15 to 64 (eld-
erly as a percentage of the working-age population); 
• the potential economic dependency ratio, which expresses the popu-
lation aged 15 or over not in the labour force as a percentage of the 
number of persons in the labour force (number of potentially inactive 
persons as a percentage of the total labour force); 
• the effective economic dependency ratio, which expresses the popu-
lation aged 15 and over not employed as a percentage of the number 
of persons employed (effective balance of inactive persons and un-
employed versus economically active). 
 
Even if available for the years 1995 to 1999 only, the results for the 
accession countries underline the finding of the critical importance of 
increasing employment rates as a means of meeting the economic and 
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budgetary challenges of ageing populations in the EPC’s report for the 
Member States. Higher employment rates, especially amongst women 
and older workers, can help mitigate the challenges of ageing popula-
tions. In the accession countries, with the exception of Bulgaria, the 
demographic old-age dependency ratio is lower than in the EU (for 
long-term projections of the old-age dependency ratio, see Annex 1). By 
contrast, because of lower participation rates especially among men, the 
potential economic dependency ratios are significantly higher than in 
the EU. The difficult employment conditions reinforce this trend, which 
is reflected in the effective economic dependency ratio. Additional ef-
forts will be required by the accession countries to increase employment 
rates. 
 
Table 11: Economic dependency ratios 
 
a) Old-age dependency ratio (%) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 23 24 24
Czech R. 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20
Cyprus 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18
Estonia 18 18 18 19 20 20 20 21 21 21 21
Hungary 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Latvia 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 21 21 22
Lithuania 16 17 17 17 18 18 18 19 19 20 20
Malta 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18
Poland 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 18 18
Romania 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 18 19 19 19
Slovakia 17 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 19 19 20
Slovenia 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
EU-15 -- 22 22 23 23 23 23 24 24 24 --
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b) Potential economic dependency ratio 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria -- -- -- 89 89 90 92 92 91
Czech R. 64 63 62 63 63 64 64 64 66
Cyprus -- -- -- -- -- 90 91 91 90
Estonia -- -- -- -- 69 69 72 75 74
Hungary 84 92 99 105 107 108 106 102 101
Latvia -- -- -- 65 66 63 64 66 68
Lithuania -- -- -- -- -- -- 58 60 59
Malta -- -- -- -- -- 119 120 122 120
Poland 70 74 73 74 74 75 75 75 74
Romania -- -- -- 69 78 87 92 99 94
Slovakia -- -- -- 70 68 70 67 67 68
Slovenia -- -- -- 82 85 87 87 87 86
EU-15 75 77 77 77 77 77 75 75 --
 
c) Effective economic dependency ratio 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulga-
ria 69 94 111 114 113 110 109 116 115 118 128
Czech 
R. -- -- 68 70 70 69 70 72 75 80 81
Cyprus -- -- -- -- 100 95 97 100 102 102 99
Estonia 47 50 59 71 75 85 88 87 90 98 99
Hunga-
ry -- -- 103 118 123 127 129 129 125 118 115
Latvia 49 49 60 69 86 91 95 92 91 92 93
Lithua-
nia 55 52 56 63 73 77 76 75 78 80 88
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 130 131 135 132
Poland -- -- 98 104 104 102 100 97 94 101 108
Roma-
nia 64 65 71 78 80 90 93 101 107 117 113
Slova-
kia -- -- -- -- 95 93 89 93 92 100 107
Slove-
nia 68 80 90 95 98 97 100 103 104 102 101
EU-15 -- 87 91 95 96 96 96 95 92 90 --
Sources: Population = UN for the CC, AMECO for EU; Labour force and employment 
= AMECO and own calculations 
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4. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF PENSION SYSTEMS  
 
Tables 12-15 provide an overview of some basic characteristics of the 
pension systems in the accession countries. As in the EU-15, there are 
substantial differences amongst those countries that result in diverging 
reform needs regarding the financial sustainability of the pension sys-
tems. As for first-pillar pensions, five accession countries (Cyprus, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia and Malta) offer universal state pension schemes 
(Table 15). Means testing, however, is applied only in a minority of the 
Candidate Countries. A majority offer labour-market-based public pen-
sion schemes. All of them are mandatory for workers in the private and 
public sectors and for most of the self-employed. The schemes for the 
private sector and the self-employed are usually almost identical as far 
as the financing arrangements are concerned. They usually represent 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes, sometimes with state budget financ-
ing. 
 
There are notable differences in regard to the size of current public 
spending on public pensions (Table 12). In several countries, public 
pension expenditure is close to or above 10 per cent of GDP (Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia). Long-term projections, where avail-
able, point to a sharply rising trajectory for public pension expenditure 
due to ageing populations. Ageing populations could lead to a substan-
tial increase in public expenditures in many accession countries. 
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Table 12: Public pension expenditures in 2000-50 (% of GDP)  
 2000 2030 2050 Change 2000-50  
Cyprus 8 11.9 14.8 +6.8 
Czech Republic 7.85 - 14.65 +6.8 
Estonia 6.9 2.4 - -  
Hungary 6.05 - 7.25 +1.2 
Latvia 9.8 4 - -  
Lithuania 5.3 6 7 +1.7 
Malta 5.4 2.4 - -  
Poland 10.8 9.6 9.7 -0.9 
Slovakia 7.9 4 - -  
Slovenia 13.2 19.7 18.1 +4.9 
Bulgaria 9.1 2.4 - -  
Romania 6.4 7.8 8.2 +1.8 
EU-15 10.4 13.0 13.3 +2.9 
Sources: If not explicitly indicated, data are based on the 2002 Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes.  
Notes: -: not available; 1)2002; 2)2001; 3) 2000; 4) According to Gesellschaft für Versi-
cherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. (which in turn draws on national statistics). 5 
OECD. Since definitions of public pension expenditures are not identical for each coun-
try, caution is warranted when making comparisons.  
 
In several acceding countries, funded schemes within the publicly fi-
nanced pension systems have gradually become more prominent in re-
cent years. Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland have intro-
duced a three-pillar pension system (compulsory and non-
funded/compulsory and funded/voluntary and funded) and Lithuania 
and Slovakia are planning to do so in the near future. The projected 
development of pension fund assets is shown in table 13. Those projec-
tions might be uncertain and may not necessarily realise. However, it 
should be recognised that if funding is to make a meaningful contribu-
tion towards financing age-related expenditures, then very considerable 
resources will need to be devoted. Future updates of the Pre-Accession 
Economic Programmes, and notably the first Convergence Programmes 
in 2004 for the acceding countries would benefit from a more extensive 
description of reforms underway, including the precise role of funding 
and the pace of asset accumulation. For many accession countries, the 
section of the PEPs on the long-term sustainability of public finances 
should be more comprehensive.  
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Table 13: Pension fund assets (% of GDP) 
 2000 2020 
Bulgaria - - 
Czech Republic - - 
Cyprus 39.0 25.2 
Estonia - 20 1 
Hungary - 31 1 
Latvia - 20 1 
Lithuania - - 
Malta - - 
Poland 2.54 46.5 
Romania - 30 1 
Slovakia - - 
Slovenia - - 
EU-15 44  
Sources: 2002 PEPs; 1) according to Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -
gestaltung e.V. 
 
Challenges facing pension systems in the accession countries, quite 
similar to those facing EU Member States, may for instance include the 
relatively low effective retirement age (even if some countries have 
made efforts to increase the retirement age the proportion of older work-
ers in the work force has fallen dramatically since the early 1990s), the 
dynamics of early retirement arrangements (in some countries those 
have been used as a response to the decline in employment, e.g. in the 
Czech Republic or Poland), expenditure pressures due to indexation 
rules (in some countries pensions are indexed to wages, in others to 
prices, and in some they are adjusted on an ad hoc basis), and finding 
the right balance between contribution rates and the level of benefits 
paid out (for some key determinants of activity of the elderly and bene-
fits of public pensions, see Table 14). 
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Table 14: Determinants of activity of the elderly and benefits of public 
pensions in the accession countries 
 Statutory reti-
rement age 
Pension 
regime 
Indexation 
rules 
(P = prices; 
W = wages) 
Taxation 
rules 
 Men Women    
Bulgaria 63 60 E-R P/W Not taxed 
Czech R. 62 59 E-R P/W Not taxed 
Cyprus 63 63 E-R W - 
Estonia 63 58,5 E-R P/ 3) Taxed as 
income iii) 
Hungary 62 57 2 E-R P/W Not taxed iv) 
Latvia 62 58,5 1 E-R P/W 4) Taxed as 
income ii) 
Lithua-
nia 
62 58 E-R - Not taxed 
Malta 61 60 E-R W - 
Poland 65 60 E-R P/W Taxed as 
other inco-
me 
Romani
a 
60 1 55 1 E-R P Not taxed iv) 
Slovakia 60 57 E-R P/W 10% on 
second-
pillar bene-
fits 
Slovenia 64 59,5 E-R - Not taxed I) 
Notes: 1) 2001; 2) 2000; 3) Increase is determined equally by rise of CPI and by rise in 
social security contributions. 4) Partly indexed to contribution to GDP growth. E-R 
means earnings-related systems, where pensions are related to past earnings. It should 
be noted though that in some accession countries the earnings-related systems come 
very close to flat-rate systems which provide a basic income irrespective of wages 
earned or contributions made (e.g. in Latvia or Lithuania). i) For personal income tax 
purposes, net pensions are notionally grossed up by the average personal income tax 
rate, and a personal income tax schedule is applied. If the computed amount of tax is 
greater than the amount represented by "gross" pension minus net pension, then the 
person pays tax. In effect, this means that only high-income pensioners pay, albeit very 
little, income tax.ii) Pensions granted before 1 January 1996 are not subject to taxation. 
Pensions granted or recalculated after that date are subject to taxation. The annual tax 
exemption limit is LVL 12 000.iii) However, pensions less than three times the non-
taxable minimum (EEK 36 000 a year, EEK 3 000 a month), which make up the over-
whelming majority of cases, are not subject to taxation.iv) After 2013, the pension base 
will be shifted from net to gross earnings and will be made subject to taxation. v) Taxa-
tion of only those pensions which are higher than twice the national average gross sal-
ary. 
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Table 15: Overview of first- and second-pillar pensions in the accession countries 
First-pillar  BG CY CR EE H LV LIT MT PL RO SK SL 
General             
Universal No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
Means-tested Yes - No - No No Yes No No - No Yes 
Labour- 
market-based 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - Yes 
Private sector             
Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PAYG/FF/SF PA
YG 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAY
G 
PAYG
+ 
PAY
G 
PAY
G 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAY
G 
PA
YG 
Public sector             
Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PAYG/FF/SF PA
YG 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAY
G 
PAYG
+ 
PAY
G 
SF PAYG/S
F 
SF PAYG/ 
SF 
PAY
G 
PA
YG 
Self-employed             
Mandatory  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
PAYG FF/SF PA
YG 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAY
G 
PAYG
+ 
PAY
G 
PAY
G 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
PAYG/S
F 
 PA
YG 
Second-pillar              
Private sector              
Mandatory  Yes Yes** No Yes*** Yes*** Yes No* - Yes - No No 
Public sector              
Mandatory  Yes Yes** No Yes*** Yes*** Yes No* - Yes - No No 
Notes: -: Not applicable; PAYG (pay-as-you-go); FF (fully funded); SF (financed by state budget); * Second pillar yet to be established; ** Par-
tial; *** For new entrants; voluntary for others; + Any deficits are financed from the state budget. 
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Annex 3 provides an overview of recent reforms of public pension sys-
tems in the Candidate Countries, as laid out in the 2002 PEPs. Common 
features of those reforms include: 
• A gradual increase of the retirement age. To date, the retirement 
age in most accession countries is relatively low. In the long run, 
many countries also aim at equalising the retirement ages of men and 
women. The eligibility for early retirement and disability schemes is 
tightened. 
• A shift in the indexation of pension benefits. Some countries shift 
from wage indexation, or ad-hoc price adjustments, to price indexa-
tion, or to hybrid price and wage indices. 
• An increase in contributions. The reform agendas often include 
some increase in the overall pension contributions, mostly in re-
sponse to budgetary pressures.  
• Incentives for increased funding. In most countries reforms have 
been accompanied by a strengthening of occupational and private 
pension schemes, e.g. via tax incentives.  
• A move towards more actuarial systems. While some countries re-
emphasised the distributive character of their pension system, others 
moved towards a closer link between contributions paid in during ac-
tive working life and benefits paid out during retirement (however, in 
some cases with very long phasing-in periods).  
 
5.  MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SUSTAINABILITY 
OF PUBLIC PENSION SCHEMES  
 
The transition from planned to market economies brought about severe 
economic recession in many of the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries. More than a decade after the beginning of the reform process, it is 
of particular interest to attempt to determine how much catching-up, or 
real convergence, has actually occurred with respect to the Western 
European economies.  
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Recent evidence13 based on 1993-2001 quarterly data for eight CEECs, 
(using statistical correlation analysis and VAR modelling techniques for 
output and price impulse response functions) indicates that there are 
significant similarities between the CEECs and the Western European 
economies. These similarities can be seen in the relatively clear and 
positive correlation of output and price fluctuations, but also in the na-
ture and speed of responses of the two groups of countries to supply and 
demand shocks. Significant differences seem to exist among the CEECs, 
with respect to correlation and shock responses, with either the EU 
taken as a whole, or with certain specific EU countries. This would indi-
cate that the basic features and mechanisms of market economies now 
exist and function in a large number of CEECs, and that the main con-
vergence issue is now one of catching-up to Western European income 
levels or, to put it otherwise, of high and sustained GDP growth.  
 
Though numerous and sometimes deep differences subsist between 
them, Doyle et al (2001) show that the CEECs as a group currently seem 
to be in a position where future GDP growth should be driven mainly by 
increases in TFP. The labour force is expected to continue to decline in 
a number of CEECs or, at best, rise only modestly. Demographic trends 
cannot be counted upon to support high future output growth rates. Edu-
cational standards, measured by the average number of years of educa-
tion, are fairly similar to EU standards, though the quality and nature of 
schooling is sometimes different. Thus, future growth should not be 
massively supported by demographic or labour market developments, 
and one should in line with the Lisbon targets aim at increasing "em-
ployability" through increasing educational levels and reducing labour 
market imbalances.  
 
                                                     
13Frenkel M., Nickel Ch. (2002), "How symmetric Are the Shocks and the Shock Adjustment 
Dynamics Between the Euro Area and Central and Eastern European Countries?", IMF Working 
Paper, n°222. 
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It has also been suggested that there is currently only a limited potential 
for increases in domestic saving, thus limiting investment growth rates 
in the absence of significant external borrowing. Efforts should be pur-
sued in developing the institutions and regulatory frameworks that rein-
force sound domestic financial markets and are conducive to higher 
domestic savings rates.  
 
Overall, future GDP growth appears to be linked more to increases in 
TFP and sound institutional and regulatory frameworks than to future 
increases in factor intensities. However, in the medium term, high and 
sustained TFP-driven GDP growth rates should also lead to rising 
employment, even in the face of increased labour productivity. Labour 
productivity developments should allow for increases in real wages. The 
increases in employment and real wages would then generate a larger 
(taxable) wage base, on which one could more easily base the financing 
of public pension schemes even in light of sharply increasing depend-
ency ratios. It should also be kept in mind that at the moment significant 
parts of the workforce do not pay taxes and social security contribu-
tions, or do so a reduced rates or for only part of their incomes. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
While a case-by-case analysis is warranted on the impact of population 
ageing on public finances in the accession countries, the results of the 
preliminary analysis above suggest that demographic developments in a 
number of countries may soon result in additional pressures on public 
pension expenditure. The objectives for the reform of pension systems, 
agreed at the EU level, have been defined by: 
• the Stockholm European Council, which agreed to set an EU target 
for increasing the average EU employment rate among older workers 
(aged 55-64) to 50% by 2010; and 
• the Barcelona European Council, which called for an increase in the 
effective average retirement age in the EU of some five years by 
2010. 
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In line with those objectives, the following points seem important for 
the accession countries: 
 
Unless offset by increases in total factor productivity, a decline in the 
size of the active labour force may dampen growth expectations and 
thereby slow down the catching-up process. High and sustained total 
factor productivity-driven GDP growth rates including labour productiv-
ity are key to reach a larger taxable wage base on which one could more 
easily base the financing of public pension schemes in the light of the 
demographic challenges. 
 
Many accession countries have already introduced a wide range of pen-
sion reforms. However, in order to counter longer-term spending trends, 
in line with the EU’s three-pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary 
implications of ageing populations in several countries further reforms 
seem needed before the projected decline in the size of the active labour 
force fully materialises (the window of opportunity for pension reform 
before this happens is not much different relative to present Member 
States). In view of low employment rates, such reforms need to focus on 
raising the employment rate of older workers and the effective retire-
ment age. The pension system and/or other transfers such as early re-
tirement, disability or unemployment benefits should provide better 
incentives for older workers to remain in the workforce. 
 
In a number of accession countries far reaching reforms aimed at in-
creasing funding have been introduced. However, in some countries 
reform of pension systems will still have to include measures for reduc-
ing the cost of existing public pension systems. Moreover, if funding is 
to make a meaningful contribution towards financing age-related expen-
ditures, then very considerable resources will need to be devoted.  
 
Scope for further improvements is to be found in reforming pension 
systems in the direction of better financial sustainability. Several acces-
sion countries have introduced, or are contemplating to introduce no-
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tionally defined-contribution systems in which while the PAYG charac-
ter of the system is preserved, individual pension benefits are computed 
actuarially and are based on effective working-life contributions. The 
introduction of such actuarially neutral systems, which link the replace-
ment rate to the life expectancy of each age cohort, and strenghten the 
link between contributions and benefits at the individual level is best 
practice also among current Member States. Appropriate reforms aimed 
at combining flexibility regarding the retirement age and actuarial neu-
trality are to be encouraged. 
 
Increased funding of pensions may have notable effects on the structure, 
liquidity and effectiveness of national financial markets. Increased pri-
vate funding should be accompanied by appropriate supervision and 
regulation of private funds so as to safeguard the funds managed on 
behalf of contributors.  
 
Data availability in the field of pension reform is rather poor for most of 
the countries concerned. More information seems to be needed, in par-
ticular on: 
• long-term projections for pension expenditures; 
• effective retirement ages; 
• contribution (and replacement) rates. 
 
Future updates of the Pre-Accession Economic Programmes, and nota-
bly the first Convergence Programmes for the acceding countries in 
2004 would benefit from a more extensive description of reforms un-
derway, including available long-term projections for pension expendi-
tures as well as the precise role of funding and the pace of asset accumu-
lation. For many accession countries, the section of the PEPs on the 
long-term sustainability of public finances should be more comprehen-
sive.  
 
So as to produce comparable long-term projections for pension expendi-
tures for the first Convergence Programmes, it is suggested to include 
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the accession countries in the next round of common projections for 
public spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly 
by the Economic Policy Committee’s Ageing Working Group in 
2004/5. 
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7. ANNEX 
 
Annex 1: Demographic assumptions - UN population projections 2002 
2 0 0 0 - 0 5 2 0 2 0 - 2 5 2 0 4 5 - 5 0 c h a n g e 2 0 0 0 - 0 5 2 0 2 5 - 3 0 2 0 4 5 - 5 0 c h a n g e
B u l g a r i a 1 , 1 1 , 4 1 , 9 0 , 8 B u l g a r i a 6 7 , 1 7 1 , 9 7 5 , 3 8 , 2
C z e c h  R . 1 , 2 1 , 4 2 , 0 0 , 8 C z e c h  R . 7 2 , 1 7 6 , 6 7 8 , 4 6 , 3
C y p r u s 1 , 9 1 , 9 1 , 9 0 , 0 C y p r u s 7 6 7 8 , 3 7 9 , 9 3 , 9
E s t o n i a 1 , 2 1 , 5 2 , 0 0 , 8 E s t o n i a 6 5 , 8 7 1 , 3 7 4 , 7 8 , 9
H u n g a r y 1 , 2 1 , 5 2 , 0 0 , 8 H u n g a r y 6 7 , 8 7 3 , 2 7 6 , 1 8 , 3
L a t v i a 1 , 1 1 , 5 2 , 0 0 , 9 L a t v i a 6 5 , 7 7 1 , 2 7 4 , 6 8 , 9
L i t h u a n i a 1 , 2 1 , 5 2 , 0 0 , 8 L i t h u a n i a 6 7 , 6 7 3 , 2 7 6 , 1 8 , 5
M a l t a 1 , 8 1 , 8 1 , 8 0 , 1 M a l t a 7 5 , 9 8 0 8 2 6 , 1
P o l a n d 1 , 3 1 , 6 2 , 1 0 , 8 P o l a n d 6 9 , 8 7 4 , 6 7 6 , 9 7 , 1
R o m a n i a 1 , 3 1 , 6 2 , 1 0 , 7 R o m a n i a 6 6 , 5 7 1 , 6 7 4 , 2 7 , 7
S l o v a k i a 1 , 3 1 , 4 1 , 7 0 , 4 S l o v a k i a 6 9 , 8 7 4 7 6 , 6 6 , 8
S l o v e n i a 1 , 1 1 , 4 1 , 8 0 , 7 S l o v e n i a 7 2 , 3 7 6 , 8 7 8 , 6 6 , 3
E U - 1 5 1 , 5 1 , 6 1 , 7 0 , 2 E U - 1 5 7 5 , 0 7 8 , 7 8 0 , 0 5 , 0
E U - 2 7 1 , 3 1 , 5 1 , 9 0 , 6 E U - 2 7 7 0 , 1 7 4 , 7 7 7 , 2 7 , 1
2 0 0 0 - 0 5 2 0 2 5 - 3 0 2 0 4 5 - 5 0 c h a n g e
B u l g a r i a 7 4 , 8 7 8 , 5 8 1 , 1 6 , 3
C z e c h  R . 7 8 , 7 8 2 , 8 8 4 , 4 5 , 7
C y p r u s 8 0 , 5 8 2 , 9 8 4 , 5 4
E s t o n i a 7 6 , 4 7 9 , 5 8 1 , 5 5 , 1
H u n g a r y 7 6 , 1 8 0 , 5 8 2 , 5 6 , 4
L a t v i a 7 6 , 2 7 9 , 3 8 1 , 3 5 , 1
L i t h u a n i a 7 7 , 7 8 1 , 1 8 3 5 , 3
M a l t a 8 1 8 4 , 1 8 6 , 1 5 , 1
P o l a n d 7 8 8 1 , 4 8 3 , 3 5 , 3
R o m a n i a 7 3 , 3 7 7 , 7 7 9 , 7 6 , 4
S l o v a k i a 7 7 , 6 8 0 , 4 8 2 , 4 4 , 8
S l o v e n i a 7 9 , 6 8 3 , 4 8 5 5 , 4
E U - 1 5 8 1 , 3 8 4 , 3 8 5 , 5 4 , 2
E U - 2 7 7 7 , 8 8 1 , 2 8 3 , 1 5 , 3
F e r t i l i t y  r a t e M a l e  l i f e  e x p e c t a n c y
F e m a l e  l i f e e x p e n t a n c y
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2 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 A b s o l u t e % 2 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 A b s o l u t e %
B u l g a r i a 7 , 9 4 , 5 - 3 , 4 - 4 3 , 0 1 6 , 6 2 8 , 2 1 1 , 6 6 9 , 4
C z e c h  R . 1 0 , 3 8 , 4 - 1 , 8 - 1 7 , 9 1 5 , 3 2 6 , 8 1 1 , 6 7 5 , 7
C y p r u s 0 , 8 0 , 9 0 , 1 1 6 , 1 1 4 , 3 2 2 , 2 7 , 9 5 4 , 9
E s t o n i a 1 , 4 0 , 8 - 0 , 6 - 4 6 , 1 1 6 , 2 2 7 , 1 1 0 , 9 6 7 , 2
H u n g a r y 1 0 , 0 7 , 5 - 2 , 5 - 2 4 , 9 1 6 , 1 2 5 , 7 9 , 5 5 9 , 0
L a t v i a 2 , 4 1 , 7 - 0 , 7 - 2 7 , 9 1 7 , 5 2 9 , 2 1 1 , 7 6 6 , 9
L i t h u a n i a 3 , 7 3 , 0 - 0 , 7 - 1 9 , 1 1 5 , 8 2 8 , 2 1 2 , 4 7 8 , 3
M a l t a 0 , 4 0 , 4 0 , 0 2 , 5 1 5 , 0 2 2 , 5 7 , 5 5 0 , 1
P o l a n d 3 8 , 6 3 3 , 4 - 5 , 2 - 1 3 , 6 1 2 , 5 2 5 , 7 1 3 , 1 1 0 4 , 8
R o m a n i a 2 2 , 4 1 8 , 1 - 4 , 3 - 1 9 , 1 1 5 , 0 2 4 , 5 9 , 5 6 3 , 8
S l o v a k i a 5 , 4 4 , 7 - 0 , 7 - 1 3 , 4 1 5 , 4 2 6 , 8 1 1 , 5 7 4 , 7
S l o v e n i a 2 , 0 1 , 5 - 0 , 5 - 2 3 , 2 1 2 , 7 2 6 , 4 1 3 , 7 1 0 8 , 4
E U - 1 5 3 7 6 , 4 3 6 4 , 2 - 1 2 , 2 - 3 , 2 1 6 , 4 1 8 , 1 1 , 6 1 0 , 0
E U - 2 7 4 8 1 , 7 4 4 9 , 2 - 3 2 , 5 - 6 , 8 1 5 , 3 2 5 , 5 1 0 , 2 6 6 , 6
P o p .  a g e d  5 5 - 6 4  a s  %  o f  p o p .  a g e d  1 5 - 6 4
2 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 A b s o l u t e %
B u l g a r i a 1 3 , 1 2 4 , 4 1 1 , 4 8 7 , 0
C z e c h  R . 1 6 , 9 2 9 , 0 1 2 , 1 7 1 , 3
C y p r u s 2 2 , 8 3 2 , 5 9 , 7 4 2 , 6
E s t o n i a 1 7 , 2 2 7 , 0 9 , 8 5 6 , 8
H u n g a r y 1 6 , 9 2 6 , 6 9 , 7 5 7 , 5
L a t v i a 1 8 , 2 2 9 , 0 1 0 , 8 5 9 , 4
L i t h u a n i a 1 8 , 0 3 2 , 5 1 4 , 5 8 0 , 4
M a l t a 1 9 , 4 3 3 , 4 1 4 , 0 7 2 , 2
P o l a n d 1 6 , 2 2 6 , 6 1 0 , 4 6 4 , 3
R o m a n i a 1 3 , 5 2 3 , 4 9 , 9 7 3 , 1
S l o v a k i a 1 6 , 0 2 5 , 6 9 , 5 5 9 , 4
S l o v e n i a 1 5 , 8 3 4 , 0 1 8 , 2 1 1 4 , 8
E U - 1 5 2 2 , 6 3 7 , 0 1 4 , 4 6 3 , 7
E U - 2 7 1 7 , 4 2 9 , 3 1 1 , 9 6 8 , 1
P o p .  a g e d  8 0 +  a s  %  o f  p o p .  a g e d  6 5 +
T o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n
S h a r e  o f  o l d e r  p e r s o n s  i n  t h e  w o r k i n g - a g e
p o p u l a t i o n .
C h a n g e C h a n g e
V e r y  o l d  a s  a  %  o f  e l d e r l y
C h a n g e
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T otal population (millions)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Bulgaria 7,949 7,570 7,185 6,816 6,467 6,125 5,787 5,458 5,143 4,835 4,531
Czech R. 10,272 10,218 10,138 10,028 9,895 9,727 9,509 9,253 8,981 8,706 8,429
Cyprus 0,784 0,815 0,841 0,864 0,885 0,899 0,907 0,911 0,913 0,913 0,910
Estonia 1,393 1,316 1,253 1,190 1,127 1,062 0,995 0,931 0,870 0,811 0,752
Hungary 9,968 9,721 9,489 9,254 9,021 8,783 8,532 8,261 7,990 7,735 7,486
Latvia 2,421 2,353 2,288 2,225 2,161 2,090 2,015 1,941 1,874 1,810 1,744
Lithuania 3,696 3,653 3,594 3,538 3,483 3,418 3,341 3,255 3,168 3,082 2,989
M alta 0,390 0,398 0,405 0,411 0,416 0,418 0,417 0,414 0,409 0,404 0,400
Poland 38,605 38,427 38,253 38,035 37,741 37,254 36,577 35,795 34,967 34,170 33,370
Rom ania 22,438 22,150 21,819 21,437 21,026 20,585 20,130 19,662 19,186 18,688 18,150
Slovakia 5,399 5,419 5,430 5,420 5,384 5,317 5,224 5,108 4,978 4,834 4,674
Slovenia 1,988 1,976 1,955 1,926 1,890 1,847 1,794 1,733 1,667 1,598 1,527
W orking-age population aged 15-64 (millions)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Bulgaria 5,41482 5,29941 5,11353 4,76479 4,42635 4,11046 3,81213 3,52004 3,18718 2,83302 2,54023
Czech R. 7,16405 7,27303 7,20308 6,86697 6,5482 6,30011 6,04481 5,7654 5,32223 4,84374 4,53113
Cyprus 0,51229 0,54513 0,56532 0,56981 0,56978 0,56695 0,56758 0,56814 0,56794 0,56046 0,54745
Estonia 0,94645 0,91792 0,88331 0,82513 0,76332 0,70261 0,64757 0,59633 0,5411 0,48655 0,43179
Hungary 6,81896 6,74594 6,64054 6,41286 6,04963 5,75662 5,55323 5,28145 4,91563 4,50165 4,23811
Latvia 1,64188 1,64248 1,617 1,5491 1,47116 1,38331 1,30241 1,23256 1,15715 1,08138 0,99047
Lithuania 2,48228 2,52573 2,53044 2,49088 2,40634 2,28252 2,14375 2,03313 1,91804 1,81167 1,68952
M alta 0,26284 0,2709 0,27388 0,26701 0,2615 0,25488 0,25175 0,25172 0,24723 0,23923 0,23084
Poland 26,52451 27,2044 27,63354 26,87044 25,52605 24,25542 23,50695 22,8985 21,85006 20,39044 18,80527
Rom ania 15,35665 15,49714 15,39623 15,04818 14,5341 14,01859 13,71502 12,91791 12,11833 11,20133 10,55783
Slovakia 3,72945 3,86237 3,92692 3,86728 3,72958 3,59669 3,47688 3,36078 3,17272 2,93009 2,70918
Slovenia 1,39515 1,39836 1,38075 1,33839 1,26289 1,18597 1,10887 1,03533 0,96184 0,87913 0,80608  
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Elderly population aged 65 or over (millions)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Bulgaria 1,28225 1,24395 1,19175 1,2208 1,25187 1,2678 1,27035 1,26943 1,30454 1,35849 1,36373
Czech R. 1,42094 1,45342 1,60702 1,87952 2,11965 2,24407 2,31913 2,37078 2,54567 2,73382 2,75537
Cyprus 0,08998 0,09897 0,11241 0,12808 0,14502 0,16386 0,17794 0,18801 0,19273 0,19989 0,21065
Estonia 0,20014 0,20727 0,20068 0,20138 0,20543 0,21026 0,21114 0,20802 0,2061 0,2026 0,20218
Hungary 1,45943 1,46971 1,52412 1,61395 1,78597 1,87056 1,8516 1,88654 2,00517 2,16467 2,1691
Latvia 0,35734 0,38716 0,394 0,39635 0,40654 0,42959 0,45012 0,46021 0,46858 0,47156 0,49137
Lithuania 0,49422 0,53825 0,57112 0,58691 0,6183 0,67193 0,74336 0,78755 0,82569 0,84121 0,8619
M alta 0,04815 0,05329 0,0604 0,07424 0,08409 0,09362 0,09811 0,09762 0,09959 0,10357 0,10736
Poland 4,68508 4,95325 4,96615 5,62261 6,63708 7,54216 7,84356 7,88793 8,15327 8,68053 9,30912
Romania 2,98571 3,17053 3,07146 3,12736 3,3721 3,59558 3,56134 3,94267 4,24866 4,62299 4,71394
Slovakia 0,61481 0,63468 0,66766 0,74415 0,87285 0,98159 1,05551 1,09359 1,1714 1,27697 1,34875
Slovenia 0,27663 0,3039 0,32662 0,3565 0,40633 0,44829 0,48134 0,50242 0,51454 0,52886 0,53093
Very elderly population aged 80 or over (millions)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Bulgaria 0,16743 0,21299 0,23674 0,25108 0,24174 0,24138 0,27967 0,30732 0,3201 0,32471 0,33296
Czech R. 0,24084 0,32132 0,37749 0,40694 0,42501 0,51736 0,66563 0,76486 0,77865 0,7808 0,79985
Cyprus 0,0205 0,02342 0,02599 0,02884 0,03256 0,03897 0,04608 0,05315 0,0609 0,06552 0,06842
Estonia 0,03451 0,03914 0,04679 0,04923 0,05214 0,04808 0,04972 0,05325 0,05628 0,0564 0,05467
Hungary 0,24651 0,30689 0,34859 0,36897 0,37987 0,41482 0,46787 0,55411 0,5794 0,55105 0,57689
Latvia 0,06492 0,07778 0,09452 0,10164 0,11128 0,1105 0,11069 0,11735 0,13029 0,13983 0,14228
Lithuania 0,08906 0,10429 0,13248 0,15599 0,17223 0,18158 0,18459 0,2002 0,22975 0,26609 0,28012
M alta 0,00933 0,01175 0,0139 0,01639 0,01878 0,02227 0,02954 0,03336 0,03682 0,0374 0,03583
Poland 0,75993 0,96426 1,19165 1,345 1,42063 1,3861 1,73917 2,24334 2,60089 2,58253 2,48046
Romania 0,4029 0,50982 0,60805 0,66982 0,71894 0,67021 0,73702 0,87894 0,96905 0,91278 1,10128
Slovakia 0,09866 0,13096 0,15089 0,16121 0,16523 0,17968 0,21886 0,27901 0,32011 0,33875 0,34492
Slovenia 0,04382 0,05804 0,07573 0,09026 0,09935 0,10727 0,12151 0,14701 0,16433 0,17548 0,18064  
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O ld -ag e  dep en d ency  ra tio  (% )
2 000 2 005 2 010 2 015 2 020 2 025 2 030 2 035 2 040 2 045 2 050
B u lgaria 2 3 ,7 2 3 ,5 2 3 ,3 2 5 ,6 2 8 ,3 3 0 ,8 3 3 ,3 3 6 ,1 4 0 ,9 4 8 ,0 5 3 ,7
C zech  R . 1 9 ,8 2 0 ,0 2 2 ,3 2 7 ,4 3 2 ,4 3 5 ,6 3 8 ,4 4 1 ,1 4 7 ,8 5 6 ,4 6 0 ,8
C yp ru s 1 7 ,6 1 8 ,2 1 9 ,9 2 2 ,5 2 5 ,5 2 8 ,9 3 1 ,4 3 3 ,1 3 3 ,9 3 5 ,7 3 8 ,5
E ston ia 2 1 ,1 2 2 ,6 2 2 ,7 2 4 ,4 2 6 ,9 2 9 ,9 3 2 ,6 3 4 ,9 3 8 ,1 4 1 ,6 4 6 ,8
H u n gary 2 1 ,4 2 1 ,8 2 3 ,0 2 5 ,2 2 9 ,5 3 2 ,5 3 3 ,3 3 5 ,7 4 0 ,8 4 8 ,1 5 1 ,2
Latv ia 2 1 ,8 2 3 ,6 2 4 ,4 2 5 ,6 2 7 ,6 3 1 ,1 3 4 ,6 3 7 ,3 4 0 ,5 4 3 ,6 4 9 ,6
Lith u an ia 1 9 ,9 2 1 ,3 2 2 ,6 2 3 ,6 2 5 ,7 2 9 ,4 3 4 ,7 3 8 ,7 4 3 ,0 4 6 ,4 5 1 ,0
M alta 1 8 ,3 1 9 ,7 2 2 ,1 2 7 ,8 3 2 ,2 3 6 ,7 3 9 ,0 3 8 ,8 4 0 ,3 4 3 ,3 4 6 ,5
P olan d 1 7 ,7 1 8 ,2 1 8 ,0 2 0 ,9 2 6 ,0 3 1 ,1 3 3 ,4 3 4 ,4 3 7 ,3 4 2 ,6 4 9 ,5
R om ania 1 9 ,4 2 0 ,5 1 9 ,9 2 0 ,8 2 3 ,2 2 5 ,6 2 6 ,0 3 0 ,5 3 5 ,1 4 1 ,3 4 4 ,6
S lovak ia 1 6 ,5 1 6 ,4 1 7 ,0 1 9 ,2 2 3 ,4 2 7 ,3 3 0 ,4 3 2 ,5 3 6 ,9 4 3 ,6 4 9 ,8
S lov en ia 1 9 ,8 2 1 ,7 2 3 ,7 2 6 ,6 3 2 ,2 3 7 ,8 4 3 ,4 4 8 ,5 5 3 ,5 6 0 ,2 6 5 ,9  
Population aged 65+ as % of population aged 15-64 
Share of the  very  e lderly  in  to tal elderly  population  (% )
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
B ulgaria 13,1 17,1 19,9 20,6 19,3 19,0 22,0 24,2 24,5 23,9 24,4
C zech  R . 16,9 22,1 23,5 21,7 20,1 23,1 28,7 32,3 30,6 28,6 29,0
C yprus 22,8 23,7 23,1 22,5 22,5 23,8 25,9 28,3 31,6 32,8 32,5
E stonia 17,2 18,9 23,3 24,4 25,4 22,9 23,5 25,6 27,3 27,8 27,0
H ungary 16,9 20,9 22,9 22,9 21,3 22,2 25,3 29,4 28,9 25,5 26,6
Latvia 18,2 20,1 24,0 25,6 27,4 25,7 24,6 25,5 27,8 29,7 29,0
Lithuan ia 18,0 19,4 23,2 26,6 27,9 27,0 24,8 25,4 27,8 31,6 32,5
M alta 19,4 22,0 23,0 22,1 22,3 23,8 30,1 34,2 37,0 36,1 33,4
Poland 16,2 19,5 24,0 23,9 21,4 18,4 22,2 28,4 31,9 29,8 26,6
R om ania 13,5 16,1 19,8 21,4 21,3 18,6 20,7 22,3 22,8 19,7 23,4
Slovak ia 16,0 20,6 22,6 21,7 18,9 18,3 20,7 25,5 27,3 26,5 25,6
Sloven ia 15,8 19,1 23,2 25,3 24,5 23,9 25,2 29,3 31,9 33,2 34,0
Pop ulatio n age d 80+  as %  of pop u latio n a ged 65
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Annex 2: Labour market participation rates (as % of age-specific 
groups)  
Male 
15-64 55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 67.4 67.8 -- -- -- -- 39.9 41.8
Czech R. -- 80 79.8 79.7 79 78.5 -- 56.8 55.4 55.9 54.5 54.7
Cyprus -- -- -- -- 81.6 81.9 -- -- -- -- 69.3 77
Estonia -- 78.8 78.7 76.2 75.6 74.5 -- 63.9 65.5 64.3 56.7 61.5
Hungary 66.6 66 66.3 67.5 67.6 67.6 28.8 28.9 27.8 30.3 34.3 36.3
Latvia -- -- 75.1 76 73.6 72.7 -- -- 57.6 54.1 53.9 52.3
Lithuania -- -- 78.9 77.7 75.5 74.5 -- -- 60.1 60.6 59.5 59.4
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 73.1 72.5 72.1 71.8 71.6 -- 47 45.2 45.7 41.1 43.3
Romania -- 77.7 76.7 76.1 75.7 74.3 -- 63.6 62.6 60.2 58.4 57.7
Slovakia -- -- -- 78.3 76.5 77.4 -- -- -- 41.2 41 43
Slovenia 71.1 71.8 73 72.2 71.7 72.5 29.1 31 33.7 33.9 33.5 34.8
EU-15 77.7 77.7 77.9 78.1 78.1 78.1 -- -- -- -- 52.6 --
Female 
15-64 55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 56.1 59.1 -- -- -- -- 12.5 18.3
Czech R. -- 63.4 63.7 63.9 63.5 63 -- 25.1 24.3 24.8 23.3 24.2
Cyprus -- -- -- -- 56.7 60 -- -- -- -- 33.3 35.3
Estonia -- 67.1 66.5 64.8 64.8 65.6 -- 42.3 43.5 41 39.3 46.6
Hungary 49.5 48.6 50.8 52 52.5 52.2 10.8 11.1 10 11.3 13.2 14.8
Latvia -- -- 62.9 62.6 61.9 63.6 -- -- 29.8 29.2 28.1 33
Lithuania -- -- 65.7 67.7 67.6 66.5 -- -- 29.1 32 36.5 35
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 59.5 59.4 59.6 60.5 60.8 -- 29.2 26.6 25.9 24.4 26
Romania -- 65.4 64 63.7 63.6 62.4 -- 48.4 48.4 47.5 47.5 46
Slovakia -- -- -- 62 62.8 63.6 -- -- -- 11.3 11.1 11.1
Slovenia 61.5 62.9 64.4 63 63.1 62.5 13.2 16.8 19.7 15.1 14.8 15
EU-15 57.3 57.8 58.4 59.2 59.8 60.2 -- -- -- -- 29.9 --
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Male and female 
15-64 55-64
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 61.6 63.3 -- -- -- -- 25.1 29.3
Czech R. -- 71.7 71.7 71.8 71.2 70.7 -- 40 38.9 39.5 38.1 38.7
Cyprus -- -- -- -- 69 70.8 -- -- -- -- 50.8 52.6
Estonia -- 72.7 72.4 70.3 70 69.9 -- 51.7 53 51 46.8 53.1
Hungary 57.8 57.1 58.4 59.6 59.9 59.7 18.7 19 17.8 19.6 22.6 24.4
Latvia -- -- 68.7 69.1 67.5 68 -- -- 41.5 39.9 39.1 41.3
Lithuania -- -- 72.1 72.6 71.5 70.4 -- -- 42.5 44.4 46.5 45.6
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 66.2 65.9 65.8 66.1 66.1 -- 37.4 35.2 35 32.1 33.9
Romania -- 71.5 70.3 69.8 69.6 68.3 -- 55.5 55 53.4 52.5 51.4
Slovakia -- -- -- 69 69.6 70.4 -- -- -- 24.8 24.5 25.4
Slovenia 66.3 67.4 68.8 67.6 67.4 67.5 20.6 23.5 26.5 24.3 23.7 24.6
EU-15 67.4 67.7 68.1 68.6 69 69.2 -- -- -- -- -- --
Source: Employment in Europe 2002 - European Commission and EPC Ageing Work-
ing Group 2001.  
Notes: Four Candidate Countries have also undertaken long-term projections in their 
Pre-Accession Economic Programme Reports 2002 (total participation rates, as % of 15-
64 age group, change 2001-50): Czech Rep.: + 8,6; Cyprus: +10,6; Lithuania: +15,2; 
Slovenia: +16,7. 
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Annex 3: Reform of public pension systems in the accession countries (outlined in the 2002 PEPs) 
BG A three-pillar pension system has been established in Bulgaria. Mandatory public social security based on 
the PAYG scheme is the first pillar. Mandatory supplementary and voluntary pension insurance in private 
pension funds form the second and third fully capitalised pillars. The budget of public social security (the 
first pillar) is generating deficits as a result of the combined impact of several factors: the unfavorable sys-
tem-dependency ratio (almost 1:1) due to the ageing of the population, outmigration and high unemploy-
ment, low contribution compliance before 2001, unreported incomes and employment, financial instability 
of many of the big insurers, early retirement eligibility, and the gradual diversion of contributions to the 
second pillar. A major step to increase contribution compliance was taken in 2001. In 2002 high contribution 
compliance of about 98-99% is expected. In 2003 a variety of supplementary social insurance laws will be 
adopted to develop the second and third pillars further.  
CY The government is currently examining the following reform options: a gradual increase in the normal 
retirement age from 63 at present to 65 over the period 2004-11; the indexing of lower-band pensions 
based on a price index, instead of the wage index, as is currently the case; an increase in the rate of return 
on investment by investing part of the reserves in non-government assets. There will also be a gradual in-
crease in contribution rates based on predetermined rules. In more specific terms, the policy option under 
consideration is to increase contribution rates automatically if the reserves of the fund fall below one year of 
coverage of pension payments. A gradual increase until 2050 in the contribution rate from the present level 
of 14.2% of earnings to above 20% is considered necessary to neutralize the effects of the maturing pension 
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scheme and population ageing on public finances and to safeguard proper financing of the pension scheme 
over the long-term. 
CR The Czech pension system consists of a two-pillar scheme. In addition to a public PAYG first pillar, a volun-
tary individual second pillar supported by government incentives figures prominently. Contribution rates for 
the first pillar are 6.5% of contributory income for employees, 19.5% for employers and 26% for the self-
employed. By 2007 the statutory retirement age of 60 for men will be raised to 62 and that for women 
from 57 to 59 (depending on the number of children). In 2001 the government proposed a reform package 
that was, however, subsequently rejected by the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament. A new ap-
proach would be launched only after the 2002 elections. According to the government proposal, the pension 
system should consist of three pillars. The first pillar will continue as a mandatory, continually financed 
pension scheme. The second pillar contemplates the introduction of a collective voluntary pension insurance 
scheme. The third pillar will continue to develop additional pension schemes with state contribution. Other 
forms of individual provision for old age (such as life insurance) are also considered to form an integral part 
of the third pillar. The future first pillar of the mandatory pension schemes (as proposed by the government) 
meets the following principles: the system will continue to be continuously financed and a transition is 
proposed to a notional defined contribution system; the system will be uniform, without substantial dif-
ferences for various groups of insured parties (armed forces, civil service employees, etc.); it will reinforce 
the insurance principle. 
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EE The reform process transforms the current PAYG system into a three-pillar pension scheme. On 1 June 
2002 participants started paying into the second-pillar funds, which are compulsory pension savings 
schemes. In April 2002 the first-pillar pensions were indexed for the first time. This procedure will be car-
ried out annually in line with the growth of social security contributions and the Consumer Price Index. In 
addition to the first and second pillars, the government introduced a third pillar that makes individual pen-
sion savings possible, either by acquiring pension fund shares or by entering into a pension contract with an 
insurance company.  
H Changes to the newly (1998) established two-pillar system will be on the reform agenda. The pension calcu-
lation rules that strengthen the insurance character of the first pillar (PAYG) are being amended. Beyond 
2013 this pillar will be restructured and turned into more of a defined notional contribution system. Also 
from 2013 a new benefit formula will be used to calculate the pensions by which the relatively generous 
public pension benefits are to be pared down and the degree of equivalence strengthened. The second pillar 
operates through pension funds established as non-profit institutions. There is also a third pillar that is pro-
vided mainly by banks. The contribution rate to private pension funds will be raised to 8% in 2002. Fur-
ther reform steps depend on a comprehensive review exercise for the private pension fund system scheduled 
for 2003/04. 
LV The pension reform concept (started in 1995) featured the establishment of a three-pillar system. Back-up 
legislation is now finalised. The first pillar is in the nature of a compulsory non-funded pension scheme 
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(PAYG). The second pillar is a public mandatory funded pension scheme (2001). The third pillar establishes 
a market for private pension funds. The contribution rate to the second pillar started at 2% of pay and will 
be increased to 10% by 2010, while the contribution rate to the first pillar will be reduced accordingly.  
LIT The pension system is currently based on the PAYG principle, with pension insurance contributions equiva-
lent to 25% of wages. Regarding future demographic challenges (2025: 7 pensioners per 10 contributors, 
2050: 9 pensioners per 10 contributors), the government submitted a draft law on pension reform to parlia-
ment that would introduce a mandatory privately funded pension scheme on 1 January 2004. 5% of the 
participant's income will be reallocated from the PAYG contributions to the privately funded system. How-
ever, the draft was rejected by parliament as requiring further improvements.  
MT Malta operates a PAYG system administered by the government. There is no second-pillar pension system, 
by which workers would contribute towards a retirement fund. Likewise, there are no occupational pension 
schemes, as such funds were wound up in 1979, with a lump sum being then paid to contributors. A National 
Commission for Welfare Reform was set up in 1999 to examine the extent of these problems and suggest 
solutions. Lack of consensus among the social partners is holding up publication of the final report, which is 
known to suggest a number of parametric reforms to the present system together with the introduction of a 
funded pillar. 
PL Pension system reform started in 1999 with the dual aim of stabilising the pension system's expenditures in 
the light of an ageing population and limiting the implicit debt. Implementation of the reform has taken place 
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according to schedule. The new pension system contains two obligatory elements. The first pillar (PAYG) 
operates according to the principle of notional defined contribution and is serviced by the Social Security 
Office; the second pillar is a funded one, and the obligatory pension contributions are transferred to the 
Open Pension Funds (OFE). The third pillar is voluntary. Since July 2001 pension contributions have been 
registered in accounts, and since June 2002 a full servicing of accounts, including transferring pension 
contributions to the open pension funds, has been operating as a mature sophisticated system. In the coming 
years the planned activities under the reform of the pension system will incorporate the relevant legislative 
and administrative aspects. Work is under way on legislation finalising the package of laws on the pension 
reform: law on annuities, law on bridging pensions and law on a national actuary. In the long run, amend-
ments are planned to equalize the situation of men and women within the pension system. The law on the 
social insurance system and the law on organization and operation of pension funds will be amended so as to 
simplify the existing system of information exchange and to strengthen the role and increase allocations of 
OFE members. As regards pension contributions, in 2004 the beneficiaries will receive initial information on 
the balance of their pension accounts within the first pillar. Completion of implementation of the computer 
system should allow increased efficiency in transferring current pension contributions to pension funds, as 
well as for a gradual reduction in delays. Work is under way on calculating initial capital for individuals 
insured prior to implementation of the pension reform. 
RO Romania has introduced a three-pillar system. The first pillar consists of a compulsory redistributive compo-
nent that is publicly managed. The second pillar has a compulsory capitalisation-based component, that is 
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privately managed. According to the government programme, this component will be adopted when a reli-
able source for covering the deficit exists (should have been adopted by the end of 2002). The third pillar 
features an optional capitalisation-based component which is also privately managed and designed for peo-
ple who have an income higher than the ceiling established in the public system. The following reforms are 
also under consideration: setting-up of a supervisory institution for pension companies, and establishment 
of rules to avoid moral hazard for pension companies.  
SK The pension system reforms constitute a gradual shift from continuous pension financing to the new form of 
pension insurance. The pension system in force is based exclusively on continuous financing. Maintaining 
public finance stability requires a shift to a mixed-finance insurance system. Therefore, a three-pillar sys-
tem will be established, introducing a second-pillar compulsory pension insurance scheme and a third-pillar 
private supplementary scheme. In the short term, the pension system is also influenced by a high unemploy-
ment rate, a reduction in the number of people paying social security contributions and a declining collection 
rate for premiums caused mainly by high corporate insolvency. A new Social Insurance Law was adopted in 
May 2002, and will enter into force on 1 July 2003. It regulates basic social insurance consisting of sickness 
(health) insurance, pension insurance and accident insurance. It lays down more stringent conditions of 
eligibility for benefits, non-systematic benefits being excluded from the material scope of the pension in-
surance benefits. It provides a new way of calculating benefits, an indexation mechanism and an amended 
definition of disablement and unifies the conditions of eligibility for widower's and widow's pensions. It 
equalizes the pension age for men and women in 2003-19 (60). 
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SL The Slovenian pension system has three pillars: The first pillar is a mandatory public pension scheme, while 
the second pillar is a collective and individual pension scheme (since 2000) that has strong tax incentives. 
The third pillar is for voluntary individual savings for old-age (e.g. life insurance). The government pro-
motes this pillar by granting tax reliefs for premiums/annuities (cap at 3% for premiums). Upcoming 
changes in the system of mandatory pension insurance are designed for the most part to abolish certain diffi-
culties or uncertain aspects that arose during implementation of the reform and to amend a law with provi-
sions that were implemented subsequently. Changes to a system of voluntary pension insurance may lead to 
an increase in the number of participants in the system. Further changes also relate to a mixed system of 
indexation of pensions where pensions are adjusted annually in accordance with the change in average 
wages per employee. The upper limit on the rise in pensions is set by the increase in the average salary per 
employee in the past year, while the lower limit is set by price increases in the past year. 
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN ACCEDING 
COUNTRIES 
ANA MARTINEZ AND ESTHER GORDO 
 
1. CHALLENGES FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYS-
TEMS IN THE EU: THE LISBON TARGETS 
 
Human capital is a key element in the Lisbon strategy, which sets an 
ambitious goal: to obtain a substantial increase in per capita investment 
in human resources; and to halve the number of 18 to 24 year-olds with 
only lower-secondary education who are not in further education and 
training.  
 
Educational systems face similar challenges in current EU Members and 
in acceding countries: to raise quality of educational systems, improving 
performance and to ensure population is given adequate skills adapted to 
the needs of working life and market requirements. In addition, if Lis-
bon targets are to be met, more resources, and more efficiently invested, 
will have to be devoted to investment in education, to ensure that overall 
investment in human resources is conducive to economic growth. How-
ever, acceding countries must tackle with more severe problems in terms 
of mismatch of skills and adaptability of labour force, low participation 
at tertiary education and inefficiencies.  
 
Efficient investment in education should be a high priority as a part of a 
policy strategy designed to promote growth and social cohesion, since 
education is a key growth input, particularly in an increasingly knowl-
edge-based economy, and an important lever of social cohesion policy. 
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2. THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
 
Education could be considered as a key component of human capital, as 
it encompasses knowledge and skills embodied in humans that are ac-
quired through schooling, training and experience and are useful in the 
production of goods, services and further knowledge. 
 
Investment in human capital contributes directly to economic perform-
ance, at the individual level and for the whole economy. More skilled 
workers will be more productive with any given technology and they 
can learn faster, i.e. improve existing production processes or adapt to 
new technologies faster, and develop new ones more easily. The impor-
tance of human capital rises as production processes become increas-
ingly knowledge-intensive. 
 
At individual level, school attainment is a primary determinant of indi-
vidual income and labour market status (labour force participation rates 
and employment probabilities). Recent research suggests that an addi-
tional year of schooling increases wages at the individual level by 
around 6.5% in the EU. The link between human capital and individual 
wages becomes stronger in times of rapid technological change. Given 
these links between education and earnings and labour market status, 
education is a key tool of social cohesion policy. 
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, human capital is linked to eco-
nomic growth through two non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: one the 
hand, the level effects, by which human capital can increase productiv-
ity directly (it enters the production function as an additional input); and 
on the other, the rate effects i.e. human capital facilitates the creation or 
absorption of knowledge (it enters the technical progress function). As 
important as quantity of human capital is its quality for growth (Lee and 
Lee (1995) and Hanusek and Kimko (2000)). Some estimates (De la 
Fuente and Ciccone, 2002) show that an additional year of average 
school attainment increases the level of aggregate productivity by 
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around 5% on impact and by further 5% in the long run. This second 
effect reflects the contribution of human capital to technological pro-
gress (the rate effects). 
 
Externalities may be important, i.e. that some of the benefits of educa-
tional investment will leak out and will be captured by other parties. 
This would justify public corrective action. 
 
2.1. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Policy action in education is based on market failures which lead to sub 
optimal results from a social point of view, such as capital market fail-
ures, risk and uncertainty; asymmetric information; spill over effects; 
monopsony power and poaching. Social returns from investment in hu-
man capital could exceed the private returns to individuals and firms. 
Thus, investment may be sub-optimal from the social perspective. This 
justifies corrective measures such as education subsidies and compul-
sory schooling laws. In addition, there are other arguments in favour of 
intervention, resting on its redistributive effects, considering education 
as an instrument of social cohesion.  
 
The education system is key for the development of the knowledge-
based society. It should perform four roles with respect to knowledge: it 
should provide the broad basic education that makes a populace literate, 
imparting both everyday skills and intellectual abilities needed for an 
informed citizenship. Secondly, it should stimulate interest and prepare 
adequate numbers of young people to pursue careers in science and 
technology. Thirdly, it should educate a diverse labour force and de-
velop skills at various levels of sophistication, including skills needed to 
navigate in the knowledge economy. Finally, it should conduct research 
and advanced training that creates the highly trained specialists needed 
to advance the frontiers of knowledge and its application. A complex 
nexus of institutions and actors makes up national higher education sys-
tems. 
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A country knowledge economy strategy would explicitly address how 
knowledge production moves form universities to users. Significant 
emphasis would be given to institutions whose purpose extends to train-
ing and production of knowledge as a public good. It would propose 
reforms needed to allow these institutions to develop both the research 
base, and the skilled people, needed for a knowledge economy to flour-
ish. Distance learning, lifelong learning, and policy stimulus for greater 
mobility of students and teachers would be part of the education strategy 
needed to support the knowledge economy. Preparing workers to take 
decisions, to learn, to deal with non-routine problems would be integral 
to reformed education systems. 
 
To meet these objectives, educational systems should be ensured ade-
quate resources that must be invested efficiently and improve quality 
and performance. Studies show that the impact of education systems 
does not necessarily depend on the level of public spending, but as 
much on the intra-sectoral allocation and the composition of spending. 
Education policies first must ensure that the available resources are ade-
quately allocated within the sector among education levels: tertiary edu-
cation programmes should not absorb excessively large shares of the 
education budget at the expense of primary and secondary education. 
Also, resources in some cases must be shifted away from the public pre-
school systems that traditionally have been large in size and scope. Sec-
ond, the delivery cost of education services can be lowered in many 
areas, and the quality of spending can be improved through changes in 
the school curriculum and by ensuring that textbooks and other essential 
teaching materials are provided. 
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3. EDUCATION IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
 
3.1. OVERVIEW1 
 
Education systems in accession countries have gone through major re-
forms in recent years, as the development of a market economy has 
raised new needs to be met by the educational systems.  
 
In terms of resources, education spending in the transition economies 
has been high but somehow inefficient: some structural failures such as 
over-staffing, duplication of facilities and overemphasis on non-
essential services have inflated spending in this sector in certain coun-
tries.  
 
Overall, the populations of the accession countries have a high literacy 
rate and the educational infrastructure is well developed. However, 
educational attainment does not fully meet the needs of the private 
sector in terms of the knowledge being produced and the adaptabil-
ity of the workforce. There are two important issues facing most acces-
sion countries: first, available data show that an excessively large pro-
portion of their workers are not prepared for knowledge-based 
jobs, which is in large part a failure of the education system. Secondly, 
related to the above, gross enrolment rates in tertiary education are 
very low in most accession countries. Accordingly, efforts should be 
made to improve performance of educational systems in order to pro-
duce skills and qualifications needed in a knowledge society and to raise 
education expenditure efficiency (reducing cost per person educated). 
 
A review of current education reform plans in accession countries sug-
gests considerable awareness of these issues, although progress in re-
forms in the education sector varies across accession countries:  
                                                     
1 Data for EU and Candidates Countries come from Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, European 
Report of Quality Indicators of Lifelong Learning and the Unesco. 
 Kick-off Papers 314 
Estonia has a comprehensive education reform programme connected to 
labour market needs and to R&D needs. The Estonian Education Strat-
egy focuses on vocational education and higher education. In higher 
education, priority is given to engineering, technology and teacher train-
ing. Adult re-training is also included. 
 
Latvia is connecting all state libraries and schools to the Internet, and 
providing universal information literacy through its schools.  
 
Lithuania has an education reform programme focused on the quality 
of higher education, and including reform of curricula (more science 
based), distance education, adult training and greater international con-
tacts. 
 
Slovakia and Slovenia have announced education reforms. In Slovenia, 
an expanded proportion of the government budget will go to education.  
 
Hungary is currently implementing a comprehensive higher education 
reform (1996-2001). The overall objective is to increase responsiveness 
to social and economic needs; improve the operating efficiency of the 
system; mobilise private finance; improve equity in higher education 
finance. As a result of the reform, during the period 1995/1996 and 
2000/2001, the gross tertiary level enrolment rate increased from 18% to 
30%. During the period 1995/1996 and 1999/2000, the total spending 
per student as a percent of per capita GDP decreased from 121% to 
70%. Private finance in higher education has grown significantly. 
Within the framework of the reform, programs are currently imple-
mented to adjust national R&D efforts more to private sector demand. 
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3.2. RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO EDUCATION: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
ON EDUCATION2  
 
Graph 1: Public Expenditure on Education, % GDP (2000) 
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos 
 
Across EU countries, there is a wide range of variation on the volume of 
public spending assigned to education, from the highest at 8.1% in 
Denmark to the lowest at 3.6% in Greece. Public funding of education 
in acceding countries is on average somewhat lower than the EU aver-
age of 5.3% of GDP. Two groups among acceding countries can be 
differentiated: The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with 
expenditure levels above 6% of GDP, higher than the EU average and 
ranking among the EU countries with the highest levels; and the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia with the lowest ratios of public expenditure, not 
only relative to the EU-15 average but also in an EU with 25 members.  
In some Candidate Countries public spending on education has regis-
tered a marked drop during the nineties. This is the case of Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In contrast, public spending has risen 
                                                     
2 It should be noted, though, that these figures are difficult to compare, as they are not controlled 
for differences in demographic developments. Data comparability may be further impeded by 
differences in the efficiency of resource input. 
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steadily in Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania and Cyprus.  
 
The share of public spending allocated to education in the public 
budget, an indicator of the priority given to education in public spend-
ing, varies considerably among EU Members ranging from 14.5% 
(Denmark) to 6.4% (Greece), with an EU average of 11.2%. For those 
accession countries for which data is available, they suggest that educa-
tion absorbs a high percentage of public spending. 
 
The Czech Republic spends 7.8% of its overall public expenditure 
budget on education, well below the EU average, and exceeds only 
Greece among the EU countries. Slovakia with 13.9% report figures 
higher than most EU countries while Cyprus has the highest share with 
15.6%.  
 
Concerning private funding, there is little information but estimates 
signal that private expenditure on education is much lower in accession 
countries than in EU Member States. Families and companies devote 
fewer resources to education in accession countries. 
 
Graph 2: Total education budget as a share of total public expenditure 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Graph 3: Public Financing as % GDP, by levels of education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
By levels of education, graph 3 shows that in the EU public financing is 
especially important for primary and secondary education, which re-
ceive a much larger proportion of public spending than tertiary educa-
tion. On average, the EU spends 3.5% of GDP in primary and secondary 
education. Four countries spend less than the average (2-3%) and five 
(Denmark, France, Austria, Portugal and Sweden) more than 4%. For 
the tertiary level, the EU average is 1.1%. Eight Member States spend 
from 0.65 to 0.99% in tertiary education, below EU average.  
 
Accession countries show a similar pattern. A larger proportion of pub-
lic spending is allocated to primary and secondary education, ranging 
from 4.6% in Estonia to 2.7% in Cyprus. Overall, the average among the 
accession countries is not much lower than in the EU. The difference is 
much more marked for tertiary education, with higher homogeneity 
among accession countries but lower average spending than EU mem-
bers. 
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3.3. STRUCTURAL ISSUES 
 
Expenditure on education must be complemented with indicators on 
efficiency in the use of those resources. Apparently, there are some con-
cerns on this issue. In many countries the ratio of pupils per teacher and 
the class size are very low and the number of teachers as part of the 
active population is quite high in some accession countries compared to 
EU Member States. In addition in some countries, equipment is outdated 
and funding for renewing is often scarce. Some accession countries have 
encouraged the schools to provide services to the market, aiming at 
compensating the lack of sufficient resources. Big efforts are being 
made to supply computers, ICT and Internet access, in part thanks to 
funding of EU programs, and the number of schools connected to the 
Internet are growing fast, with 95% of Slovenian schools connected in 
2000, 75% in Estonia and 40% in Lithuania. 
 
These features of educational system can explain the rise in costs ob-
served in accession countries and the priority given to optimisation of 
resources in policy agenda.  
 
One major issue is the situation of teachers, which has deteriorated in 
most accession countries. In general average teacher’s salary has grown 
less than the average salary. In addition, there is a need to update and 
improve teachers training to deal with the requirements of new curric-
ula, new pedagogies and methodologies and the development of ICT 
and learning. And available data show a large gap between EU Member 
States and accession countries on teacher training. This discourages the 
best qualified from entering the system to prepare for the replacement of 
older staff and prevents teachers from being adequately retrained. 
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3.4. OUTPUT AND QUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 
There is a series of indicators, namely educational attainment of the 
population and participation in education and training that provide an 
overview of the output and quality of educational systems of countries 
concerned. 
 
3.4.1. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 
Despite the fact that some figures could lead to rather optimistic conclu-
sions and although qualitative information is missing for a number of 
countries, there is in general for the accession countries a clear gap in 
qualifications of the adult population in quantitative terms, in particu-
lar at tertiary level, and in qualitative terms. Recent reforms aiming at 
improving quality and contents of lower-secondary and general educa-
tion will change these results. 
 
There are different indicators to assess educational attainment: on the 
quantitative side, the percentage of 25-64 year-olds having completed at 
least upper-secondary level (International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) level 3); and the percentage of 25-64 year-olds hav-
ing completed tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6). Qualitative informa-
tion is given by international surveys such the IALS and the PISA 
study. These indicators have to be complemented with information on 
the labour market results by level of education. 
 
A. Adult population with at least upper-secondary education 
 
The data obtained from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey show that 
accession countries are in better position than EU countries. However, 
these figures must be interpreted with caution. First, attainment has 
nothing to do with quality of the education provided and do not differ-
entiate between the old communist qualifications and the new qualifica-
tions needed for the developing knowledge-based economies. 
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As the following figure shows, accession countries have a larger propor-
tion of population aged 25-64 having completed at least upper secon-
dary level than the EU. The average in the Candidate Countries is 
77.40% of adult population, well above the EU average of 63.80% and 
the three worst EU performers. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia 
and Lithuania score higher than the top EU countries (Germany, 83% 
and the UK 81%). 
 
These differences remain when considering the younger group of popu-
lation. Accession countries have, on average, a higher percentage of 22 
years olds having completed at least upper secondary education than the 
EU countries, where the rate is 75%. In the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia the figure exceeds 90%. Conversely, Portugal has the lowest 
percentage (45%) in the EU. 
 
Educational levels improve in younger generations, both in the EU and 
in acceding countries. In the EU more than 60% of 55-64 year olds had 
not completed upper secondary education against 29% of 25-34 year 
olds. In acceding countries, percentages are lower in all age groups and 
differences are less marked. 
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Graph 4: Population aged 25-64 completed at least secondary education 
(2001) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Graph 5: % of population by age group who do not have completed 
secondary education (2000) 
Source: Eurostat 
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B. Adult population who have completed tertiary education 
 
On average, 22% of 25-64 year-olds have completed tertiary education 
in the EU, whereas in acceding countries that figure is only 14%. Only 
Lithuania, Estonia and Cyprus are above the EU average. The majority 
of acceding countries reach less than 15%, above the two bottom EU 
countries (Italy and Portugal). 
 
Tertiary levels are higher among the youngest in the EU. Whereas 23% 
of the EU population aged between 35 and 39 have a tertiary education 
qualification, the proportion for those aged 55-59 is only 16%. This 
trend is particularly strong in Greece and Spain, where the proportion of 
those with tertiary education qualifications is at least twice as high in the 
35-39 age group as in the 55-59 age group. In other countries, the age-
based differences are less marked since the percentage of people with 
tertiary education qualifications in the 55-59 age group is relatively high 
(19% or more in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom). In Italy and Portugal the pro-
portions of those with tertiary level qualifications are relatively small 
across all the age groups considered.  
 
In the acceding countries, there is less disparity in the educational at-
tainment levels between generations. In the majority of these countries 
the proportion of those with tertiary education qualifications is fairly 
stable across different age groups, excepting Cyprus where the propor-
tion of those with tertiary education qualifications is at least twice as 
high in the 35-39 age group as in the 55-59 age group. In Estonia and 
Lithuania the age-based differences are less marked since the percentage 
of people with tertiary education qualifications in the 55-59 age group is 
relatively high. In Poland, and Slovakia the proportions of those with 
tertiary level qualifications are relatively small across all the age groups 
considered.  
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Graph 6: aged 25-64 with tertiary education (2001) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
However, figures of educational attainment must be interpreted with 
caution. Curricula reforms recently undertaken in Candidate Countries 
are difficult to put in place and in some cases old and outdated curricula 
are still used. In addition, these aggregate levels are broad categories, 
which aggregate different qualifications, which do not correspond to the 
same level in all countries. Finally, there are indicators that some of the 
candidates showing the highest rates of educational attainment at terti-
ary level (Lithuania, Estonia) are those that show the highest rate of 
unemployment and the lowest rate of employment for highly skilled 
workers (markedly higher and lower than the respective EU rates). 
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Graph 7: Group age tertiary education 2001 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Graph 8: Unemployment rates by level of education (2000) 
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acceding countries have a larger proportion of adult population with at 
least upper secondary education than the EU. However, unemployment 
rates for this group are much higher than in current Member States re-
flecting a mismatch between the educational system and skills provided 
and the labour market requirements. 
 
In acceding countries, the situation of low skilled workers is especially 
serious. They are in a much more disadvantaged situation compared to 
their high-skilled counterparts and even more so when compared to the 
EU. While unemployment rates of the high skilled workers in Candidate 
Countries are comparable to the EU (differences reflect mainly higher 
unemployment rates), the situation of the low skilled is rather different. 
Unemployment rates are higher than in any EU country and the gap 
between high and low skilled is wider, reflecting a somewhat stronger 
segmented labour market. This conclusion is reinforced when taking 
into account the extremely low employment rates for the low skilled. 
 
C. Qualitative analysis 
 
Qualitative analysis is provided by two studies carried out by the 
OECD: the International Adult Literacy Survey, conducted between 
1994 and 1998, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia; and the PISA (OECD, 2000) study including Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia.  
 
The IALS survey considered the performance of adults (15-65 years) in 
three literacy fields: prose, document and quantitative literacy. The sur-
vey covered 22 countries. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia were placed at 
the bottom pf the group, except Hungary in quantitative literacy and the 
Czech Republic, which scored high in the three fields. 
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Table 1 
PROSE DOCUMENT QUANTITATIVE 
SE 301.30 SE 305.60 SE 305.90 
FI 288.60 DK 293.80 DK 298.40 
NL 282.70 FI 289.20 CZ 298.10 
DE 275.90 NL 286.90 DE 293.30 
DK 275 DE 285.10 NL 287.70 
BE 271.80 CZ 282.90 FI 286.10 
CZ 269.40 BE 278.20 BE 282.00 
UK 266.70 UK 267.50 HU 269.90 
IE 265.70 IE 259.30 UK 267.20 
HU 242.40 HU 249.00 IE 264.60 
Sl 229.70 Sl 231.90 Sl 242.80 
PL 229.50 PL 223.90 PL 234.90 
PT 22.60 PT 220.40 PT 231.40 
Source: OECD, International Adult Literacy Survey (1994-1998) 
 
The PISA study confirmed the previous results. Countries are ranked on 
a scale with an average score of 500 points. It concentrates on 15-years-
olds. In the table the European countries are shown, which participated 
at the survey. The Czech Republic is slightly under the average in read-
ing literacy. The other three, place at the last quarter. In mathematics 
literacy, the results for the four candidates are better with all of them 
placing in the second half. In scientific literacy, the results are mixed. 
The Czech Republic is above the average and Hungary, Poland and 
Latvia in the last third. 
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3.4.2. PARTICIPATION AT EDUCATION 
 
A. Duration of compulsory education 
 
Compulsory education in accession countries is lower than in the EU: 
10 years on average against 12 in the current Member States, with 
ranges from 9 years to 13 years. On average, students start later and 
finish earlier their compulsory education in Candidate Countries than in 
EU members. Duration of primary and secondary education in Candi-
date Countries is similar to the EU. 
 
Table 2   
Reading Mathematics Scientific 
FI 546 FI 536 FI 546 
IE 527 UK 529 UK 532 
UK 523 BE 520 AT 519 
SE 516 FR 517 IE 513 
AT 507 AT 515 SE 512 
BE 507 DK 514 CZ 511 
FR 505 SE 510 FR 500 
DK 497 IE 503 HU 496 
ES 493 CZ 498 BE 496 
CZ 492 DE 490 ES 491 
IT 487 HU 488 DE 487 
DE 484 ES 476 PL 483 
HU 480 PL 470 DK 481 
PL 479 LV 463 IT 478 
EL 474 IT 457 EL 461 
PT 470 PT 454 LV 460 
LV 458 EL 447 PT 459 
LU 441 LU 446 LU 443 
Source: OECD, Programme for international student assessment: European Com-
mission, European Report on Quality Indicators of lifelong learning, 2002 
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Table 3: Duration of primary, lower and upper secondary education 
(2000) 
 BG CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL RO SK Sl 
Primary 4 6 5 6 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 4 
Lower 
secondary 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 5 2 4 5 4 
Upper 
secondary 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 
 
 
B. School life expectancy 
 
This indicator (UNESCO, database on Education) measures the prob-
ability for children to spend more years in education and overall reten-
tion within the education system. Data must be interpreted with caution 
because neither the length of the school year nor the quality of educa-
tion is necessarily the same in each country. And it does not take into 
account the effects of repetition.  
 
The average school expectancy in the EU is 52,60%, with marked dif-
ferences between Finland and Luxembourg (the top and the bottom 
countries). Most accession countries for which data is available show 
lower average school expectancy than the EU, with Slovenia and Esto-
nia reporting the highest values, close to EU average. This suggests that 
the retention capacity of educational systems is low, with a low prob-
ability for a child to spend more years in education.  
AT BE DK DE EL ES FR IE LU FI PT SE UK NL 
Primary 4 6 6 4 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Lower 
secon-
dary 4 2 3 6 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Upper 
secon-
dary 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 3 
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Graph 9: School expectancy (1999-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNESCO 
 
C. Participation at Education  
 
Gross enrolment ratio (GER) is defined as total enrolment in a spe-
cific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of 
the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same 
level of education in a given school year. It indicates the capacity of the 
education system to enrol students of a particular age group. The 
indicator includes over-aged and under-aged students because of early 
or late entrants, and grade repetition. Thus a rigorous interpretation re-
quires additional information on the extent of repetition, late entrants, 
etc. 
 
According to data from UNESCO, accession countries show lower GER 
than current EU Members for secondary education. In Lithuania, Po-
land and Slovenia GER exceeds 90% indicating the system is approach-
ing to universal access, if one can expect the under-aged and over-aged 
enrolments to decline in the future to free places for pupils from the 
expected age group. Estonia has a GER of more than 100 per cent, 
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which indicates that it is, in principle, able to accommodate all of its 
school-age population. 
 
Graph 10: Gross enrolment ratio at secondary education (1999-2000) 
Source: UNESCO 
 
Graph 11: Participation at the end of compulsory education (2000) 
Source: Eurostat 
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Compulsory education usually ends with completion of the lower sec-
ondary level or during the upper secondary education level. Compulsory 
education end varies from a country to another. The following graphs 
compare participation at the end of compulsory education age (x) and 
the following years in accession countries and the EU. At the end of 
compulsory education, there are no marked differences between acces-
sion countries and EU members. With the exception of Malta, participa-
tion in education is very high in Candidate Countries, exceeding most 
EU countries. The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania and Estonia 
have the highest participation rates. Only two EU members, Portugal 
and Ireland, have comparables rates. The average participation rate in 
the EU is 93%, roughly the same as in the accession countries. Two 
years after the end of compulsory education, those rates fall to 73% in 
accession countries and 74% in the EU. 
 
Graph 12: Participation at the end of compulsory education 
Source: Eurostat 
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As a result of active policies aimed at raising the educational attainment 
of the population and of individual choices, participation at upper sec-
ondary level has increased significantly in recent years in accession 
countries.  
 
Participation in vocational education and training is slightly higher 
than in the EU, and show the same variations. It is particularly high in 
Central Europe ranging from 70-80% in Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, while it is lower than 40% in the Baltic states and Cyprus. 
 
An important shift has taken place in Candidate Countries. As a result of 
the priority given to the development of higher and post-secondary edu-
cation, as well as to the choices made by students and their families 
there has been a shift from the vocational or apprenticeship schemas 
which do not provide access to the Maturita and therefore neither to 
tertiary education to the technical streams aimed at delivering qualifi-
cations at ISCED level 3 as well as the Maturita and access to universi-
ties. 
 
Graph 13: Distribution of students in general and vocational upper sec-
ondary education (1999-2000) 
Source: Eurostat 
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D. Tertiary education 
 
Graph 14: Gross enrolment rates at tertiary education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNESCO 
 
Concerning participation in tertiary education, differences between EU 
members and Candidate Countries are rather pronounced, according to 
99/00 data (UNESCO) on gross enrolment ratio at tertiary level. The 
average gross enrolment ratio in the EU is 48.9, ranging from less than 
10% in Luxembourg to 84% in Finland. Only four Candidate Countries 
(Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia) score above the EU average 
gross enrolment ratio. There are significant differences among Candi-
date Countries themselves, since gross enrolment range from 19.8 in 
Malta to 53,3 in Slovenia.  
 
The proportion of students in tertiary education, as a percentage of all 
pupils and students, is relatively high in Slovenia and low in Malta. It is 
needed to take into account the structure of the educational system (the 
length of compulsory education and tertiary education), number of 
places available in tertiary educational institutions, possible restrictions 
on admissions and demographic changes. Only Latvia, Poland and Slo-
venia exceed the average proportion of tertiary students in the EU, 15%, 
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the rest of Candidate Countries are below the EU average. The average 
for Candidate Countries is 13%, with Cyprus and Malta, reporting the 
lowest percentages (7% both) respectively). As observed there are sharp 
differences among accession countries themselves. 
 
Graph 15: % of students in tertiary education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Almost all Candidate Countries are making a major effort to catch up 
with the EU level of participation at tertiary education. Poland and 
Hungary had the highest percentage increase in enrolments in higher 
education between 1995 and 1999 in all OECD countries. Estonia also 
shows a significant increase (above 80%). Other countries also had sub-
stantial increases although to a slower pace.  
 
The level of students in science, mathematics and computing and engi-
neering manufacturing and construction as a proportion of all tertiary 
students is slightly lower in accession countries than in the EU, where 
on average the percentage is 27%. Marked differences among accession 
themselves are also noted, since the percentage range from 11.5% of 
Malta to the 31.7% of the Czech Republic. 
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According to data of the European Report on Quality Indicators of Life-
long Learning, the proportion of tertiary graduates in science and tech-
nology in the accession countries, with the exception of Lithuania, is 
substantially lower than in EU Member States, although it has consider-
able increased in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. The figures range from 
3.8% in Malta to 12.1% in Lithuania. These figures provide an indicator 
of the skills produced which are relevant for the development of a 
knowledge-based economy. 
 
A low proportion of graduates in these fields represent a challenge for 
the education system and the needs of the market economy. In the EU, 
the proportion of graduates in sciences, mathematics and engineering 
accounts for 22%, although this figure conceals substantial differences 
among Member States. 
 
Graph 16: Tertiary level students in Science, Mathematics and comput-
ing and Engineering, manufacturing and construction as % of total terti-
ary students 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Another indicator of output of the educational system is the number of 
drop-outs and early leavers. Both rates have substantially increased in 
accession countries, mainly as a result of social problems and the diffi-
culties faced by accession countries in adapting the school system to the 
needs of the labour market and the individual. However, the early 
school leaver rate is lower than in the EU countries. This rate amounts 
to 19.3% for the EU, compared to 12.9% for the average rate in Candi-
date Countries in 2001. Drop-outs remain an important problem, espe-
cially in a number of vocational education and training schools. 
 
Graph 17: % graduates per field of education and training (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The early school leaver rate must be compared to participation in train-
ing to assess whether this is an alternative to higher education to obtain 
the skills needed to enter the labour market. Data from the Labour Force 
Survey show large disparities between Candidate Countries and EU 
countries in terms of participation in continuing vocational training in 
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general for the 25-64 years-olds. On average in Candidate Countries that 
participation is 3.6% against 8.4% on average for the EU. 
 
Graph 18: Early schoolleavers (aged 18-24) 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Lisbon strategy set two strategic goals in education and training: 
substantially increase investment in education and halve the proportion 
of adult population who does not have at least secondary education. 
 
Accession countries have made a big effort to reform their educational 
systems and to adapt them to the challenges posed by a market econ-
omy. Nevertheless when compared to EU Member States and the pro-
gress to be made to meet Lisbon objectives, some challenges emerge 
from the previous analysis. 
 
Concerning resources assigned to education, public investment is on 
average slightly lower than in the EU, despite accounting for a larger 
proportion of budgets. In addition some cost-inefficiencies exist related 
to structural weaknesses (low proportion of pupils per teacher, high 
proportion of teachers in the active population, class size, equipment, 
etc). 
Participation at education is high in Candidate Countries, especially in 
secondary education. Compulsory education is shorter than in the EU, 
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although duration of primary and secondary education is similar to the 
EU. School expectancy is lower. But a gap remains in terms of qualifi-
cations of adult population. Although the proportion of adult population 
having completed at least upper secondary education is larger than in 
the EU, the opposite is true for tertiary education, where in addition 
participation rates are lower than in the EU. Furthermore, the number of 
graduates in science and technology and the results in international tests 
are lower than in Member States. Recent reforms reveal growing aware-
ness of these issues and as a result of reforms of curricula and other 
aspects of higher education, participation at tertiary education is rising 
and a shift has produced from vocational secondary programmes to gen-
eral programs that provide access to tertiary education.  
 
The gap in qualifications of the adult population represents an important 
challenge to be addressed, as it is reflected in the labour market status of 
workers by level of education, suggesting the existence of a much more 
pronounced dual labour market than in the EU between high skilled and 
lower skilled workers. 
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R&D AND INNOVATION 
HELGE SIGURD NAESS-SCHMIDT 
 
The theme of R&D and innovation is central to any economic policy 
aiming at fostering higher living standards but is difficult to handle in an 
operational manner in terms of analytical content and policy recommen-
dations. At worst, it tends at the analytical level to degenerate into list-
ing of a number of input indicators supplemented with patents applied 
for and obtained. 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that in this area, there is probably much less 
of a consensus both within the EPC and indeed, in the wider aca-
demic/political community, as to what are the main prerequisites for 
innovation and particular what are the weights to be attached to different 
factors when explaining differences between Member States. Moreover, 
policies aiming for higher innovation, particular in terms of higher pub-
lic subsidies, have both budgetary and social costs, and hence imply 
trade-offs.  
 
Thus the ongoing discussion on boosting innovation, in particular when 
going beyond very broad improvement of framework conditions, is by 
no means finished and have much more open-ended questions compared 
to inter alia labour markets or liberalisation of telecommunications.  
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the EPCs report on the subject and 
recent work from the OECD may be good starting points for bench-
marking the Candidate Countries with focus on the following key areas 
as the main drivers of innovation (R&D being an input): 
• Well educated work force 
• Fierce competition in product markets 
• Strong climate for entrepreneurship 
• Easy access to risk capital and favourable financial conditions as a 
whole 
• Macro-stability 
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• Infrastructure of research network and co-operation between private 
and public sector 
• Broad brush indicators of innovation 
 
In doing this analysis, it may also be worth bearing in mind, that while 
the present EU-15 countries are increasingly homogenous in terms of 
output per worker, the ten countries now ready for membership are sub-
stantially less rich (cf. graph 1). Indeed, the richest of the new countries 
has an income level below the 25 per cent fractile of the new. 
 
Graph 1: Relative living standards, new and old EU-countries, GDP in 
PPS per person employed relative to EU-15) 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
It may thus be useful when going through the various sub-themes to 
note whether an observed difference essentially can be explained in 
terms of being a less affluent society or rather more specific characteris-
tics eventually the result of the very changing external and internal po-
litical conditions these countries have been facing. 
Naess-Schmidt    343 
1. WELL EDUCATED WORK FORCE 
 
Overall educational attainment is relative impressive. Using the OECD 
PISA study as the benchmark, the larger of the new member countries 
score relatively well on reading, mathematical and scientific literacy 
despite considerable lower income levels (cf. table 2). 
 
Table 1: Literacy impressive, proficiency of 15 olds 
 Reading literacy 
Mathematical  
literacy Scientific literacy 
Country Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation 
Czech Republic 492 96 498 - 511 - 
Latvia  458 102 463 - 460 - 
Hungary  480 94 488 - 496 - 
Poland  479 100 470 - 483 - 
EU-25%  479 91.5 455.5 - 469.5 - 
EU-50%  497 94 503 - 491 - 
EU-75%  511.5 99 516 - 512.5 - 
Source: OECD, Education at a glance 2002 
 
Moreover, enrolment rates - the percentage of a certain age group join-
ing formal education - is pretty much at par with EU-countries as a 
whole with relative little variation (graph 2). 
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Graph 2: Basic school enrolment ratio, 2000 
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Source: OECD, "Education at a Glance" and European Commission, "Note on Stocktak-
ing of Structural Reforms in Candidate Countries". 
Note: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia refer to 1998. 
 
Commission reports have some qualifications in terms of teaching over-
emphasising old-style root learning. While this may be true, one should 
reflect that quite a few of the present Member States tend to believe that 
they have gone to far in the other direction. Life long learning seems to 
receive too little attention. 
 
Public spending on education is very high relative to GDP, in fact with 
four new Member States above the 75 per cent fractile (graph 3). 
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Graph 3: Public spending on expenditure in terms of share of GDP at 
the higher end of the scale, 1999 
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Source: European Report on Quality Indicators of Lifelong Learning 
 
Finally, and perhaps reflecting a more hard-core oriented education 
policy, the new EU-members appear to have a higher concentration of 
tertiary degrees in natural sciences etc, which should be helpful in terms 
of innovation policies. Impressively, the number of graduates per 1000 
habitants exceeds the 25 old Member State fractile in all new Member 
States. 
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Graph 4: Tertiary graduates in science and technology aged 20-29, 
2000. 
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Source: European Commission - Note on Stocktaking of Structural Reforms in Candi-
date Countries 
Note: Slovenia refers to 1999 
 
2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
A number of the PEPs suggest that entrepreneurship is considered an 
important subject and is given considerable attention. It is not only to 
further innovation but also seen as an element in job creation not the 
least at the regional level.  
 
Typically, public policy in this area focus on two areas: 1) cutting red 
tape and regulatory compliance costs and 2) providing services to start- 
ups in terms of business advice, low cost rent facilities etc. 
 
Bearing in mind the Commission reports, anecdotic evidence and the 
fact that the countries to a large extent have been forced to develop 
completely new administrative systems, there are good reasons to be-
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lieve that there is considerable scope for improvement on administrative 
simplification and low compliances cost.  
 
3. FIERCE COMPETITION 
 
Studies of innovation, inter alia OECDs, suggest that strong competition 
is essential. It requires the proper legislative framework backed up by 
regulatory power and appropriate division of work between relevant 
agencies. State aid should be minimised and directed to areas with either 
significant social gains in addition to private or temporary aiming to 
assist firms and workers to adjust to changed market conditions.  
 
The bottom line is that weakly performing firms should exit, i.e. wind 
down their business or sell it to better performing competitors, and new 
firms with bright ideas should not be stopped by barriers to entry that 
keep alive ailing incumbents. 
 
While the ten new countries have demonstrated enormous progress in 
this area, the cautious language in the various Commission documents 
suggests that in terms of implementation continued close surveillance is 
highly called for. 
 
4. FINANCIAL SECTOR CONDITIONS 
 
The available evidence suggest that the financial sector in the new 
Member States are heavily bank based with share markets still being in 
their infancy and not providing much capital to finance new firms or 
risky investments in research and development.  
 
However, there is no evidence that a well functioning banking sector 
could not - at this stage in the development of these countries - provide 
the instruments for financing innovation. 
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5. MACRO STABILITY 
 
Recent years have shown marked improvement in macro stability in 
terms of lower inflation and less pronounced pick up of growth rates 
(graph 5). Growth rates tend to exceed old Member States (but not in 
recent years with a large margin). Lower and more stable inflation is 
helpful, bearing in mind that there is a substantial body of literature that 
suggests that high and unstable inflation - usually these observations 
tend to be twinned - creates uncertainty, risk premia and discourages 
investment in long-term real projects and research. It is very important 
that progress is sustained, which indeed will be a central part of the 
work of the EFC in the coming years. 
 
Graph 5: Increased macro stability and growth 
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b. Annual inflation rate 
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6. INFRASTRUCTURE OF RESEARCH NETWORKS AND CO-
OPERATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
A number of studies suggest that one of the most important public pol-
icy challenges in terms of boosting innovation is to review the whole 
architecture of public research institutions and their interaction with 
private counterparts. The EPC report touched upon this issue but not in 
depth. None the less, it was clear from last and present years EPC ex-
aminations that a number of countries are not happy with the present 
situation: the governance of public institutions is seen as being out-
moded and is in the process of being reformed, not the least to make 
them more responsive to private firms looking for partners.  
 
Going trough the available information sent out so far, it is not obvious 
where the new Member States are in this process. It seems clear that 
subsequent to the crisis following the break-down of the previous politi-
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cal system - see below - research appropriations to public institutions 
were cut substantially, but how much have the governance of institu-
tions been reformed and do the concerns in the new Member States 
match those in the old? 
 
7. BROAD BRUSH INDICATORS OF INNOVATION   
 
Clearly the new Member countries are spending less on R&D as re-
vealed by standard indicators, and consume less ICT.  
 
 
Graph 6: R&D-spending relative to per capita incomea.  
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b. Research activity 1995 
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Source: Eurostat 
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The question is what conclusions can be derived from this. Prior to the 
regime changes, countries in Central and Eastern Europe spent more in 
terms of share per GDP than the relative income position would suggest. 
And the subsequent decline probably has been quite healthy in terms of 
moving manpower from perhaps poorly and overstaffed universities to 
firms looking for qualified personal.  
 
Moreover, with relative incomes clearly well below EU-levels and mar-
ket leaders elsewhere, in particular the US, it may indeed make much 
sense for some of the countries to focus more on technology transfer and 
gradual product and process improvement as opposed to large scale, 
long-term and risky industrial and public research investment 
 
Graph 7: ICT spending (per cent of GDP), 2001 
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Spending on ICT appears on par with old Member States for the new 
Member States where data are available. 
 
Some of the decline in formalised R&D spending in the new Member 
States may have been sensible in the wake of the regime change and one 
should avoid the temptation to suggest that countries at all levels of 
economic development should aim for the same innovation and R&D-
strategy, at least in terms of public spending. 
 
An alternative, and not necessarily conflicting hypothesis, may imply 
that the new Member States could become hot beds of privately fi-
nanced investment in innovation given high degree of "academic" liter-
acy and graduate production in hard core basic sciences as well as low 
wage costs.  
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KEY STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES IN THE  
ACCEDING COUNTRIES: THE INTEGRATION OF 
THE ACCEDING COUNTRIES INTO THE COM-
MUNITY’S ECONOMIC POLICY CO-ORDINATION 
PROCESSES 
ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE1 
 
PREFACE 
 
In March 2000 in Lisbon, the European Union set itself the strategic ten-
year goal  
"to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion".  
 
The Heads of State and Government, meeting in Lisbon and Stockholm, 
called for greater efforts to speed up structural change so as to raise the 
growth potential, aiming at five priority areas: (i) employment, (ii) in-
novation and research, (iii) economic reform on product and capital 
markets, (iv) social cohesion and (v) sustainable development. The 
Member States, recognising that a marked acceleration of structural 
reforms is required in order to bring the strategic Lisbon goal within 
reach, have taken steps to implement labour, product and capital market 
reforms embedded in a sound macroeconomic environment. The new 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) for 2003-05 recognise the  
imperative of attaining higher and sustainable growth rates. Sound mac-
roeconomic conditions and policies are a prerequisite for a sustainable 
increase in economic prosperity. Better functioning and more compet-
tive labour, product and capital markets are indispensable in achieving a 
                                                     
1 EPC/ECFIN/114/03 final; Brussels, 29. April 2003 
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more dynamic economy and enhancing potential growth. 
 
Enlargement in a medium- to long-term perspective is set to enhance 
considerably the prospects for growth of the EU economy. The acceding 
countries have achieved strong and solid progress with structural and 
institutional reforms. Progress (and the speed of structural change), 
however, has not been consistently strong across all countries and areas. 
Achieving real convergence with the EU and enhanced resilience to 
possible future shocks will depend on the scope and pace of progress in 
the implementation of the structural reform agenda.  
 
The present Report should be a first step towards integrating the acced-
ing countries, after enlargement, into the multilateral surveillance con-
ducted by the Council under the Treaty, in line with the mandate given 
by the Ecofin ministers on 5 November 2002. The Report assesses the 
challenges faced by the acceding countries with regard to the Lisbon 
goal and the BEPGs, and identifies possible priorities for structural re-
forms in those countries by looking at the dynamics of a wide range of 
policy areas relative to the EU. The Report should also provide advice 
and oversight for the Council in concentrating the EU’s monitoring on 
the priority areas where reform challenges are most evident.  
 
The Report, which has been elaborated by a specific working group 
made up of experts from national administrations of the Member States, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank (a list of 
members of the Working Group is annexed to this report), has to rely 
primarily on the Pre-Accession Economic Programmes and other secon-
dary information, as the acceding countries do not yet participate in the 
Community’s economic policy co-ordination processes. The outline of 
the Report follows the BEPGs and the EPC’s annual reports on struc-
tural reforms. At this stage, its analytical part covers only the ten coun-
tries acceding in 2004 as the Report aims at preparing for their integra-
tion into the existing multilateral surveillance processes. Multilateral 
surveillance of the remaining three EU Candidate Countries (Bulgaria, 
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Romania and Turkey) will continue under the Pre-Accession Surveil-
lance procedure. Moreover, the EPC considers that the latter should be 
assessed in a report similar to the present one before their actual EU 
accession. However, for the sake of completeness the comparative ta-
bles, if data is available, also cover those three countries (albeit for Tur-
key most data have been lacking).  
 
KEY MESSAGES  
 
Structural reform challenges 
 
The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) has analysed structural chal-
lenges in the acceding countries, on the basis of the Lisbon strategy as 
implemented via the BEPGs. It found that the challenges of the acceding 
countries do not differ fundamentally in nature from those in the present 
Member States. However, some challenges are more demanding for the 
acceding countries. Consequently, the existing framework for multilat-
eral surveillance of structural reforms, as outlined in the general recom-
mendations of the BEPGs, seems broadly appropriate also for the acced-
ing countries.  
 
The gap with the EU average is still wide and in spite of experiencing 
higher growth rates than EU countries over the past few years the pro-
gress in catching-up with the EU in income levels has been limited in 
most acceding countries. Catching-up in income levels is a long-term 
process, but the challenge is to speed up the narrowing of the productiv-
ity gap and the gap in employment rates between the acceding countries 
and the EU Member States. 
 
The Lisbon strategic goal of "becoming the most competitive and dy-
namic economy" remains unchanged in an enlarged Union. Yet the Lis-
bon targets are likely to be more difficult to achieve, simply because in 
most cases the average EU starting base is statistically lowered by the 
fact that most acceding countries are less well placed vis-à-vis the Lis-
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bon targets than the existing Member States. It should also be recog-
nised, though, that at least in some areas a number of acceding countries 
are already equally or even better placed than (some) present Member 
States. 
 
Within the existing framework, the EPC considers that in the Cardiff 
process and the BEPGs, the focus for the acceding countries could rest 
more on the still incomplete structural shift. A number of product mar-
ket issues, such as privatisation, administered prices and factors affect-
ing the sectoral composition of the economy, and a number of chal-
lenges related to the knowledge-based economy, such as the perform-
ance of the education systems and R&D as well as innovation perform-
ance, need to be discussed more intensively than is currently the case for 
the existing Member States. A special focus for surveillance should be 
the institutional framework for market development and the business 
environment, and the effective implementation of competition policies. 
In the Luxembourg process, the focus for the acceding countries should, 
on account of the need for business restructuring, be more on the prior-
ity "promoting adaptability in the labour market". In regard of the spe-
cific elements of the Lisbon strategy and the BEPGs, the EPC would 
like to highlight the following priority areas: 
• Increasing employment and incentives to work. Whilst the aver-
age employment rate in the EU has been rising, this is not the case 
for many acceding countries. In most of them, unemployment has 
remained unacceptably high. Major differences exist between the ac-
ceding countries in regard of employment rates and unemployment 
ratios. Even greater efforts than in the EU-15 will therefore be 
needed in order to achieve the Lisbon employment goals in an 
enlarged EU-25 as a whole. The measures that hold the key to "more 
and better jobs" include: 
? increasing the incentive effects of tax and benefit systems, in par-
ticular for low-wage earners by reducing unemployment traps 
("increase incentives to work"); 
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? ensuring that wage increases remain in line with productivity 
gains and price stability (wage bargaining systems are key); 
? improving employment flexibility through an in-depth review of 
employment protection legislation; 
? improving the skill level with a focus on lifelong learning; 
? focusing on precisely targeted, effective and efficient active la-
bour market policies. 
Such reforms will speed up the acceding countries’ convergence 
towards the EU’s Lisbon employment targets.  
 
• Strengthening competition and efficiency in product and service 
markets. While many challenges in product markets are key to both 
acceding countries and present Member States, the acceding coun-
tries are facing some specific challenges, especially with regard to 
sectoral changes in the economy, privatisation, administered prices 
and state aid. There are still several sectors in product and service 
markets, especially in the non-tradeable sector, where competition in 
the acceding countries seems to be lacking relative to EU-15. Across 
all sectors, for enterprise and entrepreneurship to thrive, measures to 
improve the business environment will be essential. The following 
should be priorities for further action: 
? In some countries, more progress is needed to strengthen competi-
tion rules and establish independent competition authorities. De-
spite good progress, significant deficiencies need to be addressed 
in most countries with regard to the regulatory burden on busi-
ness, the effective implementation and, in some countries, the de-
sign of judicial reforms, and the quality and administrative capac-
ity of the central and local authorities. Many segments of the pub-
lic sector need to be made more efficient to facilitate the opera-
tion and growth of businesses.  
? In a number of countries, incomplete market-exit mechanisms 
should be addressed, in particular through the improvement of 
bankruptcy legislation and procedures. For network industries, it 
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will be key to reduce potential barriers to foreign and domestic 
competititon and ensuring effective and transparent supervision. 
? After accession, particular attention will have to be devoted to the 
effective implementation of internal market obligations, which is 
a challenge notably with respect to achieving rapidly the targets 
for transposing EU directives, and eliminating barriers to cross-
border trade. 
? In many countries, further scope exists for privatisa-
tion/restructuring. Countries which have encountered problems in 
devising viable strategies should reinforce and press ahead their 
privatisation/restructuring programmes. State aid should be re-
duced and overhauled with the aim to both reduce the total and to 
redirect this aid towards horizontal objectives.  
The implementation of competition policies should be a core focus 
for monitoring. Restructuring of the agricultural sector remains an 
urgent priority in many acceding countries. 
 
• Pressing ahead with financial market reforms. Bank restructuring 
and privatisation have added to financial sector stability in the acces-
sion countries. Except for some notable exceptions, the privatisation 
process can be regarded as largely completed. As regards financial 
sector development, the acceding countries in transition clearly lag 
behind the EU average in terms of stock market capitalisation, the 
level of financial intermediation, and the degree of liquidity. The fol-
lowing reforms have been identified as being important for further 
action: 
? Continued reforms to deepen and widen the financial sector are 
required so as to avoid credit constraints. The legislative frame-
works must support the development of financial markets and the 
institutional investor base. In this regard, the timely and effective 
implementation of EU financial services regulation, notably the 
Financial Services Action Plan is crucial. 
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? The availability of low-cost loan finance and early-stage risk 
capital financing for SMEs is essential. The implementation of the 
Risk Capital Action Plan has an important role to play. 
? Whilst it appears that satisfactory progress has been made in put-
ting into place adequate regulatory and supervisory capacities, 
substantial changes in the structure of financial markets create 
new demands for the organisation of financial supervision, which 
should proactively be addressed. 
 
• Improving the quality of public finance. The Ecofin ministers in 
their meeting with their counterparts from the Candidate Countries 
on 5 November 2002 noted that reaching sound fiscal positions for 
some of the acceding countries will clearly require efforts over and 
above those described in the PEPs. The acceding countries, whilst af-
ter accession respecting the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, should enhance the efficiency of public spending and revenues 
by way of institutional and structural reforms. In order to foster a 
growth-enhancing environment providing sufficient scope and incen-
tives for private-sector development, the structure of budget revenue 
and expenditure needs to be reassessed. Specifically: 
? On the revenue side, specific challenges should be addressed, 
such as the compared to present Member States narrow tax base 
with at the same time similar levels of public expenditure which 
characterises several acceding countries, and weaknesses in tax 
collection and administration. 
? On the expenditure side, the quality of services provided by the 
public sector and improvement of the efficiency of public admini-
stration set the framework for dynamic economic growth. Spe-
cific attention should be devoted to investment in key areas (such 
as R&D and innovation, public infrastructure and human capital) 
so as to underpin future competitiveness and growth, while the 
need for expenditure control rules at sub-national levels of gov-
ernment should be addressed. 
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? It is essential that the use of EU structural funds will be focused 
on those types of investments most conducive to long-term pro-
ductivity gains, particularly human and knowledge capital, as 
well as on basic infrastructure. 
 
• Continuing pension and health care reforms. Ageing populations 
could induce dramatic changes in potential growth rates, and a dete-
rioration of public finances, which is the same challenge as in the 
present EU Member States. In the light of the Lisbon agenda:  
? In line with the three-pronged strategy developed by the Ecofin 
Council to prepare for the budgetary effects of ageing (i.e. debt 
reduction, raising employment rates and reform of pension sys-
tems) and in view of the current parameters of their pension sys-
tems, many acceding countries will have to implement compre-
hensive reform strategies. These will inter alia have to include ini-
tiatives aimed at offsetting the effects of ageing via reforms of the 
basic parameters of public pension systems (e.g. the retirement 
age, the replacement rate or the contribution rate), with a view to 
improving incentives to work and strengthening the actuarial link 
between contributions and benefits.  
? Due to growing GDP as well as technical progress and product 
innovation, health care expenditures are expected to grow fast. 
Containing such expenditures, while providing effective cover-
age, will entail steps to improve the efficiency of the health care 
systems.  
 
• Accelerating the transition to a knowledge-based economy. The 
acceding countries have, in particular relative to their income levels, 
achieved high levels of educational attainment. However, they lag 
substantially behind present Member States in regard of the transi-
tion to a knowledge-based economy as reflected by lower investment 
in R&D. In regard of education, the lack of high skilled labour could 
indicate potential long-term difficulties in the light of the Lisbon 
agenda. To accelerate the catching-up process: 
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? The acceding countries should press ahead with educational re-
forms and improve their education and training systems in terms 
of educational attainment, skilled human resources, and R&D and 
innovation performance.  
? They should improve the general framework conditions for R&D, 
including the entrepreneurial climate, access to risk capital, and 
the interrelationship between business and the research network. 
? In view of the technology gap of several acceding countries vis-à-
vis EU-15, increased focus should be laid on technology transfer 
and gradual product and process improvement as well as direct 
public educational and research efforts to underpin this process. 
The dynamics of foreign direct investment, which has a key role 
as mechanism of technology transfer, should be sustained. 
 
The acceding countries, in their future Cardiff reports (and the remain-
ing Pre-Accession Programmes in 2003), are invited to pay particular 
attention to the structural reform priorities identified above. The EPC 
considers that it is crucial for the acceding countries to maintain the 
current reform momentum, even in the event of lower growth perform-
ance, as some countries could face a risk of backtracking in certain areas 
undergoing reform. There should be a determined attempt in those coun-
tries to mobilise public opinion and build a solid political consensus 
amongst the various stakeholders backing the catching-up process. 
 
Economic policy co-ordination processes and further work 
 
In response to the mandate given by the Ecofin Council in November 
2002 as to how the acceding countries could be integrated as early as 
possible into the Community’s structural reform co-ordination proc-
esses, the EPC suggests including the acceding countries for the first 
time in: 
• the BEPGs in 2004 (including in their country-specific part), taking 
into account their new three-year perspective (which for the current 
Member States is the period 2003-2005, and for the new Member 
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States should therefore be 2004-05), and accordingly the implemen-
tation report on the BEPGs in 2005;  
• the EPC’s annual report on structural reforms in 2005 (the Cardiff 
report), including specific country notes. However, the acceding 
countries should be invited to already provide Cardiff reports in Oc-
tober/November 2003 and participate at the annual examinations of 
the EPC for the 2004 annual report on structural reforms; 
• the Luxembourg and Cologne processes in 2004; a (possible) upcom-
ing report on the open method for pensions only after long-term pro-
jections for pension expenditures are made available in 2006 (the ac-
ceding countries have already been included in the Lisbon strategy in 
2003).  
 
In terms of further follow-up, in its comprehensive monitoring report 
in the structural reform area to be provided in November 2003, and in its 
Lisbon reports for the Spring European Council, the Commission is 
invited to devote particular attention to the most urgent challenges iden-
tified in this Report. Enlargement will be a special subject in the EPC 
Annual Report on Structural Reforms in 2004. With the Lisbon tar-
gets in mind, a special annex could be devoted to the areas of critical 
items identified by this report for the acceding countries, (such as priva-
tisation, the share of public enterprises, administered prices, and tertiary 
and vocational education). The EPC’s working groups are invited to 
extend their work to cover the acceding countries, for example the 
EPC’s Ageing Working Group to include them into their next round of 
common projections for public spending on pensions, health and long-
term care for the elderly in 2004/5, and the EPC’s Working Group on 
Output Gaps with a special report being submitted to the Committee by 
the end of 2004. The EPC’s Working Group on Structural Indicators is 
invited to explore whether there is any need for additions to, or changes 
to the scope of the existing list of structural indicators. The EPC as a 
whole should include the issue of regional disparities, and the role that 
Community and national policies could play over a broad range of fields 
to reduce standards of living within the Community. 
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The finance ministries and the statistical offices in the acceding coun-
tries should devote sufficient resources to the structural indicators to 
ensure best possible coverage and quality of the data used. The infor-
mation content of the Pre-Accession Programmes should be improved 
for example as regards the data on the quality of public finances (reve-
nue and expenditure) and the sustainability of public finances. 
 
1. THE CONTEXT FOR MEETING THE STRATEGIC LISBON 
GOAL 
 
1. Since the outset of transition the economies of the acceding countries 
have made remarkable progress in regard of macroeconomic stability. 
For several years, output growth in most countries has exceeded the EU 
average. A number of macroeconomic imbalances remain for some 
countries, and this calls for renewed vigour, e.g. with regard to current 
account balances, the savings rate, the sustainability of the fiscal stance 
over the medium term, the commitment to fiscal consolidation and the 
stability of price developments. Additional macro- and microeconomic 
reforms, together with continued fiscal consolidation, will be necessary 
to increase further the efficiency of economic management and domestic 
co-ordination and raise the growth potential of the economy while tack-
ling medium-term challenges. Stability-oriented macroeconomic poli-
cies as well as credible and viable exchange-rate strategies will be cru-
cial for investment and economic growth. Stable macroeconomic condi-
tions are a precondition for the acceding countries to cope successfully 
with enhanced competition, increased market flexibility and the possible 
economic vulnerabilities associated with the ongoing catching-up proc-
ess. 
 
Real convergence 
 
2. The main challenge that acceding countries are facing is to catch up 
in terms of income levels. Whilst achieving income-per-capita levels 
close to the EU average will be a long-term process, there are also signs 
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that many acceding countries are slowly but steadily closing the eco-
nomic gap with the EU even if, for a number of countries, some back-
tracking in convergence has been forecasted to take place in 2003. De-
spite overall progress, the gap in income-per-capita levels between the 
acceding countries and the EU average remains considerable. Taking 
account of differences in purchasing power, GDP per capita in the ac-
ceding countries is around 45% of the average EU level. This figure 
masks large differences between countries, as shown in Graph 1. In 
2002 GDP per capita ranged from over 74% of the EU average in Cy-
prus to 35% in Latvia. While Cyprus and Slovenia are, in fact, as pros-
perous as some of the present, less affluent Member States, the Baltic 
countries and Poland have a GDP per capita which is less than 45% of 
the EU average.  
 
Graph 1: GDP per capita in PPS in 1995 and 2002 
(EU average = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. Note: 2002: estimates. Data for Cyprus 2001 (data for 1995 not 
comparable for Cyprus). 
 
3. Looking at the future prospects for real convergence and using a styl-
ised set of assumptions, it is for illustrative purposes possible to derive a 
rather mechanistic long-term outlook for convergence trends in the ac-
ceding countries towards the EU-15 average. For that purpose, real in-
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comes as a % of EU incomes have been calculated over a longer period, 
assuming for the years after 2004: 
• the same growth rates as in the 2004 Commission’s Spring 2003 
forecasts for the Candidate Countries (see first column in Table 1); 
• an EU growth rate of 2.4% based on the 2004 growth rates in the 
Commission’s Spring 2003 economic forecasts;2  
• constant prices and population size. 
 
4. According to this calculation, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Malta and Slovakia would join Cyprus and Slovenia to reach 
75% of the EU-15 income level over the next 25 years (see third column 
in Table 1). For other countries the catching-up process would take 
much longer. Indeed, it is likely to take one or two generations in the 
case of some of them.3 This is perhaps unsurprising, given the lessons 
from the process of convergence for accession countries in the past. Yet 
the most noteworthy point is the sensitivity of the results to the assump-
tions made. Small changes in growth rates can significantly affect the 
speed of convergence. The fourth column in Table 1 shows the effect of 
increasing the growth rate assumptions in the Candidate Countries by 
0.5 percentage point. In the case of Poland, for example, increasing the 
growth assumption by that amount would reduce the period needed to 
reach "75% convergence" with the EU by thirteen years (from 50 to 37 
years). 
                                                     
2 Those figures are technical assumptions taken for purely illustrative purposes, and are not to be 
misunderstood as forecasts. 
3 See also the conclusions of the Commission’s report (DG ECFIN, November 2001) on "Real 
Convergence in the Candidate Countries": "what is clear from that exercise is that for many 
countries catching-up even to levels of just 75% of the EU average will probably be a process 
spanning over more than one generation". That paper provides also a good analysis of underly-
ing growth-enhancing factors and an overview of the economic convergence of Portugal, Ireland, 
Spain and Greece before and after joining the EU.  
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Table 1: Period needed to reach 75% of the EU-15 average for GDP per 
capita (in PPS) 
 Growth rate 
assumption as 
from 2004 (% 
p.a.) * 
 
Average 
growth rate 
achieved 
1995-2002 
(% p.a.) 
Period 
needed to 
reaching 
75% of the 
EU average 
Scenario: Period 
needed to reach 
75% of EU aver-
age with 0.5 
percentage point 
higher growth  
Cyprus 3.8 3.6 1 1  (-) 
Czech Rep 3.9 1.7 19 15 (-4) 
Estonia 5.1 4.9 23 19  (-4) 
Hungary 4.1 3.9 24 19  (-5) 
Latvia 6.0 5.6 24 21  (-3) 
Lithuania 5.0 3.9 28 23  (-5) 
Malta 3.7 3.3 25 18  (-7) 
Poland 3.7 3.9 50 37  (-13) 
Slovakia 4.5 3.7 22 18  (-4) 
Slovenia 3.7 3.9 7 5  (-2) 
Bulgaria 5.0 0.5 40 34  (-6) 
Romania 5.0 0.4 44 37  (-7) 
Turkey 4.5 2.9 61 49  (-12) 
Source: Own calculations; AMECO, European Commission, April 2003. * Commission 
2004 economic forecasts. 
 
5. The general economic developments in acceding countries in recent 
years permit a more general, albeit simplistic, observation regarding the 
role of policy: those economies which have made the strongest progress 
in implementing wide-ranging reforms seem to have achieved higher 
growth rates. 
 
Labour productivity, wage costs and the structure of the economy  
 
6. In order to close the income gap with the EU, it will be important for 
the acceding countries to increase further labour productivity and total 
factor productivity, along with employment. As illustrated by Graph 2, 
six Candidate Countries are below half the EU average productivity 
level. Only three acceding countries have a labour productivity level 
above the lowest productivity level among the current Member States. 
However, labour productivity increased steadily for most acceding 
countries over the period from 1995 to 2002. 
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Graph 2: Labour productivity per person employed in 1995 and 2002 
(EU average = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. Note: 2002: estimates. 
 
7. Recent empirical work providing a breakdown of GDP growth into its 
various components for five acceding countries shows that in Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovenia a key driver behind cumulative output growth over 
the period 1991-99 was the relatively high total factor productivity 
growth (i.e. independent technical progress) (Table 2). In addition, fixed 
capital contributed strongly to the high cumulative output growth in 
Poland. The contribution of employment declined in all five countries, 
except Slovakia (however, in the late 1990s, production was catching up 
and the contribution of employment to growth was higher). This is also 
illustrated by a recent Commission analysis which highlights the essen-
tial characteristics of the economies of the central European acceding 
countries, featuring relatively low capital endowment and a low level of 
technology. It also asserts that their future speed of real convergence 
towards the EU average depends essentially on the rate of investment 
(including foreign direct investment), the growth in total factor produc-
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tivity, and high labour force growth and participation4. In contrast, dur-
ing the same period within the EU-15 the contribution of employment to 
GDP growth was stronger than in the acceding countries; and having a 
lower growth rate than the acceding countries the contribution of total 
factor productivity growth and capital deepening was weaker.  
 
Table 2: Contributions to growth rates in central European countries 
1991-99 (as %) 
  Contribution of 
Cumulative
GDP growth TFP growth Employment Capital
Czech Rep 9.1 4.6 -4.3 9.0
Hungary 16.6 20.2 -11.1 9.2
Poland 47.9 20.9 -1.6 24.3
Slovakia 21.8 2.0 6.2 12.4
Slovenia 25.6 21.0 -6.4 10.9
Source: IMF (2001), "Real Convergence to EU income levels: Central Europe from 
1990 to the Long-Term", Doyle P., Kuijs L., and Jiang G., Discussion Paper, p. 31. 
 
8. Labour costs differ markedly between the acceding countries and 
relative to the current Member States5. The level of total hourly labour 
costs in 2000 in industry and services ranged from 2.42 euros in Latvia 
to 10.74 euros in Cyprus (Graph 3). This compares with an EU average 
of 21.5 euros (1999 figure). In most of the acceding countries, labour 
costs were below one quarter of the EU average. 
 
                                                     
4 European Commission: The economic impact of enlargement, June 2001, pp. 27-31. 
5 See Labour Costs Survey 2000, Eurostat Statistics in Focus 23/2002. 
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Graph 3: Hourly labour costs in industry and services in 2000 (in euros 
per hour) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Cost Survey, Candidate Countries 2000. 
 
9. The developments of unit labour costs between 1995 and 2002 di-
verged widely between countries and was very dynamic in some of 
them (Table 3). At the initial stage of transition, especially in labour-
intensive industries, low and falling (nominal) wages, together with 
undervalued currencies, constituted the key comparative advantage of 
acceding countries. Since then, nominal wages went up substantially, 
outpacing in several countries labour productivity growth. It should also 
be taken into account that in the period 1995-2001 real exchange rate 
appreciation ranged from approximately 10% to a maximum of 100% 
(Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus being at the lower end and Lithuania and 
Latvia at the upper end; the other countries moved within a band of 35-
60%). Accession countries are likely to face further real exchange rate 
appreciation, as inflation differentials with EU-15 will not, in general, 
diminish completely due to catching-up price movements6, internal 
market integration in association with low initial price levels and further 
                                                     
6 Through the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect faster-growing countries tend to experience 
higher rates of inflation without necessarily suffering a deterioration in their cost competitive-
ness. Wage increases will, to a large extent, be determined by productivity growth in the tradable 
sector (c.f. manufacturing, agriculture), which is exposed to international competition. 
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adjustments in administered prices. Wage increases, if not matched by 
gains in productivity in the longer term, pose a challenge to external 
competitiveness in some acceding countries and could further aggravate 
the existing current account deficits. Unit labour costs being a key de-
terminant of competitiveness, it is a major challenge for the candidates 
to ensure that real wage growth does not exceed productivity gains. 
Sustained wage moderation is therefore an important precondition for 
easing inflationary pressures, attracting foreign direct investment in-
flows, boosting growth and raising employment.  
 
Table 3: Unit labour costs in 1995 and 2002; EUR-based, annual aver-
ages 
 1995 2002 Relative change 
1995-2002 (in %) 
Czech Republic 110.3 202.7 + 83.8 
Hungary 110.9 187.4 + 69.0 
Poland 152.1 301.6 + 98.3 
Slovakia 93.1 120.5 + 29.4 
Slovenia 94.7 107.8 + 13.8 
Estonia 413.1 635.7 + 53.9* 
Latvia 508.2 794.7 + 56.4* 
Lithuania 472.7 997 + 110.9* 
Bulgaria 29 39.9 + 37.6 
Romania 60.8 90.1 + 48.2 
Source: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), Research Report 
No. 293, February 2003. Note: Unit labour costs are exchange-rate adjusted, with 
1989=100 for CZ, HU, PL, SK, Sl BG, RO and 1992 = 100 for EE, LV and LI. 2002 
data preliminary. * Note that the Baltic countries cannot be compared with the Central 
European countries as the base year for EE, LI and LT is 1992 instead of 1989.  
 
10. As regards the structure of the economy, the private sector has ex-
panded significantly over the last decade in most acceding countries. 
While in EU Member States the general government sector in 2001 ac-
counted for between 8% and 20% of GDP, in Latvia and Slovenia the 
public sector still accounted for a third of GDP or more. Only in Esto-
nia, the Slovak Republic and Hungary did the private sector generate 
more than 80% of GDP. The relatively small private sector in some 
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countries may indicate a lack of competition and ample room for effi-
ciency gains. The sectoral composition of employment in acceding 
countries and in some countries the existence of large state-owned 
manufacturing companies with hidden unemployment help explain the 
low labour productivity (Graph 4 shows the sectoral shares of employ-
ment in 2001). Productivity growth in the acceding countries could be 
increased in the future by a further shift of emphasis within the sectoral 
composition of the economy towards sectors with a higher value added. 
 
Graph 4: Sectoral share of employment in 2001 (%) 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
11. The sectoral composition of output and employment is still biased 
towards agriculture, which accounts for a high percentage of employ-
ment in most of the acceding countries. The share of the agricultural 
sector in terms of employment is, on average, three times higher in the 
acceding countries than in the EU. The employment share of agriculture 
in the acceding countries are much higher than GDP shares, i.e. they 
suffer from very low productivity. In order to foster overall productiv-
ity, in most acceding countries agriculture (farms and agro-enterprises) 
needs urgent restructuring.  
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2. LABOUR MARKET REFORMS 
 
12. A flexible labour market will be vital in achieving the strategic Lis-
bon goal. In Lisbon, viewing the EU as a whole, the EU Heads of State 
and Government set a 2010 target for the total employment rate of 70% 
and one of more than 60% for the employment rate of women. In Stock-
holm an overall target for the employment rate for those aged between 
55 and 64 was set at 50% and intermediate targets of 67% and 57% 
were set for the overall employment rate and the employment rate of 
women respectively in 2005. 
 
13. As for employment, there are major differences between countries; 
all the acceding countries except Cyprus report lower total employment 
rates than the EU average (see Graph 5). In 2001 total employment rates 
in acceding countries ranged from 50.7% to 67.9% of the working-age 
population as compared with 64% on average in the EU. The employ-
ment rates of older workers were in the 22.5%-50.5% range. This rela-
tively low employment rate is explained by, among other things, widely 
used and relatively generous early retirement systems. Female employ-
ment rates are less dispersed and range between 47.9% and 57.4%. The 
comparatively high female participation is due partly to the rather easy 
access to childcare facilities, which did, however, deteriorate in the 
post-communist period.  
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Graph 5: Employment rates in the acceding countries in 2001 (as per-
centage) 
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Source: Eurostat - Structural Indicators, April 2003. Note : * 2000 data. 
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14. Unemployment remains a serious problem in most countries, rang-
ing between 4.5% and 19.7% in 2001 (Table 4). Unlike in the EU, the 
female unemployment rate is lower than the male unemployment rate in 
about half of the acceding countries. Special attention should be paid to 
high rates of long-term and youth unemployment and to high unem-
ployment among low-skilled workers. Regional unemployment is rather 
high in most acceding countries, with Slovakia showing the widest gap 
between regions. 
 
Table 4: Unemployment rates in 2001 (as %) 
 Total Long-term Men Women Youth 
Cyprus 4.5 0.9 3.0 6.5 3.5 
Czech Rep - 4.1 - - 6.7 
Estonia 12.2 5.8 12 12.5 8.8 
Hungary 5.7 2.5 6.3 4.9 3.7 
Lithuania 16.5 9.3 19.0 13.8 10.2 
Latvia 12.9 7.7 14.2 11.5 8.6 
Malta - - -  
Poland 18.6 9.2 17.2 20.3 15.2 
Slovenia 5.9 3.6 5.6 6.3 5.7 
Slovakia 19.7 11.3 20.4 18.8 17.6 
Bulgaria 19.6 12.5 20.5 18.6 13.6 
Romania 6.5 3.2 7.0 5.9 7.0 
EU:   
   Average 7.3 3.2 6.4 8.5 7.1 
   Max 10.6 5.4 8.6 15.6 10.3 
   Min 2.0 0.5 1.7 2.4 2.7 
Source: Employment in Europe 2001 and 2002 for long-term unemployment rates of 
acceding countries, structural indicators for EU and total unemployment rates in acced-
ing countries. 
 
15. Prospects for employment creation should, however, improve in the 
years to come as widespread labour shedding, which has been part of 
the business restructuring process, is likely to come to an end. Thus, 
employment could increase modestly in 2003-04. The pure statistical 
result for the ten acceding countries joining the EU in 2004 will increase 
the unemployment ratio in an enlarged EU. In the longer run, there are 
grounds for assuming that the positive effects of enlargement on eco-
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nomic growth in Europe would bring about favourable employment 
developments as well. However, across the acceding countries, em-
ployment rates have decreased (see Annex 1) and unemployment rates 
increased since 1997 which is problematic in view of the Lisbon agenda. 
 
16. Policies to raise employment levels in the acceding countries are not 
very different from the range of approaches observed in the present 
Member States, including macroeconomic stimulus. In some countries, 
tax and benefit systems seem to be important areas for further labour 
market reforms so as "to make work pay and encourage the search for 
jobs". In most acceding countries the newly introduced unemployment 
insurance systems appear to be less generous on average than in the EU. 
However, they appear to be especially generous for unemployed persons 
with a family, which creates possible unemployment traps. Several ac-
ceding countries devote, relatively speaking, more resources to non-
employment benefits than the current Member States, undermining the 
incentives for low-productivity workers to seek and take up employ-
ment. The relatively high tax burden on labour, especially low-wage 
earners, is a particular problem in some acceding countries. Early re-
tirement systems are in some cases used as a response to the decline in 
employment and, as in current Member States, excessive replacement 
rates and generous eligibility rules might be an issue, notably for unem-
ployment and disability schemes that often lead to early retirement. 
 
17. The wage bargaining systems in the acceding countries have 
evolved during the transition period. Minimum wages were introduced 
in almost all of them and currently amount to between 25% and 42% of 
the average wage. Lack of regional differentiation of the nominal mini-
mum wage is a problem in Poland, but it is not clear whether it makes 
up for high regional differences in the labour market situation in other 
countries. Tripartite bargaining was common in the centrally planned 
economies; bilateral bargaining has developed as the degree of corpora-
tism has declined rapidly. Nowadays, in most acceding countries, wage 
negotiations at firm level predominate, facilitating wage differentiation.  
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18. Labour market flexibility in a number of acceding countries is ham-
pered by relatively strict labour market regulation, especially employ-
ment protection legislation. However, in many current Member States 
restrictions are similar to, or even more binding than, those in some 
acceding countries. In many acceding countries, factors such as compli-
cated administrative procedures and unduly long minimum notice peri-
ods are at play. Working-time flexibility varies between acceding coun-
tries, with an increasing share of part-time and fixed-term contracts.  
 
19. Active labour market policies, such as training, employment sub-
sidies and job search assistance, have gained in importance in labour 
market policies of the present Member States, but also in acceding coun-
tries. While present EU countries spend around 1% of GDP on active 
labour market policies, the comparable figures in acceding countries are 
still much lower (on average 0.2% of GDP, though the share of expendi-
ture for active labour market policies in total labour market expenditure 
is higher than in the present EU Member States). Spending patterns and 
the efficiency of spending differ widely. Finally, human capital forma-
tion is an important challenge for the acceding countries, as the educa-
tion systems in the centrally planned economies did not prepare people 
for lifelong adaptability of their skills and focused too much on narrow 
job descriptions (see Chapter 6). 
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20. Overall, while in the EU the average employment rate has been ris-
ing, this is not the case in many acceding countries. In most of them, 
unemployment has remained unacceptably high and the challenges are 
to reduce the high (and especially long-term) unemployment rates 
among certain groups, especially the young and the low-skilled, to nar-
row regional disparities and to increase employment rates for older 
workers. Institutional arrangements on the labour market in many acced-
ing countries need to be modernised. The authorities should, however, 
guard against adopting more rigid labour market policies. Measures 
such as increasing the incentive effects of tax and benefit systems so as 
to restore the financial benefits associated with a return to employment, 
reducing early retirement by offering incentives for people opting for 
later retirement, enforcing sustained wage moderation to strengthen or 
maintain the link between productivity growth and wages, improving 
employment flexibility through a thorough review of employment pro-
tection legislation, improving the skills level with the focus on lifelong 
learning, and focusing on precisely targeted, effective and efficient ac-
tive labour market policies hold the key to "more and better jobs" in the 
Lisbon process. 
 
3. PRODUCT MARKETS  
 
21. An EU aspiring to become the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world needs strong competition and an ef-
fective competition policy. In the acceding countries, given their rela-
tively low level of labour productivity, an appropriate regulatory and 
competition framework, including a right business environment condu-
cive for entrepreneurship, and the liberalisation of network industries 
are central issues for increasing international competitiveness.  
 
22. The economies of the acceding countries are very open economies, 
well-integrated into the EU. All the acceding countries except Lithuania, 
Latvia, Cyprus and Poland have a greater degree of trade openness than 
the average of the smaller EU Member States. Transposing internal 
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market directives into national legislation will be a major issue that 
will need to be monitored after accession to the EU. Integration is also 
being driven by foreign direct investment (FDI). In Estonia, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary annual FDI from the EU between 1996 
and 2001 averaged more than 3% of GDP. This is considerably more 
than Slovenia and Latvia managed to attract; their average annual inflow 
of FDI from EU Member States was below 1.6% of GDP. As a compari-
son, FDI flows to EU Member States from other Member States during 
this period averaged 3%. 
 
23. Accession countries made considerable progress in bringing high 
and volatile CPI inflation rates down from double to single-digit num-
bers and, thus, closer to EU-15 levels. In 2002, CPI inflation rates 
amounted to between 0.4% in Lithuania to 7.5% in Slovenia, compared 
to 2.1% in EU-15. Inflation differentials with EU-15 are related to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect or to specific transition factors, such as de-
regulation, indirect tax harmonisation or relative price changes. Con-
sumer price levels in most acceding countries are low compared with 
the EU. In 2001 the consumer price level, expressed in a common cur-
rency, was less than half the EU average in five acceding countries. This 
may be attributed in part to relatively low wage and income levels as 
well as to a residual need to liberalise administered prices (Graph 6 il-
lustrates that in four acceding countries regulated prices account for 
more than one fifth of the CPI). Several acceding countries are under-
taking reforms to reduce price controls (which, however, might also 
affect inflation) and to open up markets to competition. 
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Graph 6: Administered prices in 2001 as a share of CPI 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
SI EE CZ RO HU SK LT BG LV PL TR
%
of
CPI
 
Source: Commission regular reports.  
Note: Data for PL, Sl and SK from 2000. No data for CY and MT. 
 
24. A specific challenge on product markets for the acceding countries 
arises from the shift in the sectoral composition of output. Business 
privatisation and restructuring have made huge advances in most 
countries. Annual average privatisation receipts for the period 1994-99 
in the acceding countries ranged from less than 1% of GDP to almost 
4.5% of GDP. In a few countries, the privatisation process has been 
practically completed. In others, the public enterprise sector is still large 
(accounting for more than 25% of GDP in five acceding countries) and 
privatisation remains high on the structural reform agenda. Privatisation 
is an important element in raising economic efficiency further and in 
attracting sorely needed foreign capital and knowledge. A few countries 
have encountered problems devising viable privatisation and restructur-
ing strategies for some sectors (e.g. steel in Poland). In this regard, it 
will be important to reinforce and press ahead forcefully with the priva-
tisation programmes. Restructuring of the agricultural sector remains a 
major task. Agricultural modernisation is hindered notably by the lack 
of employment opportunities in other sectors. In many countries subsis-
EPC    383 
tence farming, developed during transition as a form of social safety net, 
dampens the productivity. Generally, income on subsistence farms does 
not derive from the sale of agricultural products but from welfare pay-
ments, which provides no incentive for change. In some countries, the 
functioning of land markets needs to be improved. 
 
25. In many acceding countries competition in product and service 
markets, which is a key driver of growth, productivity and job creation, 
is still relatively weak, especially in the non-tradable sector. This poten-
tially holds back real income convergence. In most countries, the ef-
fecttive implementation of the legal framework for market entry and exit 
of companies should be further enhanced. Measures to liberalise, open 
up and increase competition in product and service markets should be 
key policy priorities. Many acceding countries have made encouraging 
headway in strengthening competition rules and establishing independ-
ent competition authorities, but in some countries more progress will be 
needed if EU competition policy is to be fully and effectively enforced. 
The liberalisation of network industries, which is important in view of 
its contribution to raising growth potential and lowering inflation, ap-
pears to vary considerably between acceding countries. Too little infor-
mation is available, but it appears that in many countries effectments to 
market entry remain in certain industries and that regulation needs to be 
improved. Viable tariffs need to be in place to induce private sector 
investments. As in current Member States, it will be crucially important 
to improve market contestability by reducing (potential) barriers to for-
eign and domestic competition and by ensuring effecttive and transpar-
ent monitoring structures. In terms of the degree of energy market open-
ness, progress has to date been fastest in Slovenia. For electricity, many 
acceding countries have already gone further than the current minimum 
requirements. For gas, very few measures have been taken in most coun-
tries to support competition and there is a problem of concentration of 
gas supply sources. Unbundling requirements are currently minimal. 
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26. A major issue in the acceding countries is the quantitative impact of 
ad hoc state aid7, which has a distorting effect, deters new entrants and 
prevents the reallocation of resources to more competitive enterprises, 
thereby slowing down the restructuring of the economy. Total state aid 
in acceding countries, excluding aid to agriculture and fisheries, ranged 
from 0.4% of GDP in Slovakia to 1.7% of GDP in Hungary in 2000 (EU 
average: 0.8% of GDP) (Graph 7). Whilst Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania 
and Latvia recorded lower total state aid than the EU average, in Hun-
gary state aid was more than double the EU average. However, there 
might be some underestimation of state aid attributable to indirect state 
aid such as soft budget constraints for state-owned companies and tax 
exemptions. State aid in the acceding countries should therefore be ana-
lysed with caution. In several of them a large share of the aid was sec-
toral or ad hoc aid used for specific industries (notably for the steel and 
coal industries), which can have a particularly distorting effect on the 
economy. In a number of acceding countries it will be necessary to 
overhaul state aid with a view to both reducing total state aid and redi-
recting state aid towards horizontal measures.  
 
Graph 7: State aid in 2000 (% of GDP) 
Source: State Aid Scoreboard special edition. Note: Figures exclude aid to fisheries and 
agriculture. Data not available for MT. 
                                                     
7 which is subject to transition regulation until 2011. 
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27. A necessary component of strategies to accelerate real convergence 
is reforms improving the efficiency of the institutional framework, in-
cluding measures to improve the business environment. The 2002 
Regular Report8 by the Commission states that the acceding countries 
have made good progress in institutional and legal convergence but also 
that significant deficiencies still have to be addressed in most countries. 
This particularly concerns the regulatory burden on business, the effec-
tive implementation and, in some countries, the design of judicial re-
forms, and the quality and administrative capacity of the central and 
local public sectors. There is a widespread perception that many seg-
ments of the public sector remain highly inefficient, creating obstacles 
to the operation and growth of businesses. According to the assessment 
made in the Commission’s Regular Report, corruption remains a matter 
of serious concern in several of the acceding countries. In a number of 
countries incomplete market exit mechanisms should be rectified, in 
particular by improving bankruptcy legislation and procedures. Market 
entry and exit mechanisms are an area where additional analysis would 
be warranted.  
 
28. Overall, EU accession will increase the pressure for further struc-
tural reforms in product markets for the acceding countries. While many 
challenges in product markets are common to both acceding countries 
and EU Member States, the acceding countries are facing specific chal-
lenges, especially with regard to sectoral changes in the economy, priva-
tisation, administered prices and state aid. Reforms of product and ser-
vice markets, including a strengthening of competition, measures to 
streamline the business environment, continuous reform in public ad-
ministration and improvement of the entrepreneurial climate, are neces-
sary. For countries which have encountered problems in devising viable 
privatisation and restructuring strategies, it will be important to rein-
force and press ahead forcefully with the privatisation programmes. For 
                                                     
8 Strategy Paper and Report by the European Commission on progress towards accession by each of 
the Candidate Countries (COM(2002)700) of 9 October 2002. On the business environment in 
the acceding countries, see also, in particular, Chapter 2 of the 2002 EBRD transition report. 
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network industries, as in current Member States, it will be key to 
improve market contestability by reducing potential barriers to foreign 
and domestic competititon and ensuring effective and transparent 
supervision structures. Together with the ongoing shift in the structural 
composition of the economy from agriculture and heavy industry to 
services and capital- and technology-intensive industries, these reforms 
will provide a basis for productivity growth in the acceding countries. 
Sufficient inflow of capital will be critical to unlock the possible poten-
tial in higher tech industries for those countries in which the specialisa-
tion structures are dependent on the labour-intensive, low-skill sectors. 
After accession, particular attention will have to be devoted to comply-
ing with internal market obligations, notably with respect to the targets 
for transposing EU directives and eliminating barriers to cross-border 
trade. A specific focus of monitoring should be the implementation of 
EU competition policies (actual compliance and appropriate administra-
tive capacity). The efforts by many acceding countries to undertake 
additional important reforms in those areas, as evidenced out in the Pre-
Accession Economic Programmes, are to be welcomed.  
 
4. FINANCIAL MARKET REFORMS 
 
29. Financial markets have an important role to play in achieving the 
Lisbon objectives. Financial sector development may stimulate real 
convergence via the mobilisation of savings, which is vital in view of 
high investment needs, and via the monitoring function as a key element 
of corporate performance. The full integration of the acceding coun-
tries’ capital markets into the EU is a key issue. 
 
30. As regards financial sector development, the acceding countries in 
transition clearly lag behind the EU average in terms of stock market 
capitalisation, the level of financial intermediation, and the degree of 
liquidity. The institutional investor base is weak. This points to the 
enormous potential for financial sector growth in these countries. Only 
Cyprus and Malta have a domestic financial sector that, in size, broadly 
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resembles that of the EU Member States. The financial sector of the 
eastern European acceding countries has undergone major changes since 
the beginning of the transition. At present, it is characterised by strong 
dominance of the generally well-capitalised banking sector on capital 
markets, a still relatively low level of financial intermediation and a 
relatively low degree of liquidity in many market segments. Capital 
ratios exceed the Basle recommendation of 8% in all countries. Domes-
tic credit at the end of 2000 represented on average 60% of GDP (euro 
area: close to 140%). The average interest rate spread in 2002 in the 
accession countries was 5.8%, as compared to 3.5% in the euro area. 
Access to bank financing (i.e. by foreign parent banks) and capital mar-
kets abroad may somewhat alleviate domestic financial constraints, par-
ticularly after having become part of the EU Single Market. 
 
31. Ownership of banks in the acceding countries has been largely con-
verted from public to private and from domestic to foreign. Except for a 
few cases, the privatisation process can be regarded as largely com-
pleted, thanks to major efforts and funds from public authorities to 
consolidate and re-capitalise the banking system. Notable exceptions to 
private ownership of banks are Poland, where the government controls 
the largest bank, and Slovenia, where the government controls the sec-
ond-largest bank and holds a significant share in the largest bank. 
Moreover, acceding countries have, in individual cases, retained inter-
ests in privatised banks by offering guarantees to cover future losses. 
The further consolidation and efficiency improvements in the banking 
sector remain a challenge. 
 
32. Starting from a low level, lending to individuals in many acceding 
countries represents one of the fastest-growing areas of the banking 
system, as illustrated in Table 5 below. This largely reflects a catching-
up phenomenon; in Hungary, for example, the level of gross debt of 
individuals (around 7% of disposable income in 2002) falls far short of 
the average figure of 50% in the EU. The availability of risk capital and 
low cost debt finance for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), espe-
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cially at the earliest stages of their life cycle, is important for funding 
innovation and development. Although some progress has been made 
here, it remains inadequate and risk capital is - by and large - too expen-
sive. 
 
Table 5: Commercial bank lending to households* (% of total at year-
end) 
 1998 2000 2001
Czech Rep 6 9 12
Estonia 20 22
Hungary 8 12
Latvia 10 15 15
Lithuania 11 10 11
Poland 24 27
Slovakia 8 14 21
Slovenia 22 30 27
Bulgaria 10 7 8
Romania 4 4
Euro area* 42 43 42
Source: National data, IFS, ECB staff calculations.  
Note: * As % of total loans of euro-area residents excluding MFI. 
 
33. Rapid integration of the acceding countries into the Single Market 
for financial services has an important role to play in achieving the 
Lisbon objectives. While many acceding countries have already ad-
dressed a few issues that are also dealt with under the Financial Services 
Action Plan, such as supervising capital-based pension funds, substan-
tial challenges remain. For example, many countries still need to im-
plement changes to the legislative frameworks for securities, pension 
and investment funds and life insurance. It would be useful if the newly 
created Financial Services Committee monitored effective implementa-
tion.  
 
34. Progress on financial sector regulation and supervision remains 
uneven between countries and between different sectors but important 
progress has been achieved. The substantial changes in the structure of 
financial markets impose new demands on the organisation of financial 
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supervision (including cross-border co-operation) which should be ad-
dressed pro-actively by acceding candidates, as they seek fast integra-
tion into the Single Market for financial services. Maintaining the level 
playing field for institutions in an enlarged EU will be crucial for both 
current and future EU Member States with a view to preserving overall 
financial stability. Once they have joined the EU, acceding countries 
will face further challenges in regard to the regulatory framework. 
 
35. Overall, EU accession represents an important structural challenge 
for both the banking and the non-banking sector. Financial markets in 
the acceding countries continue to be underdeveloped relative to the EU. 
Integration is viewed as speeding up the pace of concentration, boosting 
competition, adding to efficiency incentives, promoting the range of 
financial services available (e.g. mortgages, consumer credit, SME fi-
nance) and strengthening the competition for deposits. It can also be 
expected to provide an impetus for further liberalisation, fostering better 
regulation and imparting momentum especially for retail and insurance 
banking, which makes closer co-operation between national and foreign 
supervisors important. The legislative frameworks must support the 
development of financial markets and the institutional investor base. 
Timely and effective implementation of the Financial Services Action 
Plan will play a key role. The availability of risk capital and loan fi-
nance for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), especially at the earli-
est stages of their life cycle, remains inadequate and mostly too expen-
sive. The implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan has an impor-
tant role to play. The process of adjusting acceding countries' market 
infrastructure seems particularly challenging against the background of 
a continuously evolving market infrastructure within the euro area - this 
is relevant notably for payment systems.  
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5. IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCE  
 
36. Public expenditure and taxes account for significant proportions of 
national income. With a view to raising the growth potential of the EU 
economies in conformity with the Lisbon agenda, the quality and sus-
tainability of public finances in recent years have become key policy 
objectives within the EU.  
 
37. All Member States must achieve and sustain sound budgetary posi-
tions. In this respect, the Ecofin ministers, at their meeting with their 
counterparts from the Candidate Countries on 5 November 2002, al-
ready noted that a number of Pre-Accession Economic Programmes fall 
short on policy commitments that credibly underpin a medium-term path 
of fiscal consolidation and do not envisage sufficient efforts to correct 
the major imbalances and to meet the potential costs of structural re-
forms. Achieving sound fiscal positions for some of the acceding coun-
tries will clearly require efforts over and above those described in the 
Pre-Accession Economic Programmes (see Table 6 for fiscal develop-
ments). In line with the goals agreed in Lisbon and Stockholm, also 
referred to in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, public finances 
should maximise the contribution of public finances to growth and em-
ployment. 
 
38. General government balances continue to be mostly negative in the 
acceding countries, but there are major differences among countries. For 
the acceding countries as a whole, aggregate general government defi-
cits (in ESA 95 terms) reached 5.3% of GDP in 2002, mainly due to the 
sharp increase of the deficit in Hungary. In a context of declining priva-
tisation receipts and some take over of private sector liabilities (in par-
ticular from the financial sector), debt developments should continue to 
be closely monitored. A detailed discussion relative to the Maastricht 
deficit and debt criterion is within the competence of the Economic and 
Financial Committee, and is therefore not elaborated here. 
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Table 6: Fiscal developments (percentage of GDP) 
 Government deficit Gross debt ratio 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2004 
Cyprus -3.0 -3.5 -4.0 -3.5 55.9 52.4 
Czech 
Rep. 
-5.5 -6.5 -6.3 -5.9 25.6 31.3 
Estonia 0.5 1.3 -0.5 -0.6 4.4 3.9 
Hungary -4.2 -9.1 -4.9 -3.7 52.9 51.4 
Lithua-
nia 
-2.3 -1.8 -1.9 -2.0 23.6 23.4 
Latvia -1.9 -2.5 -2.9 -2.6 16.8 18.6 
Malta -7.0 -6.1 -5.2 -4.1 64.9 62.8 
Poland -3.1 -4.2 -4.2 -4.0 43.3 46.0 
Slovenia -2.5 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 27.9 25.2 
Slovakia -5.4 -7.7 -5.3 -3.8 39.3 38.8 
Bulgaria 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 59.2 50.2 
Romania -3.3 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 24.6 26.4 
Turkey -28.9 -13.7 -9.8 -6.9 99.6 79.6 
EU-15 -0.9 -1.9 -2.3 -2.2 62.7 63.2 
Sources: Commission Spring 2003 Economic Forecast; Fiscal Notifications 2002. 
 
Quality of public finances 
 
39. The overall level of expenditure and, to a lesser degree, revenue in 
the acceding countries broadly resemble those of the present Member 
States, although significant differences for individual countries exist 
(Table 7). In most of the acceding countries, the ratio of public expendi-
ture to GDP was above 40% of GDP in 2001. However, total govern-
ment expenditure fell by several percentage points of GDP in the coun-
tries in transition from a centrally planned to a market economy in the 
late 1990s. The scale of government activities was reduced, state-owned 
enterprises were privatised to a varying degree, and complex systems of 
subsidies designed to equalise incomes between different enterprises 
and sectors were reformed or dismantled. As the large share of the pub-
lic sector in the economy hampers the convergence process of these 
catching-up economies, most acceding countries envisage a continuing 
decline in GDP ratios for both public expenditure and public revenue in 
the medium term in the PEPs 2002, via overall spending restraint and 
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tax cuts.  
 
Table 7: Size of general government spending (% of GDP) 
 Revenue Expenditure 
 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Cyprus 40.5 42.2 43.5 42.5 
Czech 
Rep. 
42.1 41.3 47.1 46.8 
Estonia 38.6 38.4 38.4 38.4 
Hungary 46.1 42.5 50.2 45 
Lithuania 34.2 36.1 36.1 37.6 
Latvia 41.4 38.6 43 40.6 
Malta 37.4 35.8 44.4 38.8 
Poland 41.8 42.2 45.3 44.5 
Slovenia 43.1 42.5 45.6 43.3 
Slovakia 41.2 39.8 46.6 41.8 
Bulgaria 40.6 35 40.3 35 
Romania 36.7 34.6 40.1 37 
Turkey 42.1 40.1 57.2 40.6 
EU-15 46.4 - 47.2 - 
Source: 2002 PEPs. 
 
40. Table 8 presents the structure of general government revenue in the 
acceding countries. Total tax receipts in the acceding countries averaged 
about 35% of GDP in 2000, compared with 45% in the euro area. Fi-
nancing the existing scale of public expenditure imposes a heavy burden 
on the tax base, which is much narrower in the acceding countries than 
in the present Member States. Nominal tax rates for earned and capital 
incomes are rather high (according to indications from the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation), while many exemptions and tax eva-
sion reduce effective rates. Social security contributions as a share of 
labour costs are also high. According to the IMF and the Commission, 
the distortions caused by high rates of taxation on labour 
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may be a serious impediment to a job-intensive growth strategy in sev-
eral acceding countries9. 
 
Table 8: Structure of general government revenue in 2000 (% of GDP) 
 Czech 
Rep 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovak 
Rep.
Slovenia Euro 
area 
Current 
revenue 39.2 38.7 41.8 36.8 30.4 41.6 36.6 41.5 45 
Tax reve-
nue 36.7 35.8 36.2 31.3 28.5 39.9 34.1 39.2 44.9 
Personal 
income tax 5 7.8 7.2 6 7.8 4.6 4.6 7.6 9.9 
Corporate 
income tax 3.9 1 2.2 1.7 0.7 2 3 - 3 
Social 
security 
contribu-
tions 14.7 12.4 9.8 10.7 7.1 8.7 13 13.6 15.6 
Property 
tax 0.5 0.4 0.9 1 0.6 - - 2.3 1.5 
Indirect 
tax 12.6 14.2 16 11.9 11.7 11.4 13.5 15.7 13.6 
Total 
public 
revenue 40.6 - 44.5 - - 41.6 46.1 - - 
Source: IMF/EU, OECD, Finmin of Poland. 
 
41. There is a general intention, as spelt out in the 2002 PEPs, to gradu-
ally shift the tax burden from labour towards consumption. However, as 
nominal VAT rates are already close to or at EU levels, boosting effec-
tive consumption tax revenue should take place through a broadening of 
the tax base and through higher excise duties and eco-taxes. Further-
more, tax administration and the effectiveness of tax collection need to 
be improved significantly. According to the PEPs, a significant lowering 
of company taxation is planned in many countries.  
 
42. As for the expenditure side of budgets, government consumption 
and social transfers as a percentage of GDP is comparable to that in the 
present Member States (Table 9). The World Bank estimates that up to 
                                                     
9  See European Commission: European Economy No 3, "Public finances in EMU 2002", 2002, pp. 
114 ff.  
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80% of all government expenditure in these countries - as in most pre-
sent Member States - is mandatory and quasi-mandatory expendi-
ture in the sense that it is determined by rules outside the budgetary 
process. These are mainly expenditures in the areas of defence, old-age 
and disability pensions. The corresponding expenditure rigidity is often 
compounded by indexation clauses for pensions and public-sector 
wages. Moreover, the widespread lack of clear frameworks defining the 
fiscal relations between the state and sub-state levels is a challenge for 
delivering the medium-term adjustment efforts needed in many cases. 
As a result, spending at the lower levels of government is difficult to 
control. Some acceding countries apply budgetary rules and procedures 
to improve public expenditure efficiency and control, such as multi-
annual budgets, expenditure rules with explicit limits on the annual 
growth rate and agreements between different levels of government. In 
some countries, these rules should be improved, both in design and/or 
enforcement as there continue to be large spending slippages. 
 
43. In the 2002 PEPs public investment expenditure is set to be main-
tained at a level of 3% of GDP on average. The acceding countries are 
characterised by a relatively low stock of public infrastructure, which 
is often ill suited to the needs and standards of market economies. They 
face considerable challenges in replacing old technology and building 
new infrastructure networks, including through public-private partner-
ship (PPP) arrangements (the implementation of which depend on viable 
tariffs). The sections below provide information on investment in human 
capital (health care, education). 
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Table 9: Structure of general government expenditure in 2000 (% of 
GDP) 
 Czech 
Rep 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland
*
Slovak 
Rep.
Slovenia Euro 
area 
Current 
expenditure 38.4 36.3 39.9 36.6 30.4 - 38.2 39.2 43.8 
Government 
consumption 8.7 24.6 14.4 16.1 16.6 15 17.6 17.6 19.8 
Interest 
payments 1.1 0.3 6.1 1.1 1.7 3 2.7 1.5 3.7 
Subsidies 
and current 
transfers 28.6 11.4 19.4 18.9 12.1 - 17.9 20.1 19.8 
Subsidies 8.1 0.8 2.8 5 0.2 - 4 1.5 1.4 
Current 
transfers 20.5 10.6 16.6 13.9 11.9 - 13.9 17.9 18.4 
Capital 
expenditure 5.9 3.2 7.1 4 1.9 2.8 3.9 4.1 1 
Total public 
expenditure 46.1 40.1 47.5 40.6 32.3 45.5 52.2 43.3 44.8 
Sources: IMF/EU, OECD, Finmin of Poland; *Year 2001. 
 
44. It is critical to use the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds effi-
ciently in the interest of long-term sustainable economic growth. The 
acceding countries are currently preparing their national development 
strategies for EU part-financing of public investment and it is essential 
that these are focused on those types of measure most conducive to 
long-run productivity gains, particularly human and knowledge capital, 
as well as on basic infrastructure. Mechanisms must be put into place to 
ensure efficient implementation.  
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45. Overall, if fiscal policy is to play its role in supporting rapid and 
sustainable real convergence, further improvement in the quality of pub-
lic finances will be crucial in a number of acceding countries. Given the 
still limited availability of data on the quality of public finances, urgent 
steps should be taken to improve data compilation and reporting to al-
low for a more detailed assessment. The following key issues can be 
identified. On the revenue side, the tax base in most acceding countries 
is narrow. The tax burden on labour is relatively high, and this is a chal-
lenge in light of the Lisbon agenda aimed at making tax and benefit 
systems more employment-friendly. Weaknesses in tax collection and 
administration should be addressed urgently so as to achieve an efficient 
and fair fiscal system, including a broader tax base. On the expenditure 
side, the quality of services provided by the public sector and improve-
ment of the efficiency of public administration set the framework for 
dynamic economic growth. However, tackling the rapidly increasing 
nominal expenditure pressure on public services and fulfilling the higher 
EU standards for these services will be further challenges also on the 
financing side. It can be expected that social security expenditure (and 
public sector wages) will also rise in tandem with the gradual conver-
gence of prices and wages towards EU levels. There is a need to control 
spending at all levels of government, which too is a challenge given the 
widespread lack of frameworks determining the fiscal relations between 
the state and sub-state levels. The need for public investment expendi-
ture will remain high in the foreseeable future in the light of the devel-
opment and convergence of the acceding countries. Some countries 
should devote particular attention to public spending on human capital 
in order to catch up with the present Member States. In sum, sound pub-
lic finances should be achieved via spending restraint and growth 
friendly tax systems, with clear priorities on the composition of public 
expenditure. 
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The sustainability of public finances: pension and health care reforms 
 
46. In view of the demographic challenges posed by ageing populations 
and the goal of the Lisbon strategy to ensure that public finances con-
tribute to growth and employment, the sustainability of public finances 
within the EU has become a core policy objective in recent years. The 
Ecofin Council developed a three-pronged strategy to address the budg-
etary implications of ageing: raising employment and participation rates, 
reducing public debt and reforming pension and health care systems. 
This was endorsed by the Stockholm European Council and subse-
quently incorporated into the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. 
 
47. The already observed population decrease in the acceding countries 
will reinforce the diminution of the population of the present Member 
States foreseen in twenty years from now (after 2020). Most acceding 
countries have very low fertility rates, lower life expectancies at birth 
than the present Member States and in many cases strong negative mi-
gration balances. In most of them, the working-age population (aged 
between 20 and 64), the number of elderly persons aged over 65 and the 
old-age dependency ratio are expected to follow broadly similar trends 
as in the present Member States10. The dependency ratio is expected to 
surpass EU levels by around 2040 (see Table 10).  
 
                                                     
10See EPC report on budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations of 24 October 2001: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc_en.htm 
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Table 10: Old-age dependency ratio (persons aged 65+ as a percentage 
of persons aged 15-64) 
    Change 2000/50 
 2000 2025 2050 Absolute % 
Czech Rep 20 36 61 41 207 
Cyprus 18 29 39 21 119 
Estonia 21 30 47 26 122 
Hungary 21 33 51 30 139 
Latvia 22 31 50 28 128 
Lithuania 20 29 51 31 156 
Malta 18 37 47 28 154 
Poland 18 31 50 32 180 
Slovakia 17 27 50 33 200 
Slovenia 20 38 66 46 233 
Bulgaria 24 31 54 30 127 
Romania 19 26 45 25 130 
EU-15 24 36 49 24 100 
Source: UN population projections 2002. AMECO for the EU-15.  
Note: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as persons aged over 65 as a percentage 
of the working-age population (aged 15-64). Similar trends are expected for the eco-
nomic dependency ratio, which expresses the population aged 15 and over not employed 
as a percentage of the number of persons employed. 
 
48. The projected decline in the size of the active labour force involves a 
strong risk of lower economic growth, even under reasonable assump-
tions concerning the increase in total factor productivity. In the Lisbon 
agenda, the goal of higher factor productivity goes hand in hand with 
that of higher participation and employment. Higher participation 
rates, among men as well as among women and especially at older ages, 
and lower unemployment rates can help mitigate the challenges of age-
ing populations.  
 
49. As regards the size of current public spending on public pensions, 
public pension expenditure in several countries is close to or above 10% 
of GDP (Cyprus, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia). Ageing populations 
could lead to a substantial increase in public expenditures in many ac-
ceding countries as long-term projections, where available, point to a 
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sharply rising expenditure trajectory (see Table 11)11. This development 
may make it more difficult to finance the impact of an ageing population 
on public spending on pensions. On the basis of the scenarios set out in 
the 2002 PEPs, six out of ten acceding countries have a debt level below 
40% of GDP. Several acceding countries, with relatively low debt lev-
els, and gradual build-up of assets in funded schemes, appear in a good 
position to cope with the budgetary impact of ageing populations. How-
ever, this could be very different for those acceding countries that have 
not yet proceeded with the introduction of a comprehensive reform of 
their first-pillar pension schemes. Given the fact that long-run budgetary 
projections are only available for a number of countries, and their lim-
ited comparability, a detailed case-by-case analysis by the EPC’s Age-
ing Working Group seems warranted on the impact of population ageing 
on public expenditure on pensions. 
 
Table 11: Public pension expenditures in 2000-50 (% of GDP) 
 2000 2030 2050 Change 2000-50  
Cyprus 8 11.9 14.8 +6.8 
Czech Republic 7.85 - 14.65 +6.8 
Estonia 6.9 2.4 - -  
Hungary 6.05 - 7.25 +1.2 
Latvia 9.8 4 - -  
Lithuania 5.3 6 7 +1.7 
Malta 5.4 2.4 - -  
Poland 10.8 9.6 9.7 -0.9 
Slovakia 7.9 4 - -  
Slovenia 13.2 19.7 18.1 +4.9 
Bulgaria 9.1 2.4 - -  
Romania 6.4 7.8 8.2 +1.8 
EU-15 10.4 13.0 13.3 +2.9 
Sources: If not explicitly indicated, data are based on the 2002 Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes.  
Notes: -: not available; 1)2002; 2)2001; 3) 2000; 4) According to Gesellschaft für Versi-
cherungswissen-schaft und -gestaltung e.V. (which in turn draws on national statistics). 
5 OECD. Since definitions of public pension expenditures are not identical for each 
country, caution is warranted when making comparisons.  
                                                     
11It should be borne in mind, though, that public debt ratios in the acceding countries are at present 
generally lower than in the present Member States. 
 EPC 400 
50. In several acceding countries funded schemes within the publicly 
financed pension systems have gradually become more prominent in 
recent years. Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland have intro-
duced a three-pillar pension system (compulsory and non-
funded/compulsory and funded/voluntary and funded) and Lithuania 
and Slovakia are planning to do so in the near future. Funding does not 
by itself reduce future pressures on public expenditure; its benefits are 
in entrenching long-term budgetary consolidation efforts, by building 
reserves for the future pension liabilities of governments and introduc-
ing a flexible and long-term instrument of budgetary discipline to help 
to respond to the expected additional budgetary cost of ageing. Benefits 
of funding in the first pillar in the existing PAYG schemes include 
strengthening the financial basis of pension systems, increasing the se-
curity of future pension provision, and enhancing intergenerational eq-
uity in public finances. However, it should be recognised that, if funding 
is to make a meaningful contribution towards financing age-related ex-
penditures, considerable resources will need to be devoted. 
 
51. Recent pension reforms in the acceding countries have also focused 
on increasing the effective retirement age, which in most countries is 
relatively low. In addition, the legal retirement age in several countries 
appears too low and is, in many cases, several years lower than in most 
EU countries (it is close to 65 for men in most Member States12, whilst it 
is two to five years lower in several acceding countries). It should be 
recalled here that the Barcelona European Council called for an increase 
in the effective average retirement age in the EU by some five years. 
Other challenges facing pension systems in the acceding countries, quite 
similar to those facing EU Member States, may include 
 
                                                     
12See EPC report on reform challenges facing public pension systems: the impact of certain para-
metric reforms on pension expenditure of 5 July 2002: 
   http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc_en.htm. 
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the dynamics of early retirement arrangements (in some countries these 
have been introduced in response to the increase in unemployment), 
expenditure pressures due to indexation rules13, and striking the right 
balance between contribution rates and the level of benefits paid out. 
 
52. Comparable information on health care spending is available for 
only four acceding countries. Public expenditure on health care in 2000 
amounted to 6.6% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 5.1% in Hungary, 
4.2% in Poland and 5.3% in the Slovak Republic14. Public health care 
expenditure has increased sharply since the start of transition in some of 
the countries. It can be expected that, owing to general increases in wel-
fare, technical progress and product innovation in the coming years, 
public health care expenditures will converge on EU levels (EU-15: 
5.9% of GDP in 1998), which for certain countries implies a significant 
increase in such expenditure.  
 
53. Overall, a decline in the size of the active labour force may dampen 
growth and thereby slow down the catching-up process, since it may not 
be possible to maintain the increase of total factor productivity continu-
ously at a level which would offset the impact of a declining labour 
force. Higher employment and participation rates are necessary to miti-
gate the challenges of ageing populations. Many acceding countries 
have already introduced a wide range of pension reforms, including the 
introduction of a three-pillar system. However, in order to counter 
longer-term spending trends in line with the three-pronged strategy for 
tackling the budgetary implications of ageing populations, further re-
forms seem to be needed in some countries before the projected decline 
in the size of the active labour force fully materialises. Such reforms 
need to focus on raising the employment rate of older workers and the 
                                                     
13For example, with pensions indexed to wages, gains in total factor productivity will not have a 
large beneficial impact on pension expenditure. 
14For the other Candidate Countries, the Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und  
-gestaltung e.V. (2001) indicates health care expenditure as follows: Cyprus 5.7% of GDP in 
2000, Estonia 5.5% in 2001, Latvia 3.5% in 2000, Lithuania 4.4% in 2000, Malta approximately 
8% in 2000, Slovenia 7% in 2000, Bulgaria approximately 10% in 2001, Romania 4.1% in 2000, 
and Turkey 4.8% in 2000.  
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effective retirement age. In a number of countries, scope for further 
improvements is to be found in reforming pension systems in the direc-
tion of better financial sustainability (e.g. by moving towards actuarial 
neutrality). The EPC considers that a further case-by-case analysis is 
warranted on the impact of population ageing on public expenditure on 
pensions. Health-care expenditure is also likely to be severely affected 
by increasing life expectancy and associated improvements in the health 
of elderly persons, whilst other factors come into play such as techno-
logical developments. Containing future expenditure growth while 
providing effective coverage will necessitate steps to raise the efficiency 
of health care systems (several countries have to contend with over-
capacities and face an urgent need for modernisation). 
 
6. FOSTERING THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY  
 
54. Within manufacturing, most acceding countries are experiencing a 
rather dynamic process of integration into the European division of la-
bour. But all acceding countries except Malta, Estonia and Hungary 
have considerably lower levels of high-technology exports as a share of 
total manufactured goods than the EU average. The gap in export struc-
tures between most acceding countries and current Member States has 
narrowed considerably over the past decade, however, and the adjust-
ment process out of commodities and labour-intensive products and into 
capital- and technology-intensive products is continuing at a fairly fast 
pace. In a few acceding countries dependence on labour-intensive 
branches in their export structures has increased since the late nineties15. 
While its share in the total economy has been increasing steadily, the 
service sector is generally less developed than manufacturing.  
 
                                                     
15See e.g. Michael Landesmann, "Structural features of economic integration in an enlarged Europe: 
patterns of catching-up and industrial specialisation", European Economy, January 2003. 
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Education and training systems  
 
55. The education systems in not only the present Member States but 
also the acceding countries face similar challenges: to raise the quality 
of education and to ensure that the population is provided with skills 
adapted to the needs of working life and market requirements. The Lis-
bon strategy set several goals in education and training, including much 
higher per capita investment in human resources, access for all schools 
in the EU to the Internet and a halving in the number of 18 to 24 year-
olds who have not completed at least secondary education.  
 
56. Graph 8 shows that public funding of education in acceding coun-
tries is, on average, somewhat lower than the EU average of 5.3% of 
GDP. Two groups among the acceding countries can be identified: the 
Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), with expenditure levels 
above 6% of GDP, which are higher than the EU average and rank them 
with the EU countries that have the highest levels of expenditure; and 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have the lowest ratios of public 
expenditure not only relative to the EU-15 average but also on an EU-25 
comparison. In Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, public spend-
ing on education has registered a marked drop during the 1990s. In con-
trast, public spending has risen steadily in Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania 
and Cyprus. No information is available on private funding, which for 
some countries might make a difference. 
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Graph 8: Public expenditure on education as % of GDP in 200016  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Structural Indicators, New Cronos, Eurostat. 
57. In terms of the efficiency of education spending, in some acceding 
countries there appear to be certain cost inefficiencies related to over-
staffing, a duplication of facilities, inefficient class sizes, inefficiencies 
in available equipment and overemphasis on non-essential services, 
which push up the costs of education.  
 
58. As regards the quality of the educational systems, curricula may be 
outdated in several respects, e.g. in terms of management skills or flexi-
bility/adaptability more generally. With regard to output, available in-
formation suggests that many acceding countries share the common 
problem that the education system does not meet the needs of the private 
sector, in terms of the knowledge produced and adaptability of the la-
bour force.17 As a consequence, a sizeable proportion of workers in the 
                                                     
16It should be noted, though, that these figures are difficult to compare as they have not been ad-
justed for differences in demographic developments. Data comparability may be further impeded 
by differences in the efficiency of resource input. 
17In terms of broader reforms to the education system, the literature has highlighted factors such as 
the decentralisation of schools or broader pedagogical aims of the educational system. See, for 
example, Andreas Ammermüller, Hans Heijke and Ludger Wössmann, "Schooling Quality in 
Eastern Europe: Educational Production During Transition", Kiel Working Paper No 1154, 
March 2003. http://www.uni-kiel.de/ifw/pub/kap/kap.htm. 
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acceding countries may not be sufficiently well prepared to meet the 
needs of the labour market. 
 
59. Educational attainment of the population in acceding countries is 
high when measured as a proportion of the adult population that has 
completed at least secondary education. On average, a larger propor-
tion of 25 to 64 year-olds in the acceding countries have completed at 
least upper secondary level than in the EU (the average in the acceding 
countries is 77%, compared to some 64% in the EU, with a number of 
acceding countries scoring higher than the EU countries). Similarly, the 
gross enrolment rate in secondary education exceeds that in most EU 
countries (the exception being Malta). 
 
60. However, the situation is different as regards tertiary education, 
which in the acceding countries has been completed on average by only 
19% of the 25 to 64 year-olds (compared with 22% in the EU). Only 
Lithuania, Estonia and Cyprus are above the EU average. Moreover, the 
situation is certainly less advanced than suggested by the quantitative 
indicators, as attainment levels do not usually differentiate between the 
narrow, often outdated, qualifications used in the former centrally 
planned economies, and the new, broad-based qualifications needed for 
the knowledge-based economy. In over half of the central European 
acceding countries the proportion of persons having completed tertiary 
education is lower in the younger age groups than in the older age 
groups. Graph 9 shows that the average gross enrolment ratio in the EU 
is 49% of the age group eligible for tertiary education18 (ranging from 
46% in Germany to 84% in Finland). Only four acceding countries (Po-
land, Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia) exceed the EU average gross enrol-
ment ratio. 
 
                                                     
18 A subgroup of university-age population. 
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Graph 9: Gross enrolment ratio at tertiary level in 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNESCO. 
 
61. Recent reforms in education systems show increasing awareness of 
these issues, and in particular the need to boost participation at tertiary 
education level to satisfy the demand for high skill workers. As a result, 
almost all acceding countries are undertaking major efforts to catch up 
with the EU level of participation in tertiary education. Poland and 
Hungary had the highest percentage increase in enrolments in higher 
education between 1995 and 1999 in all OECD countries. Estonia also 
shows a significant increase (80%) in this same respect. Other countries 
also recorded large, albeit less marked increases.  
 
62. The proportion of tertiary graduates in science and technology 
per 1000 persons in the age group 20-29 in the accession countries ap-
pears lower than in the EU Member States, even if it has increased con-
siderably, especially in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. The number of 
persons in 2000 ranged from 3.3 persons in Cyprus to 12.1 persons in 
Lithuania, compared with a range of between 23.2 persons (in Ireland) 
and 5.7 (in Italy) in the EU in 2000. On the basis of available informa-
tion, however, it is not clear whether the ratio of tertiary graduates in 
science and technology to all tertiary graduates in the acceding countries 
is lower than the same ratio in the present Member States. 
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63. The number of drop-outs and early leavers, another indicator of 
the output of the education system, has substantially increased in acces-
sion countries, but it is still lower than in the EU countries (12.9% on 
average as against 19.3%). However, drop-outs remain a major problem 
(notably in vocational education and training). 
 
64. Especially serious is the situation of low-skilled workers, who are 
in a much more disadvantaged situation than their high-skilled counter-
parts and even more so when compared with the EU. While unemploy-
ment rates of high-skilled workers in Candidate Countries are compara-
ble to those in the EU (differences reflect mainly higher unemployment 
rates), the situation of the low-skilled is rather different. Unemployment 
rates are higher than in any EU country and the gap between high- and 
low-skilled workers is wider, reflecting a more pronounced dual labour 
market. This conclusion is reinforced when taking into account the ex-
tremely low employment rates for the low-skilled. 
 
65. Education and training systems need to be better adapted to the 
needs of lifelong learning, and the capabilities of those systems to re-
spond adequately to changes in skill requirements need to be enhanced. 
In this respect, in terms of participation in continuing vocational edu-
cation and training in general for the 25 to 64 year-olds, data from the 
Labour Force Survey show large disparities between acceding countries 
and EU countries (3.6% on average in the accession countries compared 
with 8.4% on average in the EU).  
 
66. Overall, the acceding countries have made major efforts to reform 
their education systems and to adapt them gradually to the challenges 
posed by a knowledge-based economy. On balance, people in the acced-
ing countries have a high literacy rate and the educational infrastructure 
is well developed. Spending on human capital is higher than the EU 
average in several acceding countries. In some countries, however, 
spending on human capital has registered a marked drop during the 
1990s. Some important challenges remain for the education systems in 
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the acceding countries, in terms of preparedness of the workers to meet 
the demands of the labour market, participation in tertiary education and 
cost-inefficiencies when compared with EU Member States, and in 
terms of the progress to be made if the Lisbon objectives are to be met. 
In certain areas and countries a gap might emerge in regard of the qual-
ity and output of education systems since educational attainment does 
not fully meet the needs of the private sector. This is of particular con-
cern in terms of the knowledge and skills being produced and the 
adaptability of the workforce, notably for high skilled workers. Many 
members of the labour force might require time and investment to de-
velop new skills needed for prospering in a knowledge-based economy. 
This could indicate potential long-term difficulties in the light of the 
Lisbon agenda. 
 
R&D and innovation 
 
67. The Barcelona European Council set the goal of raising overall 
spending on R&D so as to approach 3% of GDP by 2010. Two thirds of 
this investment should come from the private sector. This input indica-
tor implies inter alia improved incentives for firms to invest in R&D.  
 
68. Acceding countries spend relatively little on both total and business 
R&D as a share of GDP. In 2000 total R&D spending for those coun-
tries averaged well below 1% of GDP, compared with an average of 
almost 2% of GDP in the EU (Graph 10). This poor record was matched 
by weak business R&D investment in 2000, which was equivalent to 
less than 0.4% of GDP, i.e. not even a third of the EU average. More-
over, business expenditure on R&D in the acceding countries, expressed 
as a percentage of GDP, did not increase between 1995 and 2000. There 
is therefore no sign that this large gap in business R&D expenditures 
between those countries and the EU is about to disappear. The low level 
of R&D expenditure is also reflected in low patenting activities in the 
acceding countries. 
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Graph 10: R&D expenditure in 2000  
Source: Eurostat.  
Note: *Estimated value for EU-15. No data available for Malta and Turkey. 
 
69. The EPC's 2002 report on research and development19 can provide a 
useful framework for comparing the situation in the acceding countries 
with that in the EU. It identified as key drivers of innovation activities a 
well-educated workforce, a strong climate for entrepreneurship, easy 
access to risk capital and other finance, infrastructure for research net-
works and co-operation between the private and public sector, an appro-
priate intellectual property regime and macroeconomic stability. It 
showed that the improvement of the general framework conditions, 
and above all a highly competitive environment, is vital. This means not 
only having the appropriate competition rules in place but also creating 
an environment in which smaller firms are able to grow extremely 
quickly and challenge less innovative incumbents to improve their per-
formance. According to the Commission's 2002 Regular Report, the 
implementation of competition policies in several acceding countries 
was found to be insufficient, which also affects innovation. Many firms 
face disadvantageous conditions for financing innovation, either in 
terms of obtaining access to finance or in terms of its cost. One of the 
most important policy challenges for boosting innovation, not only in 
the present but also in the future Member States, is the overall govern-
                                                     
19 http:www.europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/documents/rdfinal_en.pdf. 
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ance of public research institutions and grant mechanisms and their re-
sponsiveness to the needs of their private counterparts. It may make 
sense for some of the acceding countries to focus more on technology 
transfer and gradual product and process improvement as opposed to 
large-scale, long-term and risky industrial and public research invest-
ment. 
 
70. Three acceding countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic, invested more in information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in 2000 than the EU average (7.4% of GDP). How-
ever, no acceding country except the Czech Republic could match the 
growth of ICT investments in the EU during the last six years (1995-
2000). This trend points to a further widening of the gap in ICT maturity 
between the EU Member States and many acceding countries. 
 
71. Overall, acceding countries lag substantially behind EU Member 
States in the transition to the knowledge-based economy. Low levels of 
investment in R&D and IT may hamper their catching-up with the EU 
mainstream and any improvement in their productivity levels. Present 
levels of spending on R&D in the acceding countries fall well short of 
the Lisbon objective, notably in the private sector. Those countries may 
well benefit most from continuing their reforms of educational and re-
search institutions, raising the educational attainment in the areas most 
relevant for innovation performance and aim for gradual but steady pro-
gress towards the Barcelona target of 3% of GDP expenditure on R&D 
and innovation. It may make sense for some of the acceding countries to 
focus more on technology transfer and gradual product and process im-
provement. Measures should be taken to improve the general framework 
conditions, including the entrepreneurial climate, the efficiency of the 
education system, access to risk capital, the education of the workforce 
and the interrelationship between business and the research network so 
as to make them more responsive to private firms looking for partners. 
The effective implementation of competition policies should be a key 
priority with a view to fostering innovation. 
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7. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY  
 
72. Sustainable development is defined by the conclusions of the Goth-
enborg European Council as "to meet the needs of the present genera-
tion without compromising those of future generations" … which "re-
quires dealing with economic, social and environmental policies in a 
mutually reinforcing way". The Commission proposes to "focus on a 
small number of problems which pose severe or irreversible threats to 
the future well-being of European society", namely (1) global warming, 
(2) threats to public health, (3) poverty, (4) ageing of the population, (5) 
loss of bio-diversity and (6) transport congestion. The question of popu-
lation ageing was addressed above. 
 
Environmental sustainability 
 
73. The 2002 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines state that the "protec-
tion of environmental resources such as clean air, water and soil, main-
taining biodiversity and reducing environmental threats to public health 
require an active environmental policy in order to ensure a responsible 
use of scarce natural resources and development which is economically, 
environmentally and socially sustainable in the long run. Commitments 
undertaken at international level, notably in the area of climate change, 
also call for policy action." 
 
74. The energy intensity of the economy is more than three times 
higher in the acceding countries than the EU average (708.8 gross 
inland consumption of energy divided by GDP as opposed to 193.9 on 
average in the EU). Almost all accession countries exceed the figure of 
the EU Member State with the highest energy intensity. Urban air qual-
ity seems to be a major problem in the acceding countries. Freight 
transport volumes are about the same as the EU average. Freight trans-
portation by road in all eastern and central European acceding countries 
plays a smaller role than in the EU as a whole. The same seems to be 
true for passenger transport.  
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75. Greenhouse gas emissions are much lower in the acceding coun-
tries than in the EU and are characterised by a decreasing trend in the 
accession countries as a whole. Several countries show, however, in-
creasing emissions. It is likely that the declines observed in emissions 
are part of the sectoral shift away from heavy industry, and the increases 
in some countries are an indication that the transition process is substan-
tially completed, so that increases in emissions due to rising levels of 
economic activity are now the dominant factor. The share of renewable 
resources, which must be seen in relation to the existing indicative target 
of 22% of gross electricity consumption by 2010, is on average lower in 
the acceding countries than in the EU. In 2000 it ranged from 0.2% in 
Estonia to 31.2% in Slovenia (average EU: 14.7%). As in the EU, no 
clear trend has been discernible in recent years. 
 
Social cohesion 
 
76. Data on social cohesion in the accession countries are particularly 
scarce. Nevertheless, one can draw some conclusions from the employ-
ment situation. According to the 2002 Broad Economic Policy Guide-
lines, "… jobs are the best protection against poverty and social exclu-
sion." The unemployment and employment rates discussed above dem-
onstrate that there is scope for improving social inclusion. The high 
long-term unemployment rate in the accession countries, which ranges 
from 1.2% in Cyprus (in 2000) to 11.3% in the Slovak Republic (2001), 
further underpins this argument. However, the share of the population in 
a jobless household falls perfectly into the range recorded for EU coun-
tries. 
 
77. Regional income dispersion does not seem to pose a greater problem 
than in the EU. The same is true for the share of early school-leavers. 
Generally speaking, those leaving the education system without suffi-
cient skills are at a high risk of poverty and social exclusion.  
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8. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LISBON STRATEGY AND INTE-
GRATION OF THE ACCEDING COUNTRIES INTO EU 
STRUCTURAL REFORM PROCESSES 
 
The Lisbon strategy 
• The Lisbon strategic goal of "becoming the most competitive and 
dynamic economy" remains unchanged in an enlarged Union. Yet 
the Lisbon targets are likely to be more difficult to achieve, simply 
because in most cases the average EU starting base is statistically 
lowered by the fact that most acceding countries are less well placed 
vis-à-vis the Lisbon targets than the existing Member States (for a 
 
summary of main Lisbon targets, see Annex 2)20. It should also be 
recognised, though, that at least in some areas a number of acceding 
countries are already equally or even better placed than (some) pre-
sent Member States. Given the data collected recently and the spe-
cific characteristics of the accession countries, quantitative assess-
ments should, however, be treated with care. 
• As regards the Lisbon and Stockholm targets for employment rates, 
the total employment rate in an EU-25 would have been some 1.5 
percentage points lower than in the EU-15 in 2001 (62.6% compared 
with 64%). The female employment rate in an EU-25 would have 
been 54.1% (compared with the actual female employment rate in the 
EU-15 of 54.9%). The employment rate of older workers would have 
been 37.2% in an EU-25 (compared with the actual employment rate 
of older workers in the EU-15 of 38.6%). Challenges facing labour 
markets in the acceding countries do not differ fundamentally in na-
ture from those in the EU Member States, but the problems are often 
more severe.  
• Integration implies the full transposition of internal market directives 
                                                     
20The complete Lisbon targets can be found in the Commission staff working paper in support of 
the Report from the Commission to the Spring European Council in Brussels ("The Spring Re-
port"), SEC(2003) 25 of 14 January 2003. 
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in the area of product markets, and the removal of other barriers to 
trade and services, which is a challenge. The acceding countries face 
more severe problems than the present Member States as regards 
their efforts at reform intended to strengthen competition in several 
product markets, including the need to enhance the general business 
environment, to lower barriers imposed by market entry and exit 
mechanisms, and to reduce significantly sectoral or ad hoc state aid. 
In many acceding countries, the administrative capacity of the public 
sector also needs to be urgently enhanced. Many segments of the 
public sector are perceived as remaining highly inefficient which 
creates obstacles to the operation and growth of businesses. Neces-
sary improvements particularly concern the regulatory burden on 
business, the effective implementation and in some countries the de-
sign of judicial reforms, and the quality and administrative capacity 
of the central and local public sectors. For network industries, it will 
be key to improve market contestability by reducing potential 
barriers to foreign and domestic competititon and ensuring effective 
and transparent supervision structures. A specific challenge is posed 
by the large share of employment represented by the agricultural sec-
tor in several countries, the modernisation of which is hampered by a 
lack of employment opportunities in other sectors.  
• Financial markets in the acceding countries continue to be underde-
veloped relative to the EU. The legislative frameworks must support 
the development of financial markets and the institutional investor 
base. Challenges may arise from the adjustment process of acceding 
countries’ market infrastructure, and the access to and cost of loan 
and risk capital finance for SMEs. In line with the Financial Market 
Action Plan, continued reforms to deepen and widen the financial 
sector are required so as to avoid credit constraints. In addition, pro-
gress with financial sector supervision and regulation remains un-
even between countries. 
 
78. As regards the quality of public finances, there is a need in many 
acceding countries to reassess the structure of budget revenue and ex-
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penditure in order to foster a growth-enhancing environment providing 
sufficient space and incentives for private sector development. Sound 
public finances should be achieved via spending restraint and growth 
friendly tax systems. On the revenue side, specific weaknesses may 
stem from the narrow tax base in several acceding countries, from the 
lack of a clear definition of fiscal relations between the national and 
sub-national level in terms of public expenditure control, and from tax 
collection and administration. On the expenditure side, challenges exist 
in the shape of the ever-rising needs of public-sector services and the 
need to improve the efficiency of public administration. Specific atten-
tion should be devoted to investment in key areas (such as R&D and 
innovation, public infrastructure and human capital) so as to underpin 
future competitiveness and growth.  
 
79. In view of the current parameters of their pension systems (e.g. 
effective retirement ages, employment rates of older workers, contribu-
tion and replacement rates), many acceding countries in addition to re-
forms already introduced will have to implement comprehensive reform 
strategies. The goal of an increase in the effective retirement age is dif-
ficult to assess, as no reference point exists (there is probably no data on 
the retirement age in the EU-25 as a whole in 2002 - the reference year 
for which the goal was set at the European Council in Barcelona). How-
ever, the statutory retirement age in several acceding countries is two to 
five years lower than in present Member States which points to a prob-
lem. 
 
80. Acceding countries lag substantially behind EU Member States in 
the transition to a knowledge-based economy. The industrial base of 
most of the acceding countries is still biased towards low to medium-
technology sectors. The Lisbon target of R&D investment rising by 
2010 to 3% of GDP, of which two thirds should come from the business 
sector, is likely to be somewhat more difficult to achieve in an enlarged 
Union (rough estimates suggest that the total R&D figure in EU-25 
would be around 1.8% of GDP and the business R&D figure around 
 EPC 416 
1.1% of GDP - as opposed to 1.9% in EU-15, of which 1.1% from busi-
ness). In regard of education, the lack of high skilled labour could indi-
cate potential long-term difficulties in the light of the Lisbon agenda. 
The acceding countries have to take steps to improve their education 
and training systems in terms of educational attainment, skilled human 
resources as well as R&D and innovation performance. More attention 
should be drawn onto technology transfer and gradual product and proc-
ess improvement - this is often spurred by foreign direct investment.  
 
EU structural policy co-ordination processes and further work 
 
81. Within the EU, a number of economic policy co-ordination proc-
esses have been developed to foster economic reform and provide for 
appropriate peer pressure: 
• the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which are at the centre of 
economic policy co-ordination and which reflect and guide all other 
co-ordination activities at EU level. They are specific about mis-
alignments, structural imbalances and issues of competitiveness. The 
Council in December 2002 decided that in the future the BEPGs 
should focus on the medium-term economic policy strategy and 
should be reviewed only every three years (see Annex 3 for the set-
up of the new economic policy co-ordination cycle). In the interme-
diate years, the focus is on implementation of the key recommenda-
tions. 
• other policy co-ordination processes which deal with specific eco-
nomic policy areas, such as employment (the Luxembourg process), 
structural reforms and competitiveness (the Cardiff process/report), 
the macroeconomic dialogue with the social partners (the Cologne 
process) and pension reforms (the open method of co-ordination on 
pensions). 
• the Lisbon strategy with the Commission’s annual synthesis report 
leading to the Spring European Council on economic reform. 
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82. The existing policy co-ordination processes, notably the Cardiff 
report, the Luxembourg process, the Lisbon strategy and the BEPGs, 
cover all economic aspects which are relevant for the present and the 
future Member States. It appears that the specific challenges facing the 
acceding countries can be dealt with within the existing multilateral 
surveillance framework. However, in their future Cardiff reports (and 
the remaining Pre-Accession Economic Programmes), the acceding 
countries should pay particular attention to the challenges spelt out 
above; there is sufficient leeway for them to do so under the current 
reporting priorities.  
 
In response to the mandate given by the Ecofin Council as to how the 
acceding countries could be integrated as early as possible into the 
Community’s structural reform co-ordination processes, the EPC 
suggests including the acceding states for the first time in: 
• the BEPGs in 2004 (including in their country-specific part), taking 
into account the new three-year perspective of the BEPGs (which for 
the current Member States is the period 2003-2005), and accordingly 
the implementation report on the BEPGs in 2005;  
• the EPC’s annual report on structural reforms in 2005 (the Cardiff 
report), including specific country notes. As the acceding states will 
be observers in the EPC from 2004, they should be invited to already 
provide national Cardiff reports by October/November 2003 to allow 
them to already participate at the annual examinations of the EPC for 
the 2004 annual report on structural reforms21; 
• the Luxembourg and Cologne processes in 2004; and a (possible) 
upcoming report on the open method for pensions only after long-
term projections for pension expenditures are made available in 
2006. The acceding countries were already included in the Lisbon 
process in 2003.  
 
                                                     
21In this context, it might be interesting to note that the Commission also already receives Cardiff 
reports from Norway. 
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83. Within the existing framework, the EPC considers that: 
• in the Cardiff report and the BEPGs, the focus for the acceding coun-
tries could rest more on the still incomplete structural shift. A num-
ber of product market issues, such as privatisation, administered 
prices and factors affecting the sectoral composition of the economy, 
and a number of challenges related to the knowledge-based econ-
omy, such as the performance of the education systems and R&D as 
well as innovation performance, need to be discussed more inten-
sively than is currently the case for the existing Member States. A 
special focus for surveillance should be the institutional framework 
for market development and the business environment, and the effec-
tive implementation of competition policies; 
• in the Luxembourg process, the focus for the acceding countries 
should, on account of the need for business restructuring, probably 
be more on the priority "promoting adaptability in the labour mar-
ket"22. 
 
84. In view of the challenges outlined above, the structural indicators 
adopted under the Lisbon process appear generally adequate. The EPC 
Working Group on Indicators should explore whether there is any need 
for additions to, or changes to the scope of the existing list of structural 
indicators, e.g. in the areas of employment (tertiary education) or eco-
nomic reform (privatisation/share of public enterprises, and adminis-
tered prices). 
 
85. The statistical offices of the acceding countries need to devote 
enough resources to the structural indicators to ensure the best possible 
coverage and quality of the data used in the structural indicators. For 
example, in order to allow for a thorough assessment of the quality of 
public finances, the acceding countries should aim at improving data 
quality on public revenue and expenditure; future updates of the Pre-
Accession Economic Programmes, and indeed the first Convergence 
                                                     
22As proposed by the European Commission in COM(2003)6 final, 14.1.2003. 
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Programmes in 2004, would benefit from (i) a more extensive descrip-
tion of the pension reforms under way, (ii) the indication of available 
long-term projections for pension expenditures, and (iii) a description of 
the precise role of funding and the pace of asset accumulation in the 
funded pension systems. 
 
86. The following recommendations are made for further work in the 
EPC: 
• Enlargement will be a special subject in the EPC Annual Report on 
Structural Reforms in 2004. With the Lisbon targets in mind, a 
special annex could be devoted to the areas of critical items identi-
fied by this report for the acceding countries, (such as privatisation, 
the share of public enterprises, administered prices, and tertiary and 
vocational education). 
• Taking account of the close linkages between employment policies 
and productivity growth, the EPC’s wage monitoring exercise and 
the Working Group on Labour Market Issues should be called on 
to pay particular attention to the labour market challenges in acced-
ing countries. 
• So as to produce comparable long-term projections for pension ex-
penditures for the Convergence Programmes, the acceding countries 
should be included in the next round of common projections for pub-
lic spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly by 
the EPC’s Ageing Working Group in 2004/05. 
• The methodological work on potential output and the computation of 
cyclically adjusted budget balances by the EPC’s Working Group 
on Output Gaps should be extended to cover the acceding countries, 
with a report being submitted to the Committee by the end of 2004. 
• The EPC’s Working Group on Structural Indicators should ex-
plore whether there is any need for additions to, or changes to the 
scope of the existing list of structural indicators. 
• The EPC as a whole should include the issue of regional disparities, 
and the role that Community and national policies could play over a 
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broad range of fields to reduce standards of living within the Com-
munity. 
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9.  ANNEX 
 
Annex 1: Employment rates in the acceding countries (as % of age-
specific groups) 
Male 
 15-64 55-64 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 56.1 53.6 -- -- -- -- 34.9 34.2
Czech R. -- 77.1 76.1 74 73.1 73.2 -- 38.5 37.5 37.6 36.1 36.9
Cyprus -- -- -- 78.7 78.9 79.7 -- -- -- 66.3 67.1 67.9
Estonia -- 69.7 70.3 66.3 64.3 65.6 -- 59.6 60.9 59.2 50.2 57.1
Hungary 59.4 59.6 60 62.4 62.7 63.3 27.1 27.1 26.3 29.3 33 35
Latvia -- -- 63.5 65.2 62.3 61.9 -- -- 49.2 50.2 48.3 44.8
Lithuania -- -- 67.6 68.9 61.8 59.8 57 56.7 52.2 48.6
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 66.2 66.3 63.6 61.2 59.2 -- 44.5 42.7 41.8 37.4 38.3
Romania -- 73.4 71.9 70.4 69.5 68.6 -- 62.8 61.9 59.4 57.4 56
Slovakia -- -- -- 64 61.6 61.8 -- -- -- 36.4 35.2 37.7
Slovenia 66 67.1 67.5 66.8 66.7 68.5 28.1 29.8 32.8 32.2 31 33
EU-15 70.1 70.3 71 71.7 72.5 73 47.2 47.1 47.3 47.5 48 48.6
 
Female 
 15-64 55-64 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 47.2 47.9 -- -- -- -- 11.2 11.4
Czech R. -- 60.2 58.9 57.4 56.8 57 -- 24 23.2 23.6 22.1 23
Cyprus -- -- -- 50.2 52.5 56.5 -- -- -- 28.8 31.9 32.6
Estonia -- 60.6 60.7 58 57.1 56.9 -- 40.5 42 39.3 37.5 41.9
Hungary 45.1 44.8 46.8 48.8 49.4 49.6 10.2 10.7 9.3 11.1 13 14.6
Latvia -- -- 54.2 54.1 53.5 56.1 -- -- 28.1 26.4 25.9 30.1
Lithuania -- -- 58.5 61.4 58.5 57.4 -- -- 27.4 31.8 34.5 31.8
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 51.6 52.2 51.6 49.3 48.4 -- 27.7 25.2 24.5 21.8 23.8
Romania -- 61.1 60.1 59.7 59 58.2 -- 48.2 48.4 47.3 47.3 45.8
Slovakia -- -- -- 52.1 51.1 51.8 -- -- -- 10.6 10.2 10
Slovenia 57.5 58.4 59.5 58.1 58.5 58.6 12.9 16.4 19.4 14.9 14.3 14.4
EU-15 50.1 50.6 51.5 52.8 54 54.9 25.8 26.1 26.3 27.1 27.9 28.8
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Male and female 
 15-64 55-64 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -- -- -- -- 51.5 50.7 -- -- -- -- 22.1 23.9
Czech R. -- 68.6 67.5 65.6 64.9 65 -- 54.8 53.4 53.2 51.6 52.4
Cyprus -- -- -- 64.2 65.5 67.9 -- -- -- 47 49 49.8
Estonia -- 64.9 65.3 62 60.6 61.1 -- 48.9 50.2 47.9 43 48.6
Hungary 52 52 53.2 55.4 55.9 56.3 17.6 17.9 16.7 19.1 21.9 23.7
Latvia -- -- 58.6 59.4 57.7 58.9 -- -- 37 36.6 35.4 36.4
Lithuania -- -- 62.9 65 60.1 58.6 -- -- 40.2 42.6 42.2 39.1
Malta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland -- 58.8 59.2 57.5 55.1 53.8 -- 35.5 33.3 32.5 29 30.5
Romania 67.2 65.9 65 64.2 63.3 -- 55 54.7 52.9 52 50.5
Slovakia -- -- -- 58 56.3 56.7 -- -- -- 22.2 21.4 22.5
Slovenia 61.7 62.8 63.5 62.5 62.7 63.6 19.9 22.7 25.9 23.4 22.3 23.4
EU-15 60.1 60.5 61.2 62.3 63.2 63.9 36.2 36.3 36.6 37.1 37.8 38.5
Source: Employment in Europe 2002 - European Commission and EPC Ageing Working Group 2001. 
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Annex 2: Summary of main Lisbon targets and objectives 
The Lisbon strategy entails a variety of targets and objectives, agreed 
not only at the Lisbon Council itself (March 2000) but also at Stock-
holm (March 2001), Göteborg (June 2001) and Barcelona (March 
2002). Not all are quantified or time-specific, but those which are in-
clude: 
 
Employment 
• an overall employment rate of 67% in 2005 (Stockholm) and 70% in 
2010 (Lisbon); 
• a female employment rate of 57% in 2005 (Stockholm) and 60% in 
2010 (Lisbon); 
• an employment rate for workers aged 55-64 of 50 per cent in 2010 
(Stockholm); 
• an increase of five years by 2010 in the average effective retirement 
age (Barcelona); and 
• available childcare by 2010 for 90% of pre-school children over 
three and for 33% of children under three (Barcelona). 
 
Research and innovation 
• R&D spending equivalent to 3% of GDP by 2010, with two thirds of 
the total coming from business (Barcelona);  
• 100% of schools to be connected to the Internet by 2002; and  
• All teachers to have training in digital skills by 2003. 
 
Economic reform 
• full implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan by 2003 and of 
the Financial Services Action Plan by 2005 (Lisbon); 
• a transposition rate into national law for internal market directives of 
98.5% (Stockholm); 
• no internal market directives to be more than two years overdue in 
their transposition (Barcelona); 
• open energy markets for business customers in 2004 and subse-
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quently for domestic users (Barcelona); 
• cross-border energy transmission capacity equal to at least 10% of 
installed production capacity by 2005 (Barcelona); and 
• a single European sky by 2004 (Barcelona). 
 
Social cohesion 
• to halve by 2010 the number of early school-leavers not continuing 
with further education (Lisbon); and 
• to reduce by 2010 the numbers living at risk of poverty (Barcelona). 
 
Environment/sustainable development 
• visible progress on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2005 
(Göteborg);  
• an indicative target for electricity generated from renewable sources 
of 22% of gross electricity consumption in 2010 (Göteborg); and 
• Combating Climate Change: meet the indicative target of 22% for 
the contribution of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources to gross electricity consumption by 2010 (Gothenborg). 
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Annex 3: Flowchart of the improved economic policy co-ordination cycle 
 
W inter Spring Summer Autumn W inter
mid March
Spring
European
Council (SEC)
providing
general
political
orientations
June (2nd half)
European
Council
endorses
Guidelines
Package
Ecofin Council
adopts BEPGs
ESPHCA Council
adopts EGs &
Empl. Recs.
Competitiveness
Council  endorses
IM Strategy
Q4
Commission
reviews
implementation
on the basis of
information
received and
collected
Note: While remaining annual,
guidelines would, in principle,
be fully reviewed only once
every 3 years (i.e. year 't', 't+3',
etc.). In intermediate years,
guidelines would take
account only of major changes.
Social
Partners
Tripartite
Social
Summit for
Growth and
Employment
early April
Commission, taking
account of general
orientations of SEC, adopts
guidelines package
covering
- BEPGs
- EGs & Empl. Recs.
--------------------
In addition, it
reviews/updates the
Internal Market Strategy
mid-January
Commission presents
its Spring Report and
the implementation
package  covering the
IR on the BEPGs and
the draft Joint
Employment Report. In
addition, it presents its
progress report on the
Internal Market
Strategy.
May
European Parliament
opinion on EGs
early June
Ecofin Council
formulates
draft  for
BEPGs
early June
ESPHCA
Council
considers EGs
& Empl. Recs.
Member
States to
report on
implementati
on and
envisaged
policy actions
Jan. to early March .
various Council
contributions, including
the JER
Policy formation phase Policy implementation
review phase
Other Council follow-up
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HICP: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
HU: Hungary 
IALS: International Adult Survey 
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SI: Slovenia (SL) 
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SK: Slovak Republic 
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